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Musson v. Godley
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1999 ME 193
Docket: Han-98-646
Argued: December 8, 1999
Decided: December 22, 1999
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
EDWARD MUSSON
v.
OTIS A. GODLEY et al.
SAUFLEY, J.
[¶1] Edward Musson appeals from an order entered in the Superior
Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) finding that Musson failed to establish that
he had ousted his cotenant and consequently that he had failed to establish
that he had acquired title to property by adverse possession. Because the
order of the Superior Court was not final, we remand the case for further
proceedings.
[¶2] This matter involves a dispute over title to Loon Island (a/k/a
Goat Island) on Great Pond in the Town of Great Pond. Musson and Bruce
Hathaway purchased the property in question as tenants in common in
1946. Shortly thereafter, Hathaway left the state and had no further
involvement with the property. Musson continued his involvement with the
property, running a hunting and fishing camp on the land for several
decades. Hathaway died in 1991. After Hathaway's estate and Musson were
unable to reach an agreement regarding the nature of the estate's interest in
the property, the personal representative of the estate sold whatever
interest it had in the property to Otis Godley.
[¶3] On February 6, 1996, Musson filed suit against Godley, the
Hathaway estate, and Seeley Clark (as mortgagee to Godley) seeking
betterment compensation for improvements made to the property, a
partition of the property, or a declaration that Musson had obtained
exclusive title to the property by adverse possession. The Hathaway estate
and Godley filed answers and counterclaims. In their counterclaims, they
sought an accounting and sought to recover a proportion of profits or
earnings from the operation of the business on the property from 1946 to
the present.
[¶4] After a nonjury trial, the Superior Court found that Musson had
failed to establish title by adverse possession because he did not carry his
burden of showing a "clear ouster" of his cotenant. With respect to the
financial claims, the court ordered that Musson provide an accounting for all
income and expenses related to the property. The court, however, declined
to rule on the competing requests for monetary awards, and ordered that
"[t]he court has left the door open for the parties to return to court upon
the issues of partition and money due from one to the other as
appropriate."{1}
[¶5] It is evident, therefore, that Musson's appeal is premature.
Although the matter before us involves three separate issues-adverse
possession, partition, and income or expense allocation-it does not follow
that the resolution of any one of those issues creates an appealable event.
Generally, only final judgments are ripe for appellate review. "A judgment is
final . . . when . . . 'the trial court's action fully decides and disposes of the
whole matter leaving nothing further for the consideration and judgment of
the trial court.'" Berry v. Berry, 634 A.2d 451, 452 (Me. 1993) (quoting In
re Erica B., 520 A.2d 342, 343-44 (Me. 1987)). We have provided for a few
narrow exceptions to the rule but have limited their application to
extraordinary situations. See State v. Maine State Employees Ass'n, 482
A.2d 461, 464 (Me. 1984) (discussing the application of the death knell,
judicial economy, and collateral order exceptions).
[¶6] None of the exceptions applies here. An immediate appellate
review is not necessary to prevent an "irreparable injury." See Plumbago
Mining Corp. v. Sweatt, 444 A.2d 361, 368 (Me. 1982). Similarly, the
interests of judicial economy do not require immediate review. See Milstar
Mfg. Corp. v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 351 A.2d 538 (Me. 1976). To
the contrary, a review here would not only encourage piecemeal litigation, it
would invite the parties to relitigate several aspects of the current case.
Finally, the collateral order exception is not applicable to the facts before us.
[¶7] In limited instances, when the resolution of one part of an action
may be dispositive of the remaining unresolved components of the action,
the parties may seek appellate review of one component alone by obtaining a
certification of final judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).{2} See Key
Bank of Me. v. Park Entrance Motel, 640 A.2d 211, 212 (Me. 1994); Citicorp
Mortgage, Inc. v. Keneborus, 641 A.2d 188, 190 (Me. 1994). Neither of the
parties attempted to secure a Rule 54(b) certification in this matter. See
Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Christensen, 1999 ME 160, ¶ 6, 740 A.2d 43.{3}
[¶8] Accordingly, because there was no final judgment in the Superior
Court, we dismiss the appeal and remand the case for further proceedings.
Upon remand, the court may, in its discretion, open the record for further
evidence on issues of partition and monetary remedies.
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed. Remanded to the Superior
Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
Attorney for plaintiff:
Charles E. Gilbert, Esq., (orally)
Gilbert & Greif
P O Box 2339
Bangor, ME 04402-2339
Attorney for defendants:
Edmond J. Bearor, Esq., (orally)
Rudman & Winchell, LLC
P O Box 1401
Bangor, ME 04402-1401
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . At other points in its orders,
the court referred to its actions in deferring resolution as "dismissal
without prejudice" of the monetary and partition claims and opined
that a final judgment had been entered. The parties did not, however, agree
to dismiss the claims without prejudice, and the court anticipated further
proceedings on those claims. We therefore treat the claims as deferred for
further action of the court following an accounting. If the court concludes
that there is insufficient information upon which a decision can be based,
the court will be guided by the burdens of proof on each issue. {2} . M.R.
Civ. P. 54(b) provides in pertinent part: when more than one claim for relief
is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim . . . the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon express direction
for the entry of judgment. {3} . Alternate methods of obtaining review,
such as M.R. Civ. P. 72, would not have been applicable to these proceedings.
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