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Niehoff v. Shankman & Assoc.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2000 ME 214
Docket: Cum-00-282
Argued: November 8, 2000
Decided: December 21, 2000
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
MICHAEL NIEHOFF
v.
SHANKMAN & ASSOCIATES
LEGAL CENTER, P.A.
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶1] Michael Niehoff appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Delahanty, J.) denying his motion for partial summary
judgment and granting Shankman & Associates Legal Center's motion for
summary judgment as to all claims. Niehoff contends that the court erred
in: (1) ruling that Niehoff would not have been entitled to severance benefits
if L.L. Bean, Inc.'s severance pay policy was considered to be a welfare plan
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1993); (2) ruling in the alternative that
the L.L. Bean policy did not constitute an ERISA-covered plan; and (3) failing
to hold Shankman liable to Niehoff for legal malpractice. Because we
determine that Niehoff failed to show he would have recovered had
Shankman pled a claim under ERISA, we affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS
[¶2] Niehoff was employed by L.L. Bean beginning in November 1985.
In October 1988, Niehoff stopped working and went on leave for a nonwork-
related disability. He received short-term disability benefits from L.L. Bean
during this period. Niehoff then returned to work. Due to the same
disability, he once again went on leave in 1991 and received short-term
disability benefits. After six months, and in accordance with L.L. Bean's then
existing employment practices, Niehoff's position was terminated and he
began receiving long-term disability benefits. By February 1992, Niehoff had
not worked for a year. Pursuant to company policy, Niehoff's employment
was terminated at that time.
[¶3] When L.L. Bean refused to grant him severance benefits, Niehoff
retained Shankman & Associates Legal Center to represent him. Shankman
filed an action against L.L. Bean in Superior Court, asserting claims of breach
of contract, misrepresentation and unjust enrichment (Niehoff I). The
Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Saufley, J.) granted summary judgment to
L.L. Bean on all counts. In its order, the Superior Court sua sponte raised
the issue of ERISA preemption, stating that even if Niehoff had presented
material facts in dispute, ERISA preempted the state law claims because the
L.L. Bean policy on severance benefits was a plan under ERISA.
[¶4] We affirmed the Superior Court's decision on the common law
claims by a memorandum of decision in which we stated that there was no
need to discuss the ERISA issue. Niehoff v. L.L. Bean, Inc., No. 7122 (Niehoff
I) (Me. Feb. 1, 1995) (mem.). Niehoff then filed another lawsuit in Superior
Court pleading claims under ERISA (Niehoff II). In that suit, he was
represented by an attorney unaffiliated with Shankman. The Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Saufley, J.) granted L.L. Bean's motion for summary
judgment, finding that res judicata barred Niehoff's claims. Niehoff did not
appeal from that judgment.
[¶5] Niehoff then brought the present action for legal malpractice
against Shankman, alleging legal malpractice and breach of contract (Niehoff
III). The Superior Court (Delahanty, J.) denied Niehoff's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of liability and for partial summary judgment
on the issue of damages applicable to severance pay. The court granted
Shankman's cross-motion for summary judgment on all claims. This appeal
followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶6] The entry of summary judgment must be reviewed
independently "for errors of law, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered." Steeves v.
Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.C., 1998 ME 210, ¶ 11, 718 A.2d 186,
190 (citation omitted). A summary judgment will be upheld "if the evidence
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Where the
defendant properly challenges all elements of plaintiff's claim, the "plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case for each element of his cause of action."
Id. See also Dumont v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 2000 ME 197, ¶ 10, 760 A.2d
1049, 1053.
[¶7] In legal malpractice cases, the plaintiff must show (1) a breach
by the defendant attorney of the duty owed to the plaintiff to conform to a
certain standard of conduct; and (2) that the breach of the duty proximately
caused an injury or loss to the plaintiff. See Corey v. Norman, Hanson &
DeTroy, 1999 ME 196, |