Find Legal Information

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) appeals from a circuit courtorder dismissing its action for administrative review of a decisionof the Industrial Commission (Commission) denying its request forapproval of a Panel of Physicians pursuant to section 8(a) of theWorkers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1998)) andsection 7 of the Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/7 (West1998)). For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

Section 8 of the Act governs the amount of compensation to bepaid to an employee for a nonfatal accidental injury. 820 ILCS305/8 (West 1998). Among other things, subsection (a) providesthat the employee may elect to secure his own physician at theemployer's expense or that:

"[u]pon agreement between the employer and the employees,or the employees' exclusive representative, and subjectto the approval of the Industrial Commission, theemployer shall maintain a list of physicians, to be knownas a Panel of Physicians, who are accessible to theemployees." (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West1998).

Section 7 of the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act provides that,if an employee's disablement, disfigurement, impairment, or deathis caused by an occupational disease, he is entitled to the same"benefits, rights and remedies, in the same manner, to the sameextent and subject to the same terms, conditions and limitations,* * * as are now or may hereafter be provided by the 'Workers'Compensation Act'". 820 ILCS 310/7 (West 1998).

On August 31, 1999, Wal-Mart filed a petition for theCommission's approval of a Panel of Physicians pursuant to section8(a) of the Act and Section 7 of the Workers' Occupational DiseasesAct. In its petition, Wal-Mart asserted that it had reached anagreement with the employees at 74 of its Illinois locations toestablish a panel. It stated that, at each location, it hadsubmitted the proposal for a Panel of Physicians to all of theemployees, and the employees in agreement with the proposal signeda written agreement to establish the panel. Attached as exhibitsto Wal-Mart's petition were a list of the 74 locations where anagreement had been reached and a list of the physicians on theproposed panel. Also attached was the affidavit of TheresaRussell, an employee of Claims Management, Inc., a wholly ownedsubsidiary of Wal-Mart which administers its' workers' compensationclaims. In her affidavit, Russell averred that more than 50% ofthe employees at each of the 74 locations had signed an agreementconsenting to the formation of the panel.

After the petition was filed, Commissioner Gilgis sent Wal-Mart several letters requesting information pertaining to thepetition. Wal-Mart responded to each of the letters, providinginformation and materials. In one of his letters, CommissionerGilgis also informed Wal-Mart that its petition was scheduled fortwo evidentiary hearings before him, the first to be held onDecember 7, 1999, at the Commission's Springfield offices and thesecond to be held on December 14, 1999, at its Chicago offices. Pursuant to instructions from Commissioner Gilgis, Wal-Mart postednotices in each of its stores informing its employees of the dateand location of each hearing and inviting them to attend thehearings and present comments.

Counsel for Wal-Mart was the only person who appeared at theDecember 7 hearing in Springfield. In response to counsel'sinquiry, Commissioner Gilgis stated that he did not, at that time,need any further information from Wal-Mart. Commissioner Gilgisconcluded the hearing and continued the matter to December 14.

No Wal-Mart employees appeared at the December 14 hearing inChicago. At that hearing, the following items were introduced intoevidence: a copy of the petition and its attachments; a list of thephysicians on the proposed panel; a copy of the notice of thehearings which was posted in each of Wal-Mart's stores; a copy ofthe notice to employees which Wal-Mart intended to post uponapproval of the petition; and copies of all correspondence betweenCommissioner Gilgis and Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart presented only onewitness, Theresa Russell, who testified regarding the manner inwhich she obtained the signatures of the employees who approved ofthe Panel of Physicians. After Russell's testimony, the hearingwas concluded.

On February 16, 2000, the Commission issued an order denyingWal-Mart's petition for approval of a Panel of Physicians. TheCommission found that Wal-Mart had failed to prove that all of itsemployees had waived their rights under section 8(a) and thatestablishment of the panel is in the best interests of itsemployees as a whole. It stated, inter alia, that: "Where theCommission has approved panels of doctors in the past, the proposalwas made jointly by the employer and the union authorized torepresent its employees on such matters so that it was clear thatthe arrangement was in the best interest of both parties." OnMarch 1, 2000, the Commission issued another order, in which itdirected Wal-Mart to post notices of the Commission's denial of thepetition in each of its 132 Illinois locations, the 74 locationswhich were the subject of the petition and an additional 58locations which were not.

On March 10, 2000, Wal-Mart filed a petition for rehearing andfor leave to submit additional evidence in support of its petitionfor approval of the panel. On March 15, 2000, the Commissionissued an order denying and dismissing Wal-Mart's petition forrehearing. In that order, the Commission stated that there is noprovision in the Act, its rules, or case law permitting rehearings.

On April 7, 2000, Wal-Mart sought judicial review of theCommission's three orders by filing in the circuit court of CookCounty a Request for Summons and Review, which stated that it wasfiled pursuant to section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(West 1998)) and Supreme Court Rule 292 (134 Ill. 2d R. 292). TheCommission filed a motion to dismiss Wal-Mart's judicial reviewaction pursuant to section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 1998)), arguing that thetrial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because it was notcommenced within the time constraints of section 19(f), i.e.,within 20 days of the issuance of the Commission's February 16,2000, order. On July 24, 2000, the trial court granted theCommission's motion and dismissed Wal-Mart's action for judicialreview. Wal-Mart then filed the instant timely appeal.

Our review of a dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 isde novo. Kedzie & 103^rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 116, 619 N.E.2d 732 (1993). Further, as will be explainedherein, the propriety of the trial court's dismissal order turnsupon a question of statutory construction, a question of law whichis also subject to de novo review. Advincula v. United BloodServices, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996).

Section 19(f) of the Act provides, inter alia, as follows:

"The decision of the Commission acting within itspowers, according to the provisions of paragraph (e) ofthis Section shall, in the absence of fraud, beconclusive unless reviewed as in this paragraphhereinafter provided. * * *

(1) * * * [T]he Circuit Court of the countywhere any of the parties defendant may befound, or if none of the parties defendant canbe found in this State then the Circuit Courtof the county where the accident occurred,shall by summons to the Commission have powerto review all questions of law and factpresented by such record.

A proceeding for review shall becommenced within 20 days of the receipt ofnotice of the decision of the Commission. Thesummons shall be issued by the clerk of suchcourt upon written request * * *." 820 ILCS305/19(f) (West 1998).

When reviewing decisions of the Commission, courts exercise specialstatutory jurisdiction, and strict compliance with the statuteconferring that jurisdiction is required. Arrington v. IndustrialComm'n, 96 Ill. 2d 505, 508, 451 N.E.2d 866 (1983). Compliancewith the 20-day period for initiating an action for judicial reviewpursuant to section 19(f) is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Ill. 2d 314, 321, 721 N.E.2d 563(1999). Illinois courts have held that, as the Act does notauthorize the filing of petitions for rehearing from theCommission's decisions, the filing of such a petition does not tollthe time for the filing of an action for judicial review pursuantto section 19(f). See Wilson-Raymond Constructors Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 79 Ill. 2d 45, 56, 402 N.E.2d 584 (1980)(petition requesting reconsideration of Commission's decision onthe merits a nullity); Chambers v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ill. App.3d 891, 893, 478 N.E.2d 498 (1985)(Act contains no provision forfiling petition for rehearing).

On appeal, Wal-Mart contends that the trial court erred ingranting the Commission's motion to dismiss its action for judicialreview. It does not argue that it complied with the requirementsof section 19(f), nor could it successfully do so. The Commissionissued an order denying Wal-Mart's petition for the approval of aPanel of Physicians on February 16, 2000. Wal-Mart did not fileits request for a summons until April 7, 2000, well beyond the 20-day limit imposed by section 19(f). As noted above, the filing ofWal-Mart's petition for rehearing did not toll the time for thefiling of a request for summons pursuant to section 19(f). SeeWilson-Raymond Constructors Co., 79 Ill. 2d at 56; Chambers, 132Ill. App. 3d at 893. Rather than asserting that it met therequirements of section 19(f) of the Act, Wal-Mart contends that itdid not have to meet these requirements as section 19(f) does notgovern appeals from the Commission's rulings on petitions forapproval of a Panel of Physicians brought pursuant to section 8(a)of the Act. The proper method of obtaining appeal of such orders,Wal-Mart argues, is by the filing of a common law writ ofcertiorari.

A writ of certiorari is the general method of obtaining reviewof administrative actions when the act conferring power upon theagency in question does not adopt the Administrative Review Law(735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1998)) and provides no other meansof review. Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272, 673 N.E.2d251 (1996). The Act clearly does not adopt the AdministrativeReview Law. Nor, Wal-Mart argues, does it provide, either throughsection 19(f) or any other section, for review of the Commission'sdecisions on petitions for the approval of a Panel of Physicians. Thus, relying on the rule that a petition for a common law writ ofcertiorari must be filed within six months of the action of whichreview is sought unless a reasonable excuse is shown for the delay(see Connolly v. Upham, 340 Ill. App. 387, 391, 92 N.E.2d 207(1950)), Wal-Mart argues that its writ of certiorari was timelyfiled.

Wal-Mart's argument involves the question of the properconstruction of section 19 of the Act. The rules of statutoryconstruction are well-settled, the primary one being that effectmust be given to the intent of the legislature. Advincula, 176Ill. 2d at 16. In order to ascertain the legislature's intent,courts must begin by examining the language of the statute, readingthe statute as a whole, and construing it so that no word or phraseis rendered meaningless or superfluous. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990). Clear and unambiguousstatutory language must be given effect without resort to otheraids of construction. People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443, 677N.E.2d 935 (1997). Where a statutory provision is ambiguous, orcapable of being understood in two or more different senses byreasonably well-informed people, the court may look to extrinsicsources in order to ascertain the legislature's intent. In reB.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43, 680 N.E.2d 1355 (1997). Suchsources include the purpose of the statute, the evils it wasdesigned to remedy, and the legislative history, In re B.C., 176Ill. 2d at 542-43.

Wal-Mart's argument that the decision issued by the Commissionin the instant case is not appealable pursuant to section 19(f) ispremised upon the following language contained therein: "Thedecision of the Commission acting within its powers, according tothe provisions of paragraph (e) of this Section shall, in theabsence of fraud, be conclusive unless reviewed as in thisparagraph hereinafter provided." (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS305/19(f) (West 1998). Based on this language, Wal-Mart contendsthat the method of review set forth in section 19(f) applies onlyto review of decisions made by the Commission when it is actingwithin its powers pursuant to section 19(e) of the Act. Wal-Martfurther argues, however, that the only power which the Commissionexercises pursuant to section 19(e) is its power to conducthearings and issue decisions relating to employees' claims forbenefits under the Act. Accordingly, Wal-Mart argues, since theCommission's decision on a petition for the approval of a Panel ofPhysicians is not made pursuant to section 19(e), it is notappealable by the procedure set forth in section 19(f).

Our consideration of Wal-Mart's argument necessarily requiresan examination of the language of section 19(e). The first twoparagraphs of subsection (e) provide as follows:

"(e) This paragraph shall apply to all hearings beforethe Commission. Such hearings may be held in its officeor elsewhere as the Commission may deem advisable. Thetaking of testimony on such hearings may be had beforeany member of the Commission. If a petition for reviewand agreed statement of facts or transcript of evidenceis filed, as provided herein, the Commission shallpromptly review the decision of the Arbitrator and allquestions of law or fact which appear from the statementof facts or transcript of evidence.

In all cases in which the hearing before thearbitrator is held after December 18, 1989, no additionalevidence shall be introduced by the parties before theCommission on review of the decision of the Arbitrator. In reviewing decisions of an arbitrator the Commissionshall award such temporary compensation, permanentcompensation and other payments as are due under thisAct. The Commission shall file in its office itsdecision thereon, and shall immediately send to eachparty or his attorney a copy of such decision and anotification of the time when it was filed. Decisionsshall be filed within 60 days after the Statement ofExceptions and Supporting Brief and Response thereto arerequired to be filed or oral argument whichever islater." 820 ILCS 305/19(e)(West 1998).

Wal-Mart is correct in its assertion that section 19(e)contains numerous references to the Commission reviewing thedecision of an arbitrator, as occurs with respect to an employee'sclaim for benefits. It is not, however, limited in scope to suchreviews. Rather, section 19(e) provides that: "This paragraphshall apply to all hearings before the Commission." 820 ILCS305/19(e) (West 1998). It is a fundamental rule of statutoryconstruction that the plain language of a statute must be giveneffect and that courts must not, under the guise of statutoryconstruction, add limitations or requirements which areinconsistent with the plain meaning of that language. People exrel. LeGout v. Decker, 146 Ill. 2d 389, 394, 586 N.E.2d 1257(1992). Section 19(e) clearly states that it applies to "allhearings". The Commission issued the decision in question hereafter conducting a hearing. Accordingly, the Commission's decisiondenying Wal-Mart's petition for approval of a Panel of Physiciansis a "decision of the Commission acting within its powers, pursuantto the provisions of paragraph (e)" and is appealable pursuant tosection 19(f).

In reaching this conclusion, we reject Wal-Mart's alternatecontention that the Commission's order is not a "decision of theCommission acting within its powers" within the meaning of section19(f) because the Commission, in fact, exceeded its authority. Wal-Mart contends that the Commission exceeded its authority byconducting hearings and applying a "best interests of the parties"standard, neither of which is provided for in the Act. As aresult, Wal-Mart contends, it was denied its rights to due processand a meaningful hearing. Similarly, Wal-Mart argues that theCommission exceeded its authority when it denied the petition forapproval on the basis that its employees were not represented by aunion. This, it contends is contrary to the plain language ofsection 8(a), which refers to an agreement being made between theemployer and the employees or the employees' representative. Wal-Mart thus contends the Commission's February 16, 2000, order isvoid. We disagree.

We first note that Wal-Mart did not object to the Commissionconducting hearings on its petition and, thus, waived any objectionthereto. See Langendorf v. Irving Trust Co., 244 Ill. App. 3d 70,81, 614 N.E.2d 23 (1992)(participation in hearing with no objectionwaived any objection on appeal to adequacy of hearing). Furthermore, even if the Commission applied an improper standard inruling on Wal-Mart's petition or based its decision on an improperground, we cannot conclude that the Commission was not "actingwithin its powers." Rather, we find that the Commission's decisionin such a case is an appealable order which is reviewable by thecircuit court pursuant to section 19(f) and that any such argumentsmust be raised in the context of that review. See Chambers, 132Ill. App. 3d at 894 (Commission's alleged failure to conduct aproper hearing pursuant to section 19(e) did not render its ordervoid). "This rule allows for the finality of Commission decisionsand for the certainty of orderly procedure as set forth in theAct." Chambers, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 894.

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that theCommission's decision to deny Wal-Mart's petition for the approvalof a Panel of Physicians is appealable pursuant to section 19(f) ofthe Act. Because Wal-Mart failed to initiate its action forjudicial review within the 20-day time limit set forth therein, thecircuit court lacked jurisdiction over the action. As such, weaffirm the circuit court's order dismissing Wal-Mart's action forjudicial review.

Affirmed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and O'MALLEY, HOLDRIDGE, andRARICK, JJ.,concur.