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State v. Albert Stanley
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2000 ME 22
Docket: Was-98-543
Argued: October 5, 1999
Decided: February 9, 2000
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
ALBERT STANLEY
DANA, J.
[¶1] Albert Stanley appeals from the judgment entered in the
Superior Court (Washington County, Atwood, J.) on a jury verdict finding him
guilty of murder. See 17-A M.R.S.A § 201(1)(A) (1983).{1} Stanley contends
that the court erroneously excluded (1) evidence of his knowledge of a prior
act of violence by the victim which he had offered to support his argument
that he reasonably believed that his life was in danger and (2) evidence of
the victim's reputation for violence while intoxicated that Stanley sought to
introduce for the same purpose. We agree that Stanley should have been
permitted to introduce his knowledge of a prior act of violence and,
therefore, vacate the judgment.
I. FACTS
A. The Events that Led to the Shooting
[¶2] Stanley had gone to Mabel McVicar's home at approximately 5:00
p.m. on the night of November 8, 1996, and the couple consumed alcohol
there for several hours before leaving to look for friends. They made several
stops, including a trip to a store to purchase beer, before arriving at
Stanley's home at approximately 12:30 a.m. Stanley and McVicar had argued
earlier in the evening and discussed breaking up,{2} but they had settled down
and were not arguing with each other at this point in the evening.
[¶3] For the next three hours Stanley and McVicar consumed beer
and welcomed guests in Stanley's home. McVicar became involved in a
heated argument with two of the guests that culminated in McVicar
throwing them out. Stanley recollected that one of the guests remained for
a short period of time and attempted to calm McVicar down but left because
McVicar's anger appeared to be increasing.
[¶4] Stanley testified that after the guests left, McVicar directed her
anger at him. He fueled the flames of her anger by telling her she should
not have "pick[ed] on" their guests. According to Stanley, McVicar then
began pushing and hitting him and said she "wanted to kill" him. Stanley
asserted he shot McVicar because these events escalated to the point that
he believed it was his only option to adequately protect himself.
B. Stanley's State of Mind
[¶5] Stanley supported his belief that he was in danger by testifying
that McVicar was a strong woman who was capable of overpowering him. He
testified that although he and McVicar were of similar physical size, his
ability to defend himself was diminished by a physical disability.{3} The court
also allowed Stanley to testify about his personal knowledge of McVicar's
reputation for violence when she consumed alcohol, and about specific acts
of violence of which he had been the target. The parties also stipulated that
McVicar's blood-alcohol level was .30 percent, nearly four times the legal
limit for operating a motor vehicle.{4}
[¶6] Stanley also sought to testify to his knowledge that McVicar,
while intoxicated, had stabbed an ex-boyfriend during an argument in 1991
and to have other members of the community testify as to McVicar's
reputation for violent behavior while intoxicated to corroborate his own
assertion to that effect. The court, however, excluded the 1991 stabbing
incident because it found that testimony regarding a specific act of violence
would be improper character evidence and excluded the testimony of other
members of the community because it found the absence of a proper
foundation.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] A person may justify the use of deadly force when that person
reasonably believes the other person is about to use unlawful, deadly force
against him or another person. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 108(2)(A)(1) (Supp.
1994). In addition, it is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for murder
that the actor "causes the death while under the influence of extreme anger
or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation." 17-A M.R.S.A.
§ 201(3) (1983). As each of these defenses relies heavily on the
reasonableness of Stanley's state of mind, it was critical that Stanley be
afforded the opportunity to present the facts, as he understood them to be,
during his altercation with McVicar.
[¶8] Evidence of a person's character or of a person's bad acts is
generally not admissible to prove that that person acted in conformity
therewith. M.R. Evid. 404 (emphasis added). In applying Rule 404, we have
stated that evidence of a victim's violent nature is "clearly inadmissible" to
prove the victim was violent on a given occasion. See State v. Mitchell, 390
A.2d 495, 501 (Me. 1978). Stanley, however, did not seek to admit
evidence of McVicar's 1991 stabbing and her reputation for violence while
intoxicated for that purpose. Rather, he sought to demonstrate that his
knowledge of these facts caused him to have a reasonable apprehension of
imminent danger. See State v. Dutremble, 392 A.2d 42, 46-47 (Me. 1978)
(error by trial court in excluding evidence of defendant's knowledge of
murder victim's reputation for violence; ruled harmless in the
circumstances). We review the trial court's exclusion of evidence for clear
error or an abuse of discretion. State v. Shuman, 622 A.2d 716, 718 (Me.
1993).
A. Evidence of the Prior Bad Act
[¶9] We agree with the numerous jurisdictions that have admitted
evidence of prior bad acts offered for the purpose of proving the defendant's
state of mind and excluded such evidence when offered to demonstrate the
victim's character.{5} A defendant's knowledge of prior acts of violence,
whether witnessed by or recounted to the defendant, serves to establish that
the defendant's mental judgments and physical responses during the
encounter were reasonable. See King v. United States, 177 A.2d 912, 913
(D.C. 1962) (finding error in court's exclusion of evidence offered by the
defendant that he "had heard" that the victim had been involved in two
other fights with co-workers).{6}
[¶10] Stanley did not offer the evidence of the 1991 incident for the
purpose of proving that McVicar acted in conformity with her violent nature
or even to show that she had a violent nature. Rather, he offered the
evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that his knowledge of that
incident caused him to reasonably apprehend that his life was in danger
during the event in question. In State v. Bennett, 658 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Me.
1995), we stated that the exclusion of such evidence is not erroneous
"[u]nless the accused is aware of the victim's reputation or past acts."
(Emphasis added.) Conversely, where the accused is aware of the victim's
past acts, it is erroneous for the trial court to exclude the evidence. Field &
Murray, Maine Evidence |