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State v. Samuel Warren
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT				Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	1998 ME 136
Docket:	Sag-96-651
Submitted 
 On Briefs:	December 23, 1997
Decided:	June 3, 1998

Panel:   ROBERTS,  CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and SAUFLEY, JJ.  

STATE OF MAINE

v.

SAMUEL L. WARREN, III

LIPEZ, J.

	[¶1]  Samuel L. Warren III appeals from the judgment entered in the
Superior Court (Sagadohoc County, Atwood, J.) following a jury verdict
finding him guilty of gross sexual assault in violation of  17-A M.R.S.A. § 253
(1983 & Supp. 1997).{1}  Warren argues, inter alia,  that he was deprived of
his constitutional right to a fair trial by the court's exclusion of all evidence
concerning the child victim's alleged past sexual behavior.{2}  We agree that
the court erred in excluding all of the proffered evidence, and we are unable
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. 
Accordingly, we must vacate the judgment.  

I.

	[¶2]  In January 1996 the grand jury returned an indictment charging
Samuel L. Warren III with gross sexual assault in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 253.  At a two-day jury trial in June 1996, the following evidence was
produced.  
	[¶3]  On October 31, 1995, Warren visited the home of his sister,
Virginia, who lived with her seven year old daughter, the victim in this case;
her two sons, ages six and eight; her boyfriend; and several other relatives in
Bath.  According to the testimony of the victim, who was eight years old at
the time of the trial,  Warren entered her bedroom after she had gone to
sleep that evening, kneeled on the floor next to her bed, and told her that
he was returning to his home in New York.   After saying goodnight to her,
he pulled back her blanket, lifted her nightgown, and pulled down her
underwear.  The victim testified that Warren then "started licking me on my
private spot," which she explained was the place on the front of her body
that she uses for going to the bathroom.  She recalled that her legs were
apart, and that he licked her on "the inside" of her private spot.  
	[¶4]  After Warren left her bedroom, the victim immediately reported
the incident to her mother, Virginia, who testified that she confronted
Warren about her daughter's accusations and that Warren claimed he did not
know what she was talking about.{3}  Virginia then took her daughter to the
hospital emergency room.  According to the testimony of the physician who
examined the child, there was no physical evidence of sexual abuse.  The
physician also testified, however, that the type of conduct alleged in this
case would be unlikely to produce any detectible physical evidence.
Following the medical examination, the victim and her mother went to the
Bath Police Department, where they were interviewed by Detective Donald
Marsh in the early morning hours of November 1.    
	[¶5]  According to the testimony of Detective Marsh, Warren went to
the police station at Marsh's request shortly before 3:00 a.m. to be
interviewed about the allegations.  During the interview, Warren
acknowledged that he had entered the victim's bedroom to kiss her
goodnight, but claimed that he could not remember whether there had been
any sexual contact. The State also introduced through Detective Marsh a
written statement prepared by Warren following the interview.  In the
statement, Warren wrote that he kissed the victim goodnight, left her room,
and was confronted by Virginia. The statement concluded:  "I don't know if
it happened but if it did . . . I'm sorry you are not to blame I am you are right
in tell your mom [sic]." 
	[¶6]  As the trial progressed, defense counsel sought to introduce
evidence to establish that the victim had been exposed to sexual conduct
similar to Warren's alleged conduct on two prior occasions,  in part to rebut
the jury's natural inference of her sexual naivete.  First, according to the
police report filed in connection with the charges against Warren, the
victim told the investigating officer that when she was two years old a baby
sitter's boyfriend kissed her vagina after she (the child) had scratched it
while taking a bath.  The court excluded the evidence, concluding that the
victim had not demonstrated extraordinary sexual knowledge for her age to
give rise to an inference of sexual naivete. Second, defense counsel sought to
introduce evidence concerning an alleged sexual encounter between the
victim and her older brother which occurred in 1993. During a voir dire
examination, the victim's great-aunt testified that in 1993 she had
personally observed the victim's older brother "rubbing his face" against the
victim's vagina while her underwear was pulled down around her knees.{4} 
After noting that the victim had demonstrated no sexual "proclivities" and
that there was no evidence to show that she was an "active participant" in
the 1993 incident, the court precluded the admission of all evidence
regarding the incident, again reasoning that the victim had not displayed
extraordinary knowledge of sexual matters for her age:

[F]or the inference [of sexual naivete] to arise there must be a
display of extraordinary sexual knowledge, not the child's age
[sic].  Here we have none of that and as I indicated yesterday the
experience of this child and her testimony certainly does not
display extraordinary sexual knowledge for his or her age, and I
make that finding based on her demeanor on the witness stand,
which was certainly very reluctant, embarrassed, marked by
some distress in her voice when describing all this and her use
of childish terms to describe her genitals.  So based upon all of
that the court is going to exclude the description of the event
that [the great-aunt] will describe . . . .

	[¶7]  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty
and judgment was entered accordingly.  Warren was sentenced to twenty
years imprisonment, all but fifteen years suspended, and six years probation. 
This appeal of the judgment of conviction followed.

II.  

	[¶8]  Warren argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to
a fair trial by the court's exclusion of all evidence concerning the child
victim's alleged past sexual behavior with her baby sitter's boyfriend in
approximately 1990 and with her older brother in 1993.  Relying on our
decision in State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706 (Me. 1989), he contends that he
was entitled to present evidence concerning the existence of an alternative
source of the victim's extraordinary sexual knowledge for the purpose of
rebutting the jury's natural presumption of her sexual naivete,
notwithstanding M.R. Evid. 412.  
	[¶9]  Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 412, a victim's past sexual behavior
generally is not admissible at trial.{5}  This rule protects the State's strong
and legitimate interest in preventing a trial from becoming a trial of the
victim, rather than of the accused.  See Jacques, 558 A.2d at 707. We have
recognized, however, that the State's interest in protecting victims of sexual
abuse "is neither absolute nor paramount."  Id.  Rather, the State's interest
must be weighed against a defendant's constitutional right, emanating from
the right of confrontation and the rights to compulsory process and to due
process, to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.   See id. at 708 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (state's
interest in protecting juvenile offender does not take precedence over
defendant's right to effectively cross-examine)). The Advisory Committee
Note accompanying Rule 412 reflects this balancing of competing interests
with its statement that "evidence constitutionally required to be admitted"
falls outside the scope of the text of Rule 412's exclusion.  See M.R. Evid.
412 advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me. Rptr, 449-458 A.2d
LXX; see also Jacques, 558 A.2d at 708. 
	[¶10]  As we observed in Jacques, when a prosecutor "opens the
door" to evidence otherwise inadmissible pursuant to Rule 412 by
affirmatively offering evidence of a victim's sexual inexperience or chastity
on direct, the admission of a defendant's evidence to the contrary may be
"constitutionally required," subject to the limitations of Rule 403.  See id. at
708 (citing Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 412, at 139 (2d ed. 1987)).  
When the victim of a sex crime subject to Rule 412 is a child, however, the
child's sexual inexperience may be presumed by the factfinder even in the
absence of any affirmative action by the prosecutor:

When the victim is a child, as in this case, the lack of sexual
experience is automatically in the case without specific action by
the prosecutor.  A defendant therefore must be permitted to
rebut the inference a jury might otherwise draw that the victim
was so naive sexually that she could not have fabricated the
charge. 

Id.; cf. State v. Davis, 406 A.2d 900, 901-02 (Me. 1979) (pre-Rule 412 case
observing that defendant was subjected to "grave risk that, not being
otherwise informed, the jury might regard a complainant of tender years as
too innocent of sexual matters to think up the kind of sexual conduct that
she had described unless it was real and she had actually experienced it"). 
Jacques requires that a jury be informed of the child's past sexual behavior
in order to rebut the natural inference of her sexual naivete,
notwithstanding Rule 412's prohibition.    
	[¶11]  The Jacques exception to Rule 412 remains subject to
traditional rules of relevancy.  See M.R. Evid. 402 (evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible); cf. 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Federal Evidence § 159, at 200 (2d ed. 1994) (there is no constitutional
right to introduce irrelevant evidence).  To be relevant, evidence must be
offered to prove some fact of consequence to the proceeding, and must be
probative of the fact for which it is offered.  See M.R. Evid. 401.  When a jury
infers that a child is sexually naive and could not possibly know about the sex
acts she describes unless she had experienced them at the hands of the
defendant, evidence to rebut that inference is "of consequence" to the
proceedings.  Cf. Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 401.1, at
145 (3d ed. 1991) ("[T]he term 'fact of consequence' includes facts bearing
circumstantially upon the evaluation of the probative value to be given to
other evidence in the case, including the credibility of witnesses.").  When a
jury would not infer a child's sexual naivete, evidence of her past sexual
behavior is not "of consequence" to the proceedings. See State v. Knox, 634
A.2d 952, 953 (Me. 1993) (noting that before evidence to rebut tender years
assumption becomes admissible, the assumption itself must arise).  Such an
inference will arise only when a child displays a knowledge of sexual matters
beyond her years.  In State v. Knox, for example, we concluded that the
victim, who was nearly fifteen years old at the time of trial, "was simply too
old to cause the jury to believe that he would not know about the kind of
sexual acts he described without having experienced them." Id.; see also
State v. Gilman, 637 A.2d 1180, 1181 (Me. 1994).   In other words,
evidence of the fifteen year old child's past sexual behavior in Knox was
simply of no consequence to the proceedings, since there was no risk that
the jury would attribute enhanced credibility to his testimony by presuming
that he could not possibly have fabricated or imagined the conduct he
described at trial.
	[¶12]  Moreover, to be probative of the material question of the child's
capacity to fabricate or imagine the alleged conduct, the past sexual behavior
sought to be admitted must have some rational tendency to establish that it,
rather than the defendant's alleged conduct, was the source of the child's
extraordinary sexual knowledge displayed during the trial.  This tendency is
present when the past sexual behavior is similar to the defendant's alleged
conduct, thereby furnishing the child with the knowledge and capacity to
fabricate or imagine the later conduct.  Past sexual behavior, if dissimilar
from the defendant's alleged conduct, could not be the source of a child's
allegations and is of no probative value to the jury's assessment of whether
the child might have fabricated or imagined the specific allegations against
the defendant.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ruffen, 507 N.E.2d 684, 688
(Mass. 1987) ("Absent such a showing by the defendant of prior similar
sexual abuse, it is difficult to envision a situation where evidence of the
details of past sexual abuse would be relevant."), cited in Jacques, 558 A.2d
at 708 n.3; cf., e.g., State v. Davis, 406 A.2d at 901-02 (where child allegedly
had preoccupation with pulling down the pants of other people, and where
this preoccupation "was so prominent in the complainant's accusation
against the defendant," court erred by excluding all evidence of the child's
past sexual behavior).  To the extent that this basic relevancy requirement
was not implicit in the Jacques and Davis decisions, we now state it
explicitly.
	[¶13]  In this case, the court concluded that the victim did not display
extraordinary sexual knowledge for her age based on her embarrassed,
reluctant, distressed demeanor on the stand and her use of childish terms
to describe her genitals, and excluded evidence of her past sexual behavior
pursuant to Rule 412.  A child victim's apprehensive demeanor and reliance
on euphemisms, however, do not establish that she has failed to display
extraordinary sexual knowledge for her age. The critical inquiry is whether
the child demonstrates a knowledge of sexual matters beyond her years;
such knowledge could be evidenced even by an unsophisticated, reluctant
description of the alleged sexual conduct.  It is the nature and extent of a
child victim's sexual knowledge, not simply the manner in which she
describes it, that must be evaluated for Jacques purposes.{6} 
	[¶14]  The victim in this case was seven years old at the time of the
alleged conduct, and eight years old at the time of trial.  Her testimony,
although couched in euphemisms, was an accurate description of oral sex. 
Although we establish no bright-line age threshold here and each case must
be evaluated on its own facts, we cannot conclude that an eight year old
child is ordinarily aware of the particular acts constituting oral sex.  The
victim's knowledge of sexual matters was extraordinary for her age, creating
the risk that the jury would attribute enhanced credibility to her testimony
by inferring sexual naivete.  Moreover, the victim's alleged past sexual
behavior, particularly the 1993 incident with her older brother, is strikingly
similar to the charged conduct, making evidence of the past sexual behavior
highly probative of the existence of an alternative source of her knowledge. 
In both the 1993 incident and the incident charged in this case, there is a
claim that the victim's underwear was pulled down and that someone
"rubbed his face against" or "licked" her genital area.  In all three incidents,
there is the allegation of oral contact with the victim's genital area by a male. 
In these circumstances, we find that the proffered evidence falls within the
scope of the Jacques exception to Rule 412, and we must conclude that the
court erred by excluding all evidence of the victim's alleged past sexual
behavior.{7}

III.

	[¶15]  The harmless error doctrine "recognizes the principle that the
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the
defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the
criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather
than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error."  See Delaware
v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (citation omitted) (citing R.
Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)).  The Supreme Court has
"consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider
the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including
most constitutional violations." United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 509
(1983) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).  
	[¶16]  Although the Court has declined to apply harmless error
analysis to constitutional violations that  are "structural defects in the
constitution of  the trial mechanism" affecting "the entire conduct of the
trial from beginning to end," it has found harmless error analysis to be
applicable when the violation is merely a "trial error." Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991); see also State v. Huntley, 681 A.2d 10, 12 n.3
(Me. 1996). In the instant case, the trial court's exclusion of all evidence
concerning the child victim's past sexual behavior was a "trial error"-that
is, it was an "error that occurred during the presentation of the case to the
jury, and that may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence presented"-and therefore is subject to harmless error
analysis.  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308; cf., e.g., Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. at 684 (holding that "the constitutionally improper denial of a
defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other
Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman harmless-error
analysis").   
	[¶17]  When a trial error is of constitutional magnitude, the
appropriate harmless error inquiry is whether, after a review of the whole
record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.{8}  See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680-81
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, (1967)); State v. York, 1997 ME
156, ¶ 11, 705 A.2d 692, 695 (citing State v. Hassapelis, 620 A.2d 288, 293
(Me. 1993); State v. Diaz, 681 A.2d 466, 468 (Me. 1996); State v. Harper,
613 A.2d 945, 950 (Me. 1992).  Thus, a trial error of constitutional
magnitude is not harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that it
contributed to the verdict, see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24, regardless of
whether there was sufficient other evidence on which the defendant could
have been convicted.  See R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 26-30
(1970).  
	[¶18]  In Van Arsdall, which concerned the trial court's erroneous
exclusion of evidence to impeach a witness for bias, the Court fashioned the
following test of "harmlessness":

The correct inquiry is whether, assuming the damaging
potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a
reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Whether such an error is
harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all
readily accessible to reviewing courts.  These factors include the
importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case,
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination
otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the
prosecution's case. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 683-84; see also State v. Begin, 652 A.2d 102, 105
(Me. 1995) (stating that "the harmless error inquiry focuses on the
importance to the defense of the evidence excluded and the prejudicial
effect of the exclusion").  
	[¶19]  Applying the Van Arsdall harmless-error factors to the court's
exclusion of all evidence regarding the child victim's past sexual behavior in
the instant case, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
court's error did not affect the factfinding process of the jury.  To secure the
conviction, the State relied heavily on the testimony of the eight-year-old
victim, who was able to describe both the alleged incident and the
surrounding circumstances. As would be expected in many sexual abuse
cases, however, there was no medical evidence to corroborate her
allegations, nor were there any witnesses to the incident.  Because the
victim was the sole witness to establish the essential elements of the charge,
her testimony was critical to the State's case and cannot be characterized as
cumulative.  Compare, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 970 F.2d 948, 954 (1st
Cir. 1992) (court's erroneous exclusion of evidence tending to show bias of
only witness to establish the essential elements of the government's case
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); with State v. Begin, 652 A.2d
at 105 (court's erroneous exclusion of exculpatory testimony without
conducting voir dire was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where
witness's testimony went only to collateral issue and was cumulative).   
	[¶20]  Other than the victim's testimony, the evidence against Warren
was limited to his statements to the police and to his family following the
alleged incident, in which he claimed several times that he could not
remember what had happened with the victim.  Although these statements
could be construed as inculpatory, they were nonetheless ambiguous.  Thus,
we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury convicted the
defendant based on the sheer volume of evidence against him, and that the
verdict was surely unattributable to the error. To the contrary, if Warren had
been permitted to introduce evidence to show that the victim had an
alternative source of her unusual sexual knowledge, thereby eliminating any
attribution of enhanced credibility to her testimony based on the jury's
inference of her sexual naivete, there is a reasonable possibility that the
jury's factfinding process would have been affected.  In these circumstances,
we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the court's error
in excluding all evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior did not affect
the outcome of the trial.   
	The entry is:
				Judgment vacated.
                                                                
Attorneys for State:

Geoffrey Rushlau, District Attorney
Michael P. Turndorf, Asst. Dist. Atty. 
P O Box 246
Bath, ME 04530

Attorney for defendant:

Peter M. Rice, Esq.
317 Main Street 
Yarmouth, ME 04096