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N.A. Burkitt Inc. v. Champion Road Machinery Ltd.

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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	2000 ME 209
Docket:	Fed-00-237
Argued:	October 3, 2000
Decided:	December 5, 2000

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.

N.A. BURKITT, INC.

v.

CHAMPION ROAD MACHINERY LIMITED

and

VOLVO CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT NORTH AMERICA, INC.

SAUFLEY, J.

	[¶1]  The United States District Court for the District of Maine
(Hornby, C.J.), acting pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 57 (1989) and M.R.
Civ. P. 76B, has certified the following question of state law:  

Are motorized graders "motor vehicles," as that term is defined
in Maine's Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 10 M.R.S.A. § 1171(11)
(Supp. 2000)?

We answer the certified question in the negative.

I.  BACKGROUND

	[¶2]  N.A. Burkitt, Inc., was a dealer of motor-driven graders
manufactured by Champion Road Machinery Limited.  Graders are a type of
large, motorized devices commonly used for snowplowing, landscaping, and
road maintenance.  They typically range in weight from 9420 pounds to over
40,000 pounds.  The typical configuration of a grader includes a cab, where
the operator sits, but there are no seats for passengers or trunks or beds for
carrying personal property.
	[¶3]  Burkitt sold and serviced Champion-made graders pursuant to a
Distributor Sales Agreement entered into in 1984.  On November 15, 1999,
Volvo Construction Equipment North America, Inc., notified Burkitt that it
had assumed Champion's rights and obligations under the agreement and
was terminating the agreement effective January 15, 2000.  Burkitt
responded that the agreement was subject to Maine's Motor Vehicle Dealers
Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1171-1186 (1997 & Supp. 2000),{1} and that the
termination violated the Act.  Volvo responded that the Act did not apply
and affirmed its intent to terminate the agreement.  Burkitt then filed an
action in the United States District Court, District of Maine, seeking
injunctive relief.
	[¶4]  In an order denying Burkitt's motion for injunctive relief, the
United States District Court preliminarily concluded that graders are not
"motor vehicles" for purposes of the Act and, consequently, that Burkitt was
not entitled to the Act's protections.  The court noted, however, that the
issue of whether the Dealers Act applied to the dealers of motorized graders
might best be addressed to this Court.  Burkitt filed a motion to certify
question of law, and the court granted the motion without objections from
Champion or Volvo.
	[¶5]  The question presented requires us to interpret the term
"motor vehicle" under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act.  No disputes exist as
to the material facts of the case, no clear controlling precedents exist, and
our determination of the question would, in one alternative, be
determinative of the outcome in the United States District Court's case.  See
M.R. Civ. P. 76B(a); Maine Green Party v. Sec'y of State, 1997 ME 175, ¶ 2,
698 A.2d 516, 517.

II.  DISCUSSION

	[¶6]  To give effect to the intent of the Legislature, our primary task is
to determine the statute's plain meaning.  Burke v. Port Resort Realty Corp.,
1999 ME 138, ¶ 8, 737 A.2d 1055, 1059.  Therefore, we begin our analysis
by examining the plain meaning of the term "motor vehicle" as that term is
defined under the Dealers Act.  See Home Builders Ass'n of Maine, Inc. v.
Town of Eliot, 2000 ME 82, ¶ 4, 750 A.2d 566, 569.  If the meaning of the
language is clear, we interpret the statute to mean what it says.  Kimball v.
Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 2000 ME 20, ¶ 18, 745 A.2d 387, 392.
	[¶7]  The Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, as part of Maine's statutes on
"Regulation of Trade," provides certain protections to and restrictions on
dealers and manufacturers of "motor vehicles."  10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1171-1186. 
The Act defines a "motor vehicle" as follows:

[A]ny motor driven vehicle, except motorcycles,{2} required to be
registered under Title 29-A, chapter 5 [29-A M.R.S.A. § 351 et
seq.].

10 M.R.S.A. § 1171(11).  For purposes of the Dealers Act, therefore, a device
is a "motor vehicle," if it is something that is (1) "motor driven," (2) a
"vehicle," with the exclusion of a motorcycle, and (3) "required to be
registered under Title 29-A, chapter 5."  Id.{3}
	[¶8]  There is no dispute that graders are motor driven, thus satisfying
the first component of the definition.  We turn then to the second
component of the definition.  The Act does not define the term "vehicle,"
but it makes a specific reference to title 29-A, in which "vehicle" is defined
as follows:

"Vehicle" means a device for conveyance of persons or property
on a way.{4}  "Vehicle" does not include conveyances propelled or
drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or
snowmobiles as defined in Title 12, section 7821.

29-A M.R.S.A. § 101(91) (1996).  Thus, the distinguishing characteristic of a
"vehicle" is its use in conveying people or property.
	[¶9]  The third component provides little enlightenment.  Although
the Legislature has made a specific reference to title 29-A, chapter 5, for
"vehicle[s] . . . required to be registered," the referenced chapter does not
list or expressly state what types of "vehicles" are "required to be
registered."  29-A M.R.S.A. § 351 (1996 & Supp. 2000).  Rather, "vehicles"
under title 29-A, chapter 5, are required to be registered only if they are
operated or placed on a public way.{5}  Id.  
	[¶10]  Integrating the elements of these definitions, the term "motor
vehicle," for purposes of the Dealers Act, has the following plain meaning:  

Any motor driven device for conveyance of persons or property
on a road, highway, parkway, street or bridge used for vehicular
traffic, whether public or private, that is operated or remains on
a public way.{6}

	[¶11]  Comparing the features and characteristics of a motorized
grader to the definition of a motor vehicle, we conclude that a motorized
grader is not a motor vehicle under the Act.  See 10 M.R.S.A. § 1171(11).{7} 
Unlike motor vehicles, motorized graders are more akin to tools or
equipments that are used for certain tasks or projects, e.g., landscaping,
road maintenance, or snow removal.  See Webster's Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary 362 (7th ed. 1970) (defining "graders" as "machine[s] for
leveling earth").  As Burkitt's own brochures state, a grader's primary
function is for use in specific jobs:

Whether you're road building, fine grading, plowing snow or
cleaning ditches, we offer a complete range of graders that
deliver superior power, performance and reliability to every job.  

Although graders may incidentally carry a person or property, by the mere
necessity that they require an operator, their intended function is not for
the transport or conveyance of persons or property.
	[¶12]  Further, unlike motor vehicles, which by definition are
intended to be operated on a public way, graders are machines that are
generally used in limited areas or at a particularized site, e.g., a construction
site.  Graders are bulky and heavy, ranging from 9420 to over 40,000
pounds, and come equipped with large traction tires that are generally not
suitable for transportation on Maine's public ways.  See 10 M.R.S.A. § 1182
(Supp. 2000).{8}  Graders are simply not devices for the conveyance of
persons or property on a public way, except incidentally as part of road
construction, snowplowing, or maintenance work.  Cf. Palleria v. Farrin Bros.
& Smith, 140 A.2d 716, 725 (Me. 1958) (referring to a grader as a "large
piece of road construction equipment").  
	[¶13]  Accordingly, we end our analysis here.  "[I]f the meaning of the
statute is clear on its face, then we need not look beyond the words
themselves."  Cook v. Lisbon Sch. Comm., 682 A.2d 672, 676 (Me. 1996). 
The plain meaning of the term motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicle
Dealers Act does not include motorized graders within its definition.  See
10 M.R.S.A. § 1171(11). 
	[¶14]  Therefore, we answer the question posed to us by the United
States District Court in the negative.  Motorized graders are not "motor
vehicles," as that term is defined in 10 M.R.S.A. § 1171(11).
                                                             
Attorneys for plaintiff:

John A. Graustein, Esq., (orally)
Davis S. Sherman Jr., Esq.
Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon
P O Box 9781
Portland, ME 04104-5081

Attorneys for defendants:

Margaret Minister O'Keefe, Esq., (orally)
Jeffrey M. White, Esq.
Pierce Atwood
One Monument Square
Portland, ME 04101-1110

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