State v. Paul Young
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2001 ME 111
Docket: Cum-01-113
Submitted
on Briefs: June 28, 2001
Decided: July 18, 2001
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
PAUL YOUNG
SAUFLEY, J.
[¶1] Paul Young appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Fritzsche, J.) affirming the decision of the District
Court (Portland, Lawrence, J.) denying Young's motion to dismiss three
Class D charges pending against him. Young's motion to dismiss was
premised on an accord and satisfaction he had reached with the alleged
victim of his crimes. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 891 (Supp. 2000).{1} Contrary to
Young's contentions, his appeal from the discretionary determination of the
District Court does not fall within any recognized exception to the final
judgment rule. Thus, we dismiss the appeal.{2}
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed.
Attorneys for State:
Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney
Julia Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Atty.
142 Federal Street
Portland, ME 04101
Attorney for defendant:
Charles G. Williams III, Esq.
37 Park Street, suite 303
Lewiston, ME 04240
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . The accord and satisfaction
statute, entitled "Dismissal on satisfaction of private injury; discharge
of bail," reads, in its entirety: When a person has been admitted to
bail or is committed by a judge, or is indicted or held upon a complaint
and warrant for an assault or other Class D or E crime, as defined by Title
17-A, section 4-A, for which the party injured has a remedy by civil action,
except aggravated assaults, assaults upon or resistance of a law enforcement
officer as defined by Title 17-A in the execution of a law enforcement officer's
duty, assaults of those officers, crimes involving family or household members
as defined in Title 19-A, chapter 101 and molesting lobster gear pursuant
to Title 12, chapter 619, if the injured party appears before the judge
or court and in writing acknowledges satisfaction for the injury, the court,
on payment of all costs, may stay further proceedings and discharge the
defendant. The judge may exonerate the bail and release the obligors, supersede
the commitment by written order and exonerate the bail of the witnesses.
15 M.R.S.A. § 891 (Supp. 2000). {2} . Young's contention that we must
accept this appeal because the District Court violated his due process rights
when it allowed the State to be heard on his motion is without merit. The
court may, in the exercise of its discretion, dismiss a charge over the
objection of the State, or "without the [State's] acquiescence."
State v. Young, 476 A.2d 186, 187 (Me. 1984). It does not follow, however,
that the State may not be heard. The State is a necessary and proper party
to the proceeding. See id. at 186 (recording the appearance of the Attorney
General on behalf of the State).
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