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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                                              Reporter of Decisions

Decision:       2004 ME 44

Docket:         Han-03-398

Submitted

   on Briefs:   December 12, 2003

Decided:        April 6, 2004

Panel:           SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.

DANYELLE E. YOUNG

v.

RUDMAN, J.

         [¶1]  Jeffrey H. Young appeals from a judgment entered in the District Court (Bar Harbor, Staples, J.) holding that the court lacked the authority to enter orders pertaining to Serena, a minor child, in the divorce proceeding between Serena's mother Danyelle, and stepfather, Jeffrey.  Because the trial court erred by failing to recognize its statutory authority to grant contact with a minor child to a third party, and by failing to determine whether Jeffrey had established de facto parental rights with respect to Serena, we vacate the judgment.

I.  BACKGROUND

         [¶2]  The parties are before us for the second time.[1]  We previously stated the following facts:

Jeffery and Danyelle Young met in 1995 when Serena was several months old.  Jeffery and Danyelle were married in 1996, and Lexi, the couple's only natural child, was born in 1997.  According to Jeffery's testimony, he was the only person acting as a father to Serena during the five years the couple was together.  After Danyelle and Jeffery separated in August 2000, both children lived with Danyelle and had visitation with Jeffery.  Danyelle filed a complaint for divorce on September 22, 2000, and a subsequent interim order by the divorce court (Jordan, C.M.O.) awarded Danyelle the primary residential care of both children and Jeffery rights of visitation.

Young v. Young, 2002 ME 167, ¶ 2, 810 A.2d 418, 420.  Following our decision, Danyelle filed a motion in the District Court to "dismiss" Serena from the divorce proceedings.  In Danyelle's motion, she argued that because Jeffrey is not Serena's biological father, he has no standing to petition for parental rights or responsibilities unless there is a finding of jeopardy. 

       [¶3]  The court held that Serena was excluded from consideration during the proceedings because she was not a child "of the parties," on the basis that 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1001 (1998) limits its jurisdiction, preventing consideration of children who are not legally or biologically related to both parents.[2]  Thus, the court held that "Serena not being