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State v. Joseph Lux
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1999 ME 136
Docket: Cum-98-396
Submitted
on Briefs: June 17, 1999
Decided: September 16, 1999
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and ALEXANDER, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JOSEPH LUX
SAUFLEY, J.
[¶1] Joseph Lux appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior
Court (Cumberland County, Crowley, J.) following a bench trial convicting
him of possession of a firearm by a felon (Class C), 15 M.R.S.A. § 393 (1980
& Supp. 1998). Lux contends that the Superior Court (Cumberland County,
Perkins, A.R.J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence seized
as a result of the stop and search of his vehicle. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Lux challenges only the denial of his motion to suppress. At the
hearing on that motion, the State presented two witnesses, John Dumas and
Richard Vogel, both of whom were employed by the Maine Drug
Enforcement Agency. Lux presented no witnesses.
[¶3] Dumas and Vogel testified generally to the following facts. On
December 3, 1997, they went to the apartment of Scott Stolkner, at the
Forest Park apartment complex, to execute an outstanding arrest warrant.
Upon arrival, they interrupted a drug transaction and arrested Scott
Stolkner.
[¶4] Five days later, on December 8, Agent Vogel received a phone
call from a confidential informant who had given him reliable information in
the past. The informant had been told by Stolkner's girlfriend, who lived
with Stolkner in the same apartment, that she had picked up ten pounds of
marijuana from an individual known to the agents to be involved in drug
trafficking, and that she was going to deliver it to another individual who
had been prosecuted on marijuana-related charges in the past. The
informant identified Stolkner's girlfriend by name, identified the supplier of
the marijuana by name, and identified the person to whom Stolkner's
girlfriend expected the marijuana to be delivered. Vogel and Dumas were
familiar with each named individual as being involved in drug trafficking.
Later that same day, the informant called Vogel back and told him that
Stolkner's girlfriend had told the informant that her plans had changed, and
that she would not be delivering the drugs as planned. Instead, Joe Lux
would come to the apartment and pick up the drugs.
[¶5] Lux was known to Agent Dumas, who, a couple of months before,
had searched Lux's apartment based on information that Lux was receiving
drugs via UPS. That search had turned up a quantity of drug paraphernalia
but no drugs. The agents also knew Lux to be a friend or associate of Scott
Stolkner, and had information from other informants that Lux may have
been involved in the trafficking of marijuana and LSD.
[¶6] On December 8, the agents observed Lux's car as it entered the
parking lot at Forest Park, remained there for approximately five to seven
minutes, and drove off-exactly as predicted by the informant. They
followed the car away from the apartment complex and observed that Lux
himself was driving. He drove to a local restaurant, taking a route that
suggested he was driving evasively. As soon as Lux left the restaurant and
returned to the car, the agents asked the Portland police to stop the car.
[¶7] The agents immediately searched the entire car. Agent Dumas
searched the passenger compartment. At the same time, Agent Vogel took
the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk. Inside the trunk was a
safe, which Vogel opened with a key from the same key chain. Inside the
safe was a 9-millimeter handgun and a magazine containing several
9-millimeter rounds. Lux was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm.
After the court denied his motion to suppress the evidence found in the
safe, Lux was convicted in a jury-waived trial. This appeal followed.
II. THE STOP
[¶8] Law enforcement officials are justified in making an investigatory
stop if, "at the time of the stop: (1) [they have] an 'articulable suspicion' of
criminal activity; and (2) [that] suspicion is 'objectively reasonable in the
totality of the circumstances.'" State v. Lear, 1998 ME 273, ¶ 5, 722 A.2d
1266, 1267 (quoting State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90, ¶ 5, 694 A.2d 453, 455).
[¶9] Dumas and Vogel articulated an objectively reasonable suspicion
that Lux was transporting a quantity of marijuana. Their suspicion was based
on a detailed tip from a previously reliable informant, made all the more
credible by the agents' recent experience with Lux and with Stolkner's
apartment, and corroborated by the agents' observations. See, e.g., State v.
Sampson, 669 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Me. 1996) (anonymous tip corroborated by
officer's observations supported reasonable suspicion). The stop of the car
was justified.
III. THE SEARCH
[¶10] Turning then to the search, "[p]robable cause exists when the
officers' personal knowledge of facts and circumstances, in combination
with any reasonably trustworthy information conveyed to them, would
warrant a prudent person to believe that the container seized holds either
contraband or evidence of a crime." State v. Snow, 527 A.2d 750, 753 (Me.
1987); see also State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Me. 1991). Put
another way, probable cause to search exists when "'there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.'" State v. Crowley, 1998 ME 187, ¶ 3, 714 A.2d 834, 836
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). "[T]he quantum of
proof necessary to establish probable cause is less than the level of fair
preponderance of the evidence." State v. Bradley, 658 A.2d 236, 237 (Me.
1995) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)).
[¶11] Possessing a corroborated tip from a previously trustworthy
informant that Lux would pick up a large quantity of marijuana from
Stolkner's apartment, the agents plainly had a "reasonable belief 'that
contraband or evidence of a crime'" would be found in the car. See State v.
Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1282 (Me. 1993) (quoting State v. Tomah, 586 A.2d
1267, 1269 (Me. 1991)). An informant's tip, corroborated by the agents'
own knowledge and observations, may provide the foundation for
determining probable cause. See, e.g., State v. Nickerson, 574 A.2d 1355,
1356 (Me. 1990) (tip regarding marijuana grown in basement, corroborated
by officer's prior knowledge); Snow, 527 A.2d at 753 (tip regarding landing
of oversized lobster meat, corroborated by officer's observations). The
record fully supports the motion court's conclusion that the search of the
car was justified.
[¶12] Because the officers had ample information supporting the stop
of the car and the search in general, the only real question presented here
is whether the officers also had probable cause to search the safe found in
the trunk. "If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 825 (1982), quoted in Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1301
(1999).
[¶13] To determine whether "an object of the search" could be
contained in the safe, we must examine the permissible scope of the search.
The "scope of the warrantless search [of an automobile] is no broader and no
narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant." Ross,
456 U.S. at 825 (emphasis added). We addressed a scope of search question
in State v. Wing, 559 A.2d 783 (Me. 1989). There, law enforcement officers
obtained a warrant to search the defendant's house on the basis of their
observation of marijuana being cultivated on his land. See id. at 784-85.
The warrant identified the objects of the search as "[m]arijuana, drugs, drug
paraphernalia, drug records, and any evidence associated with drug
trafficking." Id. at 786. We approved of that warrant description, holding
that "[t]he trial court properly determined that because the goods described
in the warrant and affidavit are contraband, or directly related to the sale,
distribution or acquisition of contraband, the generic description was
appropriate." Id. Similarly, the objects of the search of Lux's car could
legitimately include objects related to the sale and distribution of drugs.{1}
The search for generic but related contraband was reasonable on the facts
known to the officers and did not offend the protections due Lux under the
Fourth Amendment.
[¶14] The apparently reliable information that Lux would be
transporting marijuana gave the agents probable cause to believe that the car
contained related evidence of drug trafficking, including not only ten
pounds of marijuana but also a lesser quantity of that substance, drug
trafficking records, and scales or other paraphernalia.{2} Because those
legitimate objects of the search could have been concealed in the safe in the
trunk of Lux's car, the search of the safe was supported by probable cause.
[¶15] If the officer has probable cause "just prior to the search," see
Izzo, 623 A.2d at 1282, he may continue searching until he has searched
"every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search," see Ross, 456 U.S. at 825. "The practical considerations that
justify a warrantless search of an automobile continue to apply until the
entire search of the automobile and its contents has been completed." Id. at
821 n.28 (emphasis added). The lawful search of Lux's car encompassed the
search of the trunk and the safe therein.
[¶16] The motion court did not err in refusing to suppress the
evidence of the gun.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorneys for State:
Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General
Lea-Anne Jameson, Asst. Atty. Gen.
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
Attorney for defendant:
Terri M. Kossoff, Esq.
277 Main Street
Westbrook, ME 04092-4712
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . See also United States v.
Owens, 167 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1999). There, when a drug- sniffing dog "alerted"
on a car stopped for speeding, the officers had "probable cause to
believe that the automobile contained drugs and evidence of drug trafficking,"
which justified the search of a hidden compartment and the seizure of address
books, notebooks, cash, and guns found therein. Id. at 747-750 (emphasis
added). {2} . It is unnecessary to decide whether the agents, in the absence
of evidence that Lux was known by the agents to carry a gun or have a propensity
for violence, also had probable cause to search for weapons. Even if they
did not, the safe was lawfully opened in a search for drugs, records, or
paraphernalia, and the handgun was lawfully seized pursuant to the plain
view doctrine. See State v. Dignoti, 682 A.2d 666, 671-72 (Me. 1996).
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