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      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION )
FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND)                    No. 87188-4 
VIOLENCE PREVENTION,                        )
a Washington nonprofit corporation;         )
DAVID GRUMBOIS, an individual,              )
                                            )
                      Appellants,           )
                                            )
and                                         )
                                            )
GRUSS, INC., a Washington                   )
corporation,                                )
                                            )
                      Plaintiff,            )
v.                                          )
                                            )
STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        )
                                            )
                      Respondent,           )
                                            )       En Banc
and                                         )
                                            )
JOHN MCKAY, BRUCE BECKETT,                  )
COSTCO WHOLESALE                            )
CORPORATION, THE YES ON 1183                )
COALITION, WASHINGTON                       )
RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, )
MACKAY RESTAURANT GROUP,                    )
NORTHWEST GROCERY                           )
ASSOCIATION, SAFEWAY, INC.,                 )
THE KROGER COMPANY, and                     )
FAMILY WINERIES OF                          )
WASHINGTON,                                 )
                                            )
           Respondents/Intervenors.         )
_______________________________ )                   Filed May 31, 2012

       González, J.  -- This court was asked to determine whether Initiative 1183 (I- 

No. 87188-4

1183) violates the single-subject and subject-in-title rules found in article II, section 

19 of the Washington State Constitution.  I-1183 removes the State from the 

business of distributing and selling spirits and wine, imposes sales-based fees on 

private liquor distributors and retailers, and provides a distribution of $10 million 

per year to local governments for the purpose of enhancing public safety programs.  

We hold that appellants have not overcome the presumption that the initiative is 

constitutional, and therefore we affirm summary judgment in favor of the State and 

intervenors.

                                         I.         Facts

       I-1183 was approved by 59 percent of voters in the November 2011 

general election.  Wash. Sec'y of State, November 08, 2011 General Election 

Results, http://vote.wa.gov/results/20111108/measures.html. The ballot title of 

I-1183 states:

       Initiative Measure No. 1183 concerns liquor: beer, wine, and spirits (hard 
       liquor).

       This measure would close state liquor stores and sell their assets; license 
       private parties to sell and distribute spirits; set license fees based on 
       sales; regulate licensees; and change regulation of wine distribution.

       Should this measure be enacted into law?
       [  ] Yes
       [  ] No

State of Washington Voters' Pamphlet, General Election 19 (Nov. 8, 2011).

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No. 87188-4

       The Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution ended 

federal prohibition of the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating 

liquors, allowing each state to develop its own system for regulating the 

presence and use of alcohol within its boundaries.  Washington adopted the 

Washington State Liquor Act (Liquor Act) to regulate intoxicating liquors.  

Laws of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 62; Title 66 RCW.  The Liquor Act created the 

Washington State Liquor Control Board (LCB), RCW 66.08.012, and 

authorized it to administer the comprehensive control scheme developed in the 

act, RCW 66.08.020.

       Beginning with the adoption of the Liquor Act, Washington has 

established distinct regulatory systems to control the distribution and sale of 

different types of liquor.  Laws of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 62.  The legislature 

enacted a "three-tier" system to govern the distribution and sale of beer and 

wine, which provided different regulations and licensing requirements for 

manufacturers, distributors, and retailers.  Former RCW 66.28.280 (2009).  The 

distributor tier was included to prevent manufacturers from exerting undue 

influence upon retailers and to provide an efficient means of tax collection.  

Three-Tier Sys. Review Task Force, Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., Beer and 

Wine Three-Tier System Review Task Force Report 11 (Nov. 2006), available 

at http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/SCBW/

                                           3 

No. 87188-4

Documents/6-10-2008_LCB.pdf.

       The three-tier system also allowed the State to control the price at which 

manufacturers and distributors sold beer and wine.  Manufacturers were 

prohibited from "discriminat[ing] in price in selling to any purchaser for 

resale," former RCW 66.28.170 (2004), and distributors were similarly required 

to maintain a wholesale price list for beer and wine, from which they were not 

allowed to deviate, former RCW 66.28.180(1) (2009).  Distributors were also 

prohibited from offering quantity discounts or selling below acquisition cost.  

Former RCW 66.28.180(1)(d) (2009).1

       Unlike the three-tier system that applied to beer and wine, prior to I-1183 

the State had a monopoly over the distribution and sale of spirits.  See former 

RCW 66.16.010 (2005); Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., FY 2010 Annual 

Report 9-10, available at http://liq.wa.gov/publications/2010-annual-report-

final-web.pdf.  State liquor stores and closely regulated contract liquor stores 

were the sole purveyors of spirits for consumers and businesses that sold spirits 

by the glass.  Id. at 10.

       The Liquor Act also created the Liquor Revolving Fund, which consists 

"of all license fees, permit fees, penalties, forfeitures, and all other moneys, 

income, or revenue received by the board." RCW 66.08.170.  Since its adoption 

1 I-1183 left these restrictions in place for beer.  See Laws of 2012, ch. 2, 
§§ 119, 121. 

                                           4 

No. 87188-4

in 1933, the Liquor Act has provided that money in excess of the statutory 

minimum remaining in the Liquor Revolving Fund would be disbursed for a 

number of purposes unrelated to alcohol.  See Laws of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 62, 

§§ 77, 78; RCW 66.08.190.  Under the Liquor Act as it was originally approved, 

30 percent of excess money in the Liquor Revolving Fund was to be distributed 

to the general fund of the State; 20 percent to the counties, to be placed in the 

old age pension fund; and the remaining 50 percent to the incorporated cities 

and towns of the state.  Laws of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 62, § 78.  Any city or town 

in which the sale of liquor was forbidden was not entitled to any share of the 

distributions; and if any unincorporated area of a county voted not to allow the 

sale of liquor, the population in that area would not be included in the 

computation of the population for distribution purposes.  Id. § 78(2).

       The Liquor Act currently provides funding for alcohol-related purposes,

including the treatment of alcoholism, juvenile alcohol and drug abuse 

prevention programs, and wine and grape research at Washington State 

University.  RCW 66.08.180.  The legislature has continued, however, to 

provide general funding for state and local governments.  The current version of 

RCW 66.08.190, which was not amended or repealed by I-1183, provides for 

distributions from the Liquor Revolving Fund to counties, cities, towns, border 

areas, and the State's general fund.  Cities and unincorporated areas in which 

                                           5 

No. 87188-4

the sale of liquor is forbidden as the result of an election are not entitled to any 

share in such distributions from the Liquor Revolving Fund.  RCW 66.08.200 

(unincorporated areas), .210 (cities).

       Prior to the effort to pass I-1183, liquor reform promoters, including 

intervenor Costco Wholesale Corporation supported attempts to modify the 

State's liquor regulation system through legislation and initiatives to the people.  

I-1183 was designed to address the primary concerns that its supporters felt had 

impeded prior attempts to reform Washington's liquor laws, such as 

maintaining tax levels and revenue streams; "ensuring adequate funding (and 

penalties) for licensing and enforcement missions of the Liquor Control Board 

and, in their discretion, for related public health and safety efforts provided by 

local governments"; and limiting the number and type of retail outlets that 

would sell spirits for off-premises consumption.  Clerk's Papers (CP) at 711-12

(Decl. of John Sullivan, Associate General Counsel at Costco Wholesale Corp.).

       I-1183 dramatically changed the State's approach to regulating the 

distribution and sale of liquor in Washington.  The initiative proposed to "[g]et 

the state government out of the commercial business of distributing, selling, and 

promoting the sale of liquor, allowing the State to focus on the more appropriate 

government role of enforcing liquor laws and protecting the public health and 

safety concerning all alcoholic beverages." Laws of 2012, ch. 2, § 101(2)(b). 

                                           6 

No. 87188-4

To that end, I-1183 authorizes the State to auction off state liquor distribution 

and liquor store facilities and equipment.  Id. § 102.  The initiative allows 

private distributors to become licensed to distribute spirits, id. § 105, and allows 

a limited number of retail stores to sell spirits, id. § 103. 

       I-1183 imposes license fees on spirits retailers and distributors.  Private 

retailers are required to pay a license issuance fee of 17 percent of their spirits 

revenue.  Id. § 103(4).  Retailers must also pay a flat license renewal fee of 

$166 per year.  Id. § 103(5).  Private distributors are required to pay a license 

issuance fee of 10 percent of revenue from sales of spirits made during the first 

two years and 5 percent of spirits revenue during subsequent years.  Id. § 

105(3)(a).  Additionally, private distributors must pay an annual license renewal 

fee of $1,320 for each licensed location.  Id. § 105(4).  I-1183 provides that it 

"does not increase any tax, create any new tax, or eliminate any tax."  Id. § 301.

       I-1183 modifies the wine distribution system by allowing wine 

distributors and wineries to give discounts based upon competitive conditions, 

id. § 119, and allowing retailers and restaurants to distribute wine to their stores 

from a central warehouse, id. § 123.  Wine retailers may also obtain retailer 

reseller endorsements, allowing them to sell wine to licensees who sell wine for 

consumption on their licensed premises.  Id. § 104(2).  An analogous retailer 

reseller endorsement was created for spirits retailers.  Id. § 103(1).

                                           7 

No. 87188-4

       The initiative additionally secures "the current distribution of liquor 

revenues to local governments and dedicate[s] a portion of the new revenues 

raised from liquor license fees to increase funding for local public safety 

programs, including police, fire, and emergency services in communities 

throughout the state." Id. § 101(2)(k).  The additional portion is "ten million 

dollars per year from the spirits license fees [to] be provided to border areas, 

counties, cities, and towns through the liquor revolving fund for the purpose of 

enhancing public safety programs."  Id. § 302.

       I-1183 also modified the law pertaining to liquor advertising.  The 

initiative removed a provision that prohibited the LCB from advertising liquor 

but maintained the LCB's "power to adopt any and all reasonable rules as to the 

kind, character, and location of advertising of liquor."  Id. § 108.  I-1183 also 

added that the LCB is prohibited from restricting the "advertising of lawful 

prices."  Id. § 107(7).

       I-1183 also amended the policy reasons behind the State's regulation of 

alcohol.  Id. § 124.  Prior to I-1183, the Liquor Act listed the State's

       goals of orderly marketing of alcohol in the state, encouraging 
       moderation in consumption of alcohol by the citizens of the state, 
       protecting the public interest and advancing public safety by preventing 
       the use and consumption of alcohol by minors and other abusive 
       consumption, and promoting the efficient collection of taxes by the state.

Former RCW 66.28.280 (2009).  I-1183 removed the first two goals: orderly

                                           8 

No. 87188-4

marketing of alcohol and encouraging moderation in consumption of alcohol.  

Laws of 2012, ch. 2, § 124.

                                 II.        Procedural History

       Appellants, the Washington Association for Substance Abuse and 

Violence Prevention (WASAVP), and David Grumbois, an individual who 

leased land to the State for a liquor store, filed an action against the State, 

challenging I-1183.  Appellants contend that I-1183 contains multiple subjects, 

in violation of article II, section 19's single-subject rule.  Additionally, 

appellants claim that I-1183's multiple subjects were not all expressed in the 

ballot title of the initiative, in violation of article II, section 19's subject-in-title 

rule.  Supporters of I-1183 filed a motion to intervene as defendants, which the 

trial court granted.

       The parties moved for summary judgment.  The trial court found that the 

distribution of $10 million to local governments for public safety programs was 

not sufficiently related to liquor and that I-1183 therefore violated the single-

subject rule.  The court found that material issues of fact existed regarding the 

severability of that section of the initiative, however, and ordered a trial on that 

issue.

       Intervenors filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the public 

safety provision did not violate the constitution.  The trial court changed its 

                                           9 

No. 87188-4

earlier decision, noting that the initiative's challengers had not sufficiently 

established the lack of a nexus between liquor regulation and public safety 

spending.  The court granted the State's motion for summary judgment.  This 

court granted direct review.

       General Teamsters Local Union No. 174 and United Food and 

Commercial Workers Local Union No. 21 filed an amici brief in support of 

appellants.  City and county government officials filed an amici brief expressing 

their interest in the implementation of I-1183 in their communities, particularly 

the allocation to local governments of liquor-related revenue for public safety 

purposes.

                                        III.       Issues

1.     Does I-1183 violate the single-subject rule?

2.     Does I-1183 violate the subject-in-title rule?

                                IV.         Standard of Review

       This court reviews summary judgment orders de novo.  Pierce County v. 

State, 150 Wn.2d 422, 429, 78 P.3d 640 (2003).

                                       V.         Analysis

A.     Standing

       As an initial matter, intervenors contend that appellants lack standing to 

challenge I-1183. Br. of Intervenor-Resp'ts at 5 n.2.  This court has established 

                                           10 

No. 87188-4

a two-part test to determine standing to seek a declaratory judgment under the 

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, chapter 7.24 RCW.  Grant County Fire 

Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 791, 802, 83 P.3d 419 

(2004).  First, the interest sought to be protected must be "'arguably within the 

zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 

guarantee in question.'"  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Save a 

Valuable Env't v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862, 866, 576 P.2d 401 (1978)).  

Second, the challenged action must have caused the challenger an injury in fact, 

economic or otherwise.  Id.

       Appellants have standing to challenge I-1183.  First, both appellants 

appear to have interests that are regulated by I-1183.  WASAVP's goal of 

preventing substance abuse and violence places it within the zone of interests of 

I-1183, which broadly impacts the State's regulation of alcohol.  Grumbois 

leased property to the State for use as a liquor store, and I-1183 removes the 

State from the business of running liquor stores.  Laws of 2012, ch. 2, § 102.2

2  Intervenors argue that appellants are required to show that they are 
within the zone of interests of the law asserted as a basis for the challenge 
(Const. art. II, § 19), not the law targeted by the challenge (I-1183).  Br. of 
Intervenor-Resp'ts at 5 n.2.  The authority intervenors cite stands for the 
opposite proposition.  In Grant County, the court found that fire districts 
lacked personal standing to bring a constitutional challenge against certain 
annexation statutes because the fire districts were not in the zone of 
interests of the statutes.  150 Wn.2d at 803.  Similarly, in To-Ro Trade 
Shows v. Collins, the court found that a vehicle trade show producer lacked 
standing to bring a claim against a dealer licensing statute because the 
producer was not a vehicle dealer and therefore was not in the zone of 
interests protected by the statute.  144 Wn.2d 403, 414-15, 27 P.3d 1149

                                           11 

No. 87188-4

       Second, both appellants have established injury in fact.  Grumbois 

suffered injury because I-1183 required the State to terminate its lease with him.  

Although WASAVP has not suffered economic loss as a result of I-1183, its 

goals of preventing substance abuse could reasonably be impacted by I-1183's 

restructuring of Washington's regulation of liquor.  Indeed, intervenors stress 

the established relationship between public safety and liquor, Br. of Intervenor-

Resp'ts at 19, such that the increase in liquor availability would injure 

WASAVP's goals.

B.     Article II, section 19

       Turning to the constitutional challenges, appellants argue that I-1183 is 

unconstitutional under article II, section 19 of the Washington State 

Constitution.  In approving an initiative measure, the people exercise the same 

power of sovereignty as the legislature does when it enacts a statute, Wash. 

Fed'n of State Emps. v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 556, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995), and 

are subject to the same constitutional limitations, City of Burien v. Kiga, 144 

Wn.2d 819, 824, 31 P.3d 659 (2001).  Therefore, even if an initiative is 

approved by a majority of voters, it will be struck down if it violates 

Washington's constitution.  Id. This court presumes that an initiative is 

constitutional, just as it presumes the constitutionality of a statute duly enacted 

(2001).

                                           12 

No. 87188-4

by the legislature.  Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 

183, 205, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000); Brower v. State, 137 Wn.2d 44, 52, 

969 P.2d 42 (1998).

       Article II, section 19 provides, "No bill shall embrace more than one 

subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." This provision is to be liberally 

construed in favor of the legislation.  Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 206; 

Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 555.  Nevertheless, "[w]e have 

declared that when laws are enacted in violation of this constitutional mandate, 

the courts will not hesitate to declare them void."  State ex rel. Wash. Toll 

Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 24, 200 P.2d 467 (1948) (Wash. Toll 

Bridge Auth. I).  Article II, section 19 applies to initiatives as well as to bills.  

Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 553-54.

       There are two distinct prohibitions in article II, section 19: (1) the single-

subject rule and (2) the subject-in-title rule.  Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. I, 32 

Wn.2d at 23.  For the reasons discussed below, we find that I-1183 does not 

violate either rule.

1.     The single-subject rule

       The single-subject rule aims to prevent the grouping of incompatible 

measures and to prevent "logrolling," which occurs when a measure is drafted 

such that a legislator or voter may be required to vote for something of which he 

                                           13 

No. 87188-4

or she disapproves in order to secure approval of an unrelated law.  Wash. 

Fed'n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 552; Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 

212.

       In determining whether legislation contains multiple subjects, we begin 

with the title of the measure.  Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 207.  The 

ballot title of an initiative is the relevant title for analysis under article II, 

section 19, not the legislative title, if any exists.  Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., 

127 Wn.2d at 555.  A ballot title consists of a statement of the subject of the 

measure, a concise description of the measure, and the question of whether or 

not the measure should be enacted into law.  RCW 29A.72.050.  A title may be 

general or restrictive; "in other words, broad or narrow, since the legislature in 

each case has the right to determine for itself how comprehensive shall be the 

object of the statute."  Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 22, 211 P.2d 

651 (1949), overruled in part on other grounds by State ex rel. Wash. State Fin. 

Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wn.2d 645, 384 P.2d 833 (1963).  "In assessing whether a 

title is general, it is not necessary that the title contain a general statement of the 

subject of an act; '[a] few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject 

stated, is all that is necessary.'"  Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 209 

(alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Scofield v. Easterday, 182 Wash. 

209, 212, 46 P.2d 1052 (1935)).

                                           14 

No. 87188-4

       The parties agree that the ballot title is general, and we find so as well.  I-

1183's title indicates that it generally pertains to the broad subject of liquor.  

See id. at 208-11 (providing examples of general and restrictive titles).

       Where a title is general, "'[a]ll that is required [by the constitution] is 

that there be some "rational unity" between the general subject and the 

incidental subdivisions.'"  State v. Grisby, 97 Wn.2d 493, 498, 647 P.2d 6 

(1982) (quoting Kueckelhan v. Fed. Old Line Ins. Co., 69 Wn.2d 392, 403, 418 

P.2d 443 (1966)).  "[T]he existence of rational unity or not is determined by 

whether the matters within the body of the initiative are germane to the general 

title and whether they are germane to one another."  Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 826 

(citing Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 209-10); Citizens for Responsible 

Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wn.2d 622, 638, 71 P.3d 644 (2003).  There is no 

violation of article II, section 19 even if a general subject contains several 

incidental subjects or subdivisions.  Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 

556; Grisby, 97 Wn.2d at 498.  Moreover, "'[f]or purposes of legislation, 

"subjects" are not absolute existences to be discovered by some sort of a priori

reasoning, but are the result of classification for convenience of treatment and 

for greater effectiveness in attaining the general purpose of the particular 

legislative act.'"  State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 61 Wn.2d 28, 

33, 377 P.2d 466 (1962) (Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. IV) (quoting State ex rel. 

                                           15 

No. 87188-4

Test v. Steinwedel, 203 Ind. 457, 467, 180 N.E. 865 (1932)); Amalgamated 

Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 209-10.

       Appellants argue that the challenged provisions lack rational unity with 

the general topic -- which they characterize as "'liquor privatization'" -- and with 

one another.  Br. of Appellants at 23.  Appellants contend that I-1183 violates 

the single-subject rule because along with the general topic of liquor 

privatization, the initiative includes a $10 million public safety earmark, 

privatizes wine distribution, impacts liquor advertising, and modifies the State's 

policy regarding liquor.

       Turning first to the public safety earmark, this provision is germane to 

the general topic of I-1183, whether that is liquor or the narrower subject of 

liquor privatization, as appellants suggest.  Although the public safety earmark 

is not restricted to use for facially liquor-related safety issues, see Laws of 

2012, ch. 2, § 302, liquor has an obvious connection to broader public safety 

concerns than might feasibly be addressed by a more limited earmark.  As local 

government officials assert in their amici brief, the burden of enforcing liquor 

sales laws and prosecuting offenders falls heavily on local governments.  Br. of 

Amici Curiae Local Gov't Officials at 15; RCW 66.44.010(1) ("All county and 

municipal peace officers are hereby charged with the duty of investigating and 

prosecuting all violations of this title . . . .").  Additionally, many violations of 

                                           16 

No. 87188-4

the Liquor Act are misdemeanors or gross misdemeanors, punishable by 

imprisonment in the county jail.  See RCW 66.44.140 (classifying unlawful sale 

of liquor as a gross misdemeanor and establishing punishment of confinement 

in county jail), .180.  It would be improper to overlook the impact that changes 

to liquor regulation could have on general public safety expenditures by local 

governments.

       Moreover, the legislature's recognition of the relationship between liquor 

regulation and public welfare supports our finding that these issues share 

rational unity.  See Wash. Fed'n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 575 (Talmadge, 

J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) (proposing that considering whether the 

legislature has historically treated issues together is relevant to analysis of a law 

under the single-subject rule).  Indeed, the general purpose of the Liquor Act is 

"for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the 

people of the state," RCW 66.08.010; Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc., 152 

Wn.2d 259, 273, 96 P.3d 386 (2004), and the Liquor Act has provided general 

revenue for the state and for local governments since its first enactment, Laws 

of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 62, §§ 77, 78.  I-1183's provision of funds for public 

safety actually has a closer nexus to the subject of liquor than does the general 

revenue provision that has existed since the State began regulating liquor.

       On the other hand, appellants contend that the liquor reform supporters'

                                           17 

No. 87188-4

prior unsuccessful attempts to privatize liquor distribution and sales 

demonstrate the existence of logrolling in I-1183; in other words, that the 

initiative was designed to attract voters who did not approve of liquor 

privatization but did favor an increase in funding for public safety programs.  

See Br. of Appellants at 24.  Nevertheless, given the State's continued 

recognition of the connection between liquor regulation, public safety, and 

revenue generation, we find that appellants have not established that I-1183's 

public safety earmark is the result of logrolling, rather than the product of 

permissible law making.

       Appellants next argue that I-1183's privatization of the distribution and 

sale of spirits is not germane to its deregulation of the private distribution of 

wine, in violation of the single-subject rule.  Br. of Appellants at 26-30.  

Appellants rely on prior decisions in which this court has found that although 

the challenged provisions of a law may have shared a general subject outlined in 

the title of the measure, the provisions did not share a rational unity among one 

another.  In Barde v. State, 90 Wn.2d 470, 584 P.2d 390 (1978), for example, 

this court reviewed the constitutionality of an act "'relating to the taking or 

withholding of property,'" which created criminal sanctions for dognapping and 

allowed recovery of attorney fees in a civil replevin action.  Id. at 471 (quoting 

Laws of 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 114).  The court found that although the two 

                                           18 

No. 87188-4

provisions may have been germane to the topic of taking or withholding 

property, there was no rational unity between criminal sanctions for dognapping 

and attorney fees in a civil action.  Id. at 472.  The court struck down the law 

under article II, section 19.  Id. at 470, 472.

       In Amalgamated Transit, this court reviewed the constitutionality of 

Initiative 695, which set license tab fees at $30 and required voter approval of 

all future state and local tax increases.  142 Wn.2d at 191.  We found that the 

initiative's subjects were germane to the general topic of tax limitation but that 

there was no rational unity between the subjects.  Id. at 217.  The court held that 

the initiative violated the single-subject rule.  Id.

       In Kiga, this court considered the constitutionality of Initiative 722, 

which sought to nullify specific tax increases and to change the method of 

assessing property taxes.  144 Wn.2d at 827.  Both provisions related to the 

general topic of tax relief, but the court found that they were not germane to one 

another.  Id. The first provision would reverse various tax increases and 

provide a one-time refund, implicating a number of different types of charges, 

while the change in tax assessment would be permanent and restricted to 

property taxes.  Id. The court found that the initiative violated the single-

subject rule.  Id. at 828.

       There is a closer nexus between I-1183's provisions affecting spirits and 

                                           19 

No. 87188-4

wine, however, than there was in the relevant provisions examined in Barde, 

Amalgamated Transit, and Kiga.  Unlike the subjects combined by the law 

examined in Barde, spirits and wine share the common distinction of being 

liquor and have been governed as such by the same act for decades.  See Laws 

of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 62, § 3 (defining "liquor").  Moreover, unlike the

subjects at issue in Amalgamated Transit and Kiga, I-1183's changes to the 

regulation of spirits and wine do not combine a specific impact of a law with a 

general measure for the future.  See Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 217; 

Kiga, 144 Wn.2d at 827; see also Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, 49 Wn.2d 

520, 523-25, 304 P.2d 676 (1956) (Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. II) (finding an act 

embraced two subjects because it granted continuing power to build toll roads 

and provided for the construction of a particular toll road).

       Appellants next contend that I-1183's change to liquor advertising 

regulations is unrelated to the rest of the initiative.  Br. of Appellants at 30-31.  

This argument lacks merit, as liquor advertising is germane to the general 

subject of I-1183, as well as to the individual provisions of the initiative.

       Finally, appellants assert that the modifications to the legislative findings 

on the three-tier system constitutes a separate subject.  Id. at 31.  Policy 

expressions, however, do not contribute additional subjects within the meaning 

of the single-subject rule.  Pierce County, 150 Wn.2d at 434.  I-1183's policy 

                                           20 

No. 87188-4

changes do not constitute a different subject from the rest of the initiative.3

2.     The subject-in-title rule

       The purpose of the subject-in-title rule is to notify members of the 

legislature and the public of the subject matter of a measure.  Power, Inc. v. 

Huntley, 39 Wn.2d 191, 198, 235 P.2d 173 (1951).  "'[A] title complies with the 

constitution if it gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the 

act, or indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of the law.'"  Wash. 

Fed'n of State Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting Young 

Men's Christian Ass'n v. State, 62 Wn.2d 504, 506, 383 P.2d 497 (1963)).  The 

title need not be an index to the contents, nor must it provide details of the 

measure.  Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 217 (citing Wash. Fed'n of State 

Emps., 127 Wn.2d at 555).  Although a measure's title can be broad and 

general -- without any particular expressions or words required -- the material 

representations in the title must not be misleading or false, which would thwart 

the underlying purpose of ensuring that "no person may be deceived as to what 

3  Appellants additionally contend that I-1183 is not "comprehensive" and 
that the provisions impacting spirits and wine are separate subjects 
because they deal with discrete parts of a larger topic.  Br. of Appellants at 
26-27.  This argument lacks merit.         The cases cited by appellants merely 
state the rule that broad, comprehensive legislation does not necessarily 
violate the single-subject rule, not that legislation must be comprehensive 
to avoid violating the single-subject rule.  See, e.g., Kueckelhan, 69 Wn.2d 
at 403-04 (finding that the comprehensive insurance code did not violate 
the single-subject rule by establishing the offices of insurance 
commissioner and state  fire  marshal);  McQueen v. Kittitas County, 115 
Wash. 672, 682, 198 P. 394 (1921) (article II, section 19 was not intended 
to prevent enactment of a complete law on a given subject).

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No. 87188-4

matters are being legislated upon."  Seymour v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138,

149, 32 P. 1077 (1893); Howlett v. Cheetham, 17 Wash. 626, 635, 50 P. 522 

(1897) ("[A] title which is misleading or false is not constitutionally framed.").  

Any "'objections to the title must be grave and the conflict between it and the 

constitution palpable before we will hold an act unconstitutional.'"  Wash. Ass'n 

of Neighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 372, 70 P.3d 920 (2003) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Creditors v. Brown, 

147 Wash. 1, 3, 264 P. 1005 (1928)).

       As an initial matter, intervenors assert that the pre-election review under 

RCW 29A.72.080 was the appropriate proceeding for appellants to challenge I-

1183's title and that appellants are now precluded from raising a subject-in-title 

challenge.  Br. of Intervenor-Resp'ts at 43-46.  Under RCW 29A.72.080, a 

person may challenge the ballot title of an initiative in Thurston County 

Superior Court within five days of its filing with the Secretary of State.  The 

superior court then examines the ballot title, measure, and objections "and shall, 

within five days, render its decision . . . ." RCW 29A.72.080.  This preliminary 

decision regarding the ballot title is final.  Id. Intervenors rely on Kreidler v. 

Eikenberry, 111 Wn.2d 828, 834, 766 P.2d 438 (1989), in which this court 

refused to review the ballot title decision of a superior court and noted that "the 

public interest is served by finality in this matter."  Kreidler is inapposite to this 

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No. 87188-4

case, however, as appellants do not challenge the result of the ballot title 

determination, but rather the constitutionality of the law itself.  Intervenors'

interpretation of Kreidler and analogous cases would improperly constrain any 

constitutional challenge to initiatives to the expedited process of ballot title 

adjudication.

       Appellants argue that the "license fees based on sales" listed in the ballot 

title are actually taxes and that I-1183 violates the subject-in-title rule because 

the title does not notify voters that the charges imposed are taxes.  Br. of 

Appellants at 43.  Words in the title of legislation "'must be taken in their 

common and ordinary meanings, and the legislature cannot in the body of an act 

impose another or unusual meaning upon a term used in the title without 

disclosing such special meaning therein.'"  Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 

226 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 

626, 110 P.2d 627 (1941)).  I-1183 imposes "license issuance fees" on spirits 

retailers and distributors, calculated as a percentage of sales that is deposited 

into the Liquor Revolving Fund.  Laws of 2012, ch. 2, § 103(4) (retailers); id. § 

105(3) (distributors).  The issue is thus whether the phrase "license fees based 

on sales," found in I-1183's ballot title, is misleading or false.  See Seymour, 6 

Wash. at 149.

       Appellants assert that we should refer to legal distinctions between 

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No. 87188-4

taxes and fees, Br. of Appellants at 44, but that would ignore the subject-

in-title rule's purpose of providing notice to the public of the contents of 

the measure, see Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 217.  We turn 

instead to the common meaning of the term "fee" because "[i]n 

construing the meaning of an initiative, the language of the enactment is 

to be read as the average informed lay voter would read it."  W.

Petroleum Imps., Inc. v. Friedt, 127 Wn.2d 420, 424, 899 P.2d 792 

(1995); see also Seymour, 6 Wash. at 149 ("As the constitution has not 

indicated the degree of particularity necessary to express in its title the 

subject of an act, the courts should not embarrass legislation by 

technical interpretations based upon mere form or phraseology.").

       In Amalgamated Transit, the initiative at issue asked whether "'voter 

approval [shall] be required for any tax increase,'" without indicating that the 

definition of "tax" included in the body of the measure was broader than the 

ordinary definition of the term.  142 Wn.2d at 227.  As defined in the body of 

the initiative, "tax" included a variety of specific taxes as well as "'impact fees, 

license fees, permit fees, and any monetary charge by government.'"  Id. at 193.  

The court found that other, narrower definitions, such as "'a forced contribution 

of wealth to meet the public needs of a government,'" likely accorded with the 

general informed voter's understanding of the term "tax." Id. at 219 (quoting 

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No. 87188-4

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2345 (1986)).  The court found 

the initiative violated the subject-in-title rule because its title did not give notice 

to voters that the meaning of "tax" in the measure was broader than its common 

meaning.  Id. at 227.

       In DeCano, this court considered the constitutionality of a statute entitled 

"'An Act relating to the rights and disabilities of aliens with respect to land[s],'"

which amended an act that prohibited ownership of land by aliens.  7 Wn.2d at 

623-24 (quoting Laws of 1921, ch. 50, at 156).  Respondents contended that the 

statute violated the subject-in-title rule because it modified the definition of 

"alien," without indicating that change in its title.  Id. at 623-24.  The earlier act 

provided that "'"[a]lien" does not include an alien who has in good faith 

declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States.'"  Id. at 623.  

The amendatory statute, however, expanded the definition of "alien" to 

"'include all persons who are non-citizens of the United States and who are 

ineligible to citizenship by naturalization.'"  Id. at 624.  The court noted that the 

amendatory statute's definition of the term "brings within its purview a whole 

new class of persons who are not in fact aliens in common understanding, by 

judicial construction, or under the express definition contained in the prior 

4 Although we considered the judicial and statutory definitions of the term 
"alien" in  DeCano, the court apparently used that analysis to inform its 
understanding of the common and ordinary meaning of the term, rather 
than to impose a technical legal definition of the term onto its common 
meaning.  See DeCano, 7 Wn.2d at 626 ("'Words in a title must be taken in 

                                           25 

No. 87188-4

law."4  Id. The court found that the title of the amendatory law gave no 

indication of this expanded definition and that it therefore violated article II, 

section 19.  Id. at 624, 627.

       Unlike the titles of the laws at issue in Amalgamated Transit and 

DeCano, I-1183's ballot title provided voters with adequate notice of the scope 

and purpose of the license fees.  A common understanding of the term "fee" is 

"a charge fixed by law or by an institution (as a university) for certain privileges 

or services  . . . ."  Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 833 (2002).  The license issuance fees under I-1183 correspond with 

this common meaning, as they are charges for the privilege of selling liquor in 

Washington State.  It is important to note that I-1183's ballot title accurately 

states that the "license issuance fees" included in the body of the initiative are 

based on sales.  Cf. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 227 (noting that the 

ballot title asked voters whether "'voter approval [shall] be required for any tax

increase' without any indication in the title that 'tax' has a meaning broader 

than its common meaning"); DeCano, 7 Wn.2d at 624 (finding that the title of 

the statute "states that it pertains to the rights of 'aliens' with respect to land, 

but it gives no intimation whatsoever that the body of the act contains an 

their common and ordinary meanings . . . .'" (quoting 59 C.J. Statutes §
390, at 810 (1932))); see also Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 219 
("Language in an initiative should be construed as the average informed 
voter voting on the initiative would read it.").

                                           26 

No. 87188-4

amended definition of the word 'alien'").  The phrase "license fees based on 

sales" is sufficient to indicate to an inquiring mind the scope and purpose of 

that provision of I-1183.

       The challenged portion of I-1183's ballot title is not palpably misleading 

or false.  We have defined "fee" as a legal term of art in some particular 

contexts.  See, e.g., Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wn.2d 874, 879, 905 P.2d 324 

(1995) (applying factors to determine whether a charge imposed by the 

government is a tax or regulatory fee).  But we will not void a law duly enacted 

by voters based upon "the technical significance of a word, where it can hardly 

be contended that anyone was likely to be deceived."  Seymour, 6 Wash. at 149.  

On numerous occasions, we have rejected ballot title challenges based on 

nuances between terms.  See, e.g., id. ("The real purpose of this act would have 

been better expressed had the word 'provide' been used, but we think the word 

'construct,' under all the circumstances, may be accorded a similar meaning . . . 

."); N. Cedar Co. v. French, 131 Wash. 394, 418-19, 230 P. 837 (1924)

(holding that "agricultural product" referenced in title included forestry product, 

based on liberal construction of the constitutional provision and the "'broad 

sense'" of the term), modified on other grounds on reh'g, 133 Wn.2d 692, 233 

P. 39 (1925).  We find that the phrase "license fees based on sales" accurately 
expresses the underlying subject contained in the body of the initiative.5

                                           27 

No. 87188-4

                                      VI.        Conclusion

       Appellants have not overcome the presumption that I-1183 meets the 

Washington State Constitution's single-subject and subject-in-title rules under 

article II, section 19.  We affirm the trial court's order of summary judgment in 

favor of the State and intervenors.

5 The dissent focuses on the legal distinction between taxes and fees, but 
we find that this analysis ignores our role of construing the language of the 
initiative as the average informed voter would have read it.  See 
Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wn.2d at 219.  We leave for another day the 
issue of whether the "license fees based on sales" withstands scrutiny 
under the legal definition of a "fee."

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No. 87188-4

AUTHOR:
       Justice Steven C. González

WE CONCUR:
       Chief Justice Barbara A. Madsen                  Justice James M. Johnson

                                                        Justice Debra L. Stephens

       Justice Susan Owens

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