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State v. Mahan
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1998 ME 143
Docket: Lin-97-259
Submitted
on Briefs:December 12, 1997
Decided: June 8, 1998
Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and SAUFLEY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
CLIFTON MAHAN, SR.
LIPEZ, J.
[¶1] Clifton Mahan, Sr. appeals the sentences imposed as a result of
his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon (Class D) in violation of 25
M.R.S.A. § 2001 (1988 & Supp. 1997){1} and criminal trespass (Class E) in
violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402 (1983 & Supp. 1997),{2} entered in the
Superior Court (Lincoln County, Calkins, J.) following his jury-waived trial.
On direct appeal pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 37, Mahan argues that the court
lacked the authority pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2)(D) (1983 & Supp.
1997) to impose two consecutive, rather than concurrent, periods of
probation for the convictions.{3} Finding no error, we affirm the sentences.
I.
[¶2] Clifton Mahan, Sr. was indicted by the Lincoln County Grand Jury
in February 1997 for armed burglary (Class A) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 401; carrying a concealed weapon (Class D) in violation of 25 M.R.S.A.
§ 2001; and criminal trespass (Class E) in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402.
At Mahan's jury-waived trial, the following evidence was presented.
[¶3] In early 1997 Geraldine Mahan left her husband of fifty-three
years, Clifton Mahan, Sr., because of a history of spousal abuse. A few weeks
after Geraldine left him, Mahan drove to the home of Joseph and Evelyn
Ball, where Geraldine was residing. Mahan, who is eighty-three years old,
testified that he intended to commit suicide by shooting himself in the
presence of the Balls and Geraldine. Finding the front door locked, Mahan
entered the home through a garage door which had been secured in a
makeshift fashion by a metal bar. Mahan confronted Mrs. Ball and demanded
to speak with Geraldine, who emerged from a back bedroom where she had
been hiding. As the group gathered in the kitchen, Mrs. Ball saw a gun in
Mahan's pocket. Following a brief struggle to gain control of the gun, it fell
to the floor. The police arrived and placed Mahan under arrest.
[¶4] At the conclusion of the jury-waived trial, the court found Mahan
guilty on the concealed weapon and criminal trespass charges, but not guilty
on the armed burglary charge. Judgment was entered accordingly. With
respect to the concealed weapon conviction, the court sentenced Mahan to
seven months imprisonment, all except 75 days suspended, and one year
probation. With respect to the criminal trespass conviction, the court
sentenced Mahan to five months imprisonment, all suspended, and one year
probation. The court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively,
stating:
[I] am convinced that the seriousness of the offenses, and
in particular the carrying of the firearm into someone else's
home, requires consecutive sentences, not so much that a great
deal of jail time be imposed on you, but more for the purpose of
being able to impose two one-year periods of probation. Because
I do think it is apparent . . . that supervision of you and
conditions of probation are not only appropriate for a two-year
period of time but necessary.
This direct appeal pursuant to M.R. Crim. P. 37 followed.
II.
[¶5] Mahan argues that the court's imposition of consecutive
probationary periods in this case was illegal and in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 1256(2)(D).{4} Specifically, Mahan contends that subsection (2)(D), on
which the court relied, authorizes the imposition of consecutive sentences
only for the purpose of extending the period of a defendant's imprisonment,
not the period of his probation.
[¶6] We have previously addressed this issue in State v. Dadiego, 617
A.2d 552 (Me. 1992). In Dadiego, the trial court, relying on 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 1256(2)(D), had imposed a split sentence of incarceration and probation,
followed by consecutive periods of probation. See id. at 553. After noting
that 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(8) precludes only a sentence that is "not wholly
suspended" from following a split sentence in certain circumstances,{5} we
rejected Dadiego's contention that the court lacked authority to impose
consecutive probationary periods. See id. 554-55. Rather, we reasoned that
the Legislature, by implication, intended to permit sentences that are
"wholly suspended"-including sentences of probation-to follow a split
sentence. See id. Thus, we concluded, "consecutive terms of probation are
permissible when the consecutive terms of imprisonment are warranted
under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(1)-(3)." Id.
[¶7] Applying Dadiego's holding to this case, we find that the court
acted within its authority by imposing consecutive periods of probation.{6}
Mahan's first sentence on the concealed weapon conviction was a split
sentence, but his second sentence on the criminal trespassing conviction
was wholly suspended. Moreover, section 1256(2)(D) expressly permits
consecutive sentences of imprisonment based on "the seriousness of the
criminal conduct involved . . . ." 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2)(D). Accordingly,
pursuant to Dadiego, the imposition of consecutive terms of probation was
permissible. See Dadiego, 617 A.2d at 554-55.
III.
[¶8] Mahan also argues that consecutive sentences were prohibited by
17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B), which provides in pertinent part:
3. A defendant may not be sentenced to consecutive terms for
crimes arising out of the same criminal episode when:
. . .
B. One crime consists only of a conspiracy, attempt,
solicitation or other form of preparation to commit,
or facilitation of, the other.
. . .
17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B). Relying on this provision, Mahan contends that
the evidence presented at trial showed that his crimes, namely carrying a
concealed weapon and criminal trespassing, were committed to facilitate
the ultimate goal of his suicide inside the Ball residence. Thus, he argues,
consecutive sentences for the crimes are prohibited by subsection (3)(B).
We disagree.
[¶9] Subsection (3)(B) prohibits consecutive sentences when one
crime facilitates "the other." See, e.g., State v. Tellier, 580 A.2d 1333 (Me.
1990) (consecutive sentences cannot be imposed for kidnapping and
unlawful sexual assault convictions, where kidnapping was committed only
to facilitate the sexual assault); State v. Prentiss, 557 A.2d 619 (Me. 1989)
(consecutive sentences cannot be imposed for burglary and gross sexual
assault convictions, where burglary was committed only to facilitate the
gross sexual assault); State v. Bunker, 436 A.2d 413 (Me. 1981) (consecutive
sentences cannot be imposed for kidnapping and sex crime convictions,
where kidnapping was committed only to facilitate the sex crimes). In this
case, however, there was no evidence that Mahan carried a concealed
weapon to facilitate his criminal trespass; similarly, there was no evidence
that Mahan committed criminal trespass to enable himself to carry a
concealed weapon. Rather, each crime was committed to further a
noncriminal goal-Mahan's suicide. Cf., e.g., State v. Winchenbach, 501 A.2d
1282 (Me. 1985) (consecutive sentences permissible for burglary and
eluding an officer/passing a roadblock convictions, where the defendant's
"purpose in burglarizing the Waltz garage and stealing the truck was not to
engage in a high speed chase with police."). The court was not precluded by
subsection (3)(B) from imposing consecutive sentences for the weapons and
trespass convictions in this case.{7}
The entry is:
Sentences affirmed.
Attorneys for State:
Geoffrey Rushlau, District Attorney
Patricia A. Mador, Asst. Dist. Atty.
High Street
Wiscasset, ME 04578
Attorney for defendant:
William M. Avantaggio, Esq.
Howard & Bowie
P O Box 460
Damariscotta, ME 04543-0460
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} 25 M.R.S.A. § 2001 provides
in pertinent part: "No person may display in a threatening manner,
or wear under his clothes or conceal about his person, any firearm . . .
, unless excepted by provision of law." {2} 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402
provides in pertinent part: "1. A person is guilty of criminal trespass
if, knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged to do so, that
person: (A) Enters any dwelling place; (B) Enters any structure that is
locked or barred;. . . ." {3} Alternatively, Mahan argues that the
court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences.
A sentence is cognizable on direct appeal "only if it appears of record
so plainly as to preclude rational disagreement that it was beyond the sentencing
authority of the court." State v. Hudson, 470 A.2d 786, 787 (Me. 1984).
Accordingly, we will review only the legality, not the propriety, of Mahan's
sentences on direct appeal. {4} Section 1256 provides in pertinent part:
2. [T]he court shall state in the sentence of imprisonment whether a sentence
shall be served concurrently with or consecutively to any other sentence
previously imposed or to another sentence imposed on the same date. The
sentences shall be concurrent unless, in considering the following factors,
the court decides to impose sentences consecutively: . . . D. That the seriousness
of the criminal conduct involved in either a single criminal episode or
in multiple criminal episodes or the seriousness of the criminal record
of the convicted person, or both, require a sentence of imprisonment in
excess of the maximum available for the most serious offense. 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 1256. {5} 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(8) (Supp. 1997) provides in pertinent
part: No court may impose a sentence of imprisonment, not wholly suspended,
to be served consecutively to any split sentence previously imposed or imposed
on the same date, if the net result . . . would be to have the person released
from physical confinement to be on probation for the first sentence and
thereafter be required to serve an unsuspended term of imprisonment on the
2d sentence. Id. (emphasis added). {6} Mahan attempts to distinguish Dadiego
by limiting its holding to cases in which a defendant would be required
to make restitutionary payments to his victim. Dadiego's holding, however,
reflects our conclusion that the Legislature impliedly intended to bestow
upon courts the authority to impose consecutive periods of probation pursuant
to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256, and was not based on our incidental observation
that the defendant in that case might be more likely to fulfill his restitutionary
obligations if he remained under the threat of probation revocation. {7}
The State also argues on cross-appeal that the court erred by determining
that criminal trespass is not a lesser-included offense of burglary. Because
we affirm the sentences, we have no occasion to consider this issue.
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