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Damariscotta Bank v. Holmes
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT					Reporter of Decisions
Decision:	1999 ME 159
Docket:	Lin-99-183
Submitted
on Briefs:	October 28, 1999
Decided:	November 15,1999

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, ALEXANDER, and
CALKINS, JJ.

DAMARISCOTTA BANK & TRUST CO.

v.

FRANK M. HOLMES

ALEXANDER, J.

	[¶1]  Damariscotta Bank & Trust Co. (Damariscotta Bank) appeals the
judgment of foreclosure entered in the Superior Court (Lincoln County,
Perkins, A.R.J.) on Damariscotta Bank's complaint for foreclosure and sale. 
Damariscotta Bank argues that it was error for the court to assign a third and
fourth priority to two of Damariscotta Bank's liens on the subject property. 
We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I.  CASE HISTORY

	[¶2]  Frank Holmes, defendant in Damariscotta Bank's foreclosure
action, and his ex-wife, Lois Holmes, appellee herein, were divorced by
order of the District Court (Wiscasset) on July 6, 1998.  At the time of the
divorce, the Holmes's marital estate included two pieces of realty, a primary
residence and a business property.  The primary residence was encumbered
by a mortgage securing a debt owed to First National Bank of Damariscotta
(First National).  The business property was encumbered by two mortgages. 
The first mortgage secured a debt owed to Clifton A. Bond and the second
secured a debt owed to Damariscotta Bank.  The divorce order granted the
marital home to Lois and ordered Frank to sell the business property and
apply the proceeds first to satisfy the debts secured by the two mortgages on
the business property and then to satisfy the debt secured by First National's
mortgage on the marital home.  An abstract of the divorce judgment{1} was
recorded in the Lincoln County Registry of Deeds on July 28, 1998, pursuant
to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(7) (1998).{2} 
	[¶3]  On September 29, 1998, Damariscotta Bank filed a complaint for
foreclosure of its mortgage on the business property.  Frank failed to file a
responsive pleading to the complaint, and on November 11, 1998,
Damariscotta Bank moved for entry of a default judgment.  
	[¶4]  On or about November 19, 1998, Damariscotta Bank obtained two
writs of execution on small claims judgments against Frank and filed the
writs in the Lincoln County Registry of Deeds.  By filing the writs,
Damariscotta Bank obtained liens against the business property.  See 14
M.R.S.A. § 4651-A (Supp. 1998).{3}  
	[¶5]  Prior to the hearing on Damariscotta Bank's foreclosure action,
counsel for Lois entered an appearance.  Following the hearing on
December 10, 1998, the court granted a default judgment of foreclosure in
favor of Damariscotta Bank, but directed that Damariscotta Bank and Lois
submit briefs on the issue of priority in the proceeds of the sale.  
	[¶6]  On February 25, 1999, the court entered its judgment and
directed that the proceeds of Damariscotta's sale of the business property be
distributed as follows:  (1) to Clifton A. Bond in the amount of the debt owed
to him on the business property; (2) to Damariscotta Bank in the amount of
its loan plus interest secured by its mortgage on the business property, with
costs; (3) to First National in the amount of its loan secured by the mortgage
on the marital home; (4) to Damariscotta Bank in the amount of the first lien
in the business property; (5) to Damariscotta Bank in the amount of the
second lien in the business property; and (6) to Frank.
	[¶7]  Damariscotta Bank contends that recording the abstract of the
divorce judgment did not create a lien against the business property and,
therefore, the interest of Lois and First National created by the divorce
court's judgment is subordinate to Damariscotta Bank's interest created by
its subsequent recording of its writs of execution.

II.  DISCUSSION

	[¶8]  Statutory interpretation is a matter of law.  See State v. Harris,
1999 ME 80, ¶ 3, 730 A.2d 1249, 1251.  We review questions of law
de novo.  See id.; King v. Town of Monmouth, 1997 ME 151, ¶ 9, 697 A.2d
837, 840.   
	[¶9]  Title 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(7) provides, "All rights acquired . . .
under this section by a party in the real estate of the other party are
effective against a person" when the abstract is recorded in the registry of
deeds.  See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(7) (emphasis added).  We must, therefore,
address whether the term "all rights" encompasses more rights than title to
property and whether "a person" includes within its meaning third parties
such as Damariscotta Bank.{4}  	[¶10]  Because the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there
is no need to resort to rules of statutory interpretation to determine its
meaning.  See State v. Harris, 1999 ME 80, ¶ 3, 730 A.2d 1249, 1251;
Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d 802, 803 (Me. 1991).  We
construe the term "all rights" in accordance with its plain meaning and
hold that among the rights protected by the recording of an abstract of a
divorce judgment, pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(7), is the right of a party
to recover his or her equity or interest in property as created by a judgment
of divorce.  We similarly construe the term "a person" in accordance with
its plain meaning and hold that such recording is effective against not only
the parties subject to the divorce judgment's mandate, but also against third
parties.  There would be little purpose in recording an abstract of judgment,
pursuant to the statute, if the notice provided by such recording affected
only the rights of the parties to the divorce.  Section 953(7) provides parties
to a divorce with an effective means of protecting their interests in real
property, as established by a decree or judgment of divorce, and prevents
these rights from being compromised by the later acts or omissions of an
adverse party.  Thus, we hold that by recording an abstract of the judgment
of divorce, Lois and First National acquired a priority in the proceeds of the
foreclosure sale as indicated in the judgment and ahead of Damariscotta
Bank's subsequent liens against the property acquired pursuant to
14 M.R.S.A. § 4651-A.  Accordingly, we find no error in the court's
judgment.	
	The entry is: 
			Judgment affirmed.
                                                         
Attorney for plaintiff:

William M. Avantaggio, Esq.
Howard & Bowie Law Offices
P O Box 460
Damariscotta, ME 04543

Defendant did not appear.

Attorneys for party-in-interest Lois K. Holmes:

Samuel G. Cohen, Esq.
Philip S. Cohen, Esq.
P O Box 1
Waldoboro, ME 04572-0910