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Hutchinson v. Cary Plantation
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2000 ME 129
Docket: Aro-99-680
Argued: June 12, 2000
Decided: June 30, 2000
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and ALEXANDER, JJ.
LEON A. HUTCHINSON
v.
CARY PLANTATION
SAUFLEY, J.
[¶1] Leon A. Hutchinson appeals from the judgment of the Superior
Court (Aroostook County, Pierson, J.) affirming a denial by the Assessors of
Cary Plantation of Hutchinson's renewal application for a permit to operate a
septage disposal and land application facility. Because we conclude that the
Assessors exceeded their authority in arriving at their decision, we vacate
the judgment and remand to the Superior Court for remand to the Assessors
for further consideration consistent with our opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Leon Hutchinson has operated a septage disposal facility in Cary
Plantation since 1994. Along with a number of trucks that transport the
sewage, the facility includes a storage building, in which sewage was
temporarily stored, and a land application site, on which the sewage was
ultimately placed for final disposal. Hutchinson's initial license was for a
five-year term beginning February 14, 1994. As the expiration of his license
approached, Hutchinson sought a renewal on August 23, 1998.
[¶3] In order to renew his license, Hutchinson was required to obtain
site approval from both the Department of Environmental Protection and
from the local municipality. See 38 M.R.S.A. § 1305(6) (Supp. 1999). The
statute does not require that the site approvals be obtained in any particular
order. See id. Apparently at the instruction of the Assessors, Hutchinson
first sought approval from the Department. The Department approved the
renewal on March 15, 1999, with several conditions.
[¶4] Hutchinson then sought approval from the Assessors. Because
the Cary Plantation has not adopted local zoning or land use controls that are
applicable to the septage site, the Assessors were required to base their
review upon the Department's septage management rules. See 38 M.R.S.A. §
1305(6). Whether the Assessors were authorized to require Hutchinson's
compliance with all or only particular sections of those rules is the issue
before us.
[¶5] The Assessors concluded that they were not limited to particular
sections of the rules in judging Hutchinson's application and, after hearing,
denied the application. In a written decision, they found, in pertinent part,
that: (1) Houlton Septic Service had operated after its license had expired
without approval by the municipality; (2) Leon Hutchinson had not
demonstrated that he had implemented a lime stabilization program; (3) the
facility contaminated the ambient air and created a nuisance to its
neighbors; (4) Hutchinson and Bruce Folsom, the owner of Houlton Septic
Service,{1} had previously failed to comply with Department regulations;
(5) Houlton Septic Service had not installed sewage screening as required
by Department regulations; and (6) neither Hutchinson nor Folsom had
demonstrated to the Assessors' satisfaction the financial or technical
capacity to operate the facility properly. After his application was denied,
Hutchinson submitted a request for reconsideration. The Assessors did not
act on the motion.
[¶6] Hutchinson then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to
30-A M.R.S.A. § 7060(2)(E)(2) (1996) and M.R. Civ. P. 80B, contending that
the Assessors had exceeded their authority in applying the Department's
Septage Management Rules.{2} Although the Superior Court found that the
Assessors had misapplied the law when they found that Houlton Septic
Service had operated without a license, it ultimately concluded, contrary to
Hutchinson's contentions, that the Assessors had not exceeded their
authority in determining whether to issue the renewal license. The court
affirmed the decision of the Assessors, and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶7] When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court,
we review the underlying decision directly for an abuse of discretion, error
of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. See
Herrick v. Town of Mechanic Falls, 673 A.2d 1348, 1349 (Me. 1996). Thus,
we review the decision of the Assessors of Cary Plantation directly.
[¶8] We must determine whether the authorizing statute, 38 M.R.S.A.
§ 1305(6), permits a municipality to undertake the same review as that
performed by the Department of Environmental Protection or restricts the
scope of the municipality's review.
[¶9] The plain language of section 1305(6) answers the question.
Section 1305(6) provides in pertinent part:
In the absence of applicable municipal ordinances and local
zoning and land use controls, the municipality shall base its
approval of the site on compliance with the siting and design
standards in the department's rules relating to septage
management.{3}
38 M.R.S.A. § 1305(6) (emphasis added). By this language, the Legislature
has expressly limited municipalities to a review of compliance with the
siting and design standards set out in the rules of the Department when
considering the approval or reapproval of a site.
[¶10] Notwithstanding the plain language of section 1305(6), Cary
Plantation urges us to conclude that its review was not limited by section
1305(6) to siting and design standards. We review the construction of a
statute de novo and determine its meaning as a matter of law. See Estate of
Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524.
In general, the starting point in interpreting a statute is the
statutory language itself. Unless the statute itself reveals a
contrary legislative intent, the plain meaning of the language will
control its interpretation. To that end, the particular words
used in the statute must be given their plain, common and
ordinary meaning.
Murphy v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 615 A.2d 255, 258 (Me. 1992) (citing
Perry v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 481 A.2d 133, 138 (Me. 1984);
Keene v. Fairchild Co., 593 A.2d 655, 657 (Me. 1991); Phelps v. President &
Trustees of Colby College, 595 A.2d 403, 405 (Me. 1991)).
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