In re Estate of Wheat
Case Date: 03/13/1998
Court: Court of Appeals
Docket No: 76968
24 Kan. App. 2d 934 No. 76,968 In the Matter of the Estate of JOHN EDWARD WHEAT. SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. It is the function of a court to interpret a statute to give it the effect intended by the legislature. 2. A district court has discretion in determining the exact amount of family allowance to award under K.S.A. 59-403. 3. When determining what amount of family allowance to award under K.S.A. 59-403(b), the district court may take into account the financial condition of the decedent's spouse and minor children. Appeal from Johnson District Court; PATRICK D. McANANY, judge. Opinion filed March 13, 1998. Affirmed. Darrell Smith, of Overland Park, for appellant. No appearance by appellees. Before GERNON, P.J., GREEN, J., and TIMOTHY E. BRAZIL, District Judge, assigned. GERNON, J.: In this appeal Karen Wheat, widow of John Edward Wheat, appeals from the district court's decision to not award a family allowance to her and decedent's minor children. When John Edward Wheat died, his surviving spouse, Karen Wheat, received approximately $120,000 from his life insurance policy, and each of his minor children received approximately $180,000 from the policy. The minor children reside with Christina Wheat, the children's mother, who is responsible for their support and maintenance. On March 13, 1996, the district court issued an opinion denying an allowance from decedent's estate pursuant to K.S.A. 59-403(b) for Karen Wheat and John Wheat's minor children. Karen filed a motion to reconsider the court's ruling. The district court denied the motion. It also authorized the judgment as a final judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 60-254(b). Karen appeals. We are somewhat hindered in our examination of this appeal by the fact that the appellees did not file a brief and that the record on appeal included only the journal entries and the judge's memorandum decision. The issue on appeal is whether the court erred in not awarding a statutory allowance pursuant to K.S.A. 59-403(b). K.S.A. 59-403 states in pertinent part:
The district court made the following finding regarding an allowance:
Karen claims that the use of the word "shall" in K.S.A. 59-403 required the district court to order a family allowance and, pursuant to the statute, the only consideration the court could take into account was the condition of the decedent's estate. She argues the statute does not contain a provision for considering the surviving spouse or minor children's financial condition and, therefore, the district court erred because it considered her financial condition. The inquiry by this court is a question of whether, pursuant to K.S.A. 59-403(b), the court can take into account the financial condition of decedent's spouse and minor children when determining what amount of family allowance to award. "[I]t is the function of a court to interpret a statute to give it the effect intended by the legislature." In re Application of Zivanovic, 261 Kan. 191, 192, 929 P.2d 1377 (1996). In In re Estate of Carriger, 4 Kan. App. 2d 594, 595, 609 P.2d 685, rev. denied 228 Kan. 806 (1980), this court noted:
The legislature intended that no surviving spouse or child of a decedent be left destitute. A surviving spouse's allowance is generally favored under the law. In re Estate of Taylor, 205 Kan. 347, 359, 469 P.2d 437 (1970). K.S.A. 59-403(b) sets a maximum allowance but sets no specific minimum. The language of the statute is broad enough to allow a judge to consider many factors in deciding whether to set an allowance. A court may use its discretion and take into consideration various factors, such as the financial condition of the decedent's spouse and minor children, when determining the amount of allowance to award. It follows that the district court could, in its discretion, decide to award no allowance based on the given set of facts, especially where the purpose of the statute is to help the survivors get through a difficult period of readjustment and not be left entirely destitute. In the present case, the district court determined that Karen and the minor children would be receiving money from decedent's life insurance, that she succeeded to the interest of the decedent in the residence, and that the minor children reside with their natural mother, who provides their support and maintenance. We conclude that the district court's ruling was consistent with the legislative intent behind K.S.A. 59-403. Affirmed. |