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(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).

     (NOTE: This is a companion case to State of New Jersey in the interest of J.L.A., also decided today.)

    Argued November 30, 1994 -- Decided June 29, 1994

    STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

    G.C. was adjudicated delinquent after having admitted the commission of acts of delinquency that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted fourth-degree aggravated assault and third-degree unlawful possession of a shotgun without a permit. The court ordered that G.C. serve an indeterminate term of incarceration, not to exceed two years, on the charge of possession of a shotgun and a consecutive indeterminate term, not exceeding one year, on the fourth-degree aggravated-assault charge.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the adjudication of delinquency but reversed that part of the judgment of the Family Court that imposed the consecutive sentences, concluding that the Juvenile Code prohibits the imposition of consecutive sentences. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the Family Court for a new hearing.

HELD:    The Code of Juvenile Justice should not be construed to prohibit the sentencing to consecutive terms of incarceration of juveniles who have committed two or more acts of delinquency.

1.    Based on the Court's holding in J.L.A., also decided today, the Juvenile Code should not be construed to prohibit imposition of consecutive sentences.

     Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED to the extent that it set aside the sentences imposed by the Family Court.

          CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN and GARIBALDI join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 46 September Term 1993

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE INTEREST OF                        

G.C.

        Argued November 30, 1993 -- Decided June 29, 1994

On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.

Edward F. Borden, Jr., Camden County Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant, State of New Jersey (Mr. Borden, attorney; Norma R. Evans and Kathleen M. Delaney, Assistant Prosecutors, of counsel and on the briefs).

Ruth Bove, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent, G.C. (Zulima V. Farber, Public Defender, attorney).

Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney General of New Jersey (Fred DeVesa, Acting Attorney General, attorney).

        The opinion of the Court was delivered by

STEIN, J.

    As in State in Interest of J.L.A., ___ N.J. ___ (1994), also decided today, the narrow issue presented is whether the Code of Juvenile Justice, N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20 to -91 (Juvenile Code), should be construed to prohibit the sentencing to consecutive terms of incarceration of those juveniles who have committed two or more acts of delinquency.

    G.C. was adjudicated delinquent after having admitted the commission of acts of delinquency that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted fourth-degree aggravated assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(3), and third-degree unlawful possession of a shotgun without a permit, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5c. The court ordered that G.C. serve an indeterminate term of incarceration, not to exceed two years, on the charge of possession of a shotgun, and a consecutive indeterminate term, not exceeding one year, on the fourth-degree aggravated-assault charge. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the adjudication of delinquency, but reversed that part of the judgment of the Family Court that imposed the consecutive sentences, concluding that the Juvenile Code prohibits the imposition of such sentences. The Appellate Division remanded the matter to the Family Court for a new dispositional hearing.

    In J.L.A., supra, we held that the Juvenile Code should not be construed to prohibit imposition of consecutive sentences. Based on our holding in J.L.A., we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division to the extent that it set aside the sentences imposed by the Family Court.

    Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, and Garibaldi join in this opinion.