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DHS v. Leifester
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1998 ME 266
Docket: And-98-15
Submitted
on Briefs: October 28, 1998
Decided: December 14, l998
Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
O/B/O JULIE A. YOUNG
v.
GREGORY J. LEIFESTER
WATHEN, C.J.
[¶1] Defendant Gregory Leifester appeals from the judgment of the
Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Marden, J.) awarding plaintiff Julie A.
Young $21,346 as reimbursement for past child support pursuant to the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). Because the court did not
err in accepting an unverified amendment to Young's Uniform Support
Petition and in ordering Leifester to pay retroactive child support, we affirm
the judgment.
[¶2] The facts may be summarized as follows: Julie Young gave birth
to her son Travis in 1982. Young never requested child support from
Leifester nor did she initiate a court action to obtain support. In 1996 the
Maine Department of Human Services (DHS), at the request of the State
Attorney's Office of Maryland, filed a Uniform Support Petition on behalf of
Young pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). See
19 M.R.S.A. §§ 421-429-B (Pamph. 1996), repealed and replaced by P.L.
1995, ch. 694, § B-1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997) (codified at 19-A M.R.S.A. §§
2801-3301 (1998 & Supp. 1998)).{1} UIFSA authorizes the state responding
to a Uniform Support Petition, in this case Maine, to commence a child
support proceeding at the request of a petitioner or an enforcement agency
in another state. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 423 (Pamph. 1996) (current version at
19-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (1998)).
[¶3] Young's petition alleged that Leifester was the father of Travis
and requested a determination of paternity as well as an award of child
support and medical coverage as required by Maine statutes. The petition,
which was verified as required by UIFSA, 19 M.R.S.A. § 423-J(1) (Pamph.
1996) (current version at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 3011 (1998)),{2} did not
specifically request collection of arrears or retroactive child support. In
March of 1997, DHS filed an amendment, sent by the Maryland State
Attorney's Office at Young's request, that altered the petition only by
including a request for the collection of arrears or retroactive child support.
[¶4] After testing demonstrated a strong likelihood that he was the
father of Travis, Leifester stipulated to paternity at the hearing and agreed to
the amount of his ongoing weekly child support obligation. The court
determined paternity, established ongoing child support, and ordered
Leifester to reimburse Young $21,346 for past child support. On appeal,
Leifester challenges only the order for past child support.
[¶5] Leifester first argues that the court erred as a matter of law in
accepting the amendment to Young's petition, adding the request for
retroactive child support. It is well settled that the decision to grant leave
to amend a pleading is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See
Holden v. Weinschenk, 1998 ME 185, ¶ 6, 715 A.2d 915, 917.
[¶6] UIFSA is a remedial statute,{3} and as such must be construed
liberally. See Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards v. Cormier, 527 A.2d
1297, 1300 (Me. 1987) ("Remedial statutes should be liberally construed to
further the beneficent purposes for which they are enacted."). Although
UIFSA requires that Uniform Support Petitions be verified, it does not
explicitly require verification for amendments to petitions. See 19 M.R.S.A.
§ 423-J(1). Thus, the court applied that provision of UIFSA requiring that
state substantive and procedural laws be applied to proceedings unless
otherwise provided by UIFSA. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 423-B (Pamph. 1996)
(current version at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 3003 (1998)).{4}
[¶7] Under Maine law, the function of a complaint is to provide notice
of a claim to the opposing party. See M.R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("A pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); see also Casco
Bank & Trust Co. v. Rush, 348 A.2d 239, 241 (Me. 1975) (stating that "the
concept underlying 8 M.R.C.P. is that the function of the complaint is to give
fair notice of the claims"). Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f) states that
"pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," and Rule 15(a)
provides that leave shall be freely granted to amend a pleading "when justice
so requires." M.R. Civ. P. 8(f); M.R. Civ. P. 15(a). Given UIFSA's remedial
nature, the equitable nature of Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 8(f) and 15(a),
and the nature of the amendment offered, the court did not exceed the
bounds of its discretion in amending Young's petition.
[¶8] Leifester next argues that UIFSA does not authorize the court to
order him to pay past child support. Because this is an issue of law, we
review the decision of the Superior Court de novo. See State v. O'Connor,
681 A.2d 475, 476 (Me. 1996). UIFSA includes within the powers of the
responding tribunal the authority to "[i]ssue or enforce a support order,
modify a child support order or render a judgment to determine
parentage," as well as to "[d]etermine the amount of any arrearages and
specify a method of payment." 19 M.R.S.A. § 423-D(2)(A), (D) (Pamph.
1996) (current version at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 3005(2)(A), (D) (1998)).
Moreover, UIFSA broadly defines the term "support order":
"Support order" means a judgment, decree or order, whether
temporary, final or subject to modification, for the benefit of a
child, a spouse or a former spouse, which provides for monetary
support, health care, arrearages or reimbursement, and may
include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding,
attorney's fees and other relief.
19 M.R.S.A. § 421(21) (Pamph. 1996) (current version at 19-A M.R.S.A. §
2802(22) (1998)).
[¶9] Maine's substantive law regarding paternity and child support is
the Uniform Act on Paternity, 19 M.R.S.A. §§ 271-287 (Pamph. 1996),
repealed and replaced by P.L. 1995, ch. 694, § B-1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997)
(codified version at 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1551-1570 (1998), which the court
applied pursuant to that provision of UIFSA requiring the application of state
substantive law. The Uniform Act on Paternity allows the court to order past
child support:
If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged
according to the laws of this State, the liabilities of the father
may be enforced in the same or other proceedings by the
mother, the child or the public authority that has furnished or
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement,
education, support or funeral expenses. Chapter 7, subchapter
I-A [19 M.R.S.A. §§ 311-320 (Pamph. 1996), repealed and
replaced by P.L. 1995, ch. 694 § B-1 (effective Oct. 1, 1997)
(codified version at 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2001-2010 (1998))]
applies to an award of past support, which is calculated by
applying the current child support guidelines to the period for
which past support is owed.
19 M.R.S.A. § 272 (Pamph. 1996) (current version at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1553
(1998)); see also Mushero v. Ives, 949 F.2d 513, 518 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
that "the right to collect retroactive support is conclusively established in
Maine's paternity statutes"). Thus, the court properly applied the
substantive law of Maine and ordered Leifester to pay for the past support of
Travis.
[¶10] Finally, Leifester assigns error to the court's method of
computing his obligation for past child support. Leifester argues that the
award must be based on reimbursement for actual and reasonable
expenditures, citing White v. Allen, 667 A.2d 112 (Me. 1995). White v.
Allen, however, lost any value as precedent by virtue of amendments to 19
M.R.S.A. § 272. See L.D. 1842, Statement of Fact (117th Legis. 1996) at
250.{5} Section 272 was amended to require that liability for past support be
calculated by applying the child support guidelines to the period for which
past support is owed. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 272. In turn, the child support
guidelines mandate the use of the child support tables in computing an
award of past support. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 316(1), (1-A) (Pamph. 1996)
(current version at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2006(1), (2) (1998)). In this case, the
court relied upon a child support worksheet prepared by DHS, applying the
child support guidelines to the period for which prior support was owed, in
correctly computing that Leifester was responsible for $21,346 in past child
support.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Attorney for the Plaintiff:
Andrew Ketterer, Esq.
Attorney General
Diane E. Doyen, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Attorney for the Defendant:
Anthony K. Ferguson, Esq.
Fales & Fales
192 Lisbon St.
P.O. Box 889
Lewiston, Maine 04243-0889
FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} Title 19 was recodified as
Title 19-A after Young's claim was filed. As a result, UIFSA is currently
located at 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2801-3301 (1998 & Supp. 1998).
No substantive changes were made to the statute that affect the issues in
this case. {2} The statute stated in pertinent part: 1. Petition; contents.
A petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support order or to determine
parentage in a proceeding under this Act must verify the petition. Unless
otherwise ordered under section 423-K, the petition or accompanying documents
must provide, so far as known, the names, residential addresses and social
security numbers of the obligor and the obligee, and the name, sex, residential
address, social security number and date of birth of each child for whom
support is sought. The petition must be accompanied by a certified copy
of any support order in effect. The petition may include any other information
that may assist in locating or identifying the respondent. 2. Specify relief
sought. The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and accompanying
documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed by the
forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement
agency. 19 M.R.S.A. § 423-J(1). {3} For example, UIFSA expressly notes
that it is not to be construed to foreclose any remedies available to a
petitioner under other law. See 19 M.R.S.A. § 421-B (Pamph. 1996) (current
version at 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2803 (1998)). UIFSA also applies special
rules of evidence to facilitate the petition of an out of state parent.
See 19 M.R.S.A. § 423-O (Pamph. 1996) (current version at 19-A M.R.S.A.
§ 3016 (1998)). {4} The statute stated in pertinent part: Except as
otherwise provided by this Act, a responding tribunal of this State: 1.
Procedural and substance law; powers and remedies. Shall apply the procedural
and substantive law, including the rules on choice of law, generally applicable
to similar proceedings originating in this State and may exercise all powers
and provide all remedies available in those proceedings; and 2. Determine
duty and amount of support. Shall determine the duty of support and the
amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this
State. 19 M.R.S.A. § 423-B. {5} The Statement of Fact explains: Part
A of this bill amends the law in response to the recent law court case,
White v. Allen, 667 A.2d 112 (Me. 1995). In that case the Maine Supreme
Court ruled that the child support guidelines do not apply to an award of
past support under Maine's Uniform Act on Paternity . . . . A result of
the White v. Allen decision is to create 2 different standards for establishing
awards for past support because other statutory provisions require the Department
of Human Services to use the Child Support Guidelines . . . . The Department
of Human Services has used guidelines to calculate awards for past support
in its administrative proceedings since the late 1970's. . . . The Uniform
Act on Paternity [is] amended to clarify that an award of past support is
based on the child support guidelines, not reimbursement for actual and
reasonable expenses. L.D. 1842, Statement of Fact (117th Legis. 1996) at
250.
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