Find Legal Information

JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes to us on Glenn Trentman's appeal from the trial court's July 26, 2000,order denying his posttrial motion. Because we conclude that a motion to strike the appeal,taken with the case, is dispositive regarding this court's lack of jurisdiction, we cannotconsider his appeal.

Illinois has a set of rules and procedures in place by which all legal proceedings arebound. These rules are not mere suggestions and not aspirational in nature. See Bright v.Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210, 652 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1995). The rules are meant to befollowed by all who seek justice in the court system.

Glenn Trentman sued Stephen R. Kappel, M.D., and Associated OrthopedicSurgeons, Ltd., for medical malpractice. The case was tried before a jury. The jury returneda verdict in favor of the defendants on April 14, 1999. Glenn Trentman's posttrial motionraising various evidentiary issues was not filed until June 28, 2000. What happened betweenApril 14, 1999, and June 28, 2000, can best be explained with the following chart:

A trial court loses its jurisdiction over a case after the passage of 30 days, unlesswithin that 30-day period the trial court has extended the time in which a posttrial motioncan be filed. Predny v. Village of Park Forest, 164 Ill. App. 3d 688, 693-94, 518 N.E.2d1243, 1247 (1987). Section 2-1202(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1202(c) (West 1998)) governs the time frame applicable to the filing of posttrial motions. This rule states, "Post[]trial motions must be filed within 30 days after the entry of judgmentor the discharge of the jury, if no verdict is reached, or within any further time the court mayallow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof." 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(c) (West 1998). Enforcement of the judgment is stayed if the posttrial motion is timely filed. 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(d) (West 1998).

The language of this procedural statute is quite plain and seems to be free ofambiguity. The simple reading of the statute is that if the trial court extends the time inwhich to file a posttrial motion beyond the initial 30-day period, that order of time extensionmust be entered within the 30-day period or within any period of extension already given. In other words, after the 30-day period has expired, or the extended period of time hasexpired, without the entry of a new order setting a new deadline, the trial court losesjurisdiction over the case.

There has been only one case specifically interpreting what is meant by the phrase"within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof." The Appellate Court, First District, analyzed this issue in Kwak v. St. Anthony De PaduaHospital, 54 Ill. App. 3d 719, 369 N.E.2d 1346 (1977). In that case there were twojudgments at issue, dated January 26 and January 29. Kwak, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 724, 369N.E.2d at 1350. The 30-day time frame for the filing of a posttrial motion ran throughFebruary 25 and February 28. Kwak, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 724, 369 N.E.2d at 1350. Becausethe plaintiff had not either filed posttrial motions prior to the February dates or filed for andreceived an extension of time from the court prior to the February dates, the appellate courtconcluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff's posttrialmotion filed thereafter. Kwak, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 724, 369 N.E.2d at 1350. The trial courtlacked jurisdiction even though the motion to extend the time was filed within the initial 30-day period. Kwak, 54 Ill. App. 3d at 724, 369 N.E.2d at 1349-50.

Similarly, in Portock v. Freeman, 53 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030, 369 N.E.2d 201, 203(1977), the Appellate Court, First District, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertainthe plaintiff's appeal because the plaintiff failed to file his posttrial motion within the timeframe ordered by the court. The judgment about which the plaintiff complained was enteredon July 21. Portock, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 369 N.E.2d at 203. The trial court allowed theplaintiff to file his posttrial motion up through November 5. Portock, 53 Ill. App. 3d at1030, 369 N.E.2d at 203. The plaintiff did not obtain another extension of time and filedhis posttrial motion on November 12. Portock, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 369 N.E.2d at 203. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff failed to comply with the Illinois civilprocedure rule requiring "that post[]trial motions be filed within any granted extension oftime." (Emphasis omitted.) Portock, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 369 N.E.2d at 203. OnNovember 12, when the trial court denied the plaintiff's posttrial motion, the appellate courtfound that the trial court had already lost jurisdiction and could not entertain the motion onits merits. Portock, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 369 N.E.2d at 203.

On one occasion, this court was called upon to discuss this jurisdictional requirement. In Spurgeon v. Alton Memorial Hospital, 285 Ill. App. 3d 703, 674 N.E.2d 517 (1996), wedid not follow the reasoning of the Kwak v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital decision. Weconcluded that the case was factually distinguishable, finding no flaw with the conclusionreached by the First District in its analysis. While Janet Spurgeon had not filed a posttrialmotion or obtained an extension of time within the 30-day period, Alton Memorial Hospitalhad done so. Spurgeon, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 706, 674 N.E.2d at 519. We concluded that solong as any party's posttrial motion remained undisposed, the underlying judgment wouldnot be final and the trial court retained jurisdiction over the case. Spurgeon, 285 Ill. App.3d at 707, 674 N.E.2d at 520.

We take this opportunity to reiterate that we follow the interpretation advanced by theFirst District in Kwak v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital. It is quite possible that the reasonthis issue has not arisen since 1977 is that the language of section 2-1202(c) of the Code ofCivil Procedure is evident and exact. If a party cannot file his or her posttrial motion withinthe original 30-day period, that party must obtain the trial court's extension within that same30-day period. If a party does not obtain an extension and the 30 days are allowed to pass,then the trial court no longer has jurisdiction to allow an extension of time. If a party obtainsan extension of time and needs an additional extension or extensions of time in which to filea posttrial motion, the additional extension(s) of time must be secured prior to expiration ofthe previously extended deadline.

In this case, the defendants did not file a posttrial motion, and so there was nothingpending before the trial court to stay the enforcement of the judgment. The first eightrequests for an extension of time filed by Glenn Trentman were proper and timely. On hisninth request, which was due by December 4, 1999, Glenn Trentman actually did not needto obtain the extension until December 6, 1999, because in 1999, December 4 fell on aSaturday. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 1998). It is with his tenth request that he missed thedeadline. After the ninth extension, Glenn Trentman had until January 4, 2000, to obtainanother extension or file his posttrial motion. He did not do so until January 5, 2000. Therequest for the extension was filed before the deadline (on January 3, 2000), but as in Kwakv. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital, both the request and the order must occur before thedeadline. After January 4, 2000, passed with no order entered, the circuit court lostjurisdiction. All orders entered by the trial court subsequent to January 4, 2000, exceededthe circuit court's jurisdiction. Glenn Trentman's posttrial motion filed on June 28, 2000,was a nullity.

Glenn Trentman's attorney argues that the entire matter was stayed once he filed histenth request for an extension of time. He also argues that the rule is not hard and fast andthat we should equate the timely filed motion for extension (with the untimely entered orderof extension) to situations allowing late-filed documents on the basis of the mailing rule. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 12. These arguments lack logic in the context of a posttrial motion inwhich the 30-day time frame is jurisdictional. If the time frame of an extension passes, thetrial court loses its jurisdiction. After the fact, the trial court is not able to grant any furtherextensions.

Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction after January 4, 2000, to entertainmotions for extension of time or Glenn Trentman's posttrial motion, we are deprived ofjurisdiction to hear Glenn Trentman's appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

MAAG, P.J., and HOPKINS, J., concur.

Opinion File August 27, 2002

Justices: Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, P.J., and

Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, J.,

Concur

Attorney Thomas Ducey, Ducey & Associates, P.C., #20 Bronze Pointe, Belleville, IL

for 62226

Appellant

Attorneys Ted W. Dennis, W. Jeffrey Muskopf, Freeark, Harvey, Mendillo, Dennis,Wuller,

for Cain & Murphy, P.C., 115 West Washington Street, Belleville, IL 62220

Appellees