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In re Melanie S.
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	1998 ME 132
Docket:	Oxf-97-171
Argued:	December 3, 1997
Decided:	June 3, 1998

Panel:	WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, LIPEZ, and SAUFLEY, JJ.

IN RE MELANIE S., et al.

LIPEZ, J.

	[¶1]  The Department of Human Services appeals from the judgment
of the District Court (Rumford, Sheldon J.) terminating the parental rights
of the mother with respect to her children, Melanie S. and Joseph S.  The
Department contends that the District Court exceeded its statutory authority
by including in its judgment the requirements that the Department provide
for visitation between the mother and her children until the children are
adopted and seek an "open" adoption for each child with respect to the
mother.  We agree with these contentions and vacate the termination order
in part.

I.

	[¶2]  In October of 1996, the Department petitioned the District Court
to terminate the mother's parental rights to Melanie and to Joseph.  At the
termination hearing, the court heard evidence that, inter alia, the mother's
psychiatric history reveals a pattern of depression and suicidal ideation; she
experiences command hallucinations telling her to hurt herself; she
consistently reports to her home health nurse that she feels suicidal; and
she loves Melanie and Joseph, visited the children whenever she was given
the opportunity, and attempted to cooperate with the Department.
	[¶3]  Although the court found that the Department had
"overwhelmingly" satisfied its burden of proof, it terminated the mother's
parental rights subject to the condition that she "be permitted continuing
participation in the children's lives to the extent that such participation
does not diminish the children's best interests."  The court required the
Department to seek "open" adoptions of Melanie and Joseph as to the
mother only{1} and to provide for regular visitation between the mother and
the children until they are adopted.  The court stated that "DHS will be
relieved of the obligation to seek an open adoption for either child as to
their mother if it is demonstrably true in that child's case that continued
contact between child and mother after adoption would be contrary to that
child's best interest."  The court reasoned:

[The mother] is a person who so desperately needs her children
that she has contemplated suicide if she loses them.  Most
people can live with the loss of a child, albeit grimly difficult to
do so.  [The mother], I fear, can't:  her psyche is so fragile that
she might not survive the termination of her parental rights. 
Given the fact that she so desperately loves her children and
needs them to bind her ragged self together, and that there is a
substantial risk of her death if she loses them, I feel that this is a
case in which I have to try to minimize her pain.

From this order, the Department appeals.

II.

	[¶4]  The District Court's authority to terminate parental rights is
defined by 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4050-4058 (1992 & Supp. 1997).  Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.  See Estate of
Spear, 1997 ME 15, ¶ 6, 689 A.2d 590, 591.  We accord the words of a
statute "their plain ordinary meaning," and if that meaning is clear, we do
not "look beyond the words, unless the result is illogical or absurd."  Id. at
¶ 7, 689 A.2d at 591-92 (quotations and citations omitted).  
	[¶5]  Section 4055 of Title 22 permits a court to terminate parental
rights if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, both that
termination will serve the best interest of the child and that:  

(i) [t]he parent is unwilling or unable to protect the child from
jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within
a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child's needs; 
(ii) [t]he parent has been unwilling or unable to take
responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably
calculated to meet the child's needs; 
(iii) [t]he child has been abandoned; or 
(iv) [t]he parent has failed to make a good faith effort to
rehabilitate and reunify with the child pursuant to section 4041.  

22 M.R.S.A. § 4055(I)(B) (1992).  "Notwithstanding the sequence in the
statute, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, one of
the four bases of parental unfitness . . . before it may consider the best
interests of the child . . . ."  In re Ashley A., 679 A.2d 86, 89 (Me. 1996).  
	[¶6]  Pursuant to section 4056(1), "[a]n order terminating parental
rights divests the parent and child of all legal rights, powers, privileges,
immunities, duties and obligations to each other as parent and child, except
the inheritance rights between the child and his parent."  22 M.R.S.A.
§ 4056(1) (1992).  The plain language of this section mandates that a
termination order sever the relationship between parent and child.  The
court's attempt to terminate the mother's rights to her children and
concomitantly to preserve her relationship with them by requiring the
Department to provide for continuing visitation was beyond its authority.{2}
	[¶7]  The mother contends that because the court must conduct
periodic reviews of a child protective order while a child remains in the
Department's custody, see 22 M.R.S.A. § 4038(7) (1992 & Supp. 1997), and
because the court may alter a protective order to include "[o]ther specific
conditions governing custody," see 22 M.R.S.A. § 4036(1)(H) (1992 & Supp.
1997), the court retains the authority to require visitation between parent
and child after it terminates the parent's rights as long as the child remains
in the Department's custody.  We disagree.  Although the Department is
always obligated "to enhance the welfare" of the children in its custody, see
22 M.R.S.A. § 4004(2) (Supp. 1997), and the court does retain jurisdiction
over a child for as long as he or she remains in the Department's custody, an
order terminating parental rights deprives the court of any authority to
impose a condition that preserves contact between the parent and the
child.{3}  	

III. 

	[¶8]  Pursuant to "The Adoption Act," 18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 9-101-9-404
(1998), "[t]he Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over . . . [p]etitions for
adoption . . . ."  18-A M.R.S.A. § 9-103(a)(1).  The District Court's order,
insofar as it requires the Department to pursue "open" adoptions of the
children, impermissibly infringes on the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. 
Moreover, pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 4056(3) (1992), "[a] parent whose
rights have been terminated shall not be entitled to notice of the child's
adoption proceedings, nor shall he have any right to object to the adoption
or participate in the proceedings."{4}  The District Court's "open" adoption
requirement violated this statutory provision{5} by making a parent whose
rights have been terminated a participant in the adoption proceedings.  
	The entry is:
		Those conditions in the judgment relating to the
continuing visitation of the mother with Melanie S. and
Joseph S. and the obligation of the Department of Human
Services to pursue "open" adoptions are hereby deleted
and, as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Attorneys for appellant:

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General
Janice S. Stuver, Asst. Atty. Gen., (orally)
Nora Sosnoff, Asst. Atty. Gen.
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006

Attorneys for appellees:

Peter J. Kaynor, Esq., (orally)
Joyce, Dumas, David and Hanstein, P.A.
251 River Road
Mexico, ME 04257-1833
(for mother)

Michael T.  Steven, Esq., (orally)
P O Box 389
Bethel, ME 04217
(Guardian ad Litem)