Terry Proveaux v. MUSC, et al.
Case Date: 01/01/1997
Docket No: 24589
S.E.2d THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court p. 9 TERRY PROVEAUX v. MUSC, et al. JOSEPH H. PROVEAUX v. MUSC, et al. Dr. Perot moved for summary judgment in both cases claiming under the South Carolina Governmental Tort Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70 (Supp. 1995), he is entitled to immunity as an employee of a governmental entity, MUSC. The trial judge granted summary judgment in both cases. The Proveauxes appeal. On or after January 1, 1989,Fn.1 . . . .The provisions of this section in no way _______________ Fn.1 We have held this language refers to all causes of action accruing on or after January 1, 1989. Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 414 S.E.2d 115 (1992). p. 10 TERRY PROVEAUX v. MUSC, et al. JOSEPH H. PROVEAUX v. MUSC, et al. shall limit or modify the liability of a licensed physician or dentist, acting within the scope of his profession, with respect to any action or claim brought hereunder which involved services for which the physician or dentist was paid, should have been paid, or expected to be paid at the time of the rendering the services from any source other than the salary appropriated by the governmental entity or fees received from any practice plan authorized by the employer whether or not the practice plan is incorporated and registered with the Secretary of State. The italicized language was added by amendment effective May 10, 1994. Dr. Perot participates in a "practice plan" as described in the May 1994 amendment. The trial judge held the amendment simply clarified the intent of the General Assembly to include doctors participating in a practice plan under the original provision of immunity that became effective for causes of action accruing on or after January 1, 1989. Since the alleged malpractice occurred in November 1992, he concluded Dr. Perot was entitled to immunity under this section. The Proveauxes contend the pre-amendment version does not cover Dr. Perot. The facts relevant to this issue are undisputed. Dr. Perot is chairman of the Department of Neurosurgery at MUSC. He receives his annual income from two sources: MUSC and University Medical Associates (UMA). UMA is a non-profit corporation formed as a billing and collecting agent for the clinical practice of medicine at MUSC. Patients are billed by UMA for all services rendered by MUSC faculty. All of MUSC's patient-related revenue is billed and collected by UMA. UMA allocates some of the revenue to the Neurosurgery Department to be used for administrative and other expenses, including faculty compensation. Dr. Perot receives separate paychecks from MUSC and UMA. In 1992, Dr. Perot received $92,730.22 from MUSC and $279,308.00 from UMA. In determining physician immunity under the pre-amendment version of § 15-78- 70(c), the operative language is whether the claim "involved services for which the physician ... was paid, should have been paid, or expected to be paid at the time of the rendering of the services from any source other than the salary appropriated by the governmental entity." The words of a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Forest Beach Villas Horizontal Prop. v. Smith, 314 S.C. 134, 442 S.E.2d 173 (1994). Aside from a legislative function, the plain and ordinary meaning of "appropriate" is "to set apart" or "authorize.Fn.2 Thus, a plain reading of subsection indicates a physician is immune from liability if he was not paid for the services in question from any source other than the salary authorized or set apart by the governmental entity. _______________ Fn.2 Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition Unabridged (1987). p. 11 TERRY PROVEAUX v. MUSC, et al. JOSEPH H. PROVEAUX v. MUSC, et al. Since Dr. Perot's salary authorized by MUSC included payment for his treatment of Terry Proveaux, he qualified for immunity under § 15-78-70 in 1992, at the time the Proveauxes's causes of action accrued. The fact that the General Assembly subsequently amended the statute to specifically cover a "practice plan" does not undermine this conclusion. See Cotty v. Yartzeff, 309 S.C. 259, 422 S.E.2d 100 (1992) (although subsequent amendments are generally presumed to change existing law, they may in some instances be interpreted as clarifying it). _______________ Fn.3 This section became effective February 21, 1990. Act No. 323, 1990 S.C. Acts 1840. This act is codified as S.C. Code Ann. § 59-101-195 (Supp. 1995). p. 12 |