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Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Parentage of P.M.M.
                                                  )         No. 67533-8-I
 KEVIN COLUMBA McGLYNN,
                                                  )         DIVISION ONE
                       Appellant,
                                                  )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                and
                                                  )
 KLAUDIA KATARZYNA BATKIEWICZ,                              FILED: May 29, 2012
                                                  )
                       Respondent.
                                                  )

                                                  )

                                                  )

                                                  )

                                                  )

                                                  )

       Appelwick, J.  --  McGlynn seeks reversal of the order dismissing his action for a 

parenting plan and support order for his minor son, P.M.M.           Pursuant to the Uniform 

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, chapter 26.27 RCW, Washington is 

the home state of P.M.M. and had jurisdiction to establish a parenting plan and order 

child support.  But, the superior court determined that Poland is a more convenient  

No. 67533-8-I/2

forum, declined jurisdiction, and dismissed the action.  We affirm.

                                            FACTS

       Kevin McGlynn and Klaudia Batkiewicz met while traveling abroad.  McGlynn is 

a dual citizen of Ireland and the United States and resides in Washington.  Batkiewicz 

is a Polish citizen.  While outside the United States, they conceived a child.  Batkiewicz 

came to the United States on June 4, 2007 on a tourist visa and gave birth to P.M.M.

on September 20, 2007, in Washington.  Due to complications during P.M.M.'s birth, he 

stayed in Washington through the end of 2007 to receive special medical care.  

       In January 2008, McGlynn, Batkiewicz, and P.M.M. flew to Poland together.  A

week later, McGlynn returned to Washington alone.  Batkiewicz and P.M.M. stayed in 

Poland.  In February, McGlynn met Batkiewicz and P.M.M. in Barbados for a ten day 

vacation.  McGlynn claims he purchased a ticket for Batkiewicz and P.M.M. to return to 

Washington from Barbados, and that Batkiewicz agreed to do so.  He claims that, 

instead, she changed her mind and they agreed she would temporarily return to Poland 

with P.M.M.  In April and May, McGlynn made two trips to Poland where he 

unsuccessfully tried    to convince Batkiewicz to return to Washington with P.M.M.  

P.M.M. and Batkiewicz have resided in Poland ever since.

       These events spawned a series of overlapping legal actions in the United States 

and Poland.    On June 27, 2008, McGlynn filed a petition for a parenting plan and child 

support in King County Superior Court.  On April 3, 2009, the superior court granted 

Batkiewicz's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  But, on January 

25, 2010, this court reversed that order, determining that Washington was P.M.M.'s 

home state and that Washington had subject matter jurisdiction.  In re the Parentage of 

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No. 67533-8-I/3

McGlynn, noted at 154 Wn. App. 1020, 2010 WL 276159, at *5.  In doing so, we noted 

that the superior court did not have to exercise its jurisdiction if it determined that 

Washington is an inconvenient forum and Poland is a more appropriate forum.  Id.

       On October 24, 2008, after McGlynn filed his petition in King County, a family 

court in Nowy Targ, Poland granted Batkiewicz exclusive care and custody of P.M.M.  

We do not have a copy of that order, but we noted in our previous decision that it 

appears to be similar to a temporary custody order.  Id. at *1.  McGlynn claims he had 

no notice or opportunity to be heard before the court made its ex parte decision.  On 

January 5, 2009, he signed a document granting Polish attorney Joanna Trojanowska

power of attorney regarding the Polish family court matter.  On January 13, 2009

Trojanowska filed a notice of appearance with the court.  Neither party asserts there 

has been any further activity in the Polish family court.

       On February 4, 2009, after his attorney filed a notice of appearance in the family 

court proceeding, McGlynn filed a petition to release P.M.M. in the Polish regional court 

in Nowy Targ under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 

Abduction.  The regional court dismissed the petition on May 25, 2010.  McGlynn 

appealed the dismissal to the district court in Nowy Sacz, Poland.  On March 3, 2011, 

the appellate court reversed the regional court in part and found that P.M.M. had been 

wrongfully retained in violation of the Hague Convention.  Despite that finding, it 

declined to return P.M.M. to McGlynn, because it determined that it would not be in 

P.M.M.'s best interest to separate him from Batkiewicz.  That decision was largely 

based on a report from the Family Diagnostic and Consultation Centre, which the court 

indicated was not challenged by McGlynn.  In the report, experts determined that 

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No. 67533-8-I/4

releasing P.M.M. would be traumatic, expose P.M.M. to psychological harm, and place 

P.M.M. in an intolerable situation.  The report further stated that a drastic change in the 

environment and people around him, in addition to the language barrier, would surpass 

P.M.M.'s adaptation skills.  

       On June 27, 2011, the superior court in King County determined that 

Washington is an inconvenient forum and that Poland is a more appropriate forum.  It 

declined  jurisdiction  and dismissed McGlynn's petition.  On July 11, it denied 

McGlynn's motion for reconsideration.  

                                        DISCUSSION

       The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), chapter

26.27 RCW, is a jurisdictional statute intended to determine which of the several states

can properly assert jurisdiction.  When a competing forum is a foreign country, it is 

treated as if it were a state of the United States.  RCW 26.27.051.  The UCCJEA

should be interpreted to "[a]void jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of 

other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of 

children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being."  UCCJEA § 101, 9 

pt. 1A U.L.A. at 657 (1999).      Further, it is intended to "[d]iscourage the use of the 

interstate system for continuing controversies over child custody," and "[d]eter 

abductions of children."  Id.  

       A court that has jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJEA may decline to exercise 

jurisdiction if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another 

state is a more appropriate forum.  RCW 26.27.261.  The declining court must first 

consider eight factors:

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No. 67533-8-I/5

              (a)     Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to 
       continue in the future and which state could best protect the parties and 
       the child;
              (b)     The length of time the child has resided out of this state;
              (c)     The distance between the court in this state and the court in 
       the state that would assume jurisdiction;
              (d)     The relative financial circumstances of the parties;
              (e)     Any agreement of the parties as to which state should 
       assume jurisdiction;
              (f)     The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve 
       the pending litigation, including testimony of the child;
              (g)     The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue 
       expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
              (h)     The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and 
       issues in the pending litigation.

RCW 26.27.261(2).

       Here, the superior court found:

       1.  Washington is an inconvenient forum for resolution of this matter as 
       defined by RCW 26.27.261.  The child has resided outside the State of 
       Washington for the majority of his life and has resided consistently in 
       Poland since January 2008.  The financial resources of the parties are not 
       largely disparate and Mr. McGlynn has already demonstrated the ability to 
       travel to Poland multiple times.  Because [P.M.M.]            has remained in 
       Poland since January 2008, all of the evidence concerning his present 
       circumstances and care is located in Poland.  Other than Mr. McGlynn, all 
       of the witnesses who have interacted significantly with [P.M.M.], including 
       his day care providers, doctors, relatives and his mother are located in 
       Poland.  Further, Poland has already asserted jurisdiction over [P.M.M.'s]
       residential schedule and Mr. McGlynn has participated in those court 
       proceedings.  It is acknowledged that Poland is not a convenient forum for 
       Mr. McGlynn.  However, the potential inconvenience to Mr. McGlynn is far 
       outweighed by the benefit of deciding this matter decided in Poland where 
       the child, the mother, and substantial evidence concerning the child's 
       welfare are located.

       2.  It is clear from the record provided to this court that the Polish Court is 
       familiar with the facts and issues in this case.

              3.  Petitioner has failed to provide persuasive evidence that he will 
       be denied due process if the dispute is adjudicated in Poland.

                                                   5 

No. 67533-8-I/6

       McGlynn argues that evaluating P.M.M.'s  contacts  with Poland as they exist 

now, rather than as they existed when McGlynn filed his petition in King County, 

violates policy objectives to prevent forum shopping and deter child abductions.  With 

that in mind, he argues that the superior court's findings were not supported by 

substantial evidence and that the court abused its discretion by declining jurisdiction.  

He also argues that the decision deprives him of due process of law, and that the 

superior court abused its discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration.

   I.  Dismissal

       We review the superior court's decision to dismiss on grounds that Washington 

courts are an inconvenient forum for an abuse of discretion.  Myers v. Boeing Co., 115 

Wn.2d 123, 128, 794 P.2d 1272 (1990).  To the extent the decision involved findings of 

fact, those findings must be supported by substantial evidence.  McCleary v. State, 173 

Wn.2d 477, 514, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).

       A.     Consideration of facts arising after the action commenced

       McGlynn's central argument is that the superior court acted against public policy 

by considering P.M.M.'s contacts in Poland that have arisen since the King County 

petition was filed.  He argues that to do so would reward forum shopping which is 

against public policy.   His argument would be correct if the issue here was whether 

Washington has jurisdiction, as opposed to whether Washington should exercise that 

jurisdiction.  

       RCW 26.27.201, which deals with making an initial child custody determination, 

is the anti-forum shopping provision of the statute.  It states that jurisdiction exists if 

Washington is the child's home-state "on the date of the commencement of the 

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No. 67533-8-I/7

proceeding."  Id.  Indeed, case law confirms that allowing a parent to obtain jurisdiction 

by abducting the child and generating new considerations and new evidence in a new 

state circumvents the intent of the jurisdiction laws.  In re Marriage of Hamilton, 120 

Wn. App. 147, 156, 84 P.3d 259 (2004).  But, RCW 26.27.201 and the cases cited by 

McGlynn deal only with establishing jurisdiction, not declining jurisdiction on forum non 

conveniens grounds under RCW 26.27.261.  See, e.g., Id.; In re Custody of A.C., 165 

Wn.2d 568, 200 P.3d 689 (2009).

       In contrast, RCW 26.27.261 does not state that the court can only consider 

evidence that existed at the time the action was commenced.               In fact, it expressly 

provides that the court shall consider current factors.  Id.  For instance, it directs the 

court to consider whether domestic violence will occur in the future, how long the child 

has resided outside Washington, and the nature and location of evidence.  Id.            Those 

factors necessarily require looking at current circumstances, not the circumstances that 

existed when the petition was originally filed.  

       If the sole purpose of the UCCJEA was to litigate where there were the most 

contacts at the time the petition was filed, then litigation would be restricted to the home 

state and there would be no forum non conveniens provision.  But, that is not the sole 

purpose.   The statute recognizes that litigation will not and should not always proceed 

in the home state of the child.  It vests that decision within the discretion of the court 

that maintains lawful jurisdiction.

       The superior court was entitled to consider contacts that have arisen since the 

King County petition was filed.    

       B.     Consideration of the statutory factors  

                                                   7 

No. 67533-8-I/8

       McGlynn argues that the superior court erred by not making written findings 

analyzing each statutory factor.  We need not decide whether the statute requires the 

superior court to make findings on each relevant factor; the court did make such 

findings here.  The parties acknowledge that factors (a) and (e) do not apply.  We

consider the rest of the RCW 26.27.261(2) factors in turn.  

       RCW 26.27.261(2)(b) The length of time the child has resided outside this state

       The superior court determined that P.M.M. lived in Poland for the majority of his 

life and had lived there consistently since January 2008.  These facts findings  are 

undisputed and supported by substantial evidence.  

       RCW 26.27.261(2)(c) The distance between the court in this state and the court 

in the state that would assume jurisdiction

       The superior court noted that the new forum was inconvenient for McGlynn, but 

that the burden was outweighed by the burden of bringing Batkiewicz, P.M.M., and 

evidence to Washington.  McGlynn correctly asserts that RCW 26.27.111 explicitly 

allows telephonic appearances, which would mitigate the burden on Batkiewicz.  

Nevertheless, in light of Batkiewicz's presence in Poland, and the existence of Polish 

witnesses and physical evidence located in Poland and written in Polish, the superior 

court's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

       RCW 26.27.261(2)(d) The relative financial circumstances of the parties

       The superior court found  that the "financial resources of the parties are not 

largely disparate."  In a declaration, McGlynn           stated that Batkiewicz owns two 

residences and a commercial building, and that Batkiewicz was living in a $6,500 per 

month London flat when they met.  Batkiewicz argues that McGlynn has greater 

                                                   8 

No. 67533-8-I/9

financial resources, because he travels to Poland to visit P.M.M.                  and attend 

proceedings, and he paid for Batkiewicz's travel to Washington and Barbados.  The 

superior court's determination that the parties do not have "largely disparate" financial 

resources is supported by substantial evidence.

       RCW 26.27.261(2)(f) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve 

the pending litigation, including testimony of the child

       The superior court determined that, other than McGlynn, all of the witnesses who 

have interacted with P.M.M. in the last three years are in Poland.  Those witnesses 

include his mother, his mother's family, day care providers, and  doctors.  McGlynn 

argues that Batkiewicz did not provide proof that P.M.M. is receiving necessary medical 

care in Poland.  But, in making a jurisdictional decision, the superior court was not 

required to make a substantive conclusion regarding what medical care P.M.M. was 

receiving  or whether that care was adequate.            Further, McGlynn's argument that 

Batkiewicz must provide evidence of P.M.M.'s medical care in Poland is misplaced.  

One of the factors in forum non conveniens analysis is to determine if there is evidence 

that is located in the foreign jurisdiction.  The fact that the Polish medical records are 

not available in Washington is precisely the point.  If all of the evidence and witnesses 

were available in Washington, then the forum non conveniens analysis would be 

unnecessary.  The superior court's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

       RCW 26.27.261(2)(g) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue 

expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence

       The superior court determined that "Poland has already asserted jurisdiction 

over [P.M.M.'s] residential schedule and Mr. McGlynn has participated in those court 

                                                   9 

No. 67533-8-I/10

proceedings."  McGlynn argues that the superior court should not have relied on the 

Polish court's assertion of jurisdiction, because it disregarded Washington law by 

awarding Batkiewicz custody while the King County petition was pending.  He also 

argues that he did not participate in the custody proceedings, because he did not 

receive notice or an opportunity to be heard before the temporary custody order was 

entered.  

       RCW     26.27.251 provides that, "a court of this state may not exercise its 

jurisdiction under this article if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a 

proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of 

another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter."  It was 

improper under Washington law for the Polish family court to enter a temporary custody 

order.  Thus, McGlynn argues that we cannot give the Polish family court's custody 

decision full faith and credit.  We do not; that is not the issue before us.  The superior 

court did not defer to the Polish family court's initial substantive determination.  Rather, 

it cited Poland's action as evidence that the Polish courts are willing and able to 

preside over the matter, which is appropriate for the superior court's purely 

jurisdictional decision.

       With regard to the superior court's finding that McGlynn participated in the 

Polish proceedings, McGlynn asserts that he did not receive notice or an opportunity to 

be heard before the temporary custody order was entered in the Polish family court.  

He argues that, although he participated in the Hague Convention proceedings, that 

court could not have resolved the merits of the underlying custody claims.  In re 

Application of Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991).  

                                                  10 

No. 67533-8-I/11

       McGlynn may not have received proper notice prior to the Polish family court's 

initial decision. We cannot resolve that issue on the record before us.               However, 

subsequent to the initial decision, he appointed an attorney who appeared in the 

matter.  He has not made any argument that he did not have an opportunity to appeal 

the temporary custody decision.  Without an appropriate record, which McGlynn has 

not provided, we are left to speculate whether he has or has not been afforded a 

subsequent opportunity to be heard on the merits of a final decision.  

       However, he initiated and actively participated in another action in Poland, and 

in fact in the same city.  Even if the court in the Hague Convention proceedings could 

not have set a parenting plan and child support as McGlynn asserts, it had an 

opportunity to effectively vitiate that initial order and order Batkiewicz to return P.M.M.

to McGlynn.  The court ruled the child had been wrongfully retained.  In considering 

P.M.M.'s best interests, it relied on an expert evaluation of the affects on the child of 

being moved.  McGlynn did not challenge that report.  Based on the evaluation's 

recommendation, the court declined to return P.M.M.  

       The superior court's finding that Poland's action is evidence that the Polish 

courts are willing and able to preside over the matter is supported by substantial 

evidence.

       RCW 26.27.261(2)(h) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and 

issues in the pending litigation

       The superior court determined that the Polish court is familiar with the facts and 

issues in the case.  McGlynn argues that there is no evidence that Polish courts are 

more familiar with the case than Washington courts.  But, there is no dispute that all 

                                                  11 

No. 67533-8-I/12

records and contacts with the child for three years are in Poland.                The original 

proceeding and the Hague Convention proceeding, which included an expert 

evaluation of the impacts on the child of being taken from his mother, took place there.  

We do not have copies of the court records or the evaluation.  The superior court's 

statement that the Polish courts are familiar with the case is supported by substantial 

evidence.

       Based on these findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the case on forum non conveniens

grounds.

   II. Due Process

       McGlynn argues that he has not received due process in Poland, that Batkiewicz 

has not provided evidence of due process rights in Poland, and that the superior court 

thus deprived him of his due process rights by declining jurisdiction.  McGlynn also 

argues that the superior court improperly placed the burden on him to prove that he 

would be denied due process rights in Poland.  

       We review alleged constitutional due process violations de novo.  Post v. City of 

Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 308, 217 P.3d 1179 (2009). Due process requires notice and 

an opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Tsarbopoulos, 125 Wn. App. 

273, 281, 104 P.3d 692 (2004).  And, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the 

care and custody of their children.  See, e.g., In re Dependency of J.H., 117 Wn.2d 

460, 473, 815 P.2d 1380 (1991).  But, there is no legal authority for McGlynn's 

assertion that the burden should have been on Batkiewicz to prove McGlynn would 

receive due process rights in Poland.  Normally, the party asserting a constitutional 

                                                  12 

No. 67533-8-I/13

violation has the burden of proving the violation.  See, e.g., State v. Momah, 141 Wn. 

App. 705, 706, 171 P.3d 1064 (2007), aff'd, 167 Wn.2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009).  The 

UCCJEA provides that the superior court may decline to apply the statute if a foreign 

jurisdiction violates fundamental principles of human rights, but makes no mention of 

due process.  RCW 26.27.051(3).  There is no provision that requires the party seeking 

to remove a case  from Washington to affirmatively prove that due process will be 

afforded in the foreign jurisdiction.  

       The entirety of McGlynn's due process argument is that Batkiewicz has not 

afforded him adequate visitation with P.M.M., and that he did not receive notice before 

the temporary custody order was entered.        Whether Batkiewicz has afforded McGlynn 

adequate visitation is an enforcement issue separate from the jurisdictional issue here.  

Batkiewicz's alleged personal restrictions on visitation are a substantive issue to be 

dealt with in an enforcement context.  There is no enforcement order before us.           Since 

jurisdiction has been properly declined, enforcement is a question under Polish law. 

       As we already noted, McGlynn may not have received proper notice prior to the 

Polish family court's initial decision.  We cannot tell on the record before us.        But, he 

subsequently appointed an attorney who appeared in the matter.  Then, he actively 

participated in another action that he initiated in Poland.  He has not articulated why 

there has been no further activity in the original Polish family court proceeding, but it 

was suggested at oral argument that the proceedings were stayed pending the 

outcome of the Hague Convention proceedings.  McGlynn has not made any argument 

that he did not have an opportunity to appeal the temporary custody decision.  

       Further, the court in the Hague Convention proceedings had an opportunity to 

                                                  13 

No. 67533-8-I/14

effectively vitiate that initial order and order Batkiewicz to return P.M.M. to McGlynn 

after it determined that P.M.M. was wrongfully retained.  It is clear McGlynn participated 

in that proceeding.  The court found in his favor on wrongful retention.  The court noted 

that McGlynn did not challenge the report of the experts who evaluated whether P.M.M.

should be returned.    The inference is that he could have done so.  The decision not to 

return the child turned on that evaluation report.  Had the decision gone the other way, 

which it could have, the original Polish order would have been of no effect against 

McGlynn.  Though he lost on the merits, the record lacks evidence that McGlynn was 

denied due process in Poland.  

       It cannot be said that,      by declining jurisdiction,  the  superior court denied 

McGlynn due process by virtue of process or result.

   III. Motion for Reconsideration

       We review the superior court's denial of McGlynn's motion for reconsideration 

for an abuse of discretion.  Kleyer v. Harborview Med. Ctr. of Univ. of Wash., 76 Wn. 

App. 542, 545, 887 P.2d 468 (1995).  

       In addition to reiterating his original arguments, McGlynn argued in his motion 

for reconsideration that the superior court should have retained jurisdiction because 

Batkiewicz engaged in unjustifiable conduct, and that the superior court should have 

held an evidentiary hearing to determine if McGlynn was denied due process in Poland.

       RCW 26.27.271 provides that Washington should not assert jurisdiction if the 

person attempting to invoke jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct.  McGlynn 

argues that Batkiewicz's wrongful retention of P.M.M. is unjustifiable conduct.  But, 

even if it is, Washington is not asserting jurisdiction.  It is undisputed that Washington 

                                                  14 

No. 67533-8-I/15

had rightful jurisdiction.  RCW 26.27.271 does not apply to a forum non conveniens 

decision to decline jurisdiction and the superior court did not abuse its discretion by 

refusing to maintain jurisdiction based on Batkiewicz's alleged unjustifiable conduct.

       McGlynn  also asserts that he was denied due process because the superior 

court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was afforded due 

process in Poland, whether P.M.M. receives medical care in Poland, and whether 

McGlynn has been denied meaningful visitation with P.M.M..                   RCW     26.27.101 

provides:

       (1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state 
       concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter.

       (2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication.  If 
       the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be 
       given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a 
       decision on jurisdiction is made.

McGlynn argues that this provision creates a due process mechanism that guarantees 

him a right to be heard before a jurisdictional decision is made.  That assertion is 

incorrect.  The statute only provides that, if a court communicates with a court in 

another state and the parties do not participate in that communication, then the parties 

are entitled to a hearing.  Id.  But, the superior court did not communicate with the 

Polish family court.  RCW 26.27.261 does not require the superior court to consult with 

a foreign court before declining jurisdiction, nor does it mandate an evidentiary hearing.  

Further, whether  P.M.M. receives adequate medical care and whether McGlynn is 

receiving meaningful visitation rights are substantive issues that the superior court was 

not required to consider, let alone decide.  It was not an abuse of discretion to deny 

McGlynn's request for an evidentiary hearing.

                                                  15 

No. 67533-8-I/16

       We understand the pain McGlynn must feel due to his son residing in Poland 

and having limited contact with him.  But, a child cannot be in two places at once and 

the result in this case should not be surprising.  Batkiewicz and McGlynn met abroad.  

They were only in Washington together for part of Batkiewicz's pregnancy and the first 

few months of P.M.M.'s life.  P.M.M. only lived in Washington during the short period 

after his birth when he was receiving necessary medical care.  Batkiewicz is Polish, 

maintained her Polish citizenship and residence, and asserts she never had any intent 

to remain in Washington.  And, P.M.M.'s contacts with Poland were, at least initially, 

consensual.  Here, the superior court considered the great burden of maintaining 

McGlynn's parenting plan petition in Washington and understandably concluded that it 

would  be more expeditious to grant jurisdiction to Poland.  That decision properly 

considered the extensive contacts with Poland that have amassed since P.M.M. moved 

to Poland in January 2008.  The UCCJEA clearly contemplates the factual scenario 

encountered here, and empowers the superior court to decline jurisdiction in its 

discretion.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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