STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C8-00-1062
Russell Newberg, et al.,
Respondents,
vs.
Commercial Union Insurance Company,
Appellant.
Filed November 21, 2000
Reversed and remanded
Crippen, Judge
Dakota County District Court
File No. C29910034
Joseph J. Dudley, Jr., Thomas C. Plunkett, Mark K. Thompson, Dudley and Smith, P.A., 2602
Firstar Center, 101 East Fifth Street, St. Paul, MN 55101 (for respondents)
Paul A. Banker, Theodore J. Smetak, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala, P.A., 500
Young Quinlan Building, 81 South Ninth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-3214 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, , Judge, and Peterson, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
Insurance contract language is not ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to only one interpretation.
Raw sewage backing up through basement drains of a home is affected by an exclusion regarding
harm directly or indirectly caused by the backup of water through sewers and drains.
O P I N I O N
CRIPPEN, Judge
Appellant Commercial Union Insurance Company challenges the trial court's summary judgment for
respondents Russell and Delores Newberg, who claimed that coverage for damages from a
discharge of raw sewage through their basement drains was unaffected by an exclusion for loss
caused directly or indirectly by water damage, meaning: water which backs up through sewers
and drains. Concluding that reasonable minds cannot differ on the scope of the exclusion, we
reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment for appellant.
FACTS
Commercial Union claims that the water-damage exclusion in respondents' policy precludes
coverage for appellants' losses. [1] Noting in its findings and conclusions that raw sewage [2] was
not explicitly written in the exclusion, the trial court found damage caused by the back-up of raw
sewage was outside the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy's exclusionary clause. As a result,
the trial court granted summary judgment for respondents and denied appellant's cross motion for
summary judgment.
ISSUE
Did the trial court erroneously construe the governing policy exclusion?
ANALYSIS
On appeal from the trial court's summary judgment, we are to determine whether there are any
issues of material fact and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. State by
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). The interpretation of insurance language is a
question of law that an appellate court reviews independently. Meister v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins.
Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 376 (Minn. 1992). The reviewing court reads the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Nygaard v. State Farm Ins. Co., 591
N.W.2d 738, 740 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. June 29, 1999).
An insurer has the burden of proving that a policy exclusion applies. Hubred v. Control Data
Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1989). Moreover, courts will construe exclusions from
coverage narrowly. State Farm Ins. Cos. v. Seefeld, 481 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. 1992).
Minnesota has a strong policy of extending coverage rather than restricting it by confusing or
ambiguous language. Hennen v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 312 Minn. 131, 136, 250 N.W.2d
840, 844 (1977). But the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous only if it is reasonably
subject to more than one interpretation. Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275
N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. 1979). Courts will not redraft insurance policies to provide coverage where
the plain language of the policy indicates no coverage exists. Ostendorf v. Arrow Ins. Co., 288
Minn. 491, 494-95, 182 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1970).
Numerous considerations have led us to conclude that water which backs up through sewers or
drains includes various compositions of raw sewage.
First, the impact of the water-damage exclusion is substantially enlarged by the language extending
the concept to losses caused indirectly by water backing up through sewers or drains, thus
including the situation where water carries with it other substances.
Second, we find compelling the reasonableness in understanding water that backs up through
sewers or drains includes sewer water or water containing various levels of raw sewage.
Third, having in mind the implausibility of determining at what level water containing foreign
substances ceases to be water, we find unreasonable a construction of water that is confined to
pure water or water containing substances other than sewage.
Under the circumstances, we believe that the exclusionary clause is applicable and that it is
unreasonable to interpret the clause in any other manner. As a result, we conclude that the plain and
ordinary meaning of the water-damage exclusion includes water containing raw sewage, and that
appellant was successful in proving that the exclusion applies in this case.
We do not doubt, as respondent contends and as the trial court concluded, appellant might have
more explicitly addressed the types of watery substances that might back up through sewers or
drains and were to be excluded from coverage. That being said, it does not follow that it is
reasonable to read the word water with a level of literalism that fails to take into account the other
language in the exclusion.
In being reminded that other courts have reached the same conclusion, [3] we also acknowledge
the good cause for disillusionment by the insured who has been denied coverage for a substantial
loss. If justice requires a different result, this will not be accomplished by an erroneous construction
of the policy language but must instead be resolved through legislative or administrative review of
policy exclusions.
Finally, we note the trial court's alternative rationale that respondents reasonably expected coverage
would be provided for a backup of sewage. There is no evidence that the water-damage exclusion
was hidden and our conclusion that the plain meaning of the exclusion precludes coverage renders
moot any examination of respondents' expectations.
Appellant contends that respondents' claim is also excluded by the pollution exclusion. Having
determined that the water-damage exclusion applies, we decline to review this position.
D E C I S I O N
The trial court erred in concluding that respondents' insurance policy covers damages caused by the
backup of raw sewage where the water-damage exclusion unambiguously precludes coverage for
damage caused directly or indirectly by water which backs up through sewers or drains.
Reversed and remanded.
Footnotes
[1] The water-damage exclusion provides:1. We do not insure for loss caused directly or indirectly
by any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other cause or event contributing
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. * * * * c. Water Damage, meaning: * * * *Water
which backs up through sewers or drains or which overflows from a sump[.]
[2] The trial court characterized the damaging substance as raw sewage, but it made no
determination of the extent to which the backup was composed of water.
[3] See, e.g., Haines v. United Sec. Ins. Co., 602 P.2d 901, 902 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (finding
policy exclusion unambiguously precluded coverage for discharge of raw sewage); Rodin v. State
Farm Fire & Cas., 844 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (finding by looking at the totality
of the exclusion, water-damage exclusion also excludes raw sewage); Capelouto v. Valley Forge
Ins. Co., 990 P.2d 414, 419 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (stating insured's understanding of
water-damage exclusion was not reasonable where insured argued that sewage is distinct from
water); Hallsted v. Blue Mountain Convalescent Ctr., Inc., 595 P.2d 574, 575 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979) (holding water-damage exclusionary clause as unambiguous as applied to backup of raw
sewage). But see Florida Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Birge, 659 So.2d 310, 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding policy ambiguous where the average homeowner would not interpret the
policy as precluding coverage for raw-sewage damage); Sterling v. City of W. Palm Beach, 595
So.2d 284, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (finding ambiguity as to whether water-damage clause
also excluded raw-sewage damage).
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