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State v. David Lear
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1998 ME 273
Docket: Pen-98-110
Submitted
on Briefs: November 6, 1998
Decided: December 22, 1998
Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
DAVID A. LEAR
RUDMAN, J.
[¶1] David A. Lear appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior
Court (Penobscot County, Kravchuk, C.J.) affirming the judgment entered in
the District Court (Bangor, Hjelm, J.) after a conditional guilty plea on the
charge of operating under the influence, in violation of 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2411
(1996 & Supp. 1998),{1} a Class D offense. Lear contends that the court
(Bangor, Anderson, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress. We
disagree and affirm the judgment.
[¶2] On the evening of November 30, 1996, Trooper Brian Strout of
the Maine State Police participated in a roadblock on Route 1A in East
Holden. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Strout saw Lear's approaching motor
vehicle safely make a U-turn and reverse direction approximately 200 yards
from the roadblock. Strout got into his cruiser and pursued the vehicle.
After continuing about one half mile on Route 1A, the vehicle turned left on
Church Road, and progressed for about one quarter mile before turning onto
Roques Bluff Road and immediately into Lear's driveway. Strout displayed
his blue lights and flashers during the entire distance he pursued Lear's
vehicle. Strout caught up with the vehicle for a portion of the distance, but
the vehicle did not promptly stop, despite the trooper's signal to do so.
[¶3] As Lear and a female passenger walked toward Lear's house,
Strout intercepted them and asked Lear to produce his operator's license.
Lear produced a conditional license prohibiting him from operating a motor
vehicle after consuming any amount of intoxicating liquor. Strout smelled an
odor of alcohol emanating from Lear and observed that Lear had glassy eyes
and slurred speech. He then ordered Lear to get into his police cruiser and
asked Lear if he would submit to a test to determine his blood alcohol level.
Lear responded: "I'm f---ed if I do and I'm f---ed if I don't."
[¶4] Lear pled not guilty to the Class D offense of operating under the
influence in violation of 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2411, and filed a motion to
suppress based upon an allegedly improper investigatory stop and failure to
administer Miranda{2} warnings. The motion court concluded that "Officer
Strout did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the stop of
[Lear's] vehicle based solely on his making a U-turn 200 yards from the
roadblock." However, the court found that Strout: (1) was justified in
stopping Lear based upon a reasonable articulable suspicion that Lear
violated 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 (1996){3} by refusing to stop for a law
enforcement officer; and (2) was not conducting an interrogation at the time
Lear made the statement at issue. The court also concluded that Strout had
probable cause to arrest Lear based on a reasonable belief that Lear had
violated both 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 and the terms of his conditional license.
Lear appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment of the
District Court, and now appeals to this court.
I.
[¶5] An officer is justified in making an investigatory stop if, at the
time of the stop: (1) the officer has an "articulable suspicion" of criminal
activity; and (2) such suspicion is "objectively reasonable in the totality of
the circumstances." State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90, ¶ 5, 694 A.2d 453, 455
(quotations omitted). "The court must find that the officer actually
entertained the suspicion and that the suspicion was reasonable under the
circumstances." State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1994) (quoting
State v. Worster, 611 A.2d 979, 980 (Me. 1992)) (emphasis added).
Therefore, an analysis of the propriety of an investigatory detention short of
formal arrest necessarily involves both a subjective component (i.e., actual
articulable suspicion) and an objective component (i.e., reasonable
suspicion). See id. Hence, the term "reasonable and articulable suspicion"
includes both subjective and objective components. See id.
[¶6] We review both the subjective and objective components of a trial
court's finding that an officer possessed the "reasonable and articulable
suspicion" necessary to support an investigatory detention of a motor
vehicle under a "clear error" standard. See Brown, 1997 ME 90, ¶ 5, 694
A.2d at 455. Lear does not contest the court's factual finding that Strout
actually had a subjective "articulable suspicion" of criminal activity.{4} Rather,
he contends that Strout's articulable suspicion of criminal activity was
objectively unreasonable, based on the undisputed facts. Therefore, the only
issue is whether the court committed clear error when it found that Strout's
suspicion of criminal activity was objectively reasonable.
[¶7] The court found that Strout's suspicion of criminal activity based
solely on Lear's U-turn was not objectively reasonable. However, the court
concluded that Lear's intervening failure to stop independently provided
Strout with an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, because
29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 prohibits a person from failing or refusing to stop a
motor vehicle "on request or signal of a uniformed law enforcement officer."
29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414. Lear does not contest the court's finding that Strout
caught up with Lear during Lear's retreat from the roadblock and that Lear
"did not promptly stop, despite the trooper's signal to do so."{5} By failing to
stop for a police officer, Lear violated 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 (a class E
crime), and thereby provided Strout with an objectively reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. See 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414(2). Therefore, the court did
not commit clear error when it concluded that Strout's articulable suspicion
of criminal activity (i.e., Lear's violation of 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414) was
objectively reasonable.
II.
[¶8] The court also held that Miranda v. Arizona{6} did not require
suppressing Lear's response to Strout's request that he submit to a blood
alcohol test because, although Lear was in custody, his gratuitous response
was not the product of an interrogation. Lear contends that the court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress, because he claims his statement
was the product of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda.
[¶9] "A Miranda warning is required only if a defendant is in custody
and subject to interrogation." State v. Swett, 1998 ME 76, ¶ 4, 709 A.2d
729, 730. The Miranda rule does not apply to spontaneous statements that
are not a response to interrogation. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496
U.S. 582, 605 (1990). As the court noted, 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2457 (1996)
authorized Strout to require Lear to take a test to determine Lear's blood
alcohol level.{7} It is clear from the record that Strout merely made a routine
request for Lear to submit to a blood alcohol test pursuant to 29p;A M.R.S.A.
§ 2457, and did not elicit incriminating information or admissions.
Therefore, Lear was not "subject to interrogation," and the court did not
erroneously deny his motion to suppress. Swett, 1998 ME 76, ¶ 4, 709
A.2d at 730.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorneys for State:
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney
C. Daniel Wood, Asst. Dist. Atty.
97 Hammond Street
Bangor, ME 04401
Attorney for defendant:
Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq.
P O Box 1423
Bangor, ME 04402-1423
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} Section 2411 of Title 29p;A
provides, in pertinent part: § 2411. Criminal OUI 1. Offense. A person
commits OUI, which is a Class D crime unless otherwise provided, if that
person operates a motor vehicle: A. While under the influence of intoxicants;
or B. While having a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more. . . . . 29p;A
M.R.S.A. § 2411(1) (1996 & Supp. 1998). {2} See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). {3} Section 2414 of Title 29p;A provides, in pertinent
part: § 2414. Refusing to stop for a law enforcement officer 1. Definitions.
As used in this section, unless the context otherwise indicates, the following
terms have the following meanings. A. "Roadblock" means a vehicle,
a physical barrier or other obstruction placed on a way at the direction
of a law enforcement officer. B. "Signal" includes, but is not
limited to, the use of a hand signal, siren or flashing emergency lights.
2. Failure to stop. A person commits a Class E crime if that person fails
or refuses to stop a motor vehicle on request or signal of a uniformed law
enforcement officer. . . . . 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 (1996). {4}
Although the District Court did not specifically or separately address whether
Strout actually had an "articulable suspicion" of criminal activity,
such finding is implicit in its analysis of whether such suspicion is objectively
reasonable. The record also supports the finding of an articulable suspicion.
For example, Lear elicited the following response from Strout on cross-examination:
Q: [O]bviously you had the suspicion because [Lear] turned around at the
roadblock? A: He turned around at the roadblock, and also he did not stop
when I was behind him, 'cause I was behind him for a mile, mile and a quarter.
He had ample time to see my blue lights behind him. He did not pull over.
He went down another road and then up another road and then in a dooryard.
That aroused my suspicion. Therefore, the court did not commit clear error
as to the subjective component, since Strout had an "articulable suspicion"
of criminal activity, whether or not such suspicion was objectively reasonable.
{5} In fact, Lear concedes that "Trooper [Strout] followed the vehicle
to the residence of [Lear]." {6} See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). {7} Section 2457 of Title 29p;A provides, in pertinent part:
§ 2457. Conditional license holder; OUI . . . . 2. Duty to submit to
test. A person who operates a motor vehicle with a conditional license shall
submit to a test if there is probable cause to believe that person holds
a conditional license and operated a motor vehicle with any amount of alcohol
in the blood. . . . 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2457(2) (1996).
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