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Hughes v. Morin
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2000 ME 135
Docket: Ken-99-627
Submitted
on Briefs: April 14, 2000
Decided: July 12, 2000
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.
DEBRA HUGHES
v.
MICHAEL MORIN
DANA, J.
[¶1] Michael Morin appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court
(Kennebec County, Atwood, J.) affirming the judgment of the District Court
(Waterville, French, J.) construing disputed language in the parties' divorce
decree in favor of Debra Hughes, f/k/a Debra Morin, and limiting Michael's
share of the equity in their marital home to half the equity the couple had in
the property at the time of their divorce. On appeal, he argues that he is
entitled to half of the present equity in the property and that it was error for
the court to determine otherwise. We affirm.
[¶2] The parties were divorced pursuant to a judgment of the District
Court (Studstrup, J.) dated June 18, 1986. In the judgment, the court
provided for the welfare of the couple's child, ordered that neither party
would be required to provide the other spousal support, and divided the
couple's personal and real property. The original divorce decree provided
that the couple's minor child would reside primarily with Hughes in the
marital home until such time as Hughes sold it, otherwise forfeited her right
to possession, or until the child reached the age of eighteen, whichever
came first.
[¶3] After the judgment was entered, in response to a motion for
relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil
Procedure,{1} the parties agreed and the court amended paragraph #8 of the
judgment to read as follows:
The family residence and adjoining property on East Pond Road,
Oakland, Maine, as more fully described in the Kennebec County
Registry of Deeds in Book 1894, Page 305 and in Book 2164,
Page 108, are determined to be marital property. The real
estate was held in joint tenancy and shall now be changed to
tenants in common. The Plaintiff shall have exclusive possession
of said property with the minor child, so long as she pays all
mortgage, insurance and tax payments. This right will end when
the minor child reaches age (18). At such time as the Plaintiff
decides not to exercise the right of residence or that right
expires, the property shall be sold and the proceeds shall be
divided as follows; the current value of the property has been
stipulated to be $54,500.00 and the parties' current equity is
found to be $32,940.00. It is ordered that the equity is divided
equally between the parties with each party receiving fifty
percent (50%) of the equity after the expenses of the sale at the
time the equity becomes available for distribution.
[¶4] After the divorce, Hughes continued to live in the residence and
made all of the mortgage, tax and insurance payments. The mortgage
payments made by Hughes reduced the mortgage to $9,000. In addition,
Hughes spent approximately $40,000 enlarging and improving the home.
As a result of these expenditures, in December of 1997, when their child
turned eighteen, the property was appraised at $94,000 and the equity in
the property had increased to $85,000.
[¶5] Hughes believed that paragraph #8 should be read to mean that
on the occurrence of their child's eighteenth birthday Morin was entitled to
receive one-half of the equity identified in paragraph #8, i.e., $16,470 (one-
half of $32,940). Accordingly, she obtained financing for that amount and
offered it to Morin. Morin rejected the offer and insisted on $42,500
(one-half of the current equity of $85,000). Hughes then filed a motion for
post-judgment relief, and the parties filed opposing memoranda in support
of their respective positions.
[¶6] The District Court interpreted paragraph #8 to mean that Morin
was entitled to one-half of the equity at the time of their divorce. The court
concluded that paragraph #8 stated that the parties' equity was $32,940 and
Morin was to receive one-half of that amount after deducting the expenses of
sale. This interpretation was affirmed on appeal to the Superior Court.
Morin appeals from this judgment and argues that the only reasonable
interpretation of the provision is that offered by him.
[¶7] Title 19-A, section 953 controls property divisions in divorce
actions and provides that the court "shall divide the marital property in
proportions the court considers just" after considering all the relevant
factors. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953 (1997).{2} "[T]here is no question that the court
has the inherent and continuing authority to construe and clarify its
judgment when that judgment is ambiguous." MacDonald v. MacDonald, 582
A.2d 976, 977 (Me. 1990) (citations omitted). The court always has the
authority to "make clear the meaning of a prior decree where necessary to
guide the conduct of the parties," id. (quoting Randlett v. Randlett, 401 A.2d
1008, 1010 (Me. 1979)).{3}
[¶8] We apply an objective test to determine whether a court has
properly exercised its authority to construe and clarify its own judgment.
To uphold the clarifying order of a court, "we must answer the following two
questions in the affirmative: (1) whether the court's prior judgment was
ambiguous as a matter of law . . . and (2) whether the court's construction of
its prior judgment is consistent with its language read as a whole and is
objectively supported by the record." MacDonald, 582 A.2d at 977 (citations
omitted). "In resolving any ambiguity in a divorce judgment, it is the intent
of the divorce court, as revealed in the language of the judgment, that
controls." Greenwood v. Greenwood, 2000 ME 37, ¶ 9, 746 A.2d 358,
361.{4}
[¶9] The first question may properly be answered in the affirmative.
At issue in the present case is the meaning of the amended paragraph #8
that describes how and when the equity in the real property is to be divided.
Although the trial court ultimately concluded that Hughes's position was
correct and that Morin was entitled only to one-half of the $32,940 minus
his share of the expenses of the sale, each party set forth before the trial
court a plausible interpretation of the provision. Cf. Portland Valve, Inc. v.
Rockwood Systems Corp., 460 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Me. 1983) ("Contract
language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of different
interpretations.").
[¶10] We next determine "whether the court's construction of its
prior judgment is consistent with its language read as a whole and is
objectively supported by the record." MacDonald, 582 A.2d at 977. "When
the meaning of ambiguous language used in a judgment is determined by a
consideration of the language in context of the judgment, that meaning also
becomes a question of law for the court." Bliss, 583 A.2d at 210. We review
questions of law de novo. See id.
[¶11] A review of the judgment as a whole demonstrates that the
divorce court intended to treat Hughes and Morin equally at the time of the
divorce. The parties were ordered to share the parental rights and
obligations as to their minor child and neither party was obligated to pay the
other spousal support. In addition, the personal property was divided
equally, and bank accounts, stocks and retirement plans were awarded to
the party in whose name they were held at the time of the divorce. Based
on this equal division of all of the other marital property, it is likely that the
court also intended to treat the parties equally when it provided for a
division of the real property.
[¶12] At the time of the divorce, the value of the property was
stipulated to be $54,500 and the parties' then "current equity" was found to
be $32,940. The court ordered that, although the sale of the property was
to be deferred, the equity was to be divided equally between the parties with
each party receiving fifty percent (50%) of the equity, after expenses, at the
time the equity became available for distribution. While it certainly could
have expressed its intent more clearly, the court's effort to calculate the
equity that the couple had in the property at the time of the divorce
demonstrates its intent that the $32,940 was the amount that was to be
divided at the time of the sale. If the court had intended otherwise, the
mention of the current equity amount would serve no purpose.
[¶13] In addition to its language with respect to the equity, the
court's order stated that Hughes and Morin would continue to own the real
property as tenants in common. The court added, however, that Hughes
was entitled to exclusive possession of the property and that she was solely
responsible for the mortgage, insurance and tax payments. Thus, while
Morin was to continue to hold half of the legal interest in the property until
the property was to be sold, he was freed of all financial obligations with
respect to its maintenance.
[¶14] When clarifying its order, the court stated that when it divided
the real property it had intended to recognize both Morin's investment in
the property until the time of the divorce and the financial requirements it
had imposed on Hughes to maintain the property after the divorce.
Accordingly, while Morin was entitled to receive one-half of the equity in
the property that he had been partially responsible for accumulating, i.e.,
$16,470, Hughes was entitled to any additional equity that accumulated in
the property as a result of both her investment in the property and her
maintaining the property until their child's eighteenth birthday.{5}
[¶15] This interpretation protects both parties' interest in the
property. It preserves both Morin's investment in the property before the
divorce and Hughes's continued investment in the property after the
divorce. Accordingly, the court did not err when it determined that Morin
was entitled to one-half of the equity in the property at the time of the
divorce.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.Attorney for plaintiff:
James A. Mitchell, Esq.
Butler, Whittier, LaLiberty & Mitchell, P.A.
P O Box 359
Waterville, ME 04903-0359
Attorney for defendant:
Daviau, Jabar & Batten
Robert J. Ringer Jr., Esq.
One Center Street
Waterville, ME 04901-5495
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . M.R. Civ. P. 60(a) provides
in pertinent part as follows: Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
{2} . Pursuant to section 953 the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including the following: A.The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition
of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
B. The value of the property set aside to each spouse; and C.The economic
circumstances of each spouse at the time of the division of property is
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home
or the right to live in the home for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of the children. {3} . A court may not, however, "under the
guise of a clarification order make any material change that will modify
the property division provided by the original judgment." Bliss v.
Bliss, 583 A.2d 208, 210 (Me. 1990). {4} . Although the court's intent controls,
we have considered the intent of the parties as relevant to determining
the intent of the court. See Greenwood, 2000 ME 37, ¶ 9, 746 A.2d at
361 n.4 (citing Cyr v. Cyr, 469 A.2d 836, 839-40 (Me. 1983)). {5} . Morin
argues that he was deprived of the use of the $16,470 during the period
of time that Hughes lived in the home with their child. His argument fails
to appreciate, however, that the deprivation he endured was at least partially
for the benefit of his child.
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