Pack v. Associated Marine Institutes
Case Date: 01/01/2004
Docket No: 3907
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA Rose M. Pack and Joseph B. Pack, III as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Tracy B. Pack, deceased, Appellants, v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc.; Rimini Marine Institute, Inc.; The South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice; Tyrone Smalls; Barney Gadson; Rodney Morrow; Thaddeus Chestnut; and John Zeigler, Defendants, of whom Associated Marine Institutes, Inc.; Rimini Marine Institute, Inc.; Tyrone Smalls; Barney Gadson; Rodney Morrow; Thaddeus Chestnut; and John Zeigler are the, Respondents. Appeal From Clarendon County
Opinion No. 3907 AFFIRMED William H. Johnson, of Manning, for Appellants. Thomas C. Salane, of Columbia, for Respondents. STILWELL, J: Rose M. Pack and Joseph B. Pack, III, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Tracy B. Pack (the Estate), appeal the circuit court’s order granting partial summary judgment to Associated Marine Institutes, Inc. (AMI), Rimini Marine Institute, Inc. (RMI), and four Rimini employees. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In August 1999, juveniles Jon Smart and Stephen Hutto were in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). They boarded at RMI, a residential rehabilitation facility for juveniles in the custody of DJJ. [1] Prior to Smart’s placement at RMI, DJJ screened him under its eligibility guidelines, classified him as a non-violent offender, and determined he was fit for placement at RMI although Smart’s DJJ record indicated he had a history of substance abuse that included becoming intoxicated from inhaling paint and gasoline fumes, a practice commonly called “huffing.” Barney Gadson, RMI’s Director of Operations, testified he had reviewed Smart’s DJJ records, and was aware that Smart had a problem with becoming violent after huffing. Gadson and Smart’s team leader, Robert McCray, tested Smart to determine if his purported huffing addiction was true by making gasoline accessible to him. After Smart attempted to steal the gas, he received counseling and RMI employees took precautions to restrict his access to fuel kept on campus. On August 11, 1999, Smart huffed gas he stole from a generator while on work furlough. When his counselor, Thaddeus Chestnut, confronted him about the odor of gasoline on his person, Smart denied huffing and claimed he smelled of gas from working on the generator. The following day, Tracy Pack obtained permission from RMI to have Smart and Hutto leave the RMI campus to work at his chicken houses. Pack was a former employee of RMI who allowed juveniles from the Rimini facility to work off-campus with him at his family’s nearby poultry farm and boat landing. Once there, Smart became intoxicated by huffing gasoline he had secretly funneled from Pack’s truck. Smart subsequently bludgeoned Pack to death. Smart and Hutto then stole Pack’s truck and went on a crime spree before police apprehended them. The Estate brought survival and wrongful death actions against AMI and RMI, arguing AMI failed to properly monitor RMI. It further alleged that RMI was negligent in its supervision of Smart and Hutto, and should have discovered and warned Pack of the boys’ violent propensities. AMI and RMI made a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to statutory limitations on liability under S.C. Code Ann. § 33-56-180 (Supp. 2003), because both corporations qualified as charitable organizations. The circuit court agreed, and partially granted their motions. The Estate then filed a complaint in United States District Court alleging DJJ, AMI, and RMI violated Tracy Pack’s civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It also amended its complaints in state court, adding nine RMI employees and DJJ as defendants. The parties later agreed to voluntarily dismiss the federal action without prejudice. Consequently, the Estate reasserted its federal civil rights claims against all defendants in state court. Following discovery, the Estate voluntarily dismissed all claims against four of the employees. [2] The circuit court also granted DJJ’s motion for summary judgment. The remaining defendants, including AMI, RMI and four RMI employees, each filed motions for summary judgment on all causes of action. The circuit court denied summary judgment to AMI and RMI on the Estate’s wrongful death and survival claims. However, it granted summary judgment in favor of individual RMI employees on both negligence claims, finding they were entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 33-56-180. The court also granted all defendants summary judgment on the Estate’s federal civil rights cause of action, finding “that even if an unconstitutional ‘custom or practice’ can be shown by the [Estate] in this case, the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard cannot be met.” To support its conclusion, the court relied on White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1997), which held “[a] claim of deliberate indifference, unlike one of negligence, implies at a minimum that the defendants were plainly placed on notice of a danger and chose to ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice.” The Estate filed a motion to amend the judgment, requesting the trial court rule on its claim that application of the “state created danger” doctrine supported a finding RMI violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the evidence failed to prove RMI created the danger that led to Tracy Pack’s death. It also stated “[e]ven if the Court determined that Tracy Pack has a substantive due process right to be protected by the defendants, the absence of deliberate indifference prevents § 1983 from being an available remedy.” STANDARD OF REVIEW When we review an order granting summary judgment, the court of appeals applies the same standard that governs the circuit courts pursuant to Rule 56, SCRCP. Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lanham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 349 S.C. 356, 361-62, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002). In making our determination whether any triable issues of fact exist, we will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. DISCUSSION I. Claims Against Individual RMI Employees |