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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                )
                                                    )      No. 83682-5
                      Respondent,                   )      (consolidated with
                                                    )       No. 84836-0)
v.                                                  )      EN BANC
                                                    )
THEODORE M. KOSEWICZ,                               )
                                                    )      Filed June 7, 2012
                      Petitioner.                   )
___________________________________                 )
                                                    )
STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                )
                                                    )
                      Respondent,                   )
                                                    )
v.                                                  )
                                                    )
ROBERT A. BROWN,                                    )
                                                    )
                      Petitioner.                   )
___________________________________                 )

       FAIRHURST, J.  --  Before the court are two consolidated cases based on the 

same facts.  Robert A. Brown and Theodore M. Kosewicz were both involved in the 

kidnapping, torture, and killing of Sebastian Esquibel.  At trial, Brown was 

convicted of first degree kidnapping and felony murder with the predicate felony 

being the first degree kidnapping.  At a separate trial, Kosewicz was convicted of  

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

first degree kidnapping and first degree aggravated murder with the aggravating 

factor being the first degree kidnapping.  On appeal, both Brown's and Kosewicz's 

first degree kidnapping convictions were overturned because of a charging defect.  

The  Court  of  Appeals  did not overturn Brown's felony murder conviction or 

Kosewicz's aggravating factor verdict.  Brown and Kosewicz argue that reversal of 

the first degree kidnapping convictions requires reversal of the felony murder and 

aggravating factor verdict that were based in part on the first degree kidnapping.  

We affirm Brown's felony murder conviction and Kosewicz's aggravating factor 

verdict.

                                           FACTS

       On January 16, 2006, Sebastian Esquibel's body was found buried beneath a 

woodpile with his hands and feet bound in jumper cables and a gunshot wound to 

the back of his head.  The facts leading up to  this murder were testified to as 

follows.  Levoy Burnham was living in a fifth wheel trailer located on Brown's 

property.  Burnham had given Esquibel $800 for a scheduled drug deal with Carlton 

Hritsco.  Esquibel failed to deliver the drugs to Burnham or to return Burnham's 

money.  Burnham brought Esquibel to his trailer,  stripped him down to his 

underwear, and tied him up.  Esquibel was intimidated and beaten over the course of 

two days by various people in an attempt to recover the missing money.    Kosewicz 

                                               2 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

and Brown were both involved at various times in this ordeal.  

       Brown admitted to detectives that while  he was at the trailer, he guarded 

Esquibel with a gun, struck him in the head, and yelled at him.  He also admitted 

checking on Esquibel's claimed connections with a local gang and advised Burnham 

and the other captors that Esquibel, in fact, had no such connections.   Brown 

eventually distanced himself from the situation, although he continued to monitor it 

from his house.  

       Burnham's wife, Shannon Burnham, testified that Kosewicz arrived at the 

trailer for a short time.  Ms. Burnham testified that Kosewicz interrogated Esquibel

about the money and joined in the punching and kicking of Esquibel.  Kosewicz 

consistently disputed this testimony, claiming that he never harmed Esquibel.  

Kosewicz left the trailer with Esquibel still restrained inside.

       The next day, Burnham and two others took Esquibel by van to various 

places where Esquibel unsuccessfully tried to get the money.  Brown did not go in 

the van with Esquibel, but Burnham picked up Kosewicz on the way.  At some 

point,  Esquibel's    captors lost patience and drove the van far out into the 

countryside.  Burnham and Kosewicz exited the van with Esquibel and shot him in 

the head.  Whether Kosewicz actually pulled the trigger is not clear, but Kosewicz, 

Burnham, and Esquibel walked away from the vehicle, a shot was fired, and only 

                                               3 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

Kosewicz and Burnham returned.  

       The State charged Brown with several crimes, only two of which are relevant 

in this appeal -- felony murder and first degree kidnapping.  The felony murder 

charge was predicated on the felony of kidnapping in the first degree.  The 

information expressly limited Brown's first degree kidnapping charge by specifying 

that Brown, as an actor or accomplice, kidnapped Esquibel "with intent to inflict 

bodily harm."1     Clerk's Papers (CP) (Brown) at 148.  However, Brown's felony 

murder charge did not include the same limitation; the information alleged that 

Brown, as an actor or accomplice, murdered Esquibel in the course of "First Degree 

Kidnapping."  CP (Brown) at 148.  At trial, Brown's defense centered on disputing

his accomplice liability.  Although Brown admitted to detectives that he had hit, 

yelled at, and held Esquibel at gun point, his attorney summed up Brown's defense 

       1Kidnapping in the first degree is a multiple means crime that may be proved in five 
alternative ways:  
       (1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree if he intentionally abducts 
       another person with intent:
       (a) To hold him for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage; or
       (b) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
       (c) To inflict bodily injury on him; or
       (d) To inflict extreme mental distress on him or a third person; or
       (e) To interfere with the performance of any governmental function.
       (2) Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A felony.
RCW 9A.40.020.     The State may charge a defendant with one or all of the alternative means 
outlined in the statute.  State v. Bray, 52 Wn. App. 30, 34, 756 P.2d 1332 (1988).        If the 
information charges an alternative means crime, and lists only one alternative, it is error to instruct 
the jury that it may consider any of the other alternative means for the purposes of that charge.  
Id.
                                               4 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

as follows:

              The things you are going to hear from the evidence today are 
       that Mr. Brown was not part of this group.  That is so very, very 
       important.  I hope I can have your detailed attention to that, to watch 
       his individual actions in comparison with the group.  The evidence is 
       going to show that the group is Mr. Levoy Burnham, Carlton Hritsco, 
       Theodore Kosewicz, Shannon Burnham to some degree, Amber 
       Johnson, David Collins.  This is the group.  The evidence will show 
       that these are the people that actually acted as accomplices, that aided 
       in some way toward this goal that the state is here to prove today, the 
       goal of kidnapping, the goal of murder.  Their actions you will see.  
       Mr. Brown's actions on the outside.  The evidence is going to show 
       that.  

III Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Brown) at 383.  

       In a separate trial, the State also charged Kosewicz  with several crimes, 

including premeditated murder in the first degree with aggravating circumstances

and kidnapping in the first degree.   The aggravating circumstance was  that the 

murder was committed during the first degree kidnapping.   Similar to Brown, the 

State expressly limited the charge of kidnapping in the first degree, whether as an 

actor or accomplice,      to kidnapping "with intent to inflict bodily injury." CP 

(Kosewicz) at 36.  However, in the  charge of premeditated murder in the first 

degree with aggravating circumstances, the State did not include the same limitation, 

stating only that the murder was alleged to have occurred in the course of 

"kidnapping in the first degree."  CP (Kosewicz) at 36.  Kosewicz's defense also 

centered on disputing his accomplice liability.  Kosewicz admitted to detectives that 

                                               5 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

he knew Burnham wanted to scare Esquibel but that he had no knowledge of any 

intent to physically harm Esquibel.  At trial, Kosewicz clarified that the purpose for 

his presence in the van was "[j]ust to have [Burnham's] back, to make sure that 

nobody gets [Burnham] while he's trying to get [Esquibel] back."  VRP (Kosewicz) 

(Jan. 28, 2008) at 35-36. Kosewicz disputed the prosecution's assertion that he 

intended to scare Esquibel, or that he had ever told detectives that was his intent.  

Kosewicz consistently maintained throughout the trial that he neither physically 

harmed  Esquibel      nor knew of anyone else's intent to kill               Esquibel.    Thus, 

Kosewicz's defense appears to be that his mere presence was insufficient for him to 

be found guilty of kidnapping and murder.  

       The jury instructions in both Brown's               and Kosewicz's trial defined 

kidnapping in the first degree as "[a] person commits the crime of kidnapping in the 

first degree when he or she intentionally abducts another person with intent to inflict 

bodily injury on the person or to inflict extreme mental distress on that person or on 

a third person."  CP (Brown) at 358; CP (Kosewicz) at 97.                 Neither Brown nor 

Kosewicz objected to this instruction on the ground that it included the alternative 

means of intent to inflict extreme mental distress in addition to intent to inflict bodily 

injury.  Brown was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, and felony murder, 

with the predicate felony being kidnapping in the first degree.  Kosewicz was 

                                               6 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

convicted of kidnapping in the first degree and premeditated murder in the first 

degree.  In connection with the premeditated murder charge, the jury returned a 

special verdict finding the aggravating circumstance that Kosewicz's murder was 

committed in the course of kidnapping in the first degree.  

       In unpublished opinions, the Court of Appeals reversed both Brown's and 

Kosewicz's kidnapping convictions.  State v. Kosewicz, noted at 150 Wn. App. 

1055, 2009 WL 1765941; State v. Brown, noted at 156 Wn. App. 1035, 2010 WL 

2403353.  The Court of Appeals  held that the trial court's instructions violated 

Brown's and Kosewicz's right to adequate notice of the charges against them

because the instructions made it possible for the jury to convict Brown and 

Kosewicz of kidnapping in the first degree under an alternative means that was not 

included in their informations.  Kosewicz, 2009 WL 1765941, at *4-5; Brown, 2010 

WL 2403353, at *2-3.  Despite reversing the kidnapping convictions, the Court of 

Appeals upheld Brown's felony murder conviction  and  Kosewicz's premeditated

murder with aggravating circumstances conviction.  Kosewicz, 2009 WL 1765941, 

at *5; Brown, 2010 WL 2403353, at *5.  Brown and Kosewicz appealed, and we

consolidated their cases and granted review solely on the issues of whether the 

validity of the felony murder and aggravated murder convictions was affected by the 

reversal of the kidnapping convictions.  State v. Brown, 170 Wn.2d 1002, 245 P.3d 

                                               7 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

226 (2010); State v. Kosewicz, 168 Wn.2d 1026, 230 P.3d 1060 (2010).2

                                         ANALYSIS

       Because both Brown's and Kosewicz's first degree kidnapping convictions 

were reversed on the ground that the defendants were provided insufficient notice, 

we must decide whether that inadequate notice permeated the informations, 

requiring reversal of Brown's felony murder conviction and Kosewicz's aggravating 

factor verdict.  The accused in a criminal case has a constitutional right to notice of 

the alleged crime the State intends to prove. Wash. Const. art. I, § 22; U.S. Const. 

amend. VI.  Notice is provided through the information.  CrR 2.1(a)(1).  The State

must include all essential statutory and court imposed elements of an alleged crime 

in the information.  State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 101-02, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).  

The purpose of this essential elements rule is to sufficiently apprise the defendant of 

the charges against them so that he or she may prepare a defense.   Id. at 101.  

       Regarding Brown's felony murder charge, the State had the burden to prove 

that Brown "commit[ed] . . . kidnapping in the first or second degree, . . . and in the 

course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, [Brown], 

       2Kosewicz argues in his supplemental brief to this court that his aggravating factor of 
kidnapping in the first degree must be reversed because the jury instructions permitted the jury to 
find this sentencing enhancement under a theory of accomplice liability rather than direct liability.  
Kosewicz argues that this is a violation of his rights under article I, section 14 of the Washington 
Constitution ("Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishment 
inflicted.").  We did not accept review of this issue and decline to address this argument here. See 
RAP 2.3(e).
                                               8 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

or another participant, cause[d] the death of a person other than one of the 

participants."  RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c).   While                 a  predicate felony, such as 

kidnapping in the first degree, is an element of this  felony murder charge, the 

defendant is not actually charged with the underlying crime.  State v. Whitfield, 129 

Wash. 134, 139, 224 P. 559 (1924).  The predicate felony merely substitutes for the 

mental state the State is otherwise required to prove.  State v. Craig, 82 Wn.2d 777, 

781, 514 P.2d 151 (1973).        Therefore, Washington courts have long held that the 

underlying elements of the predicate felony are not essential elements of felony 

murder and do not have to be included in the information.  State v. Hartz, 65 Wn.

App. 351, 354, 828 P.2d 618 (1992) (citing State v. Anderson, 10 Wn.2d 167, 180, 

116 P.2d 346 (1941); State v. Ryan, 192 Wash. 160, 164-65, 73 P.2d 735 (1937); 

State v. Fillpot, 51 Wash. 223, 228, 98 P. 659 (1908)).  Because the elements of the 

predicate felony need not be pleaded, the information also does not need to specify 

the alternative means of committing a crime on which the State will ultimately rely.  

Id. at 354-55.  

       Brown's information included all of the required essential elements of his 

felony murder charge.  The information charged Brown with "caus[ing] the death of 

SEBASTIAN  L. ESQUIBEL" as either a principal                       or accomplice, "while 

committing or attempting to commit the crime of First Degree Kidnapping, and in 

                                               9 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

the course of and in furtherance of said crime and in immediate flight therefrom."  

CP (Brown) at 148.  Unlike Brown's stand-alone charge of kidnapping in the first 

degree, the State did not enumerate a particular alternative means of committing 

kidnapping for the purpose of felony murder.  Therefore, all alternative means of 

proving kidnapping in the first degree as a predicate felony could potentially be 

argued by the State.  Viewing Brown's  felony murder charge alone, the State 

pleaded all essential elements of the crime for the purpose of the constitutional 

notice requirements. 

       Regarding Kosewicz's aggravating factor verdict, his information alleged that 

Kosewicz, as an  actor or accomplice,  murdered Esquibel "in the course of, in 

furtherance of or immediate flight from the crime of First Degree Kidnapping."  CP 

(Kosewicz) at 132.  We recently held that an aggravated factor is not the functional 

equivalent of an essential element, and, thus, need not be charged in the information 

to provide adequate notice to the defendant.  State v. Siers, __ Wn.2d __, 274 P.3d 

358 (2012).     The holding in Siers adopted the lead opinion's decision in  State v. 

Powell, 167 Wn.2d 672, 223 P.3d 493 (2009) (plurality opinion),  that "'[d]ue

process is satisfied when the defendant receives sufficient notice from the State to 

prepare a defense against the aggravating circumstances that the State will seek to 

prove in order to support an exceptional sentence.'"  Siers, 274 P.3d at 362 (quoting 

                                               10 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

Powell, 167 Wn.2d at 682).  Due process was satisfied in Siers where the State 

provided notice to  the defendant  prior to trial that it intended to seek a good 

Samaritan aggravator on an assault charge.  Id.  This court has never held that where 

the aggravating factor requires proof of a separate offense, that the elements  or 

alternative means of proof of the separate offense must also be pleaded.  Requiring 

the State to plead the elements and alternative means of an underlying offense in an 

aggravating factor would be incongruous with our recognition above that the 

underlying elements and alternative means of a predicate felony need not be pleaded

in the information.  

       Kosewicz's information pleaded the elements of premeditated murder in the 

first degree and identified that  "the murder was committed in the course of, in 

furtherance of or in immediate flight from, the crime of Kidnapping in the First 

Degree." CP (Kosewicz) at 36.  The State gave notice of its intent to prove the 

kidnapping     aggravating factor      and included all the essential elements of 

premeditated murder in the first degree charge.  Therefore, viewing the first degree 

murder charge alone, Brown cannot argue that his notice was constitutionally 

inadequate for failure to plead the essential elements of the charged crime.

       Ordinarily, finding that all the essential elements of Brown's felony murder 

charge and Kosewicz's first degree murder charge were included in the information 

                                               11 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

would conclude our analysis, and both convictions would be affirmed.  However, 

this case presents unique circumstances.  Brown's and Kosewicz's informations are 

unusual because the source of the allegedly inadequate notice arose from the State 

limiting the stand-alone kidnapping charge to the alternative means of intent to 

inflict bodily injury, while placing no such limitation on the first degree kidnapping 

allegation when it was included as a predicate felony or aggravating factor.  Because 

only one kidnapping occurred, Brown and Kosewicz argue that they only had notice 

that the State intended to prove kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm for

all charged crimes where kidnapping in the first degree was at issue.  Recognizing 
the imprecise nature of the State's charging document,3 we proceed with our notice 

analysis, although the result is the same.  

       A defendant may bring a constitutional challenge to the information at any 

time before final judgment. City of Seattle v. Jordan, 134 Wash. 30, 34, 235 P. 6 

(1925).  However, when a party challenges the information for the first time on 

appeal, we apply the liberal construction rule.  Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 105-08. The 

       3In some sense, it is surprising that the parties failed to correct this issue sooner.  It is 
unclear why the State would choose to construct its charges against Kosewicz and Brown in such 
an unartful way.  The State could have enumerated the alternative means that it would attempt to 
prove in all counts where first degree kidnapping was at issue.  Alternatively, it is surprising that
neither Brown nor Kosewicz objected to two separate jury instructions enumerating the allegedly 
uncharged alternative means.  This issue could have been easily prevented by either the State 
taking  greater care in crafting the information or the defendants raising a timely objection or
moving for a bill of particulars to clarify the information.     
                                               12 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

liberal construction rule is a two pronged test that has been described as follows:

       When a defendant challenges the information for the first time on 
       appeal, we determine if the elements "appear in any form, or by fair 
       construction can they be found, in the charging document." [Kjorsvik, 
       117 Wn.2d] at 105. We read the information as a whole, according to 
       common sense and including facts that are implied, to see if it 
       "reasonably apprise[s] an accused of the elements of the crime 
       charged." Id. at 109. If it does, the defendant may prevail only if he can 
       show that the unartful charging language actually prejudiced him. Id. at 
       106.

State v. Nonog, 169 Wn.2d 220, 227, 237 P.3d 250 (2010) (second alteration in 

original).  "This 2-prong standard of review strikes a balance: on the one hand it 

discourages the defense from postponing a challenge to the charge knowing the 

charging document is flawed; on the other hand, it insures that the State will have 

given fair notice of the charge to the defendant."  Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106.

       Under the first prong of the liberal construction rule we inquire whether the 

allegedly missing alternative means can be found by fair construction in the whole of 

the charging document, thus reasonably apprising the defendants of the elements of

the crime charged.  Nonog, 169 Wn.2d at 227.            Brown's felony murder charge did 

not limit the alternative means to intent to inflict bodily injury.  The felony murder 

charge simply stated that Brown, "while committing or attempting to commit the 

crime of First Degree Kidnapping, and in the course of and in furtherance of said 

crime and in immediate flight therefrom, did cause the death of SEBASTIAN L. 

                                               13 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

ESQUIBEL."  CP (Brown) at 124 (emphasis added).                 Therefore, reading Brown's 

information as a whole, Brown was reasonably apprised that both intent to inflict 

bodily injury and intent to inflict emotional distress were at issue. 

       Similarly, Kosewicz was reasonably apprised that intent to inflict extreme 

mental distress was an alternative means to proving kidnapping in the first degree as 

an aggravating factor to premeditated murder.  His premeditated murder charge 

itself stated that the murder was "committed in the course of, in furtherance of or in 

immediate flight from, the crime of Kidnapping in the First degree." CP (Kosewicz) 

at 36.  No limitation on kidnapping in the first degree was included in this charge 

that would restrict the prosecution's case to proving only  intent to inflict bodily 

harm.  Thus, by fair construction, Kosewicz was reasonably appraised that the State 

could seek to prove kidnapping with intent to inflict extreme mental distress as an 

aggravating factor.

       Turning to the second prong  of the liberal  construction rule, we inquire 

whether the information's unartful language prejudiced the defendants.  Our analysis 

in Kjorsvik is instructive here.  In Kjorsvik, we held that the defendant had not been 

prejudiced by a charging document that failed to enumerate the common law 

element of robbery -- "intent to steal."  117 Wn.2d at 111.  In reaching this holding, 

the court noted that at trial the defendant did not make any argument that he lacked 

                                               14 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

the intent to steal and that the jury instructions, which were not objected to at trial,

clearly enumerated the missing common law intent element.  Id.  

       Brown's and Kosewicz's prejudice claim should be dismissed for similar 

reasons as the defendant in Kjorsvik.          Neither Brown's nor Kosewicz's defense 

depended on drawing a distinction between their intent to inflict bodily harm or their 

intent to inflict extreme mental distress.  Brown confessed to the police that he 

struck Esquibel during the kidnapping and that his associates tortured and intended 

to scare Esquibel into returning the money.  Brown only disputed that he committed 

or otherwise aided in the kidnapping and was not present during the planning or 

initiation of these crimes.  Brown essentially argues that he did nothing more than 

fail to come to the aid of the victim and thus lacks accomplice liability.  

       As for Kosewicz, on cross-examination he disputed the prosecution's 

assertion that he intended to physically harm or  scare  Esquibel.  In his opening 

statement, Kosewicz's attorney drew no distinction between Kosewicz's intent to 

cause bodily harm versus his intent to cause extreme mental distress.  Instead, he 

effectively  disputed both intents by arguing simply that Kosewicz was not an 

accomplice to the kidnapping or murder.  Both Brown's and  Kosewicz's defenses 

suggest that they were not prejudiced by a lack of notice because both defenses 

centered on them not being accomplices, not on whether they intended bodily harm 

                                               15 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

versus extreme mental distress.  

       Moreover, neither Brown nor Kosewicz objected to the jury instructions on 

the ground that the definition of kidnapping in the first degree expressly permitted 

the jury to convict if the jury found the defendants had the intent to inflict extreme 

mental distress.  In fact, both sets of jury instructions stressed both alternative 

means for proving kidnapping in the first degree in two separate jury instructions.  

At Kosewicz's trial, the State even moved to amend the to convict instruction for 

first degree kidnapping (instruction 14) to add language implicating accomplice

liability.  Even when this specific instruction is discussed in open court, Kosewicz 

declined to object to the unamended portion of the instruction that expressly 

includes intent to inflict extreme mental distress as an available alternative means of 

proof.   Given the failure to object to these jury instructions, and the nature of both 

defendants' cases turning on accomplice liability rather than their particular intent, 

we hold that neither Brown nor Kosewicz have demonstrated actual prejudice from 

the unartful language in their instructions.  Since we conclude that Brown's felony 

murder   charge  and Kosewicz's aggravated premeditated murder charge were

sufficient to give the defendants reasonable notice of the essential elements of the 

charges against them, and that they suffered no prejudice from the manner in which 

the crimes were charged, there is no reversible error and both convictions are 

                                               16 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

affirmed.

       The concurrence/dissent concedes that our recent decision in Siers requires 

affirming  Kosewicz's conviction.  Concurrence/dissent at 9.              It also admits  our

holding today with respect to Brown is consistent with our older cases.  Id. at 1.  

Nevertheless, the concurrence/dissent goes on to quarrel that our jurisprudence on 

this issue is a "series of technicalities" and complains there is no "intellectually 

satisfying reason to treat crimes that are elements of another crime differently for 

notice purposes than crimes that are charged."  Id. at 1, 3. The concurrence/dissent 

would ignore a long line of our cases tracing back to 1908.  Those cases explicitly 

distinguished between the essential elements necessary for a charged crime and 

those necessary for a predicate crime.  See Fillpot, 51 Wash. at 228.  

       We are unwilling to ignore, or dismiss as outdated, our case law on this issue.  

The defendant is not actually charged with the predicate crime and therefore the 

notice standard is different.  Our decision today also harmonizes our jurisprudence 

by acknowledging this distinction where an aggravating factor involves a separate 

offense.   In our view, it is not a mere technicality to hold that Brown and Kosewicz

received adequate constitutional notice of the charges against them.  This holding 

faithfully applies established and reasoned case law to the facts at hand under the 

proper standard of review.  

                                               17 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

                                       CONCLUSION

       Brown's  and Kosewicz's informations             provided sufficient notice of the 

charges against them.  We affirm Brown's conviction for felony murder.  We affirm 

Kosewicz's first degree kidnapping aggravating factor verdict and his conviction for 

premeditated murder in the first degree with aggravating circumstances.

                                               18 

State v. Kosewicz; State v. Brown, No. 83682-5

AUTHOR:
        Justice Mary E. Fairhurst

WE CONCUR:
        Chief Justice Barbara A. Madsen                  Justice James M. Johnson

                                                         Gerry L. Alexander, Justice Pro Tem.

        Justice Susan Owens

                                               19