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Hawley v. Murphy
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1999 ME 127
Docket: And-99-12
Submitted
On Briefs: May 24, 1999
Decided: August 5, 1999
Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and CALKINS, JJ.
LEAH ANN HAWLEY
v.
JAMES P. MURPHY
CLIFFORD, J.
[¶1] James P. Murphy appeals from the summary judgment entered
in the Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Delahanty, J.) ordering the
foreclosure and sale of Murphy's Auburn real estate. Murphy contends that
the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and granting Leah Ann
Hawley's motion for a summary judgment because (1) the court did not have
personal jurisdiction over him, or (2) the Connecticut court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction to place the lien that underlies the foreclosure
action. Because the portion of the Connecticut divorce decree that places a
lien on Murphy's Auburn property is void, we vacate the judgment and
remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings to enforce
child support obligations arising out of the Connecticut judgment.
[¶2] Murphy and Hawley were divorced in August of 1996 by a
judgment entered in the Superior Court of the District of Ansonia,
Connecticut. The Connecticut court granted custody of the couple's minor
child to Hawley and ordered Murphy to pay $150 per week in child support.
At the time of the divorce judgment, Murphy already owed Hawley $2,505 in
unpaid child support and $600 in attorney fees. As part of the divorce
judgment, the Connecticut court granted a lien in favor of Hawley against
Murphy's real property located at 498 Turner Street in Auburn.{1} The lien
was granted to secure Murphy's payment of his future child support
obligations as well as the existing arrearage. The divorce judgment was
registered as a foreign judgment in the Androscoggin County Superior Court
in September of 1996 and was recorded in the Androscoggin County
Registry of Deeds. Murphy was notified of the registration, but did not
challenge the validity of the judgment at that time.
[¶3] Because Murphy had not paid any of his support obligations as
required by the divorce judgment, Hawley sent a notice to Murphy on
July 18, 1997, requesting that he pay the entire amount of the lien. When
Murphy did not respond to her request, Hawley filed a complaint in the
Superior Court requesting a judgment of foreclosure and a sale of the Auburn
property to satisfy Murphy's child support obligations. Murphy, in his
answer to the complaint, moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction to order a
foreclosure and a sale of his Auburn property. Murphy also filed a
counterclaim seeking compensation for injuries he allegedly suffered as a
result of his forced removal from the family home in Connecticut by the
police after Hawley, as Murphy alleges, falsely accused him of physically
abusing their young son.{2} Murphy further asked the court to order Hawley
to sign an affidavit admitting her deception of the court.
[¶4] Hawley moved for a summary judgment.{3} Murphy did not
oppose Hawley's motion for a summary judgment pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 7(c) & (d)(2). Instead, within the time allotted for him to
respond to Hawley's motion, Murphy did file a motion to dismiss. Murphy,
however, did not appear in court to prosecute his motion at the scheduled
hearing, and the Superior Court denied Murphy's motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute, entered a summary judgment in favor of Hawley, and
ordered the foreclosure and sale of Murphy's Auburn property. The court
specifically found, inter alia, that Murphy breached the terms of the divorce
judgment by failing to pay any of his child support obligations, and that the
divorce judgment was registered as foreign judgment and recorded in the
Androscoggin County Registry of Deeds. Murphy then filed this appeal.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
[¶5] Murphy contends that the Superior Court improperly denied his
motion to dismiss because he is not a resident of Maine and therefore is not
subject to the court's jurisdiction.{4} The legal sufficiency of a complaint
challenged by a motion to dismiss is a question of law subject to de novo
review by this Court. See Bowen v. Eastman, 645 A.2d 5, 6-7 (Me. 1994).
[¶6] Murphy's status as a nonresident of this State does not preclude
a finding that the court had personal jurisdiction over him. Section 2851 of
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2801-3401
(1998), which governs this State's enforcement of "support orders"{5} issued
outside the State, provides,
[A] tribunal of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual . . . if . . . [t]here is any other basis
consistent with the Constitution of Maine and the United
States Constitution for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Under Maine's long arm statute,
Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person . . . does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated
in this section, thereby submits such person . . . to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any of such acts: . . . C. The
ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this
State . . . .
14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A(2) (1980) (emphasis added); see Key Bank v. Walton,
673 A.2d 701, 703 n.3 (Me. 1996) (ownership of Maine property is
sufficient basis for court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over owner).
There is no dispute that Murphy owns property located in this State. The
cause of action filed against Murphy involves the foreclosure of a lien placed
on that property, and thus arises from his ownership of the property for
purposes of the long arm statute. See id. Therefore, the Superior Court has
personal jurisdiction over Murphy.
II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
[¶7] Murphy contends that the Superior Court erred in enforcing the
lien that was placed on his Maine property by the Connecticut court to
secure payment of his child support obligations because the Connecticut
court did not have jurisdiction to impose a lien and therefore the lien is
void. Hawley contends that Murphy waived any right to challenge the
validity of the Connecticut divorce judgment because Murphy did not appeal
that judgment and later failed to prosecute the motion he filed in Maine to
dismiss her complaint for foreclosure.
[¶8] Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the "[p]ower of a particular
court to hear the type of case that is then before it." Wright v. Department
of Defense & Veterans Servs., 623 A.2d 1283, 1284 (Me. 1993) (citing
Black's Law Dictionary 767 (5th ed. 1979)). A judgment that is issued by a
court that does not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue it is void. See
Coombs v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 534 A.2d 676, 678 (Me. 1987).
Thus, an initial failure to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court that issued the order does not preclude a party from raising the issue
at a later time. See Sanders v. Sanders, 1998 ME 100, ¶ 10, 711 A.2d 124,
127; see also M.R. Civ. P. 12(h) (permitting individuals to raise the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction at any time). Likewise, an entry of default against
an individual does not serve as a bar to that individual's right to challenge
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. See Precision Etchings &
Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21, 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1992);
Business Buyers of New England, Inc. v. Gurham, 754 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
1985). Contrary to Hawley's contention, Murphy's failure to contest the
registration of the Connecticut divorce judgment in Maine does not
preclude his appellate jurisdiction challenge.
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