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Greely v. Dept. of Human Services

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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	2000 ME 56 
Docket:	Cum-99-490
Submitted	
on Briefs:	January 14, 2000
Decided:	March 31, 2000	 

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER and
CALKINS, JJ.

CARLETON GREELY

v.

COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

CLIFFORD, J.

	[¶1]  Carleton Greely appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Crowley, J.), entered pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C,
affirming a decision of the Maine Department of Human Services concerning
Greely's eligibility to receive Medicaid benefits.{1}  The Department
determined that Greely's income exceeded the eligibility limit of the
Medicaid program, and that he would have to spend down certain amounts
of his own funds before receiving more Medicaid benefits. Greely asserts
that the Department's decision that resulted in a change in his benefits is
(1) in violation of due process and equal protection, (2) affected by bias, and
(3) an abuse of discretion.  In addition, Greely claims the burden of proof
was improperly placed on him.  Finding neither legal error nor abuse of
discretion, we affirm the judgment.
	[¶2]  The facts are not in dispute.  Carleton Greely is 72 years old and
suffers from severe complications of diabetes.  He requires more than
$10,000 in various medications every year in order to maintain his health. 
The Medicaid eligibility income limit in Maine has been set to be equal to
what has been determined to be the federal poverty level, see 22 M.R.S.A.
§ 3174-G(1-A), which in November 1998 was $671 per month.  Taking into
account the federal and state "disregards" of $20 and $55 respectively,
Greely's "countable income" for eligibility purposes was $764.64, or $93.64
over the Medicaid eligibility  limit.  Accordingly, the Department informed
Greely that he would no longer receive Medicaid benefits under the
"categorically needy" aspect of this program.
	[¶3]  The Department also notified Greely that he now qualified for
different coverage for the "medically needy."  This program, however,
required Greely to pay down or spend over a 6-month period a deductible of
$2,697.84 before such coverage would become available.{2}  Given Greely's
income, this leaves him with only a very limited amount of funds for his
ordinary living expenses.
	[¶4]  Greely's benefits were reinstated pending the outcome of a "fair
hearing" requested by Greely.  The hearing was conducted by the Hearing
Officer for the Department.  With Greely participating by telephone, the
Department presented evidence of Greely's income level, which Greely
conceded was accurate.{3}  Following this hearing, the Hearing Officer issued
his decision that the Department had correctly determined that Greely was
no longer eligible for full Medicaid benefits.  Greely appealed to the Superior
Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C.  Again, Greely was granted a stay of the
Department's decision pending the outcome of his appeal to the Superior
Court.  The Superior Court affirmed the Department's decision, and Greely
filed this appeal.
	[¶5]  We review a final agency action directly for "an abuse of
discretion, error of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence on
the record."  Herrick v. Town of Mechanic Falls, 673 A.2d 1348, 1349
(Me. 1996).  
	[¶6]  Notwithstanding Greely's contentions to the contrary, the record
discloses no constitutional violation in this case.  Procedurally, Greely has
had notice and an opportunity to be heard on the change in his benefits. 
Greely's real contention, in essence, is that the eligibility standards for
receipt of Medicaid benefits are overly restrictive.  These eligibility
standards are determined by the Legislature.  There is no constitutional
right to a minimum level of Medicaid benefits, and no court has so held. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in a similar case, found no
equal protection violation.  See Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 591-92
(1982).
	[¶7]  Greely further contends that the fair hearing was affected by bias
because it was conducted by an employee of the Department.  The use of an
agency employee to preside over an administrative hearing, however, is
specifically authorized by statute.  See 5 M.R.S.A. § 9062(1) (1989).  Absent
a claim of actual bias, there is no basis for vacating the Department's
decision.  See Turner v. Apollonio, 441 A.2d 679, 684 (Me. 1982).
	[¶8]  Greely contends that the Department's decision was an abuse of
its discretion.  We disagree.  An abuse of discretion is "any unreasonable,
unconscionable and arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of
facts and law pertaining to [the] matter submitted."  Black's Law Dictionary
11 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Harvey v. State, 458 P.2d 336, 338 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1969)).  Here, the Department applied the law and its regulations to an
uncontested state of facts regarding Greely's income level, and determined
that he was no longer eligible for full Medicaid benefits.  The undisputed
evidence in the record concerning Greely's income level supports the
decision of the Department.  Indeed, the Department has no discretion to
exercise when applying the facts to the law, and came to the only possible
decision in compliance with the law.  It is only the Legislature that can
change the eligibility standards for receipt of Medicaid benefits.
	[¶9]  Finally, Greely contends that the burden of proof was improperly
placed on him.  Contrary to Greely's contention, the party seeking review of
agency action has the burden of proof to show that the decision of the
agency is not supported by competent evidence.  See Maine Bankers Ass'n v.
Bureau of Banking, 684 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1996).{4}
	The entry is:
			Judgment affirmed.
                                                         
For plaintiff:

Carleton D. Greely
P O Box 206
Casco, ME 04015

Attorneys for defendant:

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General
Christina M. Hall, Asst. Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006