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Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                     DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Marriage of            )       No. 65813-1-I
                                            )       consolidated with
ALI GANJAIE,                                )       No. 66410-7-I and
                                            )       No. 66710-6-I
              Appellant,                    )
                                            )
       and                                  )
                                            )       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KATHERINE GANJAIE,                          )
                                            )       FILED:  June 11, 2012
              Respondent.                   )
                                            )

       LEACH, C.J.  --  In this consolidated appeal, Ali Ganjaie challenges multiple 

postdissolution trial court orders made to enforce the property division between him
and his former wife, Katherine Davis.1  He contends that the trial court lacked the 

authority to (1) order the sale of the family's house by special master without his 

consent; (2) modify its dissolution decree and property division; and (3) enforce its 

orders while other trial court rulings were under review by this court.  We affirm.

                                          FACTS
       The decree dissolving the parties' marriage entered in April, 2009.2 The 

       1 The dissolution decree established that the former wife changed her 
surname from Ganjaie to Davis.  For the sake of clarity, we refer to her as "Davis," 
and the former husband as "Ganjaie" herein.

       2 This court affirmed the decree of dissolution and division of property.  The 
mandate issued April 16, 2010. 

No. 65813-1-I /2

decree provided for the sale of the family's residence at an agreed-upon price of 

$578,000.  Ganjaie was to receive a $50,000 share of the anticipated proceeds from 

the sale, with the remainder to be paid to Davis after deducting costs associated with 

the sale.  The decree provided that "any adjustment to the sales price may be made 

by motion," that "[t]he husband shall pay all costs associated with the home until 

sale" and that "[i]f the husband damages the home or reduces the value, this may be 

addressed by motion." The decree also provided that the trial court retained 

jurisdiction over this matter "for all purposes," and that if the house was not sold 

within six months, either party could bring a motion before the trial court for further 

relief.

       The trial court granted Davis's motion to appoint a special master to conduct 

the sale, after Ganjaie was uncooperative in facilitating the sale.  Housing prices 

declined during the delay, and the special master was unable to sell the residence at 

the contemplated $578,000 price.  On June 22, 2010, Davis asked the trial court to 

authorize the special master to reduce the price to facilitate sale.  Ganjaie opposed 

the request.  The trial court granted it and ordered, in pertinent part:  

       It is [ordered] that [the special master] has the authority to reduce the 
       sale price of the home as he sees fit . . . .

       It is FURTHER ordered that [the special master] is authorized to 
       remove Mr. Ali Ganjaie from the home if he refuses to show the home 
       to potential buyers. . . .

       Mr. Ali Ganjaie's share of the net proceeds of the sale of the home 
       (initially [$]50,000) is ordered to be reduced proportionately with all 
       reductions in the sale price of the home.

       Ganjaie continued to interfere with efforts to sell the residence and on 

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No. 65813-1-I /3

November 10, 2010, the trial court ordered him evicted from the residence.  The 

property's value declined further during the delay, and eventually the residence sold 

for $465,000.

       After the sale, Davis moved for an order directing distribution of the sale 

proceeds.  The net proceeds of the sale were $97,106.44, and the costs associated 

with selling the home were $19,673.94.  Davis explained the basis for her proposed 

distribution:

              Under the original decree the court expected equity of $278,540 
       . . . and from that net equity, the court awarded Mr. Ganjaie $50,000 to 
       equalize the division of property.  Under the decree Mr. Ganjaie was 
       awarded 18% of the net proceeds of the sale . . . . Since the sales price 
       was reduced significantly AND the court ordered that Mr. Ganjaie's
       share of the net proceeds would also be reduced proportionately, 18% 
       of the net proceeds would be $17,491.27 . . . .

              Under the decree Mr. Ganjaie was ordered to pay all costs 
       associated with the house until sold, since he was allowed to live in the 
       house.  It was also ordered by this court that the fees for the Special 
       Master were to be paid from the sale proceeds from Mr. Ganjaie's
       share.

       On January 5, 2011, following a hearing, the court ordered the following 

distribution of the funds:  $2,648.13 to the special master, and the remainder of 

$94,525.63 to Davis.  The trial court found that the costs Ganjaie was obligated to 

pay totaled $19,673.94, exceeding his $17,491.27 share of the proceeds.  

Accordingly, Ganjaie received no distribution.

       Ganjaie appeals.

                                       DISCUSSION

                     Trial Court Jurisdiction To Order Sale Of Home

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       Ganjaie first asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the sale of 
the residence without the consent of the parties, citing High v. High,3 and Arneson v. 

Arneson.4 He is incorrect.

       In order to achieve an equitable property distribution between the parties, the 
trial court has the jurisdiction to order the sale of a family's residence.5 As our 

Supreme Court held in In re Marriage of Sedlock:

       In summary, finding no Washington case law directly addressing 
       whether courts have jurisdiction to order a forced sale of a couple's 
       house in a dissolution action, and in light of the number of cases in 
       which the Washington Supreme Court has affirmed the lower courts' 
       forced sales of property, we now hold that the trial court had jurisdiction 
       to order the sale of the family home.[6]

The same conclusion is warranted in the instant case.

       As the Sedlock court explained, neither Arneson nor High stand for the 

proposition that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to order sale of a family residence in a 

marital dissolution:

       Arneson is distinguishable because the trial court ordered a sale of the 
       couple's assets for the benefit of the creditors. The reviewing court 
       found that the order for the benefit of the creditors was improper in a 
       marital dissolution.

              High is also distinguishable. In High the couple had bought 
       three separate tracts of land for speculation. The trial court ordered 
       that "(a) the separate tracts of land be sold by private agreement; or, 
       (b) failing this, that the tracts be sold at a public sale."  A careful 
       reading of High indicates that the court felt that a forced sale would be 
       inequitable because the property would likely increase in value, not 
       because the court generally lacked jurisdiction to order a forced sale. 

       3 41 Wn.2d 811, 822-23, 252 P.2d 272 (1953).

       4 38 Wn.2d 99, 101, 227 P.2d 1016 (1951).

       5 In re Marriage of Foley, 84 Wn. App. 839, 844, 930 P.2d 929 (1997).

       6 69 Wn. App. 484, 503, 849 P.2d 1243 (1993).

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No. 65813-1-I /5

       Thus, High is not determinative of the present issue.[7]

       The trial court had jurisdiction, and authority, to order the sale of the 

residence.

             Trial Court Authority To Enforce Orders, Distribute Proceeds

       Ganjaie next contends that the trial court lacked authority to order sale of the 

house by a special master, and to order distribution of the proceeds to Davis and the 

special master, claiming that these were erroneous modifications of the court's 

earlier decree. He is incorrect.

       As a general rule, the provisions in a dissolution decree as to property 

disposition "may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of 
conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state."8

However, a trial court has the power to enforce the provisions of its decree as long 
as it does not modify the decree.9 Our Supreme Court has held that a trial court in a 

dissolution proceeding has the same authority as any trial court to enforce its orders:  

       It is inconceivable that a court in a divorce proceeding can divide the 
       property between the parties and yet have no power to make that 
       division effective if the parties are recalcitrant.  The rule is well stated 
       in Nelson on Divorce and Annulment (2d ed.), Vol. II, 285, § 16.01, 
       where it is said: 

              "To the extent that the court has the power to adjust the 
              property rights of the parties, it can require that its 
              mandates be carried out, either by act of the party or by 

       7 Sedlock, 69 Wn. App. at 502 (quoting High, 41 Wn.2d at 822-23).

       8 RCW 26.09.170(1).

       9 In re Marriage of Greenlee, 65 Wn. App. 703, 710, 829 P.2d 1120 (1992).  A 
decree is modified when rights given to one party are extended or reduced beyond 
the scope originally intended.  In re Marriage of Thompson, 97 Wn. App. 873, 878, 
988 P.2d 499 (1999).

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No. 65813-1-I /6

              directing the making of a conveyance by a representative 
              of the court if the party fails or refuses to make it. This is 
              a generally recognized power of a court invested with 
              authority to deal with property rights and interests. It is 
              commonly exercised to effectuate transfer of interests if 
              the parties are recalcitrant; hence there is nothing 
              peculiar to divorce litigation in its application, where 
              necessary, to carry out what the court is empowered to do 
              by way of adjustment of rights and interests."[1]

We interpret the original decree terms de novo to determine if the court's order was 
a de facto modification of that decree.11

       We conclude that the trial court did not modify its earlier decree by ordering

the sale of the home by the special master or distributing the proceeds.  The trial 

court simply enforced its decree.  It was entirely within the terms of the decree for 

the trial court to require Ganjaie to pay the costs associated with the home out of his 

share of the proceeds.  The decree expressly ordered him to pay "all costs 

associated with the home until sale." And the decree contemplated that he might 

"damage the home or [reduce] the value," and provided that the court would address 

the issue upon motion by the parties.  The trial court's reduction of Ganjaie's original 

$50,000 share to match the proportionate reduction in the home's sale price was a 

reasonable "adjustment to the sales price" based on a reduction "in value" caused in 

part by his delays.  These concerns were specifically provided for in the decree.

       1 Robinson v. Robinson, 37 Wn.2d 511,516, 225 P.2d 411 (1950).  

       11 Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 877-78.

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No. 65813-1-I /7

       The trial court had the authority to enforce the transfer of interests it ordered 
in the dissolution decree, and did not modify its earlier orders.12 There was no 

error.13

                         Trial Court Authority Under RAP 7.2(e)

       Ganjaie alleges that on November 10, 2010, and January 5, 2011, the trial 

court lacked authority to order his eviction from the home and to distribute the 

proceeds from the home's sale, citing RAP 7.2(e).  He fails to establish any basis for 

appellate relief.

       RAP 7.2(e) provides, in pertinent part:

       The trial court has authority to hear and determine (1) postjudgment
       motions authorized by the civil rules, the criminal rules, or statutes, and 
       (2) actions to change or modify a decision that is subject to 
       modification by the court that initially made the decision. . . . If the trial 
       court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the 
       appellate court, the permission of the appellate court must be obtained 
       prior to the formal entry of the trial court decision. 

       Ganjaie fails to demonstrate that RAP 7.2(e) applies to the trial court orders 

he challenges.  He does not explain why the trial court's November 10, 2010 or 

January 5, 2011 rulings would "change a decision then being reviewed by the 

appellate court." Moreover, the evidentiary record reveals that none of the rulings 

"changed" any prior ruling from which the husband appealed.  The essential issue

remained the same:  whether the trial court had the authority to enforce its decree.  

       12 Robinson, 37 Wn.2d at 516.

       13 Although Ganjaie claims that Davis's motion was untimely under CR 60, he 
does not brief this issue.  The issue is abandoned.  State v. Motherwell, 114 Wn.2d 
353, 788 P.2d 1066 (1990) (assignment of error that not supported by argument will 
generally be deemed abandoned.)
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No. 65813-1-I /8

Thus, the trial court did not violate RAP 7.2(e) when it entered any of the relevant 

orders.

       Ganjaie fails to establish that RAP 7.2(e) deprived the trial court of the 

authority to act, and fails to demonstrate any trial court error.
       Affirmed.14

WE CONCUR:

       14 Ganjaie also claims the trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of 
law pertaining to the July 2, 2010 or November 10, 2010 hearings.  However, he 
does not assign error to the trial court's lack of findings or conclusions.  An appellate 
court will not generally consider a claimed error to which no assignment of error has 
been made. Painting & Decorating Contractors of America Inc. v. Ellensburg School 
Dist., 96 Wn.2d 806, 638 P.2d 1220 (1982).  His failure to assign error to these 
alleged omissions precludes appellate relief in these circumstances.
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