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US fighting code 1955

COVER PAGE
THE U. S.
 FIGHTING MAN'S
 
CODE
Published by the
 OFFICE OF ARMED FORCES
 INFORMATION and EDUCATION
 Department of Defense
 
November 1955
This publication includes the report of the Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War
PROPERTY OF u.s. ARMY THE JUDGE,ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOl
LIBRARY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and as Com­mander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States which is attached to this ·order and hereby made a part thereof.
Every member of the Armed Forces of the United States is expected to measure up to the standards embodied in this Code of Conduct while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure achievement of these standards, each member of the Armed Forces liable to
.     capture shall be provided with specific training and instruction designed to better equip him to counter and withstand all enemy efforts against him, and shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and obligations expected of him during combat or captivity.
The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard except when it is serving as part of the Navy) shall take such action as is deemed necessary to implement this order and to disseminate and make the said Code known to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 17, 1955.
In signing this order, the President said: "No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States. Every available means will be employed by our government to establish contact with, to support and to obtain the release of all our prisoners of war. Furthermore, the laws of the United States provide for the support and care of dependents of members of the Armed Forces including those who become prisoners of war. I assure dependents of such prisoners that these laws will continue to provide for their welfare."

CONTENTS
Letter of Transmittal
I. Background
II. A Brief Look at History ill. The American Fighting Man and Korea
IV.    
A Code of Conduct for the Future

V.    
Korean Summary


VI.     The Road Ahead for America and the Armed Forces Addenda
THE DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
 PRISONERS OF WAR
 
MEMBERS
Mr. Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Man­
power, Personnel and Reserve)-Chairman. General John E. Hull, USA (Retired)-Vice Chairman. Dr. Frank B. Berry, Assista~t Secretary of Defense (Health
and Medical). Mr. Hugh M. Milton, II, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Forces). . Mr. Albert Pratt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Personnel and Reserve Forces). Mr. David S. Smith, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower and Personnel).
Lt. General Frank W. Milburn, USA (Retired).
Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN (Retired).
Lt. General Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (Retired).
Major General Merritt A. Edson, USMC (Retired).*
Mr. Stephen S. Jackson-Committee Counsel.
Mr. Theodore Roscoe-Special Advisor.
Mr. Edward Wetter-Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research'and Development).
STAFF
Colonel Horace E. Townsend, USA-8tafl' Director.
 Colonel John C. Steele, USA-Deputy Staff Director.
 Lt. Colonel Robert B. Rigg, USA-Member.
 Commander Fred W. Frank, Jr., USN-Member.
 Lt. Colonel Robert E. Work, USAF-Member.
 Lt. Colonel F. B. Nihart, USMC-Member.
 Major Donald B. Churchman, USA-Administration.
 
*Died 14 August 1955
Iv
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
July S9, 1955
Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Your Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has been in constant session for the past two months and is pleased to submit this report of its deliberations and findings.
We are certain that many persons have expected this Com­mittee to recommend courses of action which would be as ' revolutionar.yas the speed and techniques of the latest guided missile or jet aircraft.
However, our task deals with human beings and the Nation. We can find no basis for making recommendations other than on the principles and foundations which have made America free and strong and on the qualities which we associate with men of integrity and character. It is in, this common belief that we have determined on courses of proposed action which we are convinced are best for the United States and fo~ its position among free nations.
The Code of Conduct we recommend sets a high standard and a reasonable course for members of the Armed Forces of the future. The conscience and heart of all America are needed in the support of this Code, and 'the best of training that can be provided in our homes, by our schools and churches and by the Armed Forc~ will be required for all who undertake 'to
, live by this Code. '
America no longer can afford to think in terms of a limited
 number of our fighting men becoming prisoners of war and in
 the hands of an enemy in some distant land. Modern warfare
 has brought the challenge to the doorstep of every citizen, and
 so the Code we propose may well be a Code for all Americans
 if the problem of survival should ever come to our own main
 
streets.
.And then too the United States must constantly be aware
 of her high position of world leadership, and the Code we
 propose must consider the standard of the Ten Commandments
 and of our Constitution, as well as our pledge to the United
 
Nations.
y
No Code should overlook the watermarks of America's
greatness or bow to the easier courses which might entrap
more easily our men as alleged war criminals and weaken
their fiber for the many ordeals they may face. We must
bear in mind the past and future significance of the reserva­
tion made by Soviet Russia and other Communist nations to
Article 85 of the· Geneva Conventions of 1949 on prisoners
of war.
Past history, the story of Korea and the crises which faced
our prisoners of war in that conflict from capture through
Operation Big Switch and after, were all carefully considered
and are presented in our report. The prisoner of war situa­
tion resulting from the Korean War has received a great deal
of adverse publicity. As is stated in our account, much of
that adverse publicity was due to lack of information and
consequent misconceptions in regard to the problem.
A few statistics may prove reassuring to anyone who thinks
the Armed Forces were undermined by Communist propa­
ganda in Korea.
A total of about 1,600,000 Americans served in the Korean War. Of the 4,428 Americans who survived Communist im­prisonment, only a maximum of 192 were found chargeable with serious offenses against comrades or the United States. Or put it another way. Only lout of 23 American POWs was suspected of serious misconduct.
The contrast with civilian figures tells an interesting story. According to the lat'e8t F. B. I. statistics, 1 in 15 persons in the United States has been mested and fingerprinted for the commission, or the alleged commission, of criminal acts.
When one realizes that the Armed Forces come from a croSB­section of the national population, the record seems fine indeed. It seems better than that when one weighs in the balance the tremendous pressures the American POWs were under. Weighed in that balance, they cannot be found wanting.
We examined the publicly alleged divergent action taken by the Services toward prisoners repatriated from Korea. The disposition of all cases was governed by the facts and circum­stances surrounding each case, and was as consistent, equitable and uniform as could be achieved by any two boards·or courts. As legal steps, including appeals, are completed and in light of the uniqueness of the Korean War and the particular conditions
'Ii surrounding American prisoners of war, the appropriate Service Secretaries should make thorough reviews of all punishments a.warded. This continuing review should make certain that any excessive sentences, if found to exist, are carefully con­sidered and mitigated. This review should also take into account a comparison with sentences meted out to other prison­ers for similar offenses.
In concluding, the Committee unanimously agreed that Americans require a unified and purposeful standard of con­duct for our prisoners of war backed up by a first class training program. This position is also wholeheartedly supported by the concensus of opinion of all those who consulted with the Committee. From no one did we receive stronger recommenda­tions on this point than from the former American prisoners of war in Korea~fficersand enlisted men.
In taking this position and recommending this Code, it was pointed out to the Committee, and the Committee agr-ees, that in return America must always stand behind every American upon whom befalls prisoner of war status and spare no reason­able effort in obtaining their earliest possible release back to our
side.  /  
Sincerely,  
~.'lJs"",. _.~.~  

~1fE; C/;fG"
 
~
The Honorable Charles E. Wilson The Secretary of Defense
BLANK PAGE
I
 BACKGROUND
 
The Fortunes of War
Fighting men declare it is neither dishonorable nor heroic to
be taken prisoner. In the sense that the victim does not covet
it, but finds himself unable to avoid it, capture is an accident.
Often, like a motor crash, it comes as complete surprise. Often,
too, it is accompanied by injury. Nearly always the upshot is
painful and in the end it may prove fatal. And, as is the case
with many accidents, it is "bad luck."
Fighting men speak of "the fortunes of war." In combat,
luck cannot smile on aU participants. Some.are bound to
lose. The man taken captive is one of the unlucky-a Soldier
of Misfortune. That can be one definition for war-prisoner.
But the prisoner is always a soldier, adversity despite. For­
tune can change. In theU. S. Submarine Service there is the
maxim: "Luck is where you find it." The POW must keep on
searching. It may come by way of chance for rescue or chance
for escape. Opportunity or luck may favor him through pris­
oner exchange. They also serve who only stand and wait. The
Lord helps those who hustle in the meantime.
These are the views of fighting men. And of men who have been prisoners of war-those who have "had it." Their con­victions, derived from experience, serve to dispel a popular fallacy-the misconception that a prisoner of war is, perforce, a hero. Conversely, they do not chalk his capture down to in­ferior performance. Everything depends on the individual and the circumstances involved.
Public Interests and Misconceptions Clearly one shoUld not generalize about POWs, lump them all into a single slot, or jump from "some to all" conclusions. Public opinion tends to settle for generalities because they are convenient. The "single slot" is easy to handle. The some­equals-all deduction, quickly arrived at, does not entail bother­some thinking. But these handy and quick devices serve to
distort factuality. Misconceptions result. If, in addition, there has been misinformation or lack of information, public opinion may go far askew.
In the case of American POWs-in particular, those taken prisoner in Korea-misconceptions are abundant, For the most part they are based on erroneous generalities and some­equals-all deductions. Too, for· reasons which will become clear, the public has heretofore not been fully informed on the details necessary for balanced judgment.
Definitions were and are unclear or lacking. To begin with, just what is a prisoner of war? The man and his situation may be readily visualized. But what is his military status? What conduct is required of,the prisoner in regard to enemy interroga­tion? What rules and regulations must he follow during con­finement? What are his rights and privileges as codified by various international conventions and protocols?
What treatment may the .prisoner of war expect from the "detaining power," his captors? What conditions are imposed by the so-called "laws of war?" Can a POW be tried as a war criminal? What is a war criminal?
Did the American POW in Korea face some novel and alarming menace from his Communist captors? Were nearly all prisoners tortured or "brain washed?" Did many POWs in Korea adopt Marxist doctrine? Were there hundreds of subverted turncoats, traitors, voluntary collaborators? In punishing such malefactors was there divergence in the military Semces-some lenient; others "Spartan?"
On many of these and similar questions the citizen on the home front has remained largely uninformed. Too often the POW, himself, has not known the answers.
Appointment of the Defense Advisory Committee Every war has its disturbing aftermath. There is always another side to the Victory coin. If the victory is not clearly imprinted and the war has ended in what seems a stalemate, the coin becomes suspect. In any event, there is usually a post-war inventory. If losses have been heavy and objectives obscure, the coin may seem debased. The inventory after the War of 1812 was unpleasant. There were some rude reactions after the Spanish-American War. In a great war, some battles are inevitably lost. Military leaders study these battles, determined to uncover .mistakes, if any were made, 80 that errors in kind may be avoided in the future. Correction of possible errors and the need for a unified plan for the future led the Department of Defense to examine closely the prisoner-or-war situation in Korea. The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War was organized to study the problem.
A BRIEF LOOK AT HISTORY
From the Beginning of Time For a full understanding of today's prisoner of war problem, background knowledge of the past is essential. History has established precedents which provide the knowledge necessary to shed light on preparation for the future. Primitive man and his barbarian descendant annihilated or enslaved all foemen who were captured. In time it occurred to the conqueror to hold a captured headman or leader as hostage. Such a victim was Lot. According to Scripture he was freed by the forces of Abraham-perhaps the earliest prisoner-rescue on record. But the vanquished of the ancient world usually faced exter­mination. One finds in Samuel: "thus saith the Lord of Hosts . . . go and smite Amalek and utterly destroy all they have, and spare them not." Saul was considered disobedient because he took a few Amalekite prisoners. Six cen~uries later Hemocritus of Syracuse was exiled for refusing to slaughter all Athenian captives. But it seemed mankind had a conscience. In respect to humane treatment of captives, it found voice in India in the ancient. Code of Manu (about 200 B. C.). The Hindu warrior was enjoined to do no injury to the defenseless or to the subdued enemy. Less humane, the Romans sported with their war-prisoners, often using them for target practice or gladiatorial shows. Captives were tortured for public amusement. Enslaved war­riors rowed Caesar's naval galleys to North Africa and Britain, and were killed when they could no longer pull an oar. "Slay, and slay on!" Germanicus ordered his Rhineland invaders. "Do not take prisoners! We will have no peace until all are destroyed." Thumbs sometimes went up for the valiant for­eign gladiator or the stalwart warrior who begged no quarter. But mercy to the conquered foe was usually a whim.
Medieval Concepts Chivalry developed in the Western World with the rise of Christian civilization, the concept of "Do Unto Others." In the Dark Ages, soldiering remained savage, but the codes of knighthood served to ten:per the "Yarrior's steel. The true
knight refused to slay for slaughter's sake. Conquering, he
could be merciful to a gallant opponent. His prisoner was not
a plaything for sadistic ente,tainment.
If the chivalric code was sometimes more honored in breach
than in observance, the ideal-the Golden Rule-was there.
It was threatened by intolerant ideologies and the fanaticism
which fosters atrocities. Cruel pogroms and religious wars
bloodied Medieval Europe. The Islamic conquests were
savagery untrammeled. Woe to the Unbeliever captured by
the stepsons of Abu Bekrl But even as it clashed with the
sword, the scimitar acquired tempering. Possessed of his own
code, the Moslem warrior could appreciate gallantry.
The knight was called upon to assume the obligations of noblesse oblige. Warrior or liegeman, facing battle, was pledged to remain true to his king or cause, even if captured. Under any circumstance treason would merit retributive punishment. Treachery, the disclosure of a trust or the deliverance of a friend to the enemy, was perfidious-the mark of Judas the Betrayer.
Thus rules for the fighting man in combat or in captivity were linked to knightly concepts of duty, honor, loyalty to friend, and gallantry to foe.
Some time during the Crusades a rule evolved in regard to prisoner interrogation. The captive knight was permitted to divulge his name and rank-admissions necessitated by the game of ransom. A necessity for prisoner identification, the rule holds today, as iInposed by the modern Geneva Conven~ tions:
"Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his name, rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number."
In Europe during the 17th Century the concept emerged that prisoners of war were in custody of the capturing sovereign or state. No rules for their treatment had yet been formulated, but they were protected from servitude and personal revenge. Later, during the 18th Century, captivity was considered '& means of preventing return to friendly forces. This was a step forward. Military prisoners were no longer considered guilty of crimes against the state.
The American Revolution To discourage desertions during the Revolution, the United States established the death penalty for those. prisoners who, after capture, took up arms in the service of the enemy. Am­
nesty was granted to deserters but not those who deserted to the enemy. Duress or coercion was'recognized as mitigating only in event of threatened immediate death. This was the first American definition of requir¢",prisoner conduct. In the Treaty of 1785 no standa.rd of conduct was prescribed but conditions of confinement, care and parole were define<J.
The American Civil War During the Civil War there was some regression in the treat­ment afforded prisoners. About 3,170 Federal prisoners joined the Southern forces and about 5,452 prisoners of the Southern armies joined the Federal army. Prisoner conduct after capture was mentioned in War Depart­ment General Or.der No. 207, 3 July 1863. Among other things, the order provided that it was the duty of a prisoner of war to escape. This order apparently was intended to curb wide­spread practices of surrender and subsequent parole to escape further combatant service. Prosecution for misconduct was based on three criteria: -misconduct where there was no duress or coercion. -active participation in combat against Federal forces. -failure to return voluntarily. Nine years after the Civil War a declaration establishing the rights of prisoners was drafted by the Congress of Brussels (1874). Itwas signed by fifteen nations, none of which ratified the agreement.
World War. I C1nd II In 1907 the Hague Regulations established rules pertaining to captivity in war. These regulations led to the Geneva Con­ventions of 1929 and 1949. The United States signed all three, and it recently ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Conventions set forth in detail the rights and protections which should be afforded prisoners, but they do not.specifically pre­scribe the conduct which a nation may require of its personnel who may become prisoners. This is rightfully left for prescrip­tion by sovereign powers. There are, however, several provisions of the Conventions which do require specific conduct. Prisoners are subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force within the armed forces of the detaining power. They may be punished for infractions of rules. They must divulge name, rank, service number and date of birth.
A Code of Conduct Although all the Services had regulations, the U. S. Armed Forces have never had a clearly defined code of conduct appli­cable to American prisoners after capture. There are piece­meal legal restrictions and regulations but no comprehensive codification. However, despite this lack of a code, American troops have demonstrated through all wars that they do not surrender easily, they have never surrendered in large bodies and they have in general performed admirably in their country's cause as prisoners of war.
THE AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN AND KOREA
THE KOREAN BATTLE .Our cause was simple and just, but our objectives in the Korean War were frequently confused in the public mind~ The Korean War had three aspects. There was the Civil War aspectr--Notth Koreans fighting South Koreans for con­trol of a dhided country. There was the collective aspect-the first United Nations' attempt to stop a treaty breaking aggres­sor. And there was the Cold War aspect-the Western powers blocking the expansion of Communist imperialism. The causes of the war, United Nations'· objectives and the need for American ·intervention were not clearly delineated in the public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed among citizens and American.fighting men. The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest this condition in both international propaganda and in dealing with our prisoners of war. Armed with Soviet weapons, North Korean Communist forces invlded South Korea on June 25, 1950. Six days later a battalion of. the U. S. 24th Infantry Division was rushed to Korea from Japan. The division was soon in action against the enemy on the outskirts of Seoul. The United States began a piecemeal build-up of the fighting forces in Korea. The firs~ units to reach Korea were not well prepared for combat. Thousands of reserves were ·flown to Korea. Many were veterans of World War II, but five years· at a factory or office job can slow up a man's trigger finger. However, by Novem,ber 1950, the North Koreans had been completely beaten, their capital was in Allied hands, and their remnant forceS were scattered and disorganized. The 'victory was ahnost at its climax when the Chinese Red avalanche crashed over the Yalu. That was on October 25th. A month later the Chinese opened a massive counter-offensive hurling our forces into retreat. Early in December, American and Allied Forces were trapped at the Chang-Jin Reservoir. By fierce fighting they broke the trap and fought their way to Htu;lgnam where they were evacuated. There ensued a winter of back-to-wall
battling in subzero cold. It was during this gruelling period that most of the American POWs were captured.
Jmprisonment, North Korea
During the Korean War a total ot 7,190 Americans were
captured by the enemy. Of these, 6,656 were Army troops'
263 wer.e Air Force men; 231 were Marines; 40 were Navy men:
'fhe Army bore the heaviest burden of prisoner losses.
The captives were marched off to various prison camps in the
North Korean interior. Altogether there were 20 of these
camps.
"Death Marches"
The first ordeal the prisoner had to suffer-and·often the
worst-was the march to one of these camps. The North
Koreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back or
bound his arms with wire. Wounded prisoners were jammed
into trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken roads.
Many of the wounded received no medical attention until they
reached the camp. Some were not attended to until days
thereafter.
The marching prisoners were liable to be beaten or kicked to their feet if they fell. A number of the North Korean officers were bullwhip barbarians, products of a semi-primitive en­vironment. Probably they had neTer heard of the Geneva Conventions or any other code of war. The worst of this breed were responsible for the murder of men who staggered out of line or collapsed at roadside. They were particularly brutal to South Korean captives. Evidence indicates that many ROK prisoners were forced to dig their own graves before they were shot (an old Oriental custom applied to the execution of eriminals). Some Amencans, with hands tied behind back, were shot by the enemy.
So the journeys to the prison camps were "death marches." EspeciaJIy in the winter of. 1950-1951 when the trails were knee-deep in snow and polar winds flogged the toiling column. On one of these marches, 700 men were headed north. Before the camp was reached, 500 men had perished.
Facilities, Food, and Care Were Poor
The camps were what might be expected in a remote corner of Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty-a basic diet of rice occasionally leavened with Bome foul kind of soup. The Red
•
 
Chinese and Korean authorities pointed out that this larder conformed with the rules of the Geneva Conventions-the prisaner received the same food as the soldiery holding him captive. 01 course, the Chinese were inured to a rice diet. The average American could not stomach such fare. Sickness broke out in the camps. Many of the men suffered long sieges of dysentery.
The men suffered much from cold in winter and heat in summer. Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult. Barracks were foul and unsanitary.
In the best of the camps the men behind the barbed wire ~ere som?times gi~en tobacco, a few morsels of candy, occa­SIOnal mail. As will be noted, such items were usually offered as rewards for "cooperative conduct."
; ,
A few R:ed Cross paclP,iges got through. However, the enemy consIStently refused to permit the International Red Cross to inspect prisoner of war camps. There was good reason.
Camps Varied from Bad to Wone In the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the skin of their teeth and raw courage. Men in the "bad" camps were knoWn to lose 50 pounds weight in a matter of weeks. The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp" near Suan, a camp known as "Dea.th Valley" near Pukchin, another camp called "The Valley," apparently in the vicinity of Kanggye. Among the worst camps were the "Interrogation Center" near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary center called "The Caves." This l~t was literally composed of caverns in which the men were confined. Here they were forced to sleep without blankets. Their food was thrown at them. There were no latrine facilities. In "The Caves" the prisoners were reduced to a degree of misery and,degradation almost unbelievable. Those sent to "The Caves" were pris­oners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules, attempt­ing to escape, or committing some other crime (so-called). The testimony of survivors suggests that the "crime" was seldom fitted by the punishment. Some mEm who refused tG· talk to military interrogaters were threatened with, or sent to "The Caves."
"Pak's" Was No Palace Possibly the worst camp endured by American POWs in Korea was the one knoWn as "Pak's Palace." This was a highly
specialized interrogation center located near the city of Pyong­yang. The place was a brickyard flanked by Korean h6uses. It waS a North Korean establishment dominated by a chief interrogator, Colonel Pak. Pak was ably assisted by a hench­man who came to be called "Dirty Pictures" Wong by the POWs.
The camp was under the administration of a Colonel Lee, and there were several other interrogators on the team. But Pak and Wong were symbolic of the institution. Pak was a sadist, an animal who should have been in a cage. The team employed the usual questionnaires, the carrot-alid-prod tech­niques to induce answers. .Failing to induce them, they con­trived to compel them. The "Palace" wanted military infor­mation. Coercion was used as the ultimate resort. And for Pak, coercion began soon after a prisoner refused to talk. Then Pak would use violence. Abusive language would .be followed by threats, kicks, cigarette burns, and promises of further torture.
Several U. S. Army and Navy officers were questioned at "Pak's Palace." A few Army enlisted men went through this brickyard mill. The great majority of POWs held there were Air Force officers. They took a bad beating from Colonell'ak.
But the prisoners found ways to get around the beating. One way was to convince the captors' that you were dumb, stupid, the low man in your class. Undergoing interrogation, one officer convinced his inquisitors that he was the stupidest officer in the service.. He was awarded a contemptuous slap, and that was about all.
To the surprise of some prisoners at the "Palace," the inter­rogation team would sometimes open up with a wild political harangue. Then came the word that the enemy had established a system of indoctrination cours~s. The prisoner might start the hard way-and be punisheqrby restricted rations and other
.privations. If he began to show the "proper spirit"-to co­operate with his captors-he was lectured and handed Com­munist literature. A docile prisoner who read the literature and listened politely to the lectures, was graduated to a better class. Finally he might be sent to "Peaceful Valley." In this lenient camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners might even have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts of Marxian propaganda. .The graduates from "Peaceful Valley" and others who accepted Communist schooling were called "Progressives'" Prisoners who refused to go along with the
program often remained in tougher circumstances. They were
considered "Reactionaries."
But the enemy followed no rigid system. Rather, his treat­
ment of prisoners was capricious. Sometimes he showed
contempt for the man who readily submitted to bullying.
The prisoner who stood up to the bluster, threats and blows of
an interrogator might be dismissed with a shrug and sent to
quarters as mild as any-if any prison barracks in North Korea
could be described as mild.
All in all, the docile prisoner did not gain much by his
docility-and sometimes he gained nothing. The prisoner who
defied Pak and his breed might take a beating, but again he
might not. The ordeal was never easy. But things weren't
easy either for the combat troops battling out there in the
trenches.
Progressives and Reactionaries
The POW "political" schools in North Korea were, of course,
patterned after the Soviet Russian design. They were part of a
mass program to spread Marxian ideology and gain converts for
International Communism. The Progressives were called upon
to deliver lectures, write pamphlets, and make propaganda
broadcasts. Progressive leaders were sent among Reactionary
groups to harangue the men. They wrote speeches condemning
Capitalism and uAmerican aggression in Korea." Theyorgan­
ized e. group known as IlPeace Fighters."
Fortunately, only a few officers were Progressives. How­ever, their in:fluence was unfortunately strong on the enlisted men. If the Captain can do it, why can't I? If the Colonel signs a peace petition and orders the rest of us to do it, we have to follow orders, don't we? Altogether the enlisted men were on a spot. That many of them refused to join the Progressives (and rejected a promise, sometimes unfulfilled, of better food, minor luxuries, and mail call) says something for the spirit of privates and non-corns. The men who gave the Progressives an argu­ment-the active Reactionaries-were a rugged group.
Breakdown of leadership was exactly what the enemy de­sired. Officers were usually segregated. Then as soon as a natural leader stepped forward in a camp, he was removed. Progressives were usually placed in leadership positions. And if they weren't obeyed by the other POWs, punishments were in store for the "insubordinate prisoners."
By design and because some officers refused to assume leadership "responsibility, organization in some of the POW camps deteriorated to an every-man-for-himself situation. Some of the camps became indescribably filthy. The men scuffied for their food. Ho~ders grabbed all the tobacco. Morale decayed to the vanishing point. Each man mistrusted the next. Bullies persecuted the weak and sick. Filth bred disease and contagion swept the camp. So men died for lack of leadership and discipline.
Ordeal by Indoctrination When plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill, the average American POW was under a serious handicap. Enemy political officers forced him to read Marxian literature. He was compelled to participate in debates. He had to tell what he knew about American politics and American history. And many times the Chinese or Korean instructors knew more about these .subjects than he did. This brainstorming caught many" American prisoners off guard. To most of them it came as a complete surprise and they were unprepared. Lec­" tures-study "groups~iscussion groups-a blizzard of prop­aganda and hurricanes of violent oratory were" all a part of the enemy technique. A large number of American POWs did not lmow what the Communist program was all about. Some were confused by it. Self-seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may have believed the business. They signed peace petitions and peddled Communist literature.' It was not an inspiring spectacle. It set loyal groups against cooperative groups aild broke up camp organization and discipline. It made fools of some men and tools of others. And it provided the enemy with stooges for propaganda shows. Ignorance lay behind much of this trouble. A great many servicemen were 'teen-agers. At home they had thought of politics as dry editorials or uninteresting speeches, dull as ditchwater. They were unprepared to give the commissars an argument. Some of the POWs-among them men who became defec­tors-had heard of Communism only as a name. Many had never before heard of Karl Marx. And here was Communism held up as the salvation of the world and Marx as mankind's benefactor. The Committee heard evidence which revealed that many
of the POWs knew too little about the United States and its
ideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had the
advantage.
The uninformed POWs were up against it. They couldn't answer arguments in favor of Communism with arguments in favor of Americanism, because they knew very little. about their America. The Committee heard a number of ex-POWs who stated that a knowledge of Communism would have enabled them to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Red indoctrinators tried hard to win the support of factory workers. But as one of them put it, "We'd heard all that guff before. Back home. We knew their line." Knowledge was a defense weapon.
While it might be argued that few·of the men became sincere converts to Communism-indeed, the percentage seems to have been infinitesimal-the inability of many to speak up for Democracy distressed loyal POWs. Active collaborators aside, there were other passive prisoners that "went along." They lacked sufficient patriotism because of their limited knowl­edge oi~American Democracy.
It seemed that these POWs in question had lost their battle before they entered the Service. Good citizens-loyal Ameri­cans-the responsibility for their building lies with the home, the school, the church, the community. When men enter t~e Armed Forces, the Military Services must carryon with thIS development.
The Committee, stressing the need for spiritual and educa­tional bulwarks against enemy political indoctrination, recom­mends that the Assistant Secretary of Defens.e (Manpower and Personnel) be directed to initiate exploratory conferences with the Department of Health, Education, and WelCare, and other agencies and institutions on pre-service training.
Brainwashing and Indoctrination
The Committee made a thorough investigation of the "brain­washing" question. In some cases this time consuming and coercive technique was used to obtain confessions. In these. cases American prisoners of war were subjected to mental and physical torture, psychiatric pressures or "Pavlov Dogs" treat­ment.
Most of the prisoners, however, were not subjected to brain­washing, but were given a high-powered indoctrination for propaganda purposes.
In either' case the members of our Armed Forces should be given the best education and training possible in the future so that t.hey can resist and cope with these practices.
The Committee also learned that POWs in Korea were not drugged. Other methods such as denial of food or sleep were equally effective and more practical.
Behind the Barbed-Wire Curtain
Perhaps the Red enemy worked harder on the Americans than he did on the other prisoners. An American who signed &. propaganda leaflet, a peace petition, or a germ warfare con­fession, was a big feather in the enemy's hat. Many Americans in.Communist POW camps signed something or wrote some­thing. Out of 78 m~n under various forms of duress~ 38 signed germ warfare confesslOns. Forty others did not. Both groups were under coercion. Why did some men break, and some refuse to bend?
Many servicemen exhibited pride in themselves and their units. This was particularly pronounced where they had be­l?nged to the same unit for years. They stood»y one another like t~at u~and of brothers" inspired by NelSon. If a soldier ~as sIck, hIS fellow soldiers took care of him. They ,vllsh~d ~s .clothes, bathed him, and pulled him through. They ex­hibIted true fraternal spirit comradeship, military pride. These soldiers did not let each other down. Nor could the Korean Reds win much cooperation from them.
!nterrogation went' hand in glove with indoctrination. A prIsoner was questioned for military information. He was also ~ueried on his home life and educational background. The mterrogator made him put it in writing-a biographical sketch. Se~dom did the brief autobiography prove sufficient. The prls~ner w~ u~ually. compelled to write more, and in greater detail. If his lIterary efforts were painful, the d.iscomfort was only a. beginni~g. His autobiography was used against him. T~e slI~htest dIscrepancy, and he was accused of lying. He mIght discover thp,t he had written a confession of some kind ~d in any case, the information supplied theinterrogato~ WIth a useful leverage for more pressure. The author's mistake was in taking pen in hand.
Only a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the
American prisoners went beyond the "absolute" name, rank,
number, date of birth restriction.
Reviewing the inteITogation matter, the Defense Advisory
Committee felt that the steps taken up to now by the Armed
Forces had been decidedly inadequate.
The Committee recommends that the Department of Defense
devise a special training program to teach American service­
men the ways and means of resisting enemy interrogators.
What Can Be Done?
In a war for the minds of men, the enemy's methods can be successfully combatted by military training and civilian educa­tion. In battle and in captivity the fighting Ameriean is no better than his training and education. Military schooling can teach him combat skills. Such know-how is a t'must."
The Committee recommends that the Military Services initiate a coordinated training program including-
First, general training. This is motivational and informa­tional training to he conducted throughout the career of all servicemen during active and reserve duty. Second, specific training. This is designed for and applied to combat-ready troops. Acode ofconductmustapplywiiformlyto all Services, arid training must be uniform among the Services to the great­est degree practicable.
In all Services training should be adapted to cover the needs of all ranks from the enlisted man to the commander. It must be realistic as well as idealistic. Above all, it must be presented with understanding, skill and devotion sufficient to implant a conviction in the heart, conscience, and mind of the service­man that full and loyal support of the code is to the best interests of his country, his comrades, and himself.
But skill must be reinforced by will-by moral character and by basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long before a lad enters the Military Service. Pride in a country and respect for its principles-a sense ot honor-a sense of responsibility­such basics should be established long before ubasic training," and further developed after he enters the Armed Forces.
The Committee recommends that the Services find an effective means of coordinating with civilian educational institutions, churches and other patriotic organizations to ~rovide better understanding of American ideals.
War has been defined as "a contest' of wills." A trained hand holds the weapon. But the will, the character, the spirit More than ever,
of the individual-these control the hand. in the war .for the ininds of men moral character, will, spirit are important.As a serviceman thinketh so is he.
16
A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE FUTURE
The Services Voice Their Opinions
The leaders of the American Armed Forces-the Joint Chiefs
of Staff-The Department of Defense Committees-the various
planning and policy-making boards-reach decisions through
discussion and debate based on facts. In striving to design
a Code of Conduct for United States fighting men, the Defense
Advisory Committee weighed opposing points of view in regard
to the "name, rank, serial number and date of birth'" provision
embodied in the Geneva Conventions.
The traditional view is that the POW stockade is only an
extension of the battlefield where the prisoners must be taught
to carry on the struggle with the only weapons remaining­
faith and courage.
The absolute restliction-name, rank, number, date of birth,
and nothing more, has been called the "Spartan Code."
To some persons, such a restrictive code seemed unrealistic. Especially in the light of modern interrogation methods. Authorities on the subject of interrogation insisted that the iron-bound "nothing more" of the Spartan Code was impossible. They pointed out that Communist interrogators had bent such men of steel as Cardinal Mindszenty. Doctors and psychiatrists generally conceded that "every man has a breaking point." Many prisoners in World War II were forced beyond "name, rank and serial number." And nearly every prisoner in Korea divulged something. Why, then, the dissenters asked, should a man endure purgatory when his "breaking" was inevitable? This view was publicized in an article in a popular magazine. It was the author's opinion that American servicemen should be told that "they may sign any document the Communists want them to, or appear on TV and deliver any script the Reds hand them."
Referring to the case of a Marine colonel, the author pointed to a fine officer who had been coerced into signing a germ war­fare confession. Why not let American captives sign anything at all? The United States could announce that all such con­fessions were obtained under duress, and therefore invalid.
3654;88100-55-4
In addition to the "Spartan view" and the "let them talk
view" there were numerous advocates of in-between measures­
talk, but don't say anything.
In Axis cainps and in Korea many prisoners had stood up
against interrogation. Many had refused to sign on any dotted
line. The idea that an officer or enlisted man might stand up
to a microphone and denounce his country, his President, or
his faith, remained repellent. Moreover, the man who signed
a germ warfare or some other confession let himself in for a
"war criminal" charge. Having obtained such a confession
the unscrupulous enemy labeled him a war criminal and claimed
that he was beyond the protecting Geneva Convention.
The Committee believes that this practice is another strong
reason for our prisoners of war adhering to a wen defined
code of conduct in any future conflict.
Pro and Con. There was much to be said on both sides. And
there was something to be said by experienced officers who felt
that a man could be taught to hold his own in the battle of wits
against enemy inteITogators. Authorities pointed out that the
Geneva Conventions did not impose "absolute silence" on the
interrogated war,,:,prisoner. There were clauses indicating that
he might discuss his employment, his finances, or his state
of health, or "conditions of captivity" if necessity demanded.
In short, he did not have to remain mute.
The Committee agreed that a line of resistance must be drawn somewhere and initially as far forward as possible. The llame, rank and service number provision of the Geneva Conventions is accepted as this line of resistance.
However, in the face of experience, it is recognized that the POW may be subjected to an extreme of coercion beyond his ability to resist. If in his battle with .the interrogator he is driven from his first line of resistance he must be trained for resistance in successive positions. And, to stand on the. final line to the end-no disclosure of vital military information and above all no disloyalty in word or deed to his country, his service or his comrades.
Throughout, the serviceman must be responsible for all of his actions. This in brief is the spirit and intent of the Code of Conduct which the Defense Advisory Committee recommends.
Prominent Civilians Stated Their View5
. The Committee discussed sociological and educational prob­lems with leading educators. It consulted with labor leaders. The religious problem .was discussed with leaders of various faiths. The Comr.nittee also sought and received the in­valuable views of the leaders of the nation's veterans organiza­tions. All contrib.uted worthwhile suggestions. All helped to select a code compatible-with American precepts of honor and justice.
The Recommended Code of Conduct (See Addenda 2) After long study and earnest deliberation, the Committee came to its decision. That decision is found in the Code of Conduct now proposed ·for all members of the Armed Forces. The Committee recommends that the proposed Code of Conduct be promulgated in the form of an Executive Order. The Code demands high standards. To ensure achievement of these, each member of the Armed Forces liable to capture must be provided with specific .training designed to equip him better to cope with all enemy efforts against him. He will be fully instructed as to his behavior and obligations in combat and in the event of capture. No prisoner of war will be forgotten by the United States. The support and care of dependents of prisoners of war is pre­scribed by law. Every practical means will be employed to establish contact with, to support and to gain the release of all prisoners of war.
I
The United States serviceman, by his service is protecting his nation. Any shirking of this responsibility or any unwilling­ness to do his full part weakens this defense and invites disaster.
I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
A member of the Armed Forces is always a fighting man. As such, it is his duty to oppose the enemies of the United States regardless of the circumstances in which he may find himself, whether in active participation in combat, or as a prisoner of war.
II
If individuals and commanders were permitted to surrender wh.enever a situation seems to be desperate it would become an open invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit.
I will never surrender of my own free will. Ifin command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.
As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may never
voluntarily surrender himself..When isolated and he can no
longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his duty to evade
capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.
The responsibility and authority of· a commander never
extends to the surrender of his command to the enemy while it
has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off or sur­
rounded, a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or able to
rejoin friendly forces by breaking out or by evading the enemy.
III
The fight is everywhere. Even in the prison camp. When
the use of physical weapons is denied, the mental and moral
"will to resist" must be kept alive in every prisoner.
H I am captured I will continue to resist by aU means avail­
able. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to
escape. i will accept neither parole nor special favors from
the enemy.
The duty of a member of the Armed Forces to continue
resistance by all means at his disposal is not lessened by the
misfortune of capture. Article 82 of the Geneva Conventions
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, pertains, must be explained, and covered in the training
programs to be carried out by the Services.
Article 82 provides as follows:
"A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations
and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining
Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking
j~dicial or discip~ary measures ~ respect of any off~nce
committed by a pnsoner of war agamst such laws, regulatIOns
or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary
to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed.
IIIf any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power
shall .declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be
punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable
if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining
Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only."
He will escape if able to do so, and will assist others to escape. Parole agreements are promises given the captor by a prisoner of war upon his faith and ~onor, to fulfill stated conditions, such as not to bear arms or not to escape, in consideration of special privileges-usually release from captivity or lessened restraint. He will never sign or enter into a parole agreement.
to
IV
 
The most despicable act an American can commit is to give
aid and comfort to the enemy by informing or otherwise
harming fellow prisoners. Failure to assume responsibilities
commensurate with rank is equally reprehensible.
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my
fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in
any action which might be harmful to .my comrades. If I am
senior, I will take command. It not, I will obey the lawful
orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in
every way.
Informing, or any other action to the detriment of a fellow
prisoner, is despicable and is expressly f?rbidden. ~risoners of
war must avoid helping ihe enemy identIfy fellow pnsoners who
may have Ioiowledge of particular Y'ah~e to the e~emy, ahd may
therefore be made to suffer eoerClve mterrogatlOn., ,
Strong' leadership is essential to discipline. Wit~out dis­cipline, camp organization, resistance and ~ve? survIval may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp samtatlOn, and care .of sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and non-comUllS­sioned officers of the United States will continue to carry out their responsibilities and exercise their al!thorit~ s~bsequent to capture. The senior line officer or non-comm18S1~ned offic~r within the prisoner of war camp or group of pnsonex:s will assume command according to rank (or precedence) WIthout regard to Service. This responsibility and acco~~ability may not be evaded. Ifthe senior officer or non-comm18S10ned officer is incapacitated or unable to act for any reaso?, commS?d 'Y'ill be assumed by the next senior. If the foregomg orgamz~tlon cannot be effected an organization of elected representatIves, as provided for in Articles 79-81 Geneva Conven.tion Rela~ive to Treatment of Prisoners of War, or a clandestme organIZa­tion, or both, will be formed.
V Every serviceman possesses some import~t ~itary in­formation of value to the enemy. By revealing It they may cause the death of comrades or disaster to' their unit, or even the defeat of major forces of the nation. When questioned, sholild I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements dis­
loyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
When questioned, a prisoner of war is required by the Geneva Conventions and permitted by this Code to disclose his name, rank, service number, and date of birth. A prisoner .of war may also communicate with the enemy regarding his individual health or welfare as a prisoner of war and, when appropriate, on routine matters of camp administration. Oral or written confessions true or false, questionnaires, personal history state­ments, propaganda recordings and broadcasts, appeals to other prisoners of war, signatures to peace or surrender appeals self criticisms or any other oral or written communication on b~half of the enemy or critical or harmful to the United States its allies, the Armed Forces or other prisoners are forbidden. '
It is a violation of the Geneva Conventions to place a prisoner of war under physical or mental torture or any other form of coercion to secure from him information of any kind. If however, a prisoner is subjected to such treatment he will endeavor to avoid by every means the disclosure. of any in­formation, or the making of any statement or the performance of any action harmful to the interests of the United States or its allies or which will provide aid or comfort to the enemy.
. Russia and t~e Communist Bloc nations have made a sig­nificant reservatIOn to Article 85 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949: Under this reservation a prisoner of war who may be conVlcted of an alleged war crime under the laws of the captors, loses the protection afforded a prisoner of war by these Con­ventions. Therefore the signing of a confession or the making of a statement by a prisoner is likely to be used·to convict him as a "war criminal" and thus, according to this Communist Bloc device, deny to him any protection under the ~rms of the Geneva Conventions, including repatriation until his sentence is served.
VI
An American is responsible and accountable for his actions. Prisoner of war status doesn't change this nor does it change the obligation to remain faithful to the United States and to the principles for~ which it stands. Throughout his captivity a prisoner should look to his God for strength to endure whate~er may befall. He should remember that the United States of ~erica wi}! neither forget, nor forsake him, apd that it will WID the ultlIDate victory.
I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.
The provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice whenever appropriate continue to apply to members of the Armed Forces while they are prisoners of war. The conduct of prisoners is subject to examination as to the Circumstances of capture and through the period of detention with due regard for the rights of the individual and consideration for the conditions of captivity.
A member of the Armed Forces who becomes a prisoner of war has a continuing obligation to remain loyal to his country, his Service and his unit.
The life of a prisoner of war is hard. He must never give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Prisoners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy will aid one another in surviving this ordeal.
BLANK PAGE
V
 KOREAN SUMMARY
 
Misconduct by a Minority A total of 4,428 American fighting men were recovered from enemy prison camps in Korea. The prisoner exchanges began with Operation "Little Switch" in April 1953-significantly enough, the ~onth after Stalin died and Malenkov assumed Soviet leadership.. The war was almost over. Some 600 Allied prisoners were returned in exchange for ten times that many Communist Chinese and North Koreans. During sub­sequent Operation "Big Switch" most of the American prisoners were recovered. At this time it was learned that 2,730 Ameri­cans had died in Korean prison camps. This ghastly death­toll-38%-was the worst since the Revolutionary War. . By joint actIon of the services, all of the prisoners recovered were screened by military intelligence agencies. Of the 565 whose conduct was questioned, 373 were cleared or dropped after investigation. Of the remaining 192 suspects, 68 were separated from the services; 3 resigned; 1 received reprimand; 2 were given restricted assignmen~s; 6 were cOllvicted by courts­martial. As· of July 20, 1955, 112 cases are pending. The cases pending are in various stages of investigation. Many may never come to trial for various reasons. Others will "be disposed of by miMr disciplinary action or may be· clear~d. However, it is fairly certain that thenwnber brought to trial will be substantially less than the 112 pending, perhaps less than half that many. Some of these last are men who were discharged soon after war's end and now have a civili"an status. Information which came to light after their separation made further action indicated. The Committee feels that justice must be done in these cases-the men who kept faith with their coUntry· and fellow prisoners need have no fear-:"'but those who did not should be brought 19 trial. The Committee recommends that separated servicemen be brought to trial if.they are charged with crimes .similar to those which brought about the prosecution of other servicemen. Obviously a change from uniform to civilian clothes does not divest a guilty wrong-doer of responsibility for a crime.. A
365488m r-55-5 25
civilian criminal would not be permitted to wear Army uniform as protective coloration. If action is indicated, the dischargees should be prosecuted in civil courts. When they cannot be tried in civili8in courts and the evidence warrants it, they can be brought to trial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
The Committee finds the Uniform Code of Military Justice adequate for the prosecution of misconduct cases of prisoners of war in Korea. The Committee recommends that the Uniform Code of Military Justice should govern the final, adjudication of cases stilI pending.
None Were Tried Unjustly Establishing fscts in the case against a prisoner charged with misconduct is a lengthy process. Evidence must be studied and assessed. Witnesses must be produced. Depositions must be obtained. In the Armed Forces this amounts to the equivalent of the work a District Attorney's office must do before it presents a case to a Grand Jury. Consequently, there may seem to be a long delay before an accused service man is brought to formal trial. The Army has not been dila­tory in trying the present cases. Rather it has been thorough and exacting in its research and investigation. The Committee finds that those servicemen who have been prosecuted and those who are facing trial were charged with serious crimes. Charges included homicide, and treasonable collaboration with the enemy, combined with informing on fellow prisoners. No man of any service-Army, Air Force, Navy or Marines-who might have .been charged with such crimes would have escaped disciplinary action. As in the past, the crimes enumerated are major offenses in the Armed Forces~ (Of course, such alleged misconduct must be substantiated by evidence before disciplinary action is taken.) While the six thus far tried and sentenced to prison have been enlisted men, one officer was also disciplined; one was tried and acquitted; and other cases' coming up involve officers. They do not make pleasant r,eading. A typical case involves an officer who is accused by 180 POWs of delivering anti-D. S. speeches, informing on fellow prisoners,hoarding food, teaching' classes in Communism, and ordering men to sign peace petitions. There is no evidence he suffered duress. Another case involves a sergeant accused by many witnesses , of "ratting" on his prison-mates, beating a sick prisoner, stealillg
a wallet from a dying man, forcing a fellow prisoner out into the snow and leaving him there to die, and drowning three
U. N. prisoners crossing a stream. There was an officer who allegedly courted favors of his cap· tors as soon as he reached prison camp. He is charged with confiscating the small tobacco ration dealt to the other men and eating more than his share of the food. It is record

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