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State v. Dale Hillman

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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	2000 ME 71
Docket:	Cum-99-648
Submitted
on Briefs:	March 29, 2000
Decided:	April 20, 2000

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE

v.

DALE HILLMAN

ALEXANDER, J.

	[¶1]  Dale Hillman appeals the ruling of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Atwood, J.) denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas to charges of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 255(1)(C) (Supp. 1999) and assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207 (1983
& Supp. 1999).  Following the denial of his motion, Hillman was sentenced
on the charges and then filed his appeal from the judgment entered after
sentencing.  Because the trial court did not exceed the bounds of its
discretion, we affirm.

I.  CASE HISTORY

	[¶2]  Dale Hillman was indicted for unlawful sexual contact (Class C),
17-A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C) and assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207
involving a young boy.  At arraignment, Hillman pled not guilty.  The case
was placed on a trial list beginning September 3, 1999.  On September 10,
1999, Hillman appeared and entered pleas of guilty to both charges.  There
is no dispute that the Rule 11 proceeding, at which he entered his pleas,
was properly conducted and that Hillman knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to trial and entered a guilty plea.{1}  
	[¶3]  The plea was apparently subject to a sentencing agreement,
M.R. Crim. P. 11A(a)(4). However, sentencing was continued until
September 29, 1999, in order to comply with 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1174{2}
& 1257{3} and afford the then eight-year-old victim and family members the
opportunity to appear at sentencing.  
	[¶4]  Because of scheduling problems, the sentencing did not
proceed on September 29.  On September 29, Hillman filed a motion to
withdraw his plea.  As grounds for the motion, Hillman asserted that a
private investigator's report received on the date of plea, September 10, had
caused him to reassess his position and seek to withdraw his plea.  
	[¶5]  The matter was rescheduled for October 1, 1999.  On that
date, all appeared including the young victim, whose presence was
acknowledged by the court.  The first order of business at the hearing was
Hillman's motion to withdraw his plea.  After hearing the parties' arguments
and sensitively analyzing the issues, including acknowledging the difficulty
which such cases present for young victims and the importance of giving
them closure, the court denied the motion.  The court determined that
Hillman was not credibly asserting his innocence but instead had simply
changed his view of the odds of prevailing at trial.  
	[¶6]  After denying the motion to withdraw plea, the court
proceeded to hear the young victim and his mother speak.  Following
argument of counsel, the court imposed the agreed sentence.  Hillman then
brought this appeal.

II.  DISCUSSION

	[¶7]  A defendant may seek to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo
contendere any time before sentence is imposed.  See M.R. Crim. P. 32(d).{4}
Although relief should be granted liberally, a defendant does not have an
absolute right to withdraw a plea.  See State v. Comer, 584 A.2d 638, 640
(Me. 1990); State v. Boone, 444 A.2d 438, 441 (Me. 1982).  We review the
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea only for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Comer, 584 A.2d at 640; State v. Malo, 577 A.2d 332, 333 (Me.
1990).  
	[¶8]  Trial courts evaluate four factors when deciding motions to
withdraw pleas, and we similarly evaluate those factors when reviewing the
trial court's exercise of its discretion.  The four factors are:
 
	-	The length of time between entering the plea and seeking to
		withdraw it; 
	-	The potential prejudice to the State; 
	-	The defendant's assertions of innocence; and
	-	Any deficiency in the proceeding at which the defendant
		entered the plea in accordance with M.R. Crim. P. 11. 
 
Comer, 584 A.2d at 640; Malo, 577 A.2d at 333.  
	[¶9]  The parties agree there was no deficiency in the Rule 11
proceedings.  Only 19 days elapsed between the time when Hillman entered
his plea and sought to withdraw it.  Consequently, the parties also agree that
the timing of Hillman's motion works in his favor.  However, the trial court
could have reasonably evaluated the credibility of Hillman's assertions of
innocence and stated reasons for seeking to withdraw his plea by
considering that a plea entered when trial was imminent was sought to be
withdrawn as soon as the immediate pressure for trial had passed.
	[¶10]  At the motion hearing, the State asserted that it would be
prejudiced by the plea withdrawal, citing the potential impact upon the
young victim and his family of reopening difficult events in their lives that
they thought had been closed.  The trial court's comments also indicated
appropriate sensitivity to this concern.  However, both the court and the
State indicated that such an impact on the victim, while difficult, would not
in this instance have seriously compromised the State's case by affecting the
ability of the State to present its evidence.{5}
	[¶11]  Accordingly, both the court and the parties focused on the
credibility of Hillman's assertion of innocence as the primary consideration
in the plea withdrawal hearing.  The court recognized that when Hillman
had originally appeared, he had entered a guilty plea.  The court further
determined that Hillman's change of mind was not motivated by any
differing view of his innocence but, rather, was a later tactical decision that
he might have a better chance at prevailing at trial than he had originally
believed.  The court noted that Hillman's change of position was different
from other cases in which a defendant had consistently asserted innocence
or had pled nolo contendere rather than guilty.  Accordingly, the court
discounted the credibility of Hillman's assertion of innocence when
evaluating his motion to withdraw.  
	[¶12]  Although it is true that the complete absence of a protestation
of innocence in support of a motion to withdraw weighs against a defendant,
see, e.g., State v. Grondin, 284 A.2d 677, 678 (Me. 1971), the mere
presence of such an assertion does not necessarily entitle a defendant to
withdraw his plea of guilty, see State v. Pokorny, 458 A.2d 1212, 1217 (Me.
1983).  In Pokorny, we observed in response to a defendant's assertion that
his initial plea of nolo contendere was not intelligently and voluntarily
entered:

Although defendant did continually assert that he was
innocent of the charge against him, such an assertion is "not
conclusive" even when the defendant has entered a plea of
guilty.  Where, as here, defendant pleaded nolo contendere
and thus did not explicitly admit his guilt, and where he did
concede that he believed the State could convict him if the
case went to trial, the fact that the defendant consistently
insisted on his legal innocence does not require that he be
permitted to withdraw his nolo plea and go to trial.

Id.  Similarly, federal courts have noted, "[w]ere mere assertion of legal
innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would
effectively be an automatic right."  Nunez Cordero v. United States, 533 F.2d
723, 726 (1st Cir. 1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Another court has observed:

Were withdrawal automatic in every case where the
defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory
of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere
gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at
the defendant's whim.

United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoted in Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32 advisory committee's note to 1983 amend.
	[¶13]  In the circumstances, the trial court did not exceed the
bounds of its discretion by discounting the credibility of Hillman's recent
assertion of innocence and denying his motion to withdraw his plea,
proceeding to sentence and giving the young victim closure in the case.
	The entry is:
			Judgment affirmed.
                                                         
Attorneys for State:

Stephanie Anderson, District Attorney
Julia Sheridan, Asst. Dist. Atty.
142 Federal Street
Portland, ME 04101

Attorney for defendant:

Kevin Heffernan, Esq.
P O Box 17852
Portland, ME 04112