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Hefflefinger, Inc. v. City of Portland
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	1999 ME 153
Docket:	Cum-99-223
Argued:	October 5, 1999
Decided:	October 27, 1999	

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.

	HEFFLEFINGER, INC. d/b/a Thrifty of Portland et al.

v.

CITY OF PORTLAND

RUDMAN, J.

	[¶1]  This appeal arises from a summary judgment entered in the
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Mills, J.) in favor of the City of Portland. 
Hefflefinger, Inc. and Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. (rental agencies) assert that
the court erred when it determined (1) that the fees Portland charged to
off-airport car rental businesses complied with the Revenue Producing
Municipal Facilities Act, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405 (1996) and (2) that the rental
agencies did not unjustly enrich the City when they paid the charges.  We
disagree and affirm the judgment.
	[¶2]  The Portland City Council enacted an ordinance pursuant to
30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405 that required off-airport car rental companies picking
up passengers at Portland International Jetport to pay four to six percent of
their gross revenues from airport-derived business.{1}  The ordinancerequired Thrifty and Alamo to contract with the City to pay these charges
before they could use the airport to pick up their customers.  Both Alamo
and Thrifty agreed to pay the charges.  The companies, however, signed
these agreements under protest. 
	[¶3]  Prior to the passage of the ordinance, the City did not charge
off-airport rental car companies when they picked up customers at the
airport.  Thrifty conducted its car rental business from 1970 to January
1998 at a location in close proximity to the airport, but not on airport
property.{2} Alamo continues to conduct its car rental business from off-
airport property.  Four car rental companies operate on-airport concessions.
These companies have counter-space within the airport terminal and pay
the City rent plus ten percent of their gross revenues.{3}  These companies
also rent parking spaces from the city for their cars.  The City derives
twenty percent of its total annual airport revenue from the on-airport car
rental concessions. The City is obligated, pursuant to federal law, to
"maintain a fee and rental structure for the facilities and services at the
airport which will make the airport as self-sustaining as possible. . . ."
49 U.S.C. § 47107 (a)(13)(1997).
	[¶4]  The City does not charge uniform fees to any of the companies
that provide ground transportation.  The City does, however, charge other
courtesy shuttles, such as those run by off-airport parking facilities and
hotels, a $300 operator fee per year per company and a $10 per vehicle
decal fee.{4}  These courtesy shuttles pick up their customers at the same
location as Thrifty and Alamo.  Non-reserved taxis and limousines are
charged a $10 decal fee and a $480 operator fee per vehicle, but reserved
taxis and limousines are only charged the $10 decal fee.
	[¶5]  Alamo and Thrifty derive a majority of their business from
airline passengers.  Many passengers arrange for airport pickup by Thrifty
and Alamo through their national reservations system.  Thrifty and Alamo
also advertised within the airport and were permitted to allow their
customers to use courtesy phones to call from the airport for pick up.      
	[¶6]  Thrifty and Alamo sought a declaratory judgment asserting that
the charge was an illegal tax; that the charge violated 30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405;
and that they were entitled to recover for the fees that they already paid to
the City.  The trial court determined that the rates charged by the City were
statutorily permitted and "reasonably related" to the rental agencies' use of
the airport because the airport authority creates a "marketplace" for the
rental agencies' businesses, and thus held that the City was not unjustly
enriched and the rental agencies were not entitled to a reimbursement of
the fees they have paid in excess of other shuttle operators. 
	[¶7]  We review the grant of a summary judgment for errors of law
and independently examine the record to determine if a genuine issue of
material fact exists.  See Nevin v. Union Trust Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶ 5, 726
A.2d 694, 696.  We view the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party
against whom the judgment has been granted."  Id.   We will affirm the grant
of a summary judgment if the evidence manifests that no genuine issue of
material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.  See Landry v. Leonard, 1998 ME 241, ¶ 4, 720 A.2d 907,
908.
	[¶8]  We do not need to determine whether the charge is a user fee
or a tax.  A municipality may impose a user fee without specific authorization
from the legislature.  See Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, 611 A.2d 987,
990 (Me. 1992) (affirming imposition of jury fee because charge constituted
a user fee and not an unauthorized tax).   Although a municipality does not
have the power to tax without specific authorization, the legislature
specifically authorized the City to collect this charge pursuant to 30-A
M.R.S.A. § 5405 (1) and (4).  See City of Auburn v. Paul, 110 Me. 192, 85 A.
571, 575 (1912) (stating that when legislature delegates power to tax to
municipalities, such power must be clear and unambiguous and will be
strictly construed). 
	[¶9]  Section 5405 authorizes municipalities to "fix the schedule of
rates, fees and other charges for the use of, and for the services furnished or
to be furnished by any revenue-producing municipal facility." 30-A M.R.S.A.
§ 5405(1).  The statute requires the municipality to calculate the rates, fees
and charges at a rate that "will be sufficient at all times to pay the cost of
maintaining, repairing and operating the revenue producing facility."  30-A
M.R.S.A. § 5405(1).  The fees must be reasonable, just and equitable.  See
30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405(1).  The statute further allows the rates, fees and
charges for airport rates to be based upon "square footage, gross receipts,
landings or other basis which is reasonably related to the use of or service
furnished" by the municipal airport. 30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405(4).
	[¶10]  The statute authorizes the City's ordinance because the City
owns and operates Portland International Jetport and the airport is a
revenue producing municipal facility.  See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405(1).  The
City was authorized to charge Alamo and Thrifty for their use of the airport
and for the services the City provided them because the statute does not
limit its application to on-airport concessions.  30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405(1). 
The City did not have to limit its fee to the actual cost of using the airport
because the statute allows the City to charge for any use or service provided
and for the cost of maintaining and operating the airport.  30-A M.R.S.A.
§ 5405(1).  	
	[¶11]  Thrifty and Alamo argue that the charge is unjust,
unreasonable and inequitable because the City does not charge all courtesy
vans the same rate.  The rate of six percent of gross revenues after the first
$200,000 of airport-derived revenue is reasonable because the statute does
not limit the City to charging only the costs it bears from another's use, but
rather requires the city to charge sufficient rates to include the cost of
maintaining, repairing, and operating the entire revenue producing facility. 
See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405(1); Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport
Auth., 906 F.2d 516, 522 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that it was appropriate
for the airport authority to calculate maintenance and development costs in
user fees for off-airport companies).  Thus, even though the rental agencies
assert that they impose a minimal burden on the City when they drive
through the airport picking up customers, the City may charge them for the
use of the airport and its roadways and for the maintenance of the entire
airport because the charges are authorized by the statute and the rental
agencies benefit from the entire airport.  See 30-A M.R.S.A. § 5405(1).  
	[¶12]  The rental agencies rely on an equal protection case,
McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264 (Me. 1978), for their
assertion that the fee is unreasonable because it treats users of the airport
differently and would not survive a rational basis analysis.  In McNicholas, we
invalidated a city ordinance that charged divers a user fee but did not charge
any other park users, because there was no rational basis for the distinction
between the divers and other park users.  McNicholas, 394 A.2d at 270.  We
stated that requiring one group "to pay more than another group for the
same privilege" would be permissible if the distinction was reasonably
related to a government interest.  McNicholas, 394 A.2d at 269. 
	[¶13]  The differentiation between shuttle buses here is reasonably
related to a government interest.  When the City imposed the charge, the
City enumerated its legitimate government purpose to preserve "order and
peace at the airport" while "providing for the public health, safety and
welfare" and defraying the costs of "constructing, operating, maintaining,
and improving the public airport facilities."  Portland City Code, 18­p;82(a). 
Thus, the charge is reasonable because it is rationally related to the
government purpose of maintaining and operating the airport.  See Alamo
Rent-A-Car v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 372 (1987)
[hereinafter Sarasota I] (finding that differing fee schedule between off-
airport car rental companies and hotel courtesy vans was rationally related
to government's objective of maintaining airport facility and public health,
safety and welfare). 
	[¶14]  The City acted in a just, reasonable and equitable manner
when it distinguished its charges based on the benefit received by each user
because the operators of the courtesy shuttles benefit differently from the
airport.  See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 66, 110 S.Ct. 387,
397 (1989) (opining that distinguishing the amount of the user fee
according to the benefit received is sensible); Sarasota I, 825 F.2d at 370-71
(reasoning that distinction between charging off-airport car rental
companies a 10% user fee and charging hotel courtesy vans a flat fee was
rationally based on the differences in their businesses and benefits each
receives from the airport);  Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of
Denver, 937 F.2d 1502, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991) (reaching same conclusion as
Sarasota I); Toye Bros., Yellow Cab Co. v. Irby, 437 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1971)
(ruling that 10% of gross receipts of common carrier limousine and bus
service was fair compensation for use of airport facilities even though motel
courtesy cars and local transit system transports were only charged a flat
fee); Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 600 So.2d 1159,
1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)  (finding that off-airport user fees were
reasonable because even though the fees did not assimilate to flat fees
charged to other courtesy vans, the varying fees reflected the relative
benefits each operator received from the airport).  Thus, the ordinance does
not violate section 5405 because the charges are just, reasonable, and
equitable.
	[¶15]  Finally, the Superior Court properly determined that the City
was not unjustly enriched.  See Aladdin Elec. Assocs. v. Town of Old Orchard
Beach, 645 A.2d 1142, 1145 (Me. 1994) (stating that a party may recover
against a municipality for unjust enrichment, but recovery is only
appropriate when fairness and justice require the payment).  The
circumstances of this case do not require reimbursement because the City
had statutory authority to collect the user fee and, therefore, did not violate
principles of justice or fairness. 
	The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorney for plaintiff:

David A. Lourie, Esq., (orally)
189 Spurwink Ave.
Cape Elizabeth, ME 04107

Attoneys for defendant:

William J. Kayatta, Esq., (orally)
Michael S. Wilson, Esq.
Pierce Atwood
One Monument Square
Portland, ME 04101-1110