Find Legal Information

Opinion Information Sheet

			

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        )       NO. 67151-1-I
                                            )
                      Respondent,           )       DIVISION ONE
                                            )
                      v.                    )
                                            )
SINDY J. TRUONG,                            )       PUBLISHED OPINION
                                            )
                      Appellant.            )       FILED: May 29, 2012 
                                            )

       Lau, J.  --  Under our transactional analysis jurisprudence, an accused's use of 

force after the original taking to retain the personal property satisfies the force element 

of robbery.  Because Sindy Truong used force to overcome resistance to the taking and 

unchallenged findings support the conclusions of law, we affirm her juvenile convictions 

of first and second degree robbery involving two different victims.

                                            FACTS

       The unchallenged findings of fact show the following:  On the evening of 

November 19, 2010, Jason Decoste and Jessica Redmon-Beckstead were riding a bus 

home from a doctor appointment.  The couple sat in the back of the bus, listening to 

Redmon-Beckstead's Zune MP3 player (audio file format) with a shared set of  

67151-1-I/2

headphones.  Decoste held the Zune in his hand.  

       A group of female juveniles -- including Sindy Truong, Sha'raun Hill, Decontee 

Wea, Nyajouk Reath, and an unidentified adult female -- boarded the bus in downtown 
Seattle.1  Redmon-Beckstead did not know anyone in the group.  Decoste remembered 

Hill from a party he attended a year earlier.  Hill walked past Redmon-Beckstead and 

sat down.  She then repeatedly accused Decoste of taking her phone.  As Hill 

continued to shout at Decoste about the phone, Truong walked toward Hill, past 

Redmon-Beckstead and Decoste, and grabbed the Zune from his lap, detaching it from 
the headphones.2 Truong quickly passed the Zune to Wea.  

       Redmon-Beckstead immediately stood, confronted the girls, and demanded the 

Zune back.  They refused to return it.  Wea then sat in Redmon-Beckstead's seat next 

to Decoste and Hill sat on Decoste's lap.  Seeing Wea try to take her headphones from 

Decoste, Redmon-Beckstead moved to face Wea, Hill, and Decoste.  Redmon-

Beckstead took the headphones from Decoste and struggled with Wea over them.  

Wea pulled the headphones away and threw a punch at Redmon-Beckstead.  Truong 

immediately joined in punching Redmon-Beckstead.  When Decoste stood up to protect 

Redmon-Beckstead, Hill and Wea punched him.  Hill twice punched the back of 

Decoste's head with a closed fist.  

       1 Hill, Wea, and Reath were also charged for their participation.  Truong and Hill 
were tried together.  The fifth adult female remains unknown.

       2 Decoste testified, "I was holding the Zune, and then the Zune was out of my 
hand." RP (Mar. 11, 2011) at 68.

                                            -2- 

67151-1-I/3

       Hill then moved to stand in front of Decoste.  She continued to demand a phone 

from him while Wea grabbed an overhead bar and kicked Decoste's head several 

times.  Hill confronted Redmon-Beckstead and Decoste about the phone while Truong, 
Wea, and Reath searched Decoste's pockets.3 Decoste pushed their hands away, but 

Wea removed a pack of cigarettes from his right pocket as Hill watched.  

       Hill continued to argue with Redmon-Beckstead and Decoste about the phone 

while Truong, Wea, and the unidentified adult female punched Redmon-Beckstead and 
Decoste.4  Decoste and other passengers yelled for the driver to stop the bus.  Hill told 

a passenger that it was not necessary to stop the bus.  Truong and Wea searched

Redmon-Beckstead's pockets while Wea again grabbed an overhead bar and kicked 

Redmon-Beckstead's head several times.  Wea also kicked Decoste when he 

intervened.  

       The bus finally stopped and the rear door opened, allowing Redmon-Beckstead 

and Decoste to exit.  The group of five shouted at the driver to start driving.  When he 

declined, they exited and left the area.  Redmon-Beckstead received six stitches above 

her eye at the hospital.  

       The State charged Truong with two counts of first degree robbery -- one for 

Redmon-Beckstead's Zune and headphones and one for Decoste's cigarettes.  Based 

on an agreed motion from the State and Truong, the court waived application of 

       3 The briefs use the phrase "pocket check" to indicate insertion of the hands into 
the victim's pockets to check for items. Resp't's Br. at 5.

       4 Decoste repeatedly told the group that Redmon-Beckstead was pregnant and 
one of them commented, "Nobody hit her in the stomach."  
                                            -3- 

67151-1-I/4

exclusive adult jurisdiction and remanded the case to King County Juvenile Court.  

After a bench trial, the court found Truong guilty of first degree robbery of Redmon-

Beckstead.  The court acquitted Truong of first degree robbery of Decoste, but found 

her guilty of the lesser offense of second degree robbery.  Truong appeals both counts, 

arguing insufficient evidence to support the convictions.  

                                          ANALYSIS

       Standard of Review

       Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the State, it permits a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn. 2d 577, 586, 183 

P.3d 267 (2008).  "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and 

all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom."  State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 

192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).  We consider direct and circumstantial evidence 

equally reliable in weighing sufficiency of the evidence.  City of Seattle v. Meah, 165 

Wn. App. 453, 456, 267 P.3d 536 (2011).  We defer to the trier of fact on issues of 

conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of the evidence.  

State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).  Given the fact finder's 

opportunity to assess witness demeanor and credibility, we will not disturb those 

findings.  See State v. Pierce, 134 Wn. App. 763, 774, 142 P.3d 610 (2006).

       Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Because Truong assigns no error to the court's findings of fact except finding 11, 

they are verities on appeal.  State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).  

                                            -4- 

67151-1-I/5

As to finding 11, substantial evidence supports this finding.  Finding 11 states:

       As [Decoste] and other passengers yelled for the bus driver to stop, Truong and 
       Wea again began going through [Redmon-Beckstead's] pockets.  Wea then 
       again grabbed the overhead bar, and proceeded to kick [Redmon-Beckstead] 
       several times in the head.  When [Decoste] interposed himself between 
       [Redmon-Beckstead] and Wea, he also got kicked.

Both the metro surveillance videotape and Redmon-Beckstead's testimony amply 

establish that Wea went through her pockets after the bus stopped.  After several 

seconds, Truong also went through Redmon-Beckstead's pockets.  The entire incident 

was recorded by a metro surveillance camera, and the videotape -- including the audio 
portion -- was admitted at trial.5  Thus, the main issue here is the effect of force used 

after a taking is legally complete under our transactional analysis jurisprudence.  

       First Degree Robbery

       Truong argues that insufficient evidence supports her first degree robbery 

conviction because (1) no evidence supports the force element since she passed the 

Zune to Wea before using any force against Redmon-Beckstead and (2) no evidence 

shows that she took or touched the headphones.  The State counters that under State 

v. Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d 284, 830 P.2d 641 (1992), sufficient evidence supports 

Truong's conviction as a principal or accomplice to first degree robbery.

       A person is guilty of robbery when she unlawfully takes personal property from 

the person of another, or in his presence, against his will by the use, or threatened use, 

of force, violence, or fear of injury.  RCW 9A.56.190.  "Such force or fear must be used 

       5 The metro surveillance videotape indicates the incident lasted just under four 
minutes.  See Ex. 3.
                                            -5- 

67151-1-I/6

to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to 

the taking." RCW 9A.56.190.  "Any force or threat, no matter how slight, which induces 

an owner to part with his property, is sufficient to sustain a robbery conviction."  

Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d at 293; see also State v. Parra, 96 Wn. App. 95, 101-02, 977 

P.2d 1272 (1999).  If the person inflicts bodily injury in committing the crime, she is 

guilty of first degree robbery.  RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)(iii).

       We have adopted a "transactional" analysis of robbery, whereby the force or 

threat of force need not precisely coincide with the taking.  State v. Manchester, 57 Wn. 

App. 765, 770, 790 P.2d 217 (1990).  The taking is ongoing until the assailant has 

effected an escape.  Manchester, 57 Wn. App. at 770.  The definition of robbery thus 

includes "violence during flight immediately following the taking."  Manchester, 57 Wn. 

App. at 770; see also State v. Robinson, 73 Wn. App. 851, 856, 872 P.2d 43 (1994) 

("Pursuant to [the transactional view of robbery], a robbery can be considered an 

ongoing offense so that, regardless of whether force was used to obtain property, force 

used to retain the stolen property or to effect an escape can satisfy the force element of 

robbery.").  Citing Manchester, our Supreme Court endorsed the transactional analysis 

in Handburgh.  The Handburgh court noted, "Implicit in the Manchester holding is the 

assumption a taking can be ongoing or continuing so that the later use of force to retain 

the property taken renders the actions a robbery."  Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d at 290.  The 

court concluded:

              The plain language of the robbery statute says the force used may be 
       either to obtain or retain possession of the property.  We hold the force 
       necessary to support a robbery conviction need not be used in the initial 
       acquisition of the property.  Rather, the retention, via force against the property 

                                            -6- 

67151-1-I/7

       owner, of property initially taken peaceably or outside the presence of the 
       property owner, is robbery.

Handburgh, 119 Wn.2d at 293.  

       Truong relies on State v. Johnson, 155 Wn.2d 609, 121 P.3d 91 (2005), to argue 

that "in order to retain property through force, an individual must have actual or 

constructive possession of the property.  [Truong] gave up possession of the Zune 

within two seconds of taking it, and so could not have used force to have retained 

possession of the property." Appellant's Br. at 14 (citation omitted). In Johnson, the 

defendant walked into a store, loaded a television into a shopping cart, and pushed the 

cart out the front door.  Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 610.  Two security guards followed him 

into the parking lot and confronted him.  Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 610.  Johnson

abandoned the shopping cart and turned to run away but suddenly turned back.  

Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 610.  One of the guards grabbed Johnson's arm, and Johnson 

punched the guard and ran away.  Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 610.  The trial court 

convicted Johnson of first degree robbery and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Johnson, 

155 Wn.2d at 610.  In reversing Johnson's conviction, our Supreme Court cited 

Handburgh for the transactional view of robbery but distinguished the facts in 

Johnson's case from those in Handburgh:

              The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact state that Johnson was 
       trying to escape when he punched the security guard in the nose.  And the trial 
       court concluded that even though Johnson did not use force to obtain or retain 
       the property, he was guilty of the crime because the transactional view of 
       robbery includes force used during an escape.  But as noted above, the force 
       must relate to the taking or retention of the property, either as force used directly 
       in the taking or retention or as force used to prevent or overcome resistance to 
       the taking.  Johnson was not attempting to retain the property when he punched 
       the guard but was attempting to escape after abandoning it.

                                            -7- 

67151-1-I/8

Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 611 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).              

       Truong's reliance on Johnson is misplaced.  First, possession is not an essential 

element of robbery.  As discussed above, the elements of robbery are (1) the unlawful 

taking (2) of personal property (3) from the person or presence of another (4) against 

his will and (5) by the use or threatened use of immediate force.  RCW 9A.56.190; 

State v. Handburgh, 61 Wn. App. 763, 765, 812 P.2d 131 (1991) (rev'd on other 

grounds, 119 Wn.2d 284, 830 P.2d 641).  We have held that "first degree 

robbery . . . does not have possession as an essential element."  State v. Hayden, 28 

Wn. App. 935, 939, 627 P.2d 973 (1981); but see State v. White, 40 Wn. App. 490, 

495, 699 P.2d 239 (1985) (suggesting that whether first degree robbery includes 

possession "may be subject to some argument").  

       Second, in Johnson, the trial court applied transactional analysis to specifically 

find that the defendant used no force to obtain or retain the property.  Johnson, 155 

Wn.2d at 611.  Instead, the defendant used force to escape after abandoning the 

property. In rejecting the trial court's unwarranted "attempt to broaden the transactional 

view of robbery beyond the statutory elements of the crime," the court reasoned:

              This court in [Handburgh] rejected the common law view of robbery that 
       the force used during a robbery must be contemporaneous with the taking and 
       found the modern transactional view properly reflected Washington's robbery 
       statute.  In Handburgh, the defendant took a girl's bicycle while she was in a 
       recreation center.  When the girl saw the defendant riding her bicycle, she 
       demanded he return it and a fistfight ensued.  This court affirmed the 
       defendant's robbery conviction, holding that the plain language of the robbery 
       statute says the taking can take place outside the presence of the victim, and the 
       necessary force to constitute robbery can be found in the forceful retention of 
       stolen property that was peaceably taken.  The transactional view of robbery as 
       defined in Washington's robbery statute requires that the force be used to either 

                                            -8- 

67151-1-I/9

       obtain or retain property or to overcome resistance to the taking.
              The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact state that Johnson was 
       trying to escape when he punched the security guard in the nose.  And the trial 
       court concluded that even though Johnson did not use force to obtain or retain 
       the property, he was guilty of the crime because the transactional view of 
       robbery includes force used during an escape.  But as noted above, the force 
       must relate to the taking or retention of the property, either as force used directly 
       in the taking or retention or as force used to prevent or overcome resistance "to 
       the taking." Johnson was not attempting to retain the property when he punched 
       the guard but was attempting to escape after abandoning it.

Johnson, 155 Wn.2d at 611 (emphasis added).

       In contrast, the trial court here properly concluded that Truong used force to 

retain Redmon-Beckstead's property.  In addition to its unchallenged findings 
discussed above, the trial court's unchallenged oral finding6 states that Truong 

physically attacked Redmon-Beckstead "almost immediately after [Redmon-Beckstead] 

announced that it was her Zune and tried to get it back." RP (Mar. 28, 2011) at 134.  

As the record amply shows and the trial court found, Redmon-Beckstead attempted to 

retrieve her Zune even after Truong used force against her.  Unlike in Johnson, no 

evidence here shows the force was used to effect an escape.  We conclude that viewed 

in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient evidence supports the court's proper 

conclusion that Truong took Redmon-Beckstead's Zune and used force to overcome 

Redmon-Beckstead's efforts to resist the taking.  

       While it is unnecessary to address Truong's challenge related to Redmon-

       6 Generally "[a] trial court's oral decision has no binding or final effect unless it is 
formally incorporated into findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment."  State v. 
Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 39 n.1, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004). Here, the trial court expressly 
incorporated its oral findings and conclusions in its written findings and conclusions.  
Thus, the oral findings are binding.  

                                            -9- 

67151-1-I/10

Beckstead's headphones given our disposition above, we nonetheless conclude that the trial court 

properly found and concluded that Truong was an accomplice to first degree robbery when she 

assisted others in the robbery of Redmon-Beckstead's headphones.7

       A robbery conviction may be based on accomplice liability.  Under RCW 

9A.08.020(3)(a)(i)-(ii), an accomplice is one who, "[w]ith knowledge that it will promote 

or facilitate the commission of the crime . . . encourages . . . or aids" another person in 

committing a crime.  In other words, an accomplice associates himself with the venture 

and takes some action to help make it successful.  In re Welfare of Wilson, 91 Wn.2d 

487, 491, 588 P.2d 1161 (1979).  The evidence must show that the accomplice aided in 

the planning or commission of the crime and that he had knowledge of the crime.  State 

v. Trout, 125 Wn. App. 403, 310, 105 P.3d 69 (2005).  Where criminal liability is 

predicated on accomplice liability, the State must prove only that the accomplice had 

general knowledge of his coparticipant's substantive crime, not that the accomplice had 

specific knowledge of the elements of the coparticipant's crime.  State v. Rice, 102 

Wn.2d 120, 125, 683 P.2d 199 (1984).

       Mere presence of the defendant without aiding the principal -- despite knowledge 

of the ongoing criminal activity -- is not sufficient to establish accomplice liability.  State 

v. Parker, 60 Wn. App. 719, 724-25, 806 P.2d 1241 (1991).  Rather, the State must 

prove that the defendant was ready to assist the principal in the crime and that he 

shared in the criminal intent of the principal, thus "demonstrating a community of 

       7 With the intent to commit theft, taking the personal property of another is an 
essential element of robbery.  Here, the State is not required to show intent to take both 
the Zune and headphones.  See State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 107 P.3d 728 (2005).
                                            -10- 

67151-1-I/11

unlawful purpose at the time the act was committed."  State v. Castro, 32 Wn. App. 559, 

564, 648 P.2d 485 (1982); see also State v. Collins, 76 Wn. App. 496, 501-02, 886 

P.2d 243 (1995) ("Aid can be accomplished by being present and ready to assist."); 

State v. Rotunno, 95 Wn.2d 931, 933, 631 P.2d 951 (1981); Wilson, 91 Wn.2d at 491.

       Truong argues insufficient evidence to support her first degree robbery 

conviction involving the headphones.  She mistakenly claims, "[T]here is no allegation 

or charge of accomplice liability.  Likewise, the court did not conclude that [Truong] 

acted as an accomplice with respect to the Zune or the headphones.  Thus, the 

question is whether the evidence was sufficient for [Truong] to be convicted as a 

principal . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 8-9 (citations omitted).  She otherwise provides no 

accomplice liability argument.  The amended information alleged that Truong, "together 

with others," robbed Redmon-Beckstead of her headphones.  The court's unchallenged 

accomplice liability determination states, "It was a serious attack, and it was an attack 

in concert with

Ms. Hill, Ms. We[a], Ms. Re[a]th, the adult whose name I don't believe was ever put in 

record, all of them acted together."  RP (Mar. 28, 2011) at 134 (emphasis added).  

       Pointing to the metro surveillance videotape, Truong argues that "significant 

evidence shows that the headphones were never taken from Mr. Decoste in the first 

place." Appellant's Reply Br. at 16.  Truong also cites Hill's testimony at trial, where 

Hill stated, "[B]y looking at the video, I see a pair of headphones in [Decoste's] hands, 

so I don't think they were taken." RP (Mar. 24, 2011) at 74.  We decline to reweigh the 

evidence.  The unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. The trial judge is entitled 

                                            -11- 

67151-1-I/12

to believe one witness over another.  Given the fact finder's opportunity to assess 

witness demeanor and credibility, we will not disturb those findings.  See Pierce, 134 

Wn. App. at 774.  In addition to the court's accomplice liability finding discussed above, 

the court found that Truong "immediately started punching [Redmon-Beckstead]," after 

"Wea pulled the headphones away from [Redmon-Beckstead]." Truong does not 

dispute that Redmon-Beckstead suffered bodily injury resulting from the "series of 

assaults."     

       Second Degree Robbery

       Truong contends that the evidence is insufficient to show she was an accomplice 

to second degree robbery of Decoste's cigarettes.  The State responds that the 

evidence sufficiently indicates Truong knowingly aided Wea in the robbery.

       All robberies not constituting first degree robbery are second degree robbery.  

RCW 9A.56.210.  As discussed above, an accomplice is one who, "[w]ith knowledge 

that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime . . . encourages . . . or aids"

another person in committing a crime.  RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(i)-(ii).  Mere presence 

with knowledge of the criminal activity does not support a finding of accomplice liability, 

but "[a]id can be accomplished by being present and ready to assist."  Collins, 76 Wn. 

App. at 501-02 (emphasis added).

       In addition to the unchallenged findings discussed above, the findings state that 

Truong, Wea, and Reath searched through Decoste's pockets, Wea removed the 

cigarettes, and Truong, Wea, and the unidentified adult female punched Decoste and 
Redmon-Beckstead.8 We conclude that the unchallenged findings support Truong's 

                                            -12- 

67151-1-I/13

second degree robbery conviction.  And the findings support the court's conclusions of law.  This 

challenge fails.

                                        CONCLUSION

       Because sufficient evidence supports                                                     T

ruong's first and second degree robbery                                                         c

onvictions, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

       8 In its unchallenged oral ruling regarding robbery of Decoste's cigarettes, the 
court found that Truong "had been using force throughout this incident, both before 
and, in fact, somewhat afterwards." RP (Mar. 28, 2011) at 135.
                                            -13-