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State v. Roderick Dill
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2001 ME 150
Docket: Lin-01-16
Submitted
on Briefs: October 15, 2001
Decided: October 30, 2001
Panel:CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
RODERICK DILL
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Roderick Dill appeals his conviction for theft, Class C, 17-A
M.R.S.A. §§ 353 & 362(3-A) (1983 & Supp. 2000) entered after a jury trial
before the Superior Court (Lincoln County, Mills, J.). Dill contends that: (1)
the identification evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2)
the photo line-up, admitted into evidence, improperly included Dill's mug
shot photo; and (3) the jury instructions were improper because they: (i)
were submitted to the jury in writing; (ii) failed to include the word
"unauthorized" in the initial written instructions transmitted to the jury;
and (iii) included instruction on the inference that may be drawn from
possession of recently stolen property. Finding no error in the trial court's
actions, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS
[¶2] The evidence would support the following findings: Shortly
before July 16, 1999, Kevin Haley purchased a new utility trailer. He parked
it on the front lawn of his residence in Whitefield next to his plow truck.
The trailer was there earlier in the evening when Haley and his wife
departed for a shopping trip. As Haley and his wife were returning home at
approximately 10:30 p.m., he spotted his trailer beside Route 126 near the
intersection with Rooney Lane in Whitefield. Haley turned his vehicle
around and pulled in behind the trailer. As he did so, he saw an individual
walk away from the trailer, get into a truck and begin to drive away with no
headlights. Haley backed his vehicle down to an intersection to block the
exit of this other vehicle. The truck then turned around; its headlights were
turned on, and it drove past Haley's vehicle, going off the road, through a
ditch, and knocking over a road sign before heading out onto Route 126.
[¶3] Haley pursued the vehicle at speeds of up to 95 miles per hour.
He had identified the vehicle as a red, 1978 or 1979, Ford pick-up truck,
but continued the pursuit to determine its registration plate number. At one
point the truck slammed on its brakes, causing Haley's vehicle to bump it.
Haley's wife recorded the registration plate number. The Haleys then broke
off the chase and contacted law enforcement.
[¶4] Haley returned to his trailer where he was met by Trooper
Greg Stevens of the Maine State Police. The Haleys and Stevens were joined
by David Magnusen, who lived on Rooney Lane. Magnusen reported that at
approximately 10:30 he heard metallic sounds and a commotion on Route
126. Investigating with a flashlight, he came upon a man with a pick-up
truck and a trailer that had apparently separated from the trailer hitch.
Together, they unsucessfully tried to reattach the trailer to the hitch.
Magnusen noted that the truck was an older red pick-up truck and that the
man had dark hair, a mustache, stood about six feet tall and weighed "a
couple hundred pounds." Magnusen could not positively identify Dill in the
courtroom. Magnusen told the individual that he would get his tool box and
return. As Magnusen was returning with his tool box, he saw a vehicle leave
the area. Five to ten minutes later, he saw Haley and the officer at the scene
and reported what he had witnessed.
[¶5] With the registration plate number given to him by the Haleys,
Stevens determined that the vehicle with that plate number was a red, 1978
Ford pick-up truck registered to Dill. Four days later, Stevens contacted Dill
at Dill's home in Chelsea. He noted that Dill was approximately six feet tall,
had dark hair and a mustache, and weighed two hundred pounds. Stevens
identified Dill in the courtroom.
[¶6] Stevens explained to Dill that he was investigating the trailer
theft incident. He then asked Dill if he was at home at quarter to eleven on
the night of July 16. Dill responded that he might have been. Stevens asked
Dill if anyone else had borrowed his truck. According to Stevens's
testimony, Dill responded as follows: "He basically told me that if somebody
did, he wouldn't tell me anyway." Dill made no further statement, and
Stevens summonsed Dill for the theft charge.
[¶7] Stevens prepared an eight-picture photo line-up that he
showed to Magnusen. Magnusen could not positively identify any one
individual, but marked x's on three individual pictures that he said could be
of the person he encountered the night of July 16. One of those individuals
pictured was Dill. The other individuals marked in the photo line-up looked
quite similar to Dill.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶8] In November 1999, Dill was indicted for theft, 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 353,{1} by the Lincoln County Grand Jury. By operation of 17-A M.R.S.A.
362(3-A), the theft charge was elevated to a Class C because of Dill's four
prior theft convictions alleged in the indictment.{2}
[¶9] A jury trial was held August 22, 2000. Over Dill's objection, the
photo line-up shown to Magnusen was introduced as a State exhibit. Before
the jury was instructed, the parties discussed jury instructions. Dill's
attorney objected to the court's proposed instruction on the inference that
may be drawn from one's being in possession of recently stolen property.
See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 361(2).{3} Dill's attorney also objected to the court's plan
to both read the instructions to the jury and give the jury a written copy of
the instructions. The court overruled both of those objections, indicating
that it would give the recent possession inference instruction and that it
would provide written instructions to the jury.
[¶10] When the jury reconvened, and before closing arguments,{4}
the court instructed the jury on issues relating to: (1) evidence evaluation
and circumstantial evidence; (2) witness credibility; (3) the State's burden
to prove the elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the
elements of the theft charge, including the inference that may be drawn
from a defendant's exclusive possession of recently stolen property. In its
instructions, which are included in the transcript but not the appendix,{5} the
court indicated that among the elements of theft, the State must
demonstrate that a person has obtained or exercised "unauthorized" control
over the property. While no copy of the written instructions is available in
the record, apparently the word "unauthorized" was not in the written
version of the instructions. The court covered this by emphasizing that the
word "unauthorized" should have been in the written instructions and
indicated to the jurors that a supplemental copy with the word added would
be provided to them. Neither party made any objection to the court's
address of the omission of the word "unauthorized" from the written jury
instructions.
[¶11] After the court instructed on the evidence evaluation issues,
the burden of proof, and the elements of the charge, the closing arguments
were presented. After the closing arguments, the court instructed the jury
on procedures for deliberations and return of the verdict, and the jury
retired to begin deliberations. The jury asked two questions that are not at
issue in this proceeding. The jury then returned a guilty verdict. The
matter was continued to develop a presentence report and for sentencing.
[¶12] Dill was sentenced to serve four years at the Department of
Corrections. An appeal and appeal of sentence was filed. Leave to appeal the
sentence was denied on March 16, 2001.
III. DISCUSSION OF POINTS ON APPEAL
A. Sufficiency of Identification Evidence.
[¶13] The State relied heavily upon circumstantial evidence. A
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence. State v. Deering, 1998
ME 23, ¶ 13, 706 A.2d 582, 585-86; State v. Poulin, 1997 ME 160, ¶ 15,
697 A.2d 1276, 1280. In this case, the evidence pointing to Dill included
an eye witness who had met him, exactly described his physical
characteristics and the truck registered to him, and picked him along with
two others who closely resembled him out of a photo line-up. The record
also included evidence that identified Dill's registration plate number on the
vehicle fleeing the scene and the officer's observation of that vehicle at Dill's
house, confirmed by Dill to be his, along with an inculpatory response to a
question as to whether someone else might have been using the vehicle at
the time of the incident.
[¶14] These factors, taken together, are sufficient circumstantial
evidence that Dill was the individual who towed the trailer from Haley's
home to the vicinity of Magnusen's home before it separated from his truck,
whom Magnusen assisted in attempting to get the trailer hooked back to the
truck, and who then fled the scene pursued by Haley.
B. The Photo Line-Up.
[¶15] The photo line-up introduced into evidence is a copy of
photographs, not actual photos. It contains no identification numbers or
height lines that might indicate that the photos of Dill, or anyone else, are
mug shots. Cf. State v. Almurshidy, 1999 ME 97, ¶ 13, 732 A.2d 280, 284;
State v. Robbins, 666 A.2d 85, 86 (Me. 1995) (photos were mug shot-type
photos because height chart visible).
[¶16] We most recently addressed the admissability of photo arrays
that may contain mug shots of defendants in Almurshidy, 1999 ME 97, ¶ 14,
732 A.2d at 285. There we continued to apply the three-part test previously
stated in Robbins, 666 A.2d at 88 n.7. The elements of that test are: "(1)
the prosecution must show a demonstrable need to introduce the
photograph; (2) the photograph, if shown to the jury, must not imply that
the defendant has a prior criminal record; and (3) the introduction at trial
must not draw particular attention to the source or implications of the
photograph." Almurshidy, 1999 ME 97, ¶ 14, 732 A.2d at 285.
[¶17] The three elements in this case are not a close call. There is
no indication in the copied photos that they are based on mug shots. There
are no identification numbers, height lines, or other things typical of mug
shots. Except for the faces of the eight individuals, not much else can be
discerned from the photos. Further, use of the photo line-up was
appropriate because Dill had questioned the validity of Magnusen's
identification and his recollection of the identification. Thus, the
Almurshidy-Robbins test is met in this case.
[¶18] Dill also asserts that the photo line-up was more prejudicial
than probative and, thus, should not have been admitted under M.R. Evid.
403. Because identification was contested, the court did not exceed the
bounds of its discretion in making this decision. There was no violation of
M.R. Evid. 403.
C. Jury Instruction Issues.
1. The Inference Instruction.
[¶19] There is no direct evidence that Dill removed the trailer from
Haley's lawn. There is also no dispute, however, that the trailer was
improperly removed in a theft. Soon after the theft unquestionably
occurred, circumstantial evidence pointed to Dill as being in exclusive,
physical possession of the stolen trailer.{6} In these circumstances, the
inference instruction pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 361(2) was fully
appropriate.
2. Giving Written Instructions.
[¶20] Giving the jury written instructions is regularly practiced
where the court has the time and technical capacity to prepare such
instructions. Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(b) invites written
instructions. "The court, at its election, may provide written instructions to
the jury covering all or a part of what is orally provided." M.R. Crim. P.
30(b). See also State v. Williams, 653 A.2d 902, 907 (Me. 1995). Giving the
jury written instructions was fully appropriate and within the broad
discretion given to the trial courts in instructing juries.
3. Omission of the Word "Unauthorized."
[¶21] The court corrected any misimpression in the written
instructions by emphasizing that the instruction should properly be
considered to include the word "unauthorized." Counsel did not object to
the court's proposed method of addressing the omission of the word
"unauthorized" by emphasizing it in the oral instructions and by committing
to provide the jury with a corrected copy, although neither the original nor
any corrected copy of the written instruction appears in the record. There
was no error in the trial court's address of the apparent missing word in the
written instructions.
[¶22] The remaining points on appeal do not merit discussion.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorneys for State:
Geoffrey A. Rushlau, District Attorney
F. Todd Lowell, Asst. Dist. Atty.
P O Box 249
Wiscasset, ME 04378
Attorney for defendant:
William F. Pagnano, Esq.
431 Main Street
Rockland, ME 04841
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353(1)
(1983) states: § 353. Theft by unauthorized taking or transfer 1. A
person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with intent to deprive him thereof. {2} . 17-A
M.R.S.A. § 362(3-A) states: § 362. Classification of theft offenses
. . . . 3-A. Theft, or any attempt at theft, is a Class C crime if the actor
has 2 prior Maine convictions for any combination of theft, any violation
of section 702, 703 or 708 or any violation of section 401 in which the
crime intended to be committed inside the structure is theft, any violation
of section 651 or attempts thereat. For purposes of this subsection, the
dates of both of the prior convictions must precede the commission of the
offense being enhanced by no more than 10 years, although both prior convictions
may have occurred on the same day. This subsection does not apply if the
commission of the 2 prior offenses occurred within a 3-day period. The date
of a conviction shall be deemed the date that sentence is imposed, even
though an appeal was taken. The date of a commission of prior offenses shall
be presumed to be that stated in the complaint, information or indictment,
notwithstanding the use of the words "on or about" or the equivalent.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 362(3-A) (1983 & Supp. 2000). {3} . 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 361(2) (1983) provides: Proof that the defendant was in exclusive
possession of property that had recently been taken under circumstances
constituting a violation of this chapter or of chapter 27 shall give rise
to a presumption that the defendant is guilty of the theft or robbery of
the property, as the case may be, and proof that the theft or robbery occurred
under circumstances constituting a violation of section 401 also shall give
rise to a presumption that the defendant in exclusive possession of property
recently so taken is guilty of the burglary. {4} . M.R. Crim. P. 30(b) provides,
in pertinent part, that "[t]he court, at its election, may instruct
the jury before or after argument, or both." {5} . The appendix, filed
by counsel for this appeal, does not include the judgment from which the
appeal is taken, although required by M.R. App. P. 8(g)(3), and does not
include a transcript of the jury instructions or objections thereto, although
required by M.R. App. P. 8(h)(3) when there is a challenge to jury instructions.
Further, the record does not include, anywhere, a copy of the written jury
instructions to which counsel objected. When an appendix does not include
mandatory items, and the record does not include a document that is subject
to challenge on appeal, the points on appeal pertaining to the missing items
may be deemed to be not preserved. Parties preparing an appendix for appeal
should include all items made mandatory by M.R. App. P. 8(g) & (h).
{6} . This is not a constructive possession case requiring special instructions
on possessive conduct by the defendant. See State v. Ketchum, 1997 ME 93,
¶ 12, 694 A.2d 916, 918.
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