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JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff's insured was involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a rentalvehicle insured by the defendants, which resulted in a claim against the driver for injuriesand property damage sustained by another driver. The plaintiff sought a declaratoryjudgment that the defendants' coverage for liability stemming from the accident was primarywhile the plaintiff's was secondary. The trial court awarded a summary judgment in favorof the defendants. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) a provision in the rental contractmaking the driver's insurance primary was contrary to law and therefore ineffective and (2)the initial-permission rule required the defendants' coverage to be primary. We affirm thetrial court.

On January 11, 1999, Michael Kauling rented a 1998 Ford Contour fromADRI/Auffenberg Ford, doing business as Auffenberg Rent-A-Car (Auffenberg), to drivewhile his van was being repaired by a Ford Motor Company (Ford) dealership. His rentalcontract with Auffenberg provided that if he did not purchase a liability insurancesupplement from Auffenberg at an additional charge, his car insurance would provideprimary coverage. Kauling did not purchase the liability insurance supplement. Later thatday, Kauling was involved in a car accident with David Watson, who filed a complaintagainst Kauling for his injuries and the damage to his vehicle.

The Contour was owned by Ford and insured through defendant National Union FireInsurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (National Union). The certificate offinancial responsibility that Ford had filed with the Illinois Secretary of State pursuant tosection 9-101 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2000)) stated that thecoverage provided by the National Union policy was secondary. However, the policy itselfdid not contain such a limitation. Kauling's own vehicle was insured by plaintiff State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). His policy provided coverage forliability arising from his use of "temporary substitute vehicles," including rental cars. Itprovided, however, that such coverage was secondary if the temporary substitute vehicle hadother liability insurance.

On January 12, 2000, the plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Hertz ClaimManagement Corp., with which Ford also maintains insurance policies covering Auffenbergvehicles. On May 24, 2000, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, naming NationalUnion as an additional defendant. The complaints sought a declaratory judgment that thedefendants were responsible for providing primary coverage for Kauling's potential liabilityto Watson. The defendants and the plaintiff filed motions for a summary judgment. Thetrial court entered a summary judgment order in favor of the defendants on July 30, 2001. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff contends that Illinois law requires a vehicle owner's insurance to provideprimary coverage in all cases. The defendants, by contrast, argue that this requirement isimposed by the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law (FinancialResponsibility Law) (625 ILCS 5/7-100 through 7-708 (West 2000)), which is inapplicableto rental vehicles because their insurance is governed by a set of statutes specific to theinsurance of rental cars (rental car insurance law) (625 ILCS 5/9-101 through 9-110 (West2000)), which does not contain such a provision. We agree with the defendants.

A summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of materialfact and the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that the moving party is entitled toa judgment as a matter of law. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Alamo Rent A Car,Inc., 319 Ill. App. 3d 382, 386, 744 N.E.2d 300, 302 (2000). Our review of the trial court'sruling on a motion for a summary judgment is de novo. Farm Bureau Mutual InsuranceCo., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 385, 744 N.E.2d at 302.

Section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides that no one may operate amotor vehicle or allow a vehicle to be operated without obtaining sufficient insurance. 625ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2000). For most vehicles, section 7-203 requires that the policylimits must be at least $20,000 per person or $40,000 per accident for personal injury ordeath and at least $15,000 for property damage. 625 ILCS 5/7-601(a), 7-203 (West 2000). Section 7-317(b)(2) requires that the insurance must cover any person driving the insuredvehicle with the express or implied permission of the insured. 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2)(West 2000). Such coverage is commonly referred to as "omnibus coverage." If the policydoes not expressly provide omnibus coverage, it will be interpreted as providing it. StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240,244, 695 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1998) (where omnibus clauses are required by statute, such aclause must be read into each insurance policy).

Among the vehicles exempted from the requirements of section 7-601(a) are thosein compliance with other statutes that require insurance in amounts meeting or exceedingthose required by section 7-601(a). 625 ILCS 5/7-601(b)(6) (West 2000). The IllinoisSupreme Court has held that this exception applies only if the other statute requires coverageof the type mandated by section 7-601(a). Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d at 245,695 N.E.2d at 851. Section 9-101 of the Illinois Vehicle Code requires the owners of rentalvehicles to provide proof of financial responsibility to the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2000). Financial responsibility may be in the form of a bond, an insurance policy,or a certificate of self-insurance. 625 ILCS 5/9-102 (West 2000). If the owner of the rentalcar opts to provide an insurance policy, as Ford has done in the instant case, it must providecoverage with limits of at least $50,000 per person for bodily injury or death or $100,000per accident for bodily injury or death and property damage. The policy must cover anydriver using the car with the insured's express or implied permission. 625 ILCS 5/9-105(West 2000). Because the rental car insurance law requires rental cars to be insured inamounts exceeding those required by sections 7-601(a) and 7-203 and contains an omnibusclause identical to that found in section 7-317(b)(2), we find that rental cars fall within theexception provided by section 7-601(b)(6).

Section 7-317 and section 9-105 are silent on which insurer is to provide primarycoverage where the driver and the vehicle are covered by different policies. 625 ILCS 5/7-317, 9-105 (West 2000). However, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that, absentstatutory language to the contrary, the omnibus clause found in section 7-317(b)(2) "mustbe construed to require primary coverage." Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d at246, 695 N.E.2d at 851. We note that the two omnibus clauses serve the same purpose andcontain nearly identical language. For the reasons which follow, however, we conclude, ashave the other Illinois appellate courts to consider the issue, that section 9-105 does notrequire a rental car agency to provide primary insurance as long as such coverage is availablefrom another source.

The purpose of the omnibus provisions is to protect the public by ensuring thatadequate resources are available to compensate for injuries sustained as a result ofautomobile accidents. Insurance Car Rentals, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 225, 232, 504 N.E.2d 256, 261 (1987). Their purpose is theprotection of the public, not other insurance agencies. Continental Casualty Co. v. TravelersInsurance Co., 84 Ill. App. 2d 200, 204, 228 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1967). In general, where twoinsurance policies each purport to offer only secondary coverage, the insurance of thevehicle's owner is primary while that of the driver is secondary. Dotson v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 101 Ill. App. 3d 804, 807, 428 N.E.2d 1002, 1004 (1981). However, the Illinoiscourts that have considered this question in the unique context of rental cars have concludedthat the general rule does not apply. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 319 Ill. App. 3dat 389, 744 N.E.2d at 305; Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., 152 Ill. App. 3d at 234, 504 N.E.2dat 262; Dotson, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 808, 428 N.E.2d at 1005. This is so because the publicpolicy at stake is not frustrated by departing from the general rule. Farm Bureau MutualInsurance Co., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 389, 744 N.E.2d at 305; Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., 152Ill. App. 3d at 234, 504 N.E.2d at 262.

In Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., as here, a driver rented a car for use while his car wasbeing repaired. Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., 152 Ill. App. 3d at 227, 504 N.E.2d at 258. Ashere, the car rental agency offered him a choice between relying on his insurance companyto provide primary coverage or paying a higher cost in order to be provided with fullcoverage through the rental agency's insurer. The driver opted for the former option. Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., 152 Ill. App. 3d at 228, 504 N.E.2d at 258. The Third DistrictAppellate Court found that the car rental agency fulfilled the purpose of protecting thepublic because it "did provide a means for obtaining insurance if a customer chose to use[its] insurance." Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., 152 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 504 N.E.2d at 261. In so holding, the court emphasized that there were two separate agreements the driver couldhave entered into with the rental car agency. Had he chosen to purchase insurance throughthe agency's insurer, he would have had to sign a different form, which was a different color. Moreover, the cost of renting the car would have been higher. Insurance Car Rentals, Inc.,152 Ill. App. 3d at 232, 504 N.E.2d at 261. Thus, the court reasoned, the agency protected"those who would otherwise be uninsured." Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., 152 Ill. App. 3dat 232, 504 N.E.2d at 261.

Similarly, in the case at bar, Auffenberg offered Kauling the option of purchasing theliability insurance supplement and enjoying full primary coverage under the defendants'policies. As in Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., the rental agreement between Auffenberg andKauling made it unmistakable to Kauling that he was declining such full coverage. Thesupplement had to be purchased at an additional price. The rental contract containedparagraphs both on the front and on the reverse explaining that by not purchasing thesupplement, the driver was relying on his own insurance to provide primary coverage. Theparagraph was highlighted on the front of the contract and preceded by the words "NOTICE:Please read the following carefully" printed in bold typeface. In addition, the rentalagreement contained a space for Kauling to place his initials indicating whether he acceptedor declined the liability supplement. Thus, Auffenberg provides insurance to drivers whootherwise might not be covered while renting its cars. It also protects drivers frominadvertently declining coverage they need or prefer. We find that these measuresadequately protect the public.

We note that the aforementioned safeguards are not normally present in the contextof cars owned by repair shops and loaned to customers, dealer-owned cars taken for testdrives by customers, or privately owned cars loaned to friends or relatives. In addition, inthese contexts, the owner of the car does not pass on the cost of the insurance directly to thedriver as a rental car agency does. Further, in holding that the omnibus provision mandatedby the Financial Responsibility Law included a requirement that the vehicle's insurer provideprimary coverage, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the general practice in the insuranceindustry is to treat the owner's policy as primary. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill.2d at 246, 695 N.E.2d at 851. By contrast, the general practice among rental car agenciesis to provide customers with the option of purchasing insurance from the rental agency orproviding their own coverage.

Finally, we think important policy considerations support our holding that rental caragencies and drivers may contractually agree that the driver's policy will provide primarycoverage. As we have stated, the laws mandating omnibus liability insurance for vehiclesexist to protect the public. This policy is served regardless of which policy's coverage isprimary. On the other hand, the public policy of this state in favoring the freedom tocontract would be frustrated by holding ineffective contracts such as the rental contract hereat issue, where no competing public policy requires us to do so. See Farm Bureau MutualInsurance Co., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 389, 744 N.E.2d at 305.

The Supreme Court of Washington recently considered the precise issue before us,in New Hampshire Indemnity Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., No. 72265-0 (Wash.March 13, 2003). That court found, as we find, that the public policy of protecting thepublic from motorists unable to compensate accident victims for their injuries "is notimplicated where coverage is a given and the only question is which insurance companymust assume primary responsibility for coverage." (Emphasis in original.) New HampshireIndemnity Co., slip op. at 7.

The court went on to explain why a per se rule that the insurer of a vehicle, ratherthan that of the driver, must always provide primary coverage makes no sense in the contextof rental cars. The court stated as follows:

"A car rental customer is not in a position to sit down and carefully consider thecoverage provided in the rental agreement, nor is the rental agency able to carefullyexamine the driving history of a customer renting its vehicles. Requiring rentalinsurance always to be primary would be inefficient and likely lead to higher costsfor renters. On the other hand, when a customer buys coverage on their personalautomobile, both customer and prospective insurer can reflect on the terms andinvestigate each other before signing a policy. Unsafe drivers will pay higherpremiums and safe drivers lower premiums as is fair." New Hampshire IndemnityCo., slip op. at 9.

Although the court declined to enunciate a per se rule, it concluded that, if anything, a perse rule making the driver's insurance primary would be more logical under thecircumstances. New Hampshire Indemnity Co., slip op. at 9.

We find Insurance Car Rentals, Inc., Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., and NewHampshire Indemnity Co. persuasive. We therefore hold that neither the Illinois VehicleCode nor the public policy of this state requires rental car owners' insurers to provideprimary coverage.

Alternatively, State Farm contends that the initial-permission rule requires thedefendants to provide primary coverage to Kauling. We disagree. Under the initial-permission rule, once the owner or named insured gives another person permission to usethe car, the insurance coverage applies even if that person exceeds the scope of the owner'spermission by allowing a second person to drive the car. American Country Insurance Co.v. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d 230, 236, 537 N.E.2d 284, 287 (1989). The plaintiff contends thatthis rule prevents the defendants from denying coverage because their insured, Ford, gavepermission to Auffenberg to use the Contour and, in turn, Auffenberg gave permission toKauling to drive it. We find the initial-permission rule inapplicable to the facts before us. Ford gave permission to Auffenberg to rent the vehicle to drivers such as Kauling whiletheir own vehicles are being repaired by the Ford dealership. There is no contention thatAuffenberg exceeded the scope of Ford's permission to use the car, nor is there anycontention on appeal that the defendants' policies do not provide at least secondary coverage. The initial-permission rule is simply not implicated. We conclude that the trial courtcorrectly determined that the plaintiff's policy provides primary coverage for any liabilityKauling may have to Watson.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

KUEHN and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: April 29, 2003

Justices: Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J., and

Honorable James K. Donovan, J.,

Concur

Attorneys John W. Leskera, Dunham, Boman & Leskera, 300 West Clay Street, Collinsville,

for IL 62234; Robert D. Francis, 101 South Pointe Drive, Suite C, Edwardsville, IL

Appellant 62025

Attorneys Gregory J. Minana, R. Prescott Sifton, Jr., Blackwell, Sanders, Peper, Martin,LLP,

for Mark Twain Plaza One, 101 West Vandalia Street, Suite 325L, Edwardsville, IL

Appellees 62025