Find Legal Information

Court of Appeals Division III
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

                                                                             FILED
                                                                         MAY 8, 2012
                                                                  In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                     DIVISION THREE

In re the Marriage of:                              No.  30489-2-III
                                                )
KRISTINE BOWMAN,                                )
                                                )
                      Respondent,               )
                                                )
              and                               )   UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                                )
JAMES W. BOWMAN JR.                             )
                                                )
                      Appellant.                )
                                                )

       Kulik, J.  --  James and Kristine Bowman divorced in 2010 after 22 years of 

marriage.  Mr. Bowman contends the court abused its discretion by refusing to vacate the 

temporary orders, and by compensating Ms. Bowman with one-half of his 401(k), the 

community tax refund, and settlement proceeds.  Mr. Bowman also contends the court 

erred by making a limited award of postsecondary support for the parties' daughter and 

by failing to consider the effect of the parties' bankruptcy proceedings.  Lastly, Mr. 

Bowman asserts that he was denied a fair trial.

       We affirm the trial court's orders in all respects and grant attorney fees on appeal  

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

to Ms. Bowman.

                                            FACTS

       James and Kristine Bowman were married on December 18, 1987.  The parties 

met while they were students at the University of Washington.  Ms. Bowman dropped out 

of school to marry Mr. Bowman.  Within one year, their son James III (J.T.) was born.

       Mr. and Ms. Bowman have three children: J.T., Katarina, and A.B. When the 

petition for dissolution was filed, the two younger children were living at home and 

attending Bellarmine, a private high school.  At the time of trial, A.B. was a junior in high 

school; Katarina was attending the University of California at San Diego; and J.T. was 

attending the University of Southern California. 

       The older children had scholarships that covered most but not all of their expenses. 

Katarina's uncovered expenses were $2,250 annually, and J.T.'s uncovered expenses

were $4,000 annually.  There were also extra expenses for travel. 

       During most of the marriage, Ms. Bowman was a stay-at-home mother and 

homemaker.  In 2003, Ms. Bowman returned to school and earned her culinary degree 

from the Seattle Culinary Academy.  Ms. Bowman started an in-home business, Last Bite,

baking and selling pastries and wedding cakes.  At first, Last Bite did not generate 

significant income, so in 2007, Ms. Bowman started working in food services at the 

                                               2 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

children's school earning $15 per hour.  The Bowmans used this income to pay the 

children's tuition at the high school.

       Ms. Bowman was initially hired to serve lunch and then to overhaul the school's 

lunch program.  As a result, Ms. Bowman received a raise.  Meanwhile, Last Bite was 

increasing in sales.  In 2009, Ms. Bowman's gross income was $32,626.  

       Early in the marriage, Mr. Bowman was a loan officer for AVCO.  In 1999, Mr. 

Bowman started Pacific Real Estate Management Company (PREMCO), a successful 

company that managed branches for mortgage companies.  At one point, PREMCO had 

three offices.  Mr. Bowman was a 92.5 percent owner of PREMCO.  By the time of trial, 

Mr. Bowman had shut down PREMCO and filed for bankruptcy on its behalf.  Mr. 

Bowman then worked as a sales manager for Prospect Mortgage. 

       Mr. Bowman controlled the family finances.  Throughout the marriage, all of the 

financial statements were sent to the PREMCO office.  Mr. Bowman filed all of the 

parties' tax returns electronically, and Ms. Bowman did not review them.  As a result, 

Ms. Bowman had no real knowledge of the family finances.  Based on lifestyle and 

historical expenses, Ms. Bowman determined that Mr. Bowman earned at least $10,000 

net per month.  On one occasion, she discovered Mr. Bowman's Social Security 

statement and found that in the last years, he regularly earned well over $100,000 

                                               3 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

annually. 

       In addition to his take home pay, Mr. Bowman also controlled other cash assets 

that were not shared with Ms. Bowman.  In 2007, Mr. Bowman cashed out a $123,000 

401(k) without Ms. Bowman's knowledge. When the parties separated in late 2008, Mr. 

Bowman received at least $60,000 from a lawsuit settlement related to PREMCO.  Mr. 

Bowman also received the parties' 2007 tax refund of nearly $15,000.  Mr. Bowman told 

Ms. Bowman that he spent these funds on different obligations. 

       Mr. Bowman left the family home on October 12, 2008.  After he left, Ms. 

Bowman found that Mr. Bowman had not paid the monthly mortgage payment of $2,700 

since August 2008.  Ms. Bowman was only able to make one mortgage payment on her 

own and, by December, the house was at risk of foreclosure.  

       Ms. Bowman filed a petition for dissolution on December 1, 2008.  She also filed 

a motion seeking temporary spousal maintenance and child support.  Ms. Bowman 

asserted that the family's household expenses were $9,455 per month, which was more 

than she could afford on her income.  She asked the court to impute income for Mr. 

Bowman of $10,000 net per month.  She also asked the court to restrain Mr. Bowman 

from spending or disbursing the proceeds from the PREMCO settlement. 

       The hearing on Ms. Bowman's motion for temporary orders was set for 

                                               4 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

December 18, 2008, at 9:30 a.m.  Mr. Bowman was provided notice but did not appear.  

He claims he was told by a court employee that he did not need to be present.  The court

ordered Mr. Bowman to pay $1,395 for the monthly support of the parties' two minor 

children, plus his portion of their educational expenses based on the court's finding that 

Mr. Bowman's monthly net income was $10,000 and that Ms. Bowman's net income was 

$3,608. The court ordered Mr. Bowman to pay $9,119.38 to clear the two mortgages that 

were delinquent.  And the court ordered Mr. Bowman to pay temporary monthly spousal 

maintenance of $4,500.  Mr. Bowman was restrained from disbursing the PREMCO 

settlement funds, and Ms. Bowman was awarded $10,000 in attorney fees.  

       Around this time, Mr. Bowman removed the family car, a Suburban, from the 

family residence.  Ms. Bowman was greatly inconvenienced because she used the 

Suburban to transport the children to school and to their activities.  Ms. Bowman also 

used the Suburban to deliver desserts for her business.  Left with only her daughter's 27-

year-old pickup, Ms. Bowman used friends' vehicles for delivery.  After Ms. Bowman 

filed a motion for contempt, Mr. Bowman returned the Suburban.  

       Mr. Bowman refused to voluntarily comply with the terms of the temporary 

orders. Ms. Bowman's income from Bellarmine went primarily for the children's tuition 

and was automatically deducted from her paycheck.  This left Ms. Bowman with the 

                                               5 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

income she made from her pastry business to meet the family's obligations, including the 

expenses for the children.  Ms. Bowman incurred substantial credit card debt to meet the 

family expenses, which included disconnection notices from utilities.  Because Mr. 

Bowman did not bring the mortgage current, her bank threatened foreclosure and 

eventually placed a default notice on the door of the home.

       The bank notified Ms. Bowman that it would proceed with foreclosure unless she 

brought the mortgage current and obtained a loan modification.  Losing the family home 

would have been particularly devastating for Ms. Bowman because the commercial 

kitchen in the family home was where she made her desserts.  

       Mr. Bowman refused to bring the mortgage current.  In May 2009, Ms. Bowman 

received notice that the home would be sold at private auction unless the mortgage was 

brought current.  Ms. Bowman worked extra jobs to pay off the arrearage of 

approximately $20,000.  Ms. Bowman also accepted loans from her mother and 

stepfather to assist with her obligations and attorney fees.  

       Meanwhile, Mr. Bowman filed for personal bankruptcy and bankruptcy of 

PREMCO without telling Ms. Bowman.  A trustee for PREMCO contacted Ms. Bowman 

to obtain the Suburban because it was a company asset.  Ms. Bowman was forced to 

obtain a bankruptcy attorney and buy back the Suburban from the trustee for $6,000.  

                                               6 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

Also, Ms. Bowman's wages were garnished for bills Mr. Bowman had incurred after he 

moved out of the family home.  This caused Ms. Bowman to file for bankruptcy.  Both 

bankruptcy petitions were discharged by the time of trial and the majority of the parties'

community debts were discharged. 

       On July 17, 2009, the court addressed Mr. Bowman's refusal to comply with the 

temporary orders, including his failure to retain the PREMCO settlement proceeds and 

show how or if the proceeds were disbursed.  The trial court expressed concern that Mr. 

Bowman was dissipating or hiding assets.  The court noted that Mr. Bowman paid debts 

to his father and Mr. Bowman's lawyer in San Francisco while Ms. Bowman was 

struggling to cover two mortgages on the family home.  The trial court rejected Mr. 

Bowman's request to vacate the temporary orders, but the court left the matter open for 

Mr. Bowman to move separately to modify the temporary orders if he could show a 

change in circumstances. 

       Mr. Bowman resisted Ms. Bowman's discovery requests.  On September 18, 2009, 

the trial court granted Ms. Bowman's motion to compel discovery and awarded her 

attorney fees of $1,500 as sanctions.  The court gave Mr. Bowman two weeks to 

complete discovery.  

       The parties were originally scheduled for trial on December 1, 2009.  Before trial, 

                                               7 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

Mr. Bowman filed several motions, including a motion for contempt related to the 

parenting plan with regard to A.B., a motion to compel discovery, a motion for walk-

through of the family residence, and a motion to continue the trial date.  The court 

granted the continuance of the trial date and expressed concern that Mr. Bowman 

continued his refusal to comply with earlier orders, and, particularly, had failed to pay 

attorney fees for Ms. Bowman.  Mr. Bowman's motion to compel was continued until the 

date of trial; a list of personal property was to be presented on the date of trial. 

       One month before the parties' continued trial date, Mr. Bowman filed his fourth 

motion to vacate the December 2008 temporary orders.  The court found no basis for the 

motion because the matter had been reserved for trial.

       The trial took place on March 12, 2010.  The court awarded Ms. Bowman the 

family residence, acknowledging that it had a negative value of $53,000.  Ms. Bowman 

was awarded household furnishings valued at $10,000.  Last Bite was awarded to Ms. 

Bowman along with the equipment owned by the company, valued at $6,000.  The court 

also awarded Ms. Bowman her 401(k) with Bellarmine, valued at $511. 

       The court ordered that Ms. Bowman should be compensated for one-half of the 

$123,000 401(k) that Mr. Bowman had unilaterally liquidated, the $15,000 Internal 

Revenue Service (IRS) refund that Mr. Bowman controlled, and the $60,000 PREMCO 

                                               8 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

settlement that Mr. Bowman received around the time the parties separated.  The court 

found that PREMCO was a closely held S-corporation and that the parties owned over 90 

percent of the company.  The court also found that because PREMCO was an alter ego of 

Mr. Bowman, the court could direct the settlement proceeds in the parties' dissolution. 

       For purposes of child support, the trial court found that Mr. Bowman had a 

monthly net income of $4,053, and Ms. Bowman had a monthly net income of $3,956.  

The court ordered Mr. Bowman to pay monthly child support of $738.76 for A.B.  The 

court declined to order postsecondary support for the parties' older son, but noted that it 

"believes that it is appropriate that the parents share the expenses for JT that are not 

covered by ROTC equally."  Clerk's Papers (CP) at 640. Regarding Katarina, the court 

determined that she "warrants and deserves support for college." CP at 640. The court 

ordered that each of the parents and Katarina were responsible for one-third of any 

expenses that exceeded scholarships and grants awarded to Katarina. 

       At Mr. Bowman's request, the court reconsidered Mr. Bowman's motion to vacate 

the December 18, 2008 temporary orders.  The court categorically rejected Mr. 

Bowman's allegation that Ms. Bowman committed fraud or misrepresented Mr. 

Bowman's income to the court.  The trial court found that Ms. Bowman reasonably 

estimated Mr. Bowman's income in light of the fact that he was secretive regarding his 

                                               9 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

income and PREMCO finances.  The trial court determined that at the time the temporary 

orders were issued, Mr. Bowman earned less than $10,000 per month.  On equitable 

grounds, the trial court concluded that the temporary orders should be retroactively 

modified.  

       The trial court found that Mr. Bowman should have paid undifferentiated support 

of $4,500 per month from January to August 2009.  This amount was changed from the 

$5,900, which was previously ordered.  Thereafter, the court found that Mr. Bowman 

should have paid $4,000 in undifferentiated support until the time of trial.  The trial court 

also entered a judgment of $79,500 against Mr. Bowman for past due support he had 

failed to pay under the December 18, 2008 temporary orders, as modified by the court.  

The court also reaffirmed the judgment of $9,119.38 entered against Mr. Bowman on 

December 18, 2008.  

       Finally, the court awarded attorney fees to Ms. Bowman in the amount of $11,500. 

The court found Mr. Bowman intransigent, that his "actions have exacerbated the cost of 

attorney's fees in this case," and that those actions have been "willful, intentional and 

malicious." CP at 631. Mr. Bowman appeals. 

                                         ANALYSIS

       Standards of Review.  "'[P]ro se litigants are bound by the same rules of 

                                               10 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

procedure and substantive law as attorneys.'"  Holder v. City of Vancouver, 136 Wn. 

App. 104, 106, 147 P.3d 641 (2006) (quoting Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures, Inc., 

86 Wn. App. 405, 411, 936 P.2d 1175 (1997)).  RAP 10.3(a)(5) provides that "[r]eference 

to the record must be included for each factual statement." Mr. Bowman provides few 

citations to the record to support his factual recitation.  

       In a dissolution action, the trial court must make a just and equitable distribution 

of the property and liabilities of the parties after considering all relevant factors, 

including the nature and extent of the separate and community properties, the duration of 

the marriage, and the economic circumstances of each spouse.  RCW 26.09.080.  The 

trial court's paramount concern when distributing property in a dissolution action is the 

economic condition in which the decree leaves the parties.  In re Marriage of Williams, 

84 Wn. App. 263, 270, 927 P.2d 679 (1996).

       Findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.  Substantial 

evidence exists where there is evidence of a sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded 

person of the truth of the declared premise.  State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 129, 857 

P.2d 270 (1993).  Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed in terms of the 

substantial evidence test for quantitative determinations and de novo as to the legal 

aspects of the issue.  Harris v. Urell, 133 Wn. App. 130, 137, 135 P.3d 530 (2006).  

                                               11 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

Issues involving the discretion of the court are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State 

v. Bourgeois, 133 Wn.2d 389, 406, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997).  A court abuses its discretion 

when it acts on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.  In re Marriage of Gillespie, 

89 Wn. App. 390, 398-99, 948 P.2d 1338 (1997).

       When exercising its broad discretion in distributing assets in a dissolution 

proceeding, a trial court focuses on assets before it at the time of trial.  In re Marriage of 

White, 105 Wn. App. 545, 549, 20 P.3d 481 (2001); RCW 26.09.080.  "If one or both 

parties disposed of an asset before trial, the court simply has no ability to distribute that 

asset at trial."  Id. However, the court may consider a spouse's waste or concealment of 

assets.  In re Marriage of Wallace, 111 Wn. App. 697, 708, 45 P.3d 1131 (2002).

       An award of maintenance is within the broad discretion of the court.  In re 

Marriage of Terry, 79 Wn. App. 866, 869, 905 P.2d 935 (1995).  An award of 

maintenance must be just in light of the relevant facts, including the financial resources of 

each party, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living during the marriage, and 

the resources and obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance, including that spouse's 

ability for self support.  See In re Marriage of Estes, 84 Wn. App. 586, 593, 929 P.2d 

500 (1997).  When determining spousal maintenance, the court is governed strongly by 

the need of one party and the ability of the other party to pay.  In re Marriage of Foley, 

                                               12 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

84 Wn. App. 839, 845-46, 930 P.2d 929 (1997).

       Temporary Orders.  Whether a trial court vacates a validly entered order is a 

matter of discretion.  Morgan v. Burks, 17 Wn. App. 193, 197, 563 P.2d 1260 (1977).  

       On December 18, 2008, the trial court entered temporary orders for spousal 

maintenance of $4,500 per month, for child support of $1,395 per month, and for 

judgments and attorney fees to Ms. Bowman of $19,119.38. 

       Mr. Bowman contends that the orders were imposed based on the assumption that 

his monthly income was $10,000.  He asserts that he never made this amount.  He also 

argues that Ms. Bowman knew this and committed fraud or misstated Mr. Bowman's 

income at the hearing. 

       The court denied Mr. Bowman's motion for modification of the temporary support 

orders.  Mr. Bowman renewed this motion at trial.  The trial court rejected Mr. 

Bowman's allegations that Ms. Bowman committed fraud or misstated Mr. Bowman's 

income.  The trial court stated that Ms. Bowman's claim concerning Mr. Bowman's 

income was reasonable in light of the information available at the time.  The court 

explained that the information available at the trial indicated that Mr. Bowman's income 

was less than the $10,000 per month figure used in the December 18, 2008 temporary 

orders.  

                                               13 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

       However, recognizing that Mr. Bowman was earning less than $10,000 per month 

at the time of the hearing, the court concluded that Mr. Bowman could pay monthly 

support of at least $4,500.  The court ordered this retroactively.  This decreased support 

retroactively to the December 18, 2008 hearing date.  

       Ms. Bowman suggests that the retroactivity of the modified temporary orders 

constitutes error.  Any "decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified . . . 

[o]nly as to installments accruing subsequent to the . . . motion." RCW 26.09.170(1).  

The reason for this is that "[t]emporary support installments become judgments as they 

fall due."  In re Marriage of Lindsey, 54 Wn. App. 834, 835, 776 P.2d 172 (1989).  

However, Lindsey also recognizes that a retroactive change in a temporary support order

may be based on equitable principles.  The court clearly stated that it was modifying the 

orders on equitable grounds. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and 

affirm the court's order.

       401(k), Community Tax Refund, and Settlement Proceeds.  Mr. Bowman contends 

the trial court abused its discretion by compensating Ms. Bowman for the equivalent of 

one-half the 401(k) plan, the community tax refund, and settlement proceeds.

       Trial courts have broad discretion in the distribution of property in marriage 

dissolution proceedings.  In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 769, 976 P.2d 102 

                                               14 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

(1999).  "The trial court is in the best position to assess the assets and liabilities of the 

parties and determine what is 'fair, just and equitable under all the circumstances.'"  Id.

(quoting In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 656, 565 P.2d 790 (1977)).  In view of 

the trial court's discretion, a trial court's distribution of property will not be reversed on 

appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion.  Id.

       The court must apply the factors set forth in RCW 26.09.080.  In addition to 

applying these factors, the court may consider a spouse's waste or concealment of assets 

when distributing the parties' assets.  Wallace, 111 Wn. App. at 708.  RCW 26.09.080 

places no limit on the court's ability to consider one spouse's breach of duty to the 

community when the court makes an appropriate distribution of assets.  The marital 

misconduct that a court may not consider is limited to "immoral or physically abusive 

conduct within the marital relationship."  In re Marriage of Steadman, 63 Wn. App. 523, 

528, 821 P.2d 59 (1991) (footnote omitted).  However, the court may consider one 

spouse's "gross fiscal improvidence" or "squandering of marital assets" when making a 

fair and equitable distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities.  Id.

       In Steadman, the husband managed the parties' business and made decisions 

regarding the payment of bills, including tax liabilities.  Id. at 526.  The trial court 

ordered the husband to pay the business tax liabilities that were over three times the 

                                               15 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

liabilities charged to the wife.  Id. at 528.  Acknowledging that the trial court may 

consider this type of financial misconduct, this court upheld the allocation of debts 

because it was the husband's "'negatively productive conduct'" which resulted in the tax 

liabilities at issue. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wn. App. 805, 809, 538 P.2d 

145 (1975)).

       Here, the trial court considered the same type of negatively productive conduct.  

The trial court was concerned that after the parties separated, Mr. Bowman did absolutely 

nothing to preserve the parties' remaining assets, even though he had nearly $200,000 of 

community funds under his unilateral control.  Because those assets had been squandered, 

the trial court properly placed the value of those assets, had they been preserved, with

Mr. Bowman and awarded Ms. Bowman an equal offset.  See Steadman, 63 Wn. App. at 

528.

       In White, the court addressed a different situation.  White, 105 Wn. App. 545.  In 

White, the trial court erred by awarding the wife $30,511 that had been her separate 

property but was used to pay off the mortgage on the family residence four years before 

the parties' separation.  Id. at 548.  The appellate court held that these funds, which no 

longer existed, could not be distributed to the wife.  However, the funds could be 

considered when dividing the property because the court had the discretion to consider

                                               16 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

one "spouse's unusually significant contributions to (or wasting of) the assets on hand at 

trial."  Id. at 551.

       The court found that Mr. Bowman liquidated his 401(k) valued at $123,000 and 

that monies from the 401(k) went to finance the litigation resulting in the settlement.  The 

court did not err in finding that the PREMCO settlement proceeds were community 

property.  The court found that Mr. Bowman regularly infused community property into 

PREMCO and that the marital community owned more than 90 percent of the 

corporation.  When a corporate actor controls a corporation so closely that the 

corporation acts on behalf of the individual, corporate assets may be used to satisfy 

personal debts.  See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Blakeslee, 54 Wn. App. 1, 5, 771 P.2d 

1172 (1989) (quoting Pohlman Inv. Co. v. Virginia City Gold Mining Co., 184 Wash. 

273, 283, 51 P.2d 363 (1935)).  Similarly, when justice requires, a court may disregard a 

corporate entity in a divorce.  W.G. Platts, Inc. v. Platts, 49 Wn.2d 203, 207-08, 298 P.2d 

1107 (1956).

       The trial court had broad discretion in the distribution of property and liabilities in 

the marriage.  Here, the court's property distribution was within its discretion.

       Postsecondary Support.  RCW 26.19.090(2) provides that when considering 

whether to order postsecondary educational support, "the court shall determine whether 

                                               17 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

the child is in fact dependent and is relying upon the parents for the reasonable 

necessities for life." This provision states, in part:

       The court shall exercise its discretion when determining whether and for 
       how long to award postsecondary educational support based upon
       consideration of factors that include but are not limited to the following:  
       Age of the child; the child's needs; the expectations of the parties for their 
       children when the parents were together; the child's prospects, desires, 
       aptitudes, abilities or disabilities; the nature of the postsecondary education 
       sought; and the parents' level of education, standard of living, and current 
       and future resources.  Also to be considered are the amount and type of 
       support that the child would have been afforded if the parents had stayed 
       together.

RCW 26.19.090(2) (emphasis added).

       Here, Katarina was a minor when the dissolution action was filed.  At the time of 

trial, Katarina had a scholarship to the University of California at San Diego.  Ms. 

Bowman testified that her daughter was dependent on her parents to assist with expenses 

of approximately $2,250.  Ms. Bowman testified that she contributed $250 per month to 

expenses beyond tuition.  Both parents had attended at least some college, and the court 

noted that both parents had encouraged Katarina to attend college.  The court found that 

Katarina was "a very good student," and that she "warrants and deserves support for 

college." CP at 640; Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 11, 2010) at 10. The court 

properly concluded, based on the required factors, that Mr. Bowman should contribute to 

Katarina's postsecondary support.

                                               18 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

       Fair Trial.  Mr. Bowman claims he was denied a fair trial because Ms. Bowman 

did not turn over documents in a timely manner.  Mr. Bowman asserts that Ms. Bowman 

violated local court rules by failing to serve him with pretrial information two days prior 

to the scheduled trial.  Ms. Bowman's counsel pointed out that Mr. Bowman had been 

served with the pretrial form that afternoon.  Ms. Bowman's pretrial discovery also 

apparently included information that Mr. Bowman had not been able to get through 

discovery.  

       The court stated to Mr. Bowman: "If you feel disadvantaged in terms of your 

ability to cross-examine the petitioner or to defend when you're called as a witness, then 

raise it, and I'll note the objection.  It will be a standing objection."  RP (Mar. 12, 2010) 

at 13.

       Mr. Bowman made several objections during the trial.  He first challenged the 

authenticity of three exhibits -- some of his bankruptcy filings -- because he had not had 

time to check their authenticity.  The court admitted the exhibits.  Mr. Bowman next 

challenged an appraisal and invoice, Ms. Bowman's financial declaration, a summary of 

Ms. Bowman's bank statements, a profit and loss statement for Last Bite, a notice to Ms. 

Bowman from the IRS, and a book of photographs of household goods and furnishings 

showing values the Bowmans had attached to the items. 

                                               19 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

       During the proceedings, when Mr. Bowman could not find a document, the court 

gave him time to find it.  With regard to any other documents, Ms. Bowman's counsel 

said that he had mailed and faxed the documents to Mr. Bowman the day before.  

       Mr. Bowman repeatedly states that he did not have time to consider the evidence 

prior to trial.  But he does not demonstrate any prejudice from his lack of familiarity with 

the documents that were not available to him until trial.  The court did not err by 

admitting this evidence, and Mr. Bowman was not denied a fair trial.

       Mr. Bowman also complains that the trial was too short.  Mr. Bowman argues that 

his trial was unfair because it lasted for only one-half day.  This was a trial with two 

witnesses -- Mr. Bowman and Ms. Bowman.  Mr. Bowman originally asked for two to 

three days for a trial, but the trial court responded, "No. I can guarantee it won't be that."

RP (Dec. 18, 2009) at 13.

       A reading of the trial record reveals that Mr. Bowman was not denied his right to a 

fair trial.  Mr. Bowman was representing himself.  In response to this fact, the court 

exercised great patience.  The court also assisted Mr. Bowman by asking questions of Ms. 

Bowman and Mr. Bowman. 

       Finally, Mr. Bowman claims prejudice because he was not allowed to walk 

through the house in order to value the property.  Instead, Mr. Bowman was given 

                                               20 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

photographs of the house and household goods to examine.  This was done because of the 

court's concern for A.B., the parties' youngest son, who was still living at home.  When 

A.B. found out about his father's infidelity, he had a heated exchange with his father and 

ended up in counseling.  The court's decision to deny the walk-through inspection by Mr. 

Bowman, and, instead, provide Mr. Bowman with photographs of the property was not an 

abuse of discretion.

       Bankruptcy Proceedings.  Mr. Bowman contends that the judgments Ms. Bowman 

obtained against him as part of the temporary orders of December 18, 2008, were 

discharged as part of his personal bankruptcy or the PREMCO bankruptcy.  

       Both parties and the corporation filed for bankruptcy.  There is virtually no 

documentation of these bankruptcies in the record.  After the March 12, 2010 trial, the 

court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The court found that each of the 

parties had declared bankruptcy and found that the parties had incurred community 

liabilities.  The court also determined:

       In addition, the judgment entered against husband on December 18, 2008 in 
       the amount of $9,119.38 shall remain in full force and effect and shall not 
       merge with the decree.  The court reaffirms this judgment and it shall 
       remain in full force and effect.

       Further, the undifferentiated family support and judgment . . . as ordered 
       herein constitutes a domestic support obligation within the meaning of 
       11 U.S.C. §101(14A) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  They are exempt from 
       discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5). 

                                               21 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

CP at 630.1

       Mr. Bowman contends the judgments in the temporary orders are invalid pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 which discusses the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over civil 

proceedings arising under Title 11 U.S.C.  Here, there is no challenge to the jurisdiction 

of the bankruptcy court.  Instead, the trial court correctly applied 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) to 

exclude any discharge of Mr. Bowman's debt for domestic support obligations. 

       Attorney Fees.  Ms. Bowman seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 

RCW 26.09.140.  When awarding attorney fees in a dissolution action, the court must 

balance the needs of one party against the other party's ability to pay.  Terry, 79 Wn. 

App. at 869.  Ms. Bowman maintains that she has a need for her fees to be paid and that 

Mr. Bowman has the ability to pay.  See RAP 18.1; RCW 26.09.140. 

       Ms. Bowman also asserts that she is entitled to fees because of Mr. Bowman's 

intransigence.  Ms. Bowman contends that Mr. Bowman never sought to stay the decree 

but, as with the temporary orders, simply ignored it.  The trial court found Mr. Bowman 

intransigent and that his "actions have exacerbated the cost of attorney's fees in this 

case." CP at 631. The court further determined that Mr. Bowman's actions were 

"willful, intentional and malicious." CP at 631. These unchallenged findings of fact are 

       1 The $9,119.38 was to clear the delinquencies on the two mortgages. 

                                               22 

No. 30489-2-III
In re Marriage of Bowman

verities on appeal.  Brewer, 137 Wn.2d at 766. 

       We affirm the trial court's orders in all respects and grant attorney fees on appeal 

to Ms. Bowman.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040.

                                            _________________________________
                                            Kulik, J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________              _________________________________
Brown, J.                                   Siddoway, A.C.J.

                                               23