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Starte v. Donovan
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:  	1997 ME 181
Docket:  	Ken-96-336
Submitted
on Briefs:	June 23, 1997 
Decided:	August 8, 1997

Panel:		WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, RUDMAN, and LIPEZ, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

DANIEL DONOVAN

WATHEN, C.J.

	[¶1] Defendant Daniel Donovan appeals from the judgments entered in
the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.) following a jury verdict
finding him guilty of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253
(Supp. 1996); assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207 (1983 & Supp. 1996);
criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 806 (1983 & Supp. 1996); and
violation of a bail condition (Class E), 15 M.R.S.A. § 1092 (Supp. 1996). 
Defendant contends the court erred by refusing to allow him to cross-
examine the complainant concerning the conditions of her probation, by
allowing the complainant to testify that she had been involved in several
abusive marriages prior to her relationship with him, and by refusing to
appoint substitute counsel for his sentencing.  He also asserts that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial.  We affirm the judgments.  
	[¶2] The evidence presented at the trial may be summarized as
follows:  On the night of June 22, 1994, defendant, his girlfriend Robyn
Reed, and two other friends were celebrating Robyn's recent divorce at
defendant's house in Monmouth.  Robyn's two young children were also
present.  At one point during the evening, defendant became angry at Robyn
and her friend, Melissa Lowe, and began threatening them.  Robyn and
Melissa ran from the house and defendant threw an ashtray at Robyn, hitting
her in the back.  As they were running away, they could hear the sound of
breaking glass.  Robyn and Melissa ran to a neighbor's house and asked him
to call the police.  The women returned to the house with the police to get
Robyn's children and saw that Robyn's car was damaged.  Robyn went to the
police station with her children but later returned to the house with the
police.  Defendant apologized and said everything would be all right, and
Robyn decided that she and her children would stay with him.  After the
police left, defendant became angry and started hitting Robyn and pulling
her hair.  Robyn told him that she heard someone at the door, and while he
went to see if anyone was there, she dialed 911.  When defendant returned
and saw the phone off the hook, Robyn ran down the hallway to get away
from him.  Defendant caught Robyn, kicked her, and pulled off her pants. 
He ripped off her underwear, put on a condom, and began having
intercourse with her.  Robyn then heard the police at the door and
screamed for them to come inside.  Robyn was taken to the hospital and
examined.  Defendant was convicted on all counts and this appeal followed.

I.

	[¶3]  Defendant contends that the court improperly denied him the
opportunity to cross-examine Robyn about her motivation for testifying and
that the court's denial violated his sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses against him.  Defendant sought to introduce evidence that Robyn
had been placed on probation prior to the June 22, 1994 incident and that
one of her probation conditions required her to "testify truthfully in [the]
matter of State vs. Robert Gushue[,]" and to "make herself available for
process." The court excluded the evidence as misleading given the lack of
any connection between Robyn's probation condition and the present case. 
Defendant was permitted, however, to ask Robyn whether she was testifying
voluntarily, to which question she answered yes, and whether she had been
served a subpoena, to which question she answered no.  
	[¶4]  Maine Rule of Evidence 403 provides that the trial court may
exclude evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury . . . ."  We review the exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Cloutier, 1997 ME 96, ¶ 5, __A.2d __; State v. Hayes, 675 A.2d 106,
109 (Me. 1996).  When the evidence in question is proffered by a defendant
in a criminal proceeding, and the State contends the evidence is
inadmissible, "the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him significantly circumscribes the court's discretion to
exclude the evidence."  State v. Graves, 638 A.2d 734, 737 (Me. 1994)
(footnote omitted).{1}  "A fundamental component of the right to confront
one's accuser secures for the criminal defendant the right to cross-examine
to explore the motivations of the witness to testify."  State v. Warren, 661
A.2d 1108, 1111 (Me. 1995) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316
(1974)); Graves, 638 A.2d at 738.
	[¶5]  The trial court acted within its discretion when it determined
that evidence of probation conditions imposed prior to the incident in
question would be substantially more misleading than probative.  
Furthermore, defendant was permitted to explore Robyn's motivation for
testifying even though he was prohibited from asking about the conditions of
her probation in the unrelated case.  See State v. Huntley, 681 A.2d 10, 13
(Me. 1996) (defendant's sixth amendment right was not violated when he
was allowed to ask the victim whether she had been coerced into testifying
by third party who abused her, even though he was prohibited from asking
questions about specific instances of the third party's abuse of the victim). 
Defendant's right to confront the witness was not violated by the court's
ruling.

II.

	[¶6] Defendant asserts the court erred by allowing the victim to
respond to the State's question about the nature of her marital relationships
prior to her involvement with him.  He argues that Robyn's testimony that
she had been involved in prior abusive relationships created the inference
that her relationship with him was also abusive, and portrayed her as a
chronic victim.  In essence, he asserts that such evidence has no relevance
as to his conduct and constitutes improper character evidence with respect
to Robyn.{2} 
	[¶7] On direct examination, the State asked Robyn about her
relationships with her prior husbands.  She testified that "[t]hree of them
were not good at all and one of them was a good relationship[,]" and that
"[i]t was mental and physical abuse."  The court admitted this testimony
over defendant's objection.  The court reasoned that defendant had opened
the door for this question by suggesting in his opening statement that
Robyn's voluntary return to his house demonstrated the pretextual nature of
her accusations.  The court stated:  "We all know from the history of abuse
cases that women in violent relationships tend to go back to those
relationships, even in the face of immediate violence."
	[¶8]  Although the State may introduce evidence to rebut an inference
created by evidence introduced by the defendant, "[a] distinction exists
between assertions made by counsel in an opening statement and the
testimony of witnesses during trial.  The latter is evidence; the former is
not."  State v. Bazinet, 372 A.2d 1036, 1040 (Me. 1977).   The defendant's
opening statement did not "open the door" for rebuttal evidence
concerning matters never placed in issue by the evidence.  See Burns v.
State, 609 So. 2d 600, 605 (Fla. 1992) (citation omitted); People v. Whiters,
562 N.E.2d 325, 329-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth,
361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (Va. Ct. App. 1987). 
	[¶9] Robyn's prior marital history was not otherwise relevant and the
admission of her testimony was error.  We find, however, that it is highly
probable the error did not affect the jury's verdict and the error was
therefore harmless.   State v. Phillipo, 623 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me. 1993);
State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me. 1981). 

	III.

	[¶10]  Donovan contends the court abused its discretion when it
denied Donovan's post-trial motion for substitute counsel at sentencing. 
"The denial of a motion for withdrawal or substitution of counsel is generally
discretionary with the court."  State v. Goodine, 587 A.2d 228, 229 (Me.
1991) (citations omitted).  "The sixth amendment right to counsel does not
confer upon a defendant an absolute right to counsel of defendant's choice. 
Nor does it guarantee a 'meaningful relationship' between an accused and
his counsel."  State v. Barrett, 577 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Me. 1990) (quotations
and citations omitted).  The defendant has 

no right to be represented by a lawyer other than the one who
has been appointed to represent him except for good cause. 
Only when the defendant can establish "good cause, such as a
conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or
an irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead to an apparently
unjust verdict" must the court substitute new counsel.

Goodine, 587 A.2d at 229 (citations omitted).  
	[¶11] Defendant supported his request for a substitution by asserting
that (1) his attorney's assistance at the trial was "shoveled down [his]
throat" and he never really agreed to his attorney's representation, and (2)
his attorney's representation was inadequate because he failed to introduce
the forensic chemist's written report relied on by the chemist while
testifying and requested by the jury during deliberation.  The court did not
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion.{3}

IV.

	[¶12]  Finally, defendant contends he was denied effective assistance
of counsel at his trial.  We recently concluded that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel will not be addressed on direct appeal and must be
raised by post-conviction review.  State v. Nichols, 1997 ME 178, __A.2d __.  
	The entry is:
					Judgments affirmed.
                                                                                      
Attorneys for State:	
David W. Crook, District Attorney	
Alan P. Kelley, Dep. Dist. Atty.	
95 State Street	
Augusta, ME 04330
Attorney for defendant:

Nathaniel T. Hussey, Esq.
P O Box 411
Hallowell, ME 04347