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In re Tyler H.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT				Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	1999 ME 163
Docket: 	Yor-99-38
Submitted
on Briefs:	October 28, 1999
Decided:	November 18, 1999


Panel: 	WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.

IN RE TYLER H.

CALKINS, J.

	[¶1]  Tyler's mother, Chanin, appeals from the order of the District
Court (Biddeford, Wheeler, J.) terminating her parental rights.  Chanin
argues that DHS did not meet the statutory requirements for termination. 
We affirm.

I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

	[¶2]  In its exemplary findings of fact following the hearing on the
termination petition, the trial court detailed the history of the case,
summarized the several orders that had been issued and specified the
actions of Chanin and the jeopardy to Tyler that led to the petition for
termination.  The following facts found by the trial court are supported by
the record.  
	[¶3]  DHS sought a child protection order on January 19, 1995 when
Tyler was three and one-half years old.  The Cumberland County Probate
Court (D. Childs, J.) granted temporary custody of Tyler to DHS, finding that
he was in immediate risk of serious harm.  Subsequently, the District Court
(Biddeford, Wheeler, J.), after hearing and by agreement of the parties,
made a finding of jeopardy and issued a final child protection order granting
custody of Tyler to DHS.  The court found that the jeopardy consisted of
Chanin's mental health problems, substance abuse, and relationships with
abusive men.  The jeopardy also involved abuse toward Chanin and her
children by Chanin's husband, David, and the domestic violence witnessed
by the children.  The court further found that Chanin had abused Tyler's
sister and Chanin was under indictment for threatening several people with
a firearm. 
	[¶4]  An order after review was entered on October 31, 1995
(Biddeford, Levy, J.), by agreement of the parties, granting custody of Tyler
to his maternal grandparents and visitation to Chanin.  In the fall of 1996,
the grandparents returned Tyler to Chanin, and on July 30, 1997, the court
entered an order after review (Biddeford, Levy, J.), by agreement of the
parties, finding that Tyler continued to be in need of a child protection
order and giving Chanin custody of Tyler subject to various conditions.  The
order provided that a violation of certain enumerated conditions would
activate an "immediate transfer clause" whereby DHS could remove Tyler
from Chanin's custody without a prior hearing.  Among the conditions that
would trigger this clause were the following:  (1) Chanin was to take
reasonable steps to move David out of her home, allowing his return only
pursuant to a schedule set forth in the order; and (2) David was to have no
unsupervised contact with Tyler.{1}  The July 30 order provided that any party
could request a review hearing at any time and if the immediate transfer
clause was utilized the mother could request a hearing at that time.
	[¶5]  During the summer of 1997, Chanin had several crises consisting
of problems with her pregnancy; Tyler's behavior; and David's drinking and
refusing to leave Chanin's home which required police intervention.  She
requested assistance from DHS, and DHS placed Tyler in a crisis center for
ten days and later in a foster home for a few days.  These were voluntary
placements made at the request of Chanin.
	[¶6]  On September 10, 1997, DHS interviewed Tyler, after having
been contacted by Tyler's school.  Tyler reported that David was living in the
same home as Tyler and that Tyler had been left alone with David.  Pursuant
to the immediate transfer clause in the July 30 order, DHS took custody of
Tyler and placed him in a therapeutic foster home where he continues to
reside.  Chanin did not request a hearing to contest the removal of Tyler
from her custody nor did she request a review hearing.
	[¶7]  In October 1997, Chanin moved to Massachusetts with her other
two children and refused to disclose her address or phone number to DHS. 
Chanin provided DHS with the phone number of a contact, and Chanin
called DHS when DHS left a message for her.  Chanin continued to visit with
Tyler on alternate Wednesdays, and she participated in some counseling. 
Her refusal to disclose her whereabouts, however, prevented DHS from
providing services to her and from assessing her home situation.
	[¶8]  In June 1998, DHS notified Chanin that it was seeking to
terminate her parental rights.  Chanin still refused to disclose her address. 
The petition for termination of parental rights was filed in August 1998, and
the hearing was held in December 1998.  Chanin and her attorney
participated in the hearing.	
	[¶9]  The court found that Chanin placed Tyler in jeopardy when she
exposed Tyler to David in violation of the July 30 order.  The court noted
that Chanin had divorced David but only because DHS wanted her to divorce
him; that Chanin invited David back into her home; and that Chanin believed
that David had never abused the children.  The court found that Chanin's
refusal to cooperate with DHS, as demonstrated by her refusal to disclose
her address and participate in a home study, was a further indication of her
unwillingness to protect Tyler from jeopardy.  The court also recounted that
Chanin herself acknowledged that she currently did not have the structure
or education necessary to care for Tyler and that his current placement was
the best home for him.
	[¶10]  The court heard from Tyler's therapist who described Tyler's
aggressive and assaultive behavior.  The court found that Tyler's particular
needs called for a home with structure and predictability.  The court
concluded that a termination of parental rights was in Tyler's best interest
so that he could be placed in a permanent and nurturing home.  The court
concluded that the statutory criteria for the termination of Chanin's parental
rights were met, and it granted the petition for termination.
	[¶11]  Chanin makes two basic arguments on appeal.  First, she claims
that the statutory prerequisite of removal of custody was not met because
the removal of Tyler from her custody in September 1997, was effectuated
by DHS pursuant to a clause in the July 30 order instead of being the result
of a hearing under the child protection statutes.  Second, she argues that
the evidence was insufficient for a termination order.{2}

II.  STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

	[¶12]  Chanin contends that the District Court erred in terminating
her parental rights when the statutory basis had not been met.  Specifically,
she refers to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(A) (1992 & Supp. 1998) which provides
that termination of parental rights cannot be considered unless custody of
the child has been removed from the parent pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A.
§§ 4035 or 4038 (1992 & Supp. 1998).{3}  Chanin argues that because
custody of Tyler was taken pursuant to the immediate transfer clause of the
July 30 order, the removal of custody was not pursuant to either section
4035 or 4038.  Section 4035 authorizes a final child protection order when
a court finds that a child is in circumstances of jeopardy.  Section 4038
mandates periodic reviews of child protection orders and authorizes the
court to make further dispositional orders.
	[¶13]  The July 30 order was an order pursuant to section 4038. 
Custody of Tyler was returned to Chanin under detailed conditions with the
express caveat that custody would be removed immediately from Chanin if
she violated certain of those conditions.  Upon learning of Chanin's violation
of the conditions that David was not to reside in the home and Tyler was not
to have unsupervised contact with David, DHS removed custody of Tyler
from Chanin.  This was a removal of custody from a parent pursuant to an
order authorized by section 4038.  Thus, the prerequisite for a termination
order set forth in section 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) was met.
	[¶14]  Chanin next argues that the removal of custody under the
immediate transfer clause of the July 30 order deprived her of her right to a
hearing to determine if Tyler had been living in circumstances of jeopardy. 
The July 30 order, however, expressly notified Chanin that a hearing would
be held upon her request for one.  She never requested a hearing, and
therefore, she cannot be heard to complain that she was deprived of one.
	[¶15]  Chanin also contends that DHS failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that:  (1) she was unwilling or unable to protect Tyler
from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time
reasonably calculated to meet Tyler's needs; or (2) she was unable or
unwilling to take responsibility for Tyler within a time reasonably calculated
to meet his needs; or (3) she failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate
and reunify with Tyler.  See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B) (1992 & Supp. 1998). 
This argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and we
examine whether the trial court "reasonably could have been persuaded on
the basis of evidence on the record that the required factual findings were
'highly probable.'"  In re Denise M., 670 A.2d 390, 393 (Me. 1996).  
	[¶16]  Here, the trial court found three bases for termination and not
just one basis as required by the statute.  See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)
(1992).  The record supports the findings that Chanin was unable and
unwilling to take responsibility for and protect Tyler from jeopardy within a
time reasonably calculated to meet his needs.  Chanin was unable to protect
Tyler from unsupervised contact with an abusive step-parent, and she
admitted that she was unable to take responsibility for him in her current
situation without additional structure and parental education.  Furthermore,
her refusal to disclose her address to DHS and to cooperate with DHS
justified the finding that she failed to make a good faith effort to reunify with
Tyler.  Given the evidence before it, the trial court "reasonably could have
been persuaded . . . that the required factual findings were 'highly
probable.'"  In re Denise M., 670 A.2d at 393.
	The entry is:
			Judgment affirmed.
                                                          
Attorney for appellant:
	
Donna A. Bailey, Esq.	
88 North Street	
Saco, ME 04072	
Attorneys for appellee:	

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General	
Elizabeth F. Stout, Asst. Atty. Gen.	
6 State House Station	
Augusta, ME 04333-0006

Guardian ad Litem:

Christopher Dilworth, Esq.
P O Box 6105
Falmouth, ME 04105

Attorney for father:

Sandra Brunk, Esq.
P O Box 360
Buxton, ME 0493-0360