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Court of Appeals Division III
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
29883-3 |
Title of Case: |
State of Washington v. Kouy Guy Chhong |
File Date: |
06/12/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Grant Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-00217-3 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 04/25/2011 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Evan E Sperline |
JUDGES
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Authored by | Kevin M. Korsmo |
Concurring: | Stephen M. Brown |
| Laurel H. Siddoway |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Andrea Burkhart |
| Burkhart & Burkhart PLLC |
| 6 1/2 N 2nd Ave Ste 200 |
| Walla Walla, WA, 99362-1855 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| D Angus Lee |
| Grant County Prosecuting Attorney |
| Po Box 37 Law And Justice Center |
| Ephrata, WA, 98823-0037 |
|
| Edward Asa Owens |
| Grant County Prosecutor's Office |
| Po Box 37 |
| Ephrata, WA, 98823-0037 |
|
| Steven Peter JohnsonJr. |
| Grant County Prosecutor's Office |
| Po Box 37 |
| Ephrata, WA, 98823-0037 |
FILED
JUNE 12, 2012
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 29883-3-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KOUY GUY CHHONG, )
)
Appellant. )
)
Korsmo, C.J. -- Kuoy Guy Chhong challenges the trial court's refusal to merge
two of his five felony convictions and also presents several pro se contentions. There
was no error. The convictions are affirmed.
FACTS
Mr. Chhong was a passenger in a car stopped for speeding. A backpack at his feet
contained a stolen handgun, marijuana, psychedelic mushrooms, $3,200 cash, scales, and
other paraphernalia associated with drug usage or distribution. He admitted ownership of
the backpack.
No. 29883-3-III
State v. Chhong
A jury ultimately concluded that Mr. Chhong was guilty on five felony counts: (1)
possession of a stolen firearm, (2) possession of marijuana with intent to deliver,
(3) possession of psilocin with intent to deliver, (4) possession of more than 40 grams of
marijuana, and (5) possession of psychedelic mushrooms. The jury also found that
counts two and three were committed while armed with a firearm.
At sentencing, the trial court merged count five into count three. The court also
declined to merge count four into count two. The court then imposed four concurrent
terms of confinement, the two largest of which were for 54 months. Mr. Chhong then
timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
Counsel argues that the trial court erred in its merger decision concerning the two
marijuana charges. Pro se, Mr. Chhong presents three claims in his Statement of
Additional Grounds (SAG). We first will address the merger argument before turning to
Mr. Chhong's pro se arguments.
Merger. Appellant argues that count four should merge with count two because it
elevated the offense in count two. It did not.
Whether or not multiple punishments are permitted for the same criminal act is
largely a question of legislative intent. State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155
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No. 29883-3-III
State v. Chhong
(1995). Courts apply the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct.
180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), to determine whether or not multiple punishments are
authorized. That test determines whether two crimes are the same offense by seeing if
each crime requires proof of elements not found in the other offense. Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304. In effect, then, the Blockburger test prohibits multiple convictions when one
crime is a lesser offense of the greater crime. In addition to comparing elements of the
offenses, Washington courts also look at whether the evidence proving one crime also
proved the second crime. In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 820-21, 100
P.3d 291 (2004).
In the context of overlapping criminal behavior that violates more than one statute,
this state also recognizes that offenses will merge when one crime elevates the degree of
another and there is no independent criminal purpose to the multiple offenses. State v.
Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 772-73, 108 P.3d 753 (2005).
Appellant properly recognizes that the two offenses have different elements.
Count two required proof of possession of some amount of marijuana and proof of intent
to distribute the substance. RCW 69.50.401(1). Count four required proof of possession
of marijuana in excess of 40 grams. RCW 69.50.4013. In light of these differences, the
two crimes are not the same under the Blockburger analysis. Accordingly, appellant's
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No. 29883-3-III
State v. Chhong
sole argument is that the felony marijuana possession offense elevated the delivery
offense. It did not.
Initially, we note that the crime of delivery of a controlled substance does not have
multiple degrees. There is only one crime of delivery of a controlled substance. On this
basis alone, appellant's "elevation" argument fails. It also fails on the behavioral level.
A person commits the crime of delivery of a controlled substance when she or he delivers
any amount of a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.401(1); State v. Jones, 25 Wn. App.
746, 749, 610 P.2d 934 (1980). A person commits felony level possession of marijuana
by possessing more than 40 grams of the substance. RCW 69.40.4013; Jones, 25 Wn.
App. at 749. The quantity of marijuana does not elevate or in any other manner change
the delivery offense.
Merger does apply when one crime is a constituent element of a greater offense.
An example is found in the robbery and assault statutes, the subject of the analysis in
Freeman. There, one of the defendants had been convicted of both first degree robbery
and second degree assault after an incident where he injured a woman with a punch prior
to taking property from her. 153 Wn.2d at 770. Since the infliction of injuries was
necessary to constitute a first degree robbery instead of a second degree robbery, the
assaultive conduct elevated the crime. Therefore the crimes merged. Id. at 778.
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No. 29883-3-III
State v. Chhong
Other divisions of this court previously have rejected arguments similar to what
appellant raises here. State v. Moore, 54 Wn. App. 211, 219-20, 773 P.2d 96 (1989);
Jones, 25 Wn. App. at 749-50.1 Jones involved delivery of marijuana and possession of
marijuana in excess of 40 grams. 25 Wn. App. at 748. The court concluded, solely on
the basis of the same evidence test that the two offenses were not the same. Id. at 749-50.
In Moore, the appellant argued that felony possession merged into his conviction for
manufacturing marijuana. Relying upon Jones, the Moore court rejected the argument on
the basis that no specific quantity was necessary to support a manufacturing conviction.
54 Wn. App. at 219-20.
Similar to Moore, there is no merger here because the felony possession charge
simply did not elevate or otherwise alter the delivery count in any manner. The
possession offense was unnecessary to prove any aspect of the delivery count. The trial
court correctly determined that the two offenses do not merge.
SAG Issues. Mr. Chhong raises three claims, which we will summarily address.
His first claim is that the evidence was insufficient to prove his possession of the
backpack. We are required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and
1 However, misdemeanor possession of less than 40 grams of marijuana does
merge into a delivery of marijuana conviction. State v. Rhodes, 18 Wn. App. 191, 567
P.2d 249 (1977).
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No. 29883-3-III
State v. Chhong
determine whether there was evidence from which the jury could find each element of the
offense was proved. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). In
light of Mr. Chhong's admission to ownership of the backpack seated at his feet, the
evidence was sufficient.
Mr. Chhong next argues that the jury instructions concerning the firearm
enhancements improperly required unanimity. This court has already determined that this
issue cannot be raised initially on appeal. State v. Nunez, 160 Wn. App. 150, 165, 248
P.3d 103, review granted, 172 Wn.2d 1004 (2011). Mr. Chhong does not demonstrate
that the defense objected to this instruction at trial. The issue therefore is without merit.
Finally, the SAG contends that trial counsel performed ineffectively by not
interviewing a witness. To prevail on this claim, Mr. Chhong must demonstrate that his
counsel failed to perform to the standards of the profession and that the error rendered the
verdicts unreliable. In addition, he must overcome a presumption of effectiveness; trial
tactics and strategy cannot be the basis for establishing error. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 689-92, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
The decision to interview a witness is a classic strategy decision. State v. Piche,
71 Wn.2d 583, 590, 430 P.2d 522 (1967). Thus, Mr. Chhong cannot show that counsel
erred. In addition, there is nothing in the record that explains what the witness would
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No. 29883-3-III
State v. Chhong
have testified about. Accordingly, there is no way of assessing whether the failure to call
the witness was harmful or not.
The SAG does not provide any basis for relief.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Korsmo, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Brown, J.
______________________________
Siddoway, J.
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