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JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this case is whether Rebecca Thurman (plaintiff) is entitled tounderinsured-motorist coverage from Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Company (defendant)where the limits of the underinsured-motorist coverage are less than the limits of the bodily-injury liability insurance of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle. Thecircuit court of Jackson County granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, denied defendant's, and declared that the underinsured-motorist coverage from defendant providescoverage for the claims of plaintiff. Defendant appeals this decision. For the followingreasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

The facts in this case are undisputed. On November 13, 1997, plaintiff and ShelleyHuffman were passengers in an automobile owned and operated by Clarence Huffman(Huffman). While traveling on an Illinois highway, they were involved in an automobilecollision when Prudence Smout, the driver of an oncoming vehicle, crossed the center line. As a result of the collision, Huffman was killed, and Shelley Huffman and plaintiff sufferedvarious injuries.

At the time of the accident, Smout, the at-fault driver, was insured by State FarmInsurance Company (State Farm). Her insurance policy provided for liability limits of$50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. On July 20, 1999, State Farm paid $100,000to the court and filed an interpleader action seeking a determination as to the distribution ofthe $100,000 for the benefit of the injured parties. Following a hearing and a determinationby the court regarding the extent of the injuries suffered by the parties involved, the courtapportioned $9,070 of the $100,000 to plaintiff.

Huffman, the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger, was insured bydefendant. The policy issued by defendant to Huffman provided underinsured-motoristcoverage for his passengers in the amount of $25,000 per person and $50,000 eachoccurrence. Plaintiff sought arbitration with defendant, seeking to recover up to $25,000under Huffman's policy, after offsetting the $9,070 received from State Farm. Defendantrefused to arbitrate, claiming that under section 143a-2(4) of the Illinois Insurance Code(Code) (215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 1998)), the maximum amount payable by defendantto plaintiff for underinsured-motorist benefits is zero because the underinsured-motorist-coverage limits provided for in Huffman's policy do not exceed the liability limits in Smout'spolicy.

On January 13, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of JacksonCounty. Plaintiff sought a declaratory order requiring defendant to engage in arbitrationwith plaintiff under the policy. On January 14, 2000, defendant filed a complaint in thesame court. Defendant sought a declaratory judgment stating that there is no underinsured-motorist coverage available. The two complaints were consolidated on March 6, 2000.

On July 19, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff asked thecourt to find that plaintiff is entitled to underinsured-motorist coverage from defendant inthe amount of $25,000, less any set-off for plaintiff's prior recovery from State Farm. Insupport of her motion, plaintiff cited the Illinois Supreme Court case of Cummins v. CountryMutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474 (1997). In Cummins, in a plurality decision, thesupreme court held that to the extent that the amount of liability insurance actuallyrecovered is less than the amount of underinsured-motorist coverage, the liable driver isconsidered underinsured and the injured party is entitled to underinsured-motorist benefits. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 486.

On July 27, 2000, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and argued thatplaintiff is not entitled to any benefits because the limits of liability insurance in Smout'spolicy are greater than the limits of the underinsured-motorist coverage in the policy issuedto Huffman by defendant. In support of its argument, defendant cited section 143a-2(4) ofthe Code, specifically, a portion that was amended to be effective after the accident givingrise to the Cummins case and therefore not considered by the supreme court in Cummins. Defendant argued that the amended portion specifically precludes plaintiff from recoveringbenefits because, under the statute, where the limits of the bodily-injury liability insuranceof the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle exceed the limits of theunderinsured-motorist coverage, no amount is payable.

On October 5, 2000, the circuit court granted plaintiff's motion for summaryjudgment and denied defendant's. The circuit court examined Cummins and the amendedportion of section 143a-2(4), and it ruled that section 143a-2(4) allows plaintiff to "recoverthe entire amount of the tortfeasor's liability policy and the difference between that policyand the amount of the underinsured coverage." Defendant now appeals.

Before addressing the issue raised by defendant on appeal, we begin by noting thatplaintiff has not taken part in this appeal. Plaintiff did not file an appellee brief, and plaintiffdid not participate in oral argument. However, as defendant's brief and the record aresufficient to resolve this issue, we shall consider this appeal. See First Capitol MortgageCorp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

A circuit court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is reviewed denovo. American Service Insurance Co. v. Passarelli, 323 Ill. App. 3d 587, 589 (2001). Where there is no dispute as to an issue of material fact, the sole function of this court is todetermine whether the trial court's judgment was correct as a matter of law. Cates v. Cates,156 Ill. 2d 76, 78 (1993). We need not give deference to the judgment of the trial court. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1996).

The dispositive question before this court is whether section 143a-2(4) of the Codeprohibits plaintiff from recovering any underinsured-motorist-coverage benefits fromdefendant under a policy issued to Huffman. Defendant argues that section 143a-2(4) of theCode clearly prohibits the payment of underinsured-motorist-coverage benefits because thatsection specifically states that the "maximum amount payable" shall not exceed the amountby which the limits of liability of the underinsured-motorist coverage exceed the limits of thebodily-injury liability insurance of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle. 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 1998). Defendant argues that because, in the instant case, thelimits of liability of the underinsured-motorist coverage do not exceed the limits of thebodily-injury liability insurance of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle,that maximum amount payable is zero, so plaintiff is entitled to no benefits from defendant. Defendant acknowledges our supreme court's decision in Cummins but argues that it isinapplicable because it dealt with section 143a-2(4) before the effective date of theamendment that is applicable to the instant case. We begin our analysis by turning first tosection 143a-2(4) of the Code and then to the Cummins decision.

Since January 1, 1997, section 143a-2(4), the underinsured-motorist provision of theCode, states in pertinent part:

"For the purpose of this Code the term 'underinsured motor vehicle' means amotor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance[,] or use has resulted in bodily injuryor death of the insured, as defined in the policy, and for which the sum of the limitsof liability under all bodily[-]injury liability[-]insurance policies or under bonds orother security required to be maintained under Illinois law applicable to the driver orto the person or organization legally responsible for such vehicle and applicable tothe vehicle[] is less than the limits for underinsured[-motorist] coverage provided theinsured as defined in the policy at the time of the accident. The limits of liability foran insurer providing underinsured[-]motorist coverage shall be the limits of suchcoverage, less those amounts actually recovered under the applicable bodily[-]injury insurance policies, bonds[,] or other security maintained on the underinsured motorvehicle. However, the maximum amount payable by the underinsured[-]motorist[-] coverage carrier shall not exceed the amount by which the limits of the underinsured[-]motorist coverage exceeds [sic] the limits of the bodily[-]injuryliability insurance of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 1998).

The italicized sentence was added by Public Act 89-658, effective January 1, 1997. 1996Ill. Laws 3514-15.

In Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d 474 (1997), the IllinoisSupreme Court addressed a fact pattern similar to that in the case at bar. In Cummins, theplaintiff (Cummins) was injured in a two-car automobile accident and sustained over$50,000 in damages. The accident occurred in 1992. Cummins was a passenger in a carinsured by a policy issued by defendant (Country Mutual), which provided underinsured-motorist benefits in the amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. Cummins,178 Ill. 2d at 476. The motorist who collided with the Country Mutual vehicle wasdetermined to be at fault and had insurance with identical liability limits of $50,000 perperson and $100,000 per accident. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 475-76.

After Cummins received a good-faith settlement of $35,000 from the at-fault driver'sinsurance company, with the balance of the liability proceeds going to the injured passengersin the at-fault driver's vehicle, Cummins sued Country Mutual and sought the $15,000difference between the $35,000 received and the $50,000 limit of County Mutual'sunderinsured-motorist coverage. Country Mutual filed a motion to dismiss, contending thatthe at-fault driver's vehicle was not "underinsured" as defined in the policy and arguing that,under section 143a-2(4) of the Code, the at-fault driver's vehicle was not underinsuredbecause the at-fault driver's liability limits were not less than the limits of underinsured-motorist coverage. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 476. The trial court granted Country Mutual'smotion to dismiss, the appellate court reversed, and the case then proceeded to the supremecourt.

In a plurality decision, the supreme court framed the issue as follows: "[W]hether[Cummins] could state a claim to recover the shortfall between his underinsured-motoristpolicy limits and the amount he actually recovered from the liable driver's insurance, whenthe liable driver's policy has limits identical to [Cummins'] underinsured-motorist coverage,but the coverage was exhausted by payments to other injured claimants." Cummins, 178 Ill.2d at 476. The supreme court then began its decision by examining section 143a-2(4) of theCode, which defines an underinsured motor vehicle, and it noted that any conflict betweenstatutory and insurance policy provisions will be resolved in favor of the statutoryprovisions. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 483. At the time of the accident in Cummins, the statuteread as follows:

"For the purpose of this Code the term 'underinsured motor vehicle' means amotor vehicle whose ownership, maintenance[,] or use has resulted in bodily injuryor death of the insured, as defined in the policy, and for which the sum of the limitsof liability under all bodily[-]injury liability[-]insurance policies or under bonds orother security required to be maintained under Illinois law applicable to the driver orto the person or organization legally responsible for such vehicle and applicable tothe vehicle[] is less than the limits for underinsured[-motorist] coverage provided theinsured as defined in the policy at the time of the accident. The limits of liability foran insurer providing underinsured[-]motorist coverage shall be the limits of suchcoverage, less those amounts actually recovered under the applicable bodily[-]injuryinsurance policies, bonds[,] or other security maintained on the underinsured motorvehicle." 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 1992).

Missing from this version of the statute is the sentence that was added by Public Act 89-658,effective January 1, 1997. Although the amendment was effective at the time the supremecourt's decision in Cummins was filed, the court makes no mention of the amendment.

In analyzing the statute before it, the Cummins plurality agreed with Cummins thatit was "unclear from the definition [contained in the first sentence of section 143a-2(4)]whether underinsured-motorist status should be determined by comparing the limits of[Cummins'] underinsured-motorist coverage to the stated limits of liability coverage or tothe recoverable limits." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 480-81. As the plurality did not believe thatthe definition in the first sentence expressly referred to the stated policy limits, as opposedto the amount of liability insurance actually recovered, it turned to the second sentence,which contains a specific reference to the amount of insurance proceeds actually recovered. Then, reading the statute as a whole, the plurality concluded that "the amount actuallyrecovered may be the appropriate figure to be used in determining whether a vehicle isunderinsured." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 481. By so finding, the plurality explicitly rejecteda line of appellate court cases that had held that the second clause of the statute should onlybe examined insofar as there had already been an initial determination that the at-faultdriver's vehicle was underinsured. In conclusion, the plurality held that a determination asto whether a vehicle is underinsured must be made by comparing the amount ofunderinsured-motorist coverage to the amount of liability coverage actually recovered fromthe at-fault driver. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 485-86.

In a special concurrence by then-Chief Justice Freeman, he stated that he agreed withthe result of the plurality but that he believed the reasoning to be flawed. Justice Freemansubscribed to the view set forth by the line of appellate court cases that had held that thelanguage of the statute reveals a "two-part" inquiry that must be utilized in determiningwhether an insured is entitled to underinsured-motorist coverage. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at487 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Justice Freeman admitted that when applying thefacts of Cummins to this test, because the liability limits were equal, the vehicle that injuredCummins was not underinsured under the statute and, therefore, an examination of thesecond sentence was "wholly irrelevant." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 488-89 (Freeman, C.J.,specially concurring).

However, Justice Freeman still agreed with the result of the plurality. JusticeFreeman noted that when a strict rendering of a statute produces an "absurd result" whichthe legislature could not have contemplated, the courts are bound to presume that thoseconsequences were not intended and the courts must adopt a construction which it may bereasonable to presume was contemplated by the legislature. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 489-90(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Justice Freeman noted that under the facts inCummins, although a face-value comparison of the underinsured-motorist limits and the at-fault driver's liability limits would show that they were equal on paper, in reality, becausethe at-fault driver's liability limits were depleted by previous payouts to other claimants, theywere unequal. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 490 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). According to Justice Freeman, "Under these circumstances, an absurd and unfair resultobtains when the precise language in the first sentence [of the provision] is applied toCummins." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 490 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). JusticeFreeman simply could not "believe that the legislature intended underinsured-motoristcoverage in this state to be dependent upon the fortuity of being involved in an accident inwhich only a single person is injured and hence only a single claim is made against the at-fault driver's liability policy." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 491 (Freeman, C.J., speciallyconcurring). Accordingly, Justice Freeman believed that the only way to effectuate theGeneral Assembly's intent and avoid an absurd result was to construe the first sentence sothat the vehicle of the at-fault driver would be deemed an underinsured motor vehiclewhenever the amount of that driver's liability coverage was less than the amount of theinsured's underinsured-motorist coverage because of a payment of proceeds to otherclaimants. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 492 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring).

In a dissent filed by Justice Heiple and joined by Justice Miller, Justice Heiplecharacterized the decision of the plurality and special concurrence as "an act of judiciallegislation, defying the will of the people as expressed through their elected representatives." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 493 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Heiple pointed out that theapproach adopted by the majority was once taken by the General Assembly but that theGeneral Assembly then "changed the basis of underinsured-motorist liability from theinsured's damages to the relative limits of liability specified in the policies of the partiesinvolved in the accident." (Emphasis in original.) Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 494 (Heiple, J.,dissenting). Justice Heiple noted, "Until the [appellate court] decision in this case, everyIllinois court which had considered the current version of the statute *** agreed that theprovision makes underinsured[-motorist] coverage contingent on the limits of liabilityspecified in the policies of those involved in the accident." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 494(Heiple, J., dissenting).

Justice Heiple stated, "Although the General Assembly has had ample opportunityto disturb these decisions through recent amendments to section 143a-2, it has declined todo so." Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 495 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Finally, although Justice Heiplebelieved that the plurality and the special concurrence offered persuasive reasons for theState of Illinois to require an automobile insurer to pay the underinsured-motorist coveragelimits specified in its policy whenever the insured sustained losses which were not fullycovered by the liability of the driver at fault, he believed that such a decision must rest withthe General Assembly and not with the courts. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 496 (Heiple, J.,dissenting).

As we indicated earlier, the decision in Cummins was made without taking intoconsideration the third sentence in amended section 143a-2(4), which provides, "However,the maximum amount payable by the underinsured[-]motorist[-]coverage carrier shall notexceed the amount by which the limits of the underinsured[-]motorist coverage exceeds [sic]the limits of the bodily[-]injury liability insurance of the owner or operator of theunderinsured motor vehicle." 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4) (West 1998). After reviewingdefendant's arguments and the supreme court's decision in Cummins, we believe that theamendment to the statute clearly indicates the General Assembly's intent to restrictunderinsured-motorist-coverage carriers from providing benefits where the limits of thebodily-injury liability insurance of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicleexceed the limits of the underinsured-motorist coverage.

When construing a statute, a court must read the statute as a whole, give the statutorylanguage its plain meaning, and import to the statute the fullest possible meaning to whichit is susceptible. People v. Ferrell, 277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 77 (1995). The primary rule ofstatutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, andlegislative intent is best determined by the language of the statute. Augustus v. Estate ofSomers, 278 Ill. App. 3d 90, 97 (1996). Where the statutory language is not ambiguous, itwill be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Augustus, 278 Ill. App. 3dat 97.

The version of section 143a-2(4) in effect at the time of the accident in the case at barprovides, "[T]he maximum amount payable by the underinsured[-]motorist[-]coveragecarrier shall not exceed the amount by which the limits of the underinsured[-]motoristcoverage exceeds [sic] the limits of the bodily[-]injury liability insurance of the owner oroperator of the underinsured motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/143a-2(4)(West 1998). Plugging in the undisputed numbers for the factors in the equation above, thismeans that the "maximum amount payable" by defendant (the underinsured-motorist-coverage carrier) shall not exceed the amount by which $25,000 (the limits of theunderinsured-motorist coverage) exceeds $100,000 (the limits of the bodily-injury liabilityinsurance of Smout, the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle). Because$25,000 does not exceed $100,000, or because it can be said to exceed $100,000 by zero,under the clear language of the statute, the maximum amount payable by defendant underthe statute is $0.

We find no ambiguity in the third sentence of section 143a-2(4). In fact, we believethe addition of this third sentence makes the General Assembly's intentions perfectly clear. Interestingly, this statute was not amended regarding this issue until after this court issuedits decision in Cummins, which, as pointed out by the dissent in the supreme court's decisionin Cummins, provided a rendering of the statute different from "every Illinois court" that hadpreviously considered the statute. Cummins, 178 Ill. 2d at 494 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Thelegislature is presumed to have been aware of judicial decisions interpreting the statute andto have acted with this knowledge. Morris v. William L. Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187Ill. 2d 494, 499 (1999). Accordingly, we can presume that the General Assembly was awareof this court's decision in Cummins, as it was not until this time that the legislature decidedto take action to have this section amended and to make clear that a determination regardingthe maximum amount payable by the underinsured-motorist-coverage carrier is to be basedon a comparison of the appropriate limits.

Finally, although we agree with Justice Heiple's dissent in Cummins in that there arepersuasive reasons for the State of Illinois to require an automobile insurer to pay theunderinsured-motorist coverage limit specified in its policy whenever the insured sustainslosses which are not fully covered by the liability of the driver at fault, we also agree that thisdecision must come from the General Assembly and not by judicial legislation. In reviewingthe General Assembly's latest amendment to section 143a-2(4), we believe it is clear thatwhere the limits of the underinsured-motorist coverage do not exceed the limits of the bodilyinjury liability insurance of the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle, thereis no amount payable by the underinsured-motorist-coverage carrier. Accordingly, becausethe underinsured-motorist coverage of Huffman's policy is lower than the liability of Smout'spolicy, the statute mandates that there is no amount payable by defendant. Therefore, thecircuit court should have granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and deniedplaintiff's.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and under our powersunder Supreme Court Rule 366 (155 Ill. 2d R. 366), we enter an order granting defendant'smotion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's.

Reversed; judgment entered.

KUEHN and RARICK, JJ., concur.