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The plaintiff, Richard M. Stallings, administrator of the estate of Richard R. Stallings,deceased, brought this action in the circuit court of Williamson County to recover damagesfor the wrongful death of the decedent. The lawsuit is based on a products liability claimagainst the manufacturer of a circular saw. The jury found in favor of the defendant, and theadministrator appeals, following the denial of posttrial motions. The issues for review arewhether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict after a juror's misconduct wasdiscovered and whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to put onevidence of an alternative feasible design. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

April 17, 1991, began as a normal workday at one of the Stallings' farms near Carmi,Illinois, but ended in tragedy. Twenty-two-year-old Richard R. Stallings (Ryan), a recentUniversity of Illinois graduate with a degree in animal industries, was one of several familymembers who ran the family's large grain, cattle, and hog operation. Early that morning, heand his father met to discuss work to be done-which included the repair of a wooden cattlefeeder. Leslie Simpson, another farm employee, worked with Ryan most of the day, doingchores and grinding feed. They parted company at about 3:30 in the afternoon, which wasthe last time anyone saw Ryan alive. That evening, Ryan's uncle, Rex Stallings, had theunfortunate experience of finding Ryan's body in a work shed at the Carmi farm. Ryan waslying facedown on top of a piece of board. There appeared to be a fresh cut in the board,which was splattered with blood. A circular saw was on the workbench behind his body. There was blood and human tissue on the blade and on the guard of the saw. Ryan's carotidartery and jugular vein were severed. He had bled to death.

Richard M. Stallings, Ryan's father, brought suit against the defendant, Black andDecker (U.S.), Inc., a foreign corporation, and Gilbert Stallings, Ryan's grandfather, in theWilliamson County circuit court. Following an approved settlement agreement, GilbertStallings was dismissed from the suit. The plaintiff's amended complaint against thedefendant sounded in negligence and strict liability, alleging that the circular saw that hadcaused Ryan's death was unreasonably dangerous because it was not equipped with a rivingblade to prevent kickback. The defendant prevailed on a summary judgment motion on theissue of proximate cause. The plaintiff appealed and we reversed and remanded for furtherproceedings. Stallings v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., No. 5-97-0506 (September 30, 1998)(unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). The caseproceeded to a trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.

On appeal, the plaintiff argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion fora new trial based on the posttrial discovery of a juror's misconduct and (2) that the trial courterred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to put on evidence of an alternative feasible design,both in his case in chief and in rebuttal.

The plaintiff's first contention is that during the course of the trial one of the jurorsconducted his own investigation concerning evidence crucial to the case, whichpresumptively prejudiced the verdict. On review, we determine whether the trial courtabused its discretion in ruling that a new trial was not warranted by juror misconduct. SeeWaller v. Bagga, 219 Ill. App. 3d 542, 549, 579 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1991). We find that itdid.

Before the presentation of any evidence, the trial judge admonished the jury not toundertake any personal investigation of the case. He ended by stating: "You must rely onthe evidence you hear and see in this courtroom and the instructions and the law as I givethem to you. Please do not go outside this courtroom for information in connection with thiscase." Nevertheless, in flagrant disregard of the court's detailed admonishment, one of thejurors, James Bartley, did exactly that-he undertook his own out-of-court investigation.

This fact came to the plaintiff's attention after the verdict but before the posttrialmotions. The juror in question spoke privately with the trial judge regarding his conduct,after the plaintiff learned of it. The judge prepared a written statement summarizing theconversation. The statement was placed in the court file, and a copy was given to each ofthe parties' attorneys. For purposes of the posttrial motions, the parties stipulated as follows:

"One of the jurors, James Bartley, personally took to investigate riving blades duringthe trial of the case. This investigation purportedly included going to hardware[-]typestores to look at saws for sale[] and talking to a store clerk at one store, True ValueHardware, who did a computer search for the availability of riving blades."

Neither party moved for a hearing to examine Mr. Bartley.

In general, a jury verdict cannot be impeached by the testimony of the jurors. Peoplev. Pitsonbarger, No. 89368, slip op. at 18 (May 23, 2002). This rule of law promotes thefinality of verdicts and protects the privacy of jury deliberations. Tanner v. United States,483 U.S. 107, 119-20, 97 L. Ed. 2d 90, 105-06, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 (1987). The courts,however, distinguish between juror testimony involving the "motive, method[,] and process"of deliberations and juror testimony describing an "improper extraneous influence" ondeliberations, carving out an exception to the rule for the latter category of testimony. Pitsonbarger, slip op. at 19.

The defendant implicitly concedes that Mr. Bartley's extrajudicial inquiry involvedan "improper extraneous influence" on the jury deliberations. The defendant argues,however, that the plaintiff does not meet the standard set out by the Illinois Supreme Courtin People v. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d 507, 372 N.E.2d 656 (1978). The defendant contends thatHolmes mandates that a jury verdict can only be set aside if the conduct involved has sucha probability that prejudice resulted that the trial inherently lacked due process. See Holmes,69 Ill. 2d at 513, 372 N.E.2d at 659. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he needonly show that the improperly acquired information relates directly to a crucial issue in thecase and may have improperly influenced the jury, shifting the burden to the prevailing partyto show that no actual prejudice occurred. We agree with the plaintiff and find that thedefendant's reliance on the case law that it urges supports its position is misplaced.

Because it is impossible to prove whether extraneous information affected jurors'decisions, the courts do not require proof of actual prejudice when determining whether ajury verdict has been tainted. Macias v. Cincinnati Forte, 277 Ill. App. 3d 947, 950, 661N.E.2d 472, 474 (1996). The Holmes case, cited by both parties, involved juror misconductin a criminal trial. Several jurors went to a shoe store to investigate shoe heels after hearingcourt testimony by police regarding the heel print left at the crime scene by the defendant. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d at 509-10, 372 N.E.2d at 657. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed theconviction and remanded, holding that prejudicial error had resulted because the extraneousinformation was evidence crucial to the question of the defendant's identification, which thedefendant did not have the opportunity to confront or refute, amounting to a probability ofprejudice in violation of the defendant's due process rights. Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d at 519, 372N.E.2d at 661-62. Subsequent civil cases have found that a probability or presumption ofprejudice exists if the extraneous information bears on a crucial issue in the case and mayhave improperly influenced the verdict. Heaver v. Ward, 68 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241, 386N.E.2d 134, 139 (1979). After this requisite showing, the burden then shifts to the prevailingparty to demonstrate that no prejudice resulted. Haight v. Aldridge Electric Co., 215 Ill.App. 3d 353, 368, 575 N.E.2d 243, 254 (1991); Frede v. Downs, 101 Ill. App. 3d 812, 816,428 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (1981).

The case before us revolves around the design of a circular saw manufactured by thedefendant that the plaintiff alleged was unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff claims thatif the saw had been designed with a riving blade or riving knife (used interchangeably), thekickback that he contends caused Ryan's accident would not have occurred. He thus arguesthat the absence of a riving blade was a crucial issue in the case.

The defendant characterizes Mr. Bartley's extrajudicial investigation as "a computersearch for the availability of riving blades" only and contends that it focused on an irrelevantmatter and thus could not possibly prejudice the jury's decision. In our opinion, however,this argument attempts to obscure the big picture by ignoring the totality of Mr. Bartley'sinvestigation. The "availability" of saws with riving blades was just a part of what Mr.Bartley investigated. The summary statement begins with the general statement that he"personally took to investigate riving blades." It then goes on to say that the investigationincluded his looking at saws and talking with a store clerk who then conducted "a computersearch for the availability of riving blades." It is also agreed by the parties that Mr. Bartleyvisited several stores during his investigation. It is impossible for the court to know to whatlength this investigation went, and therefore we must assume that what Mr. Bartleycharacterized as an investigation was just that-an investigation. Webster's Dictionary defines"investigate" as follows: "to observe or study by close examination and systematic inquiry." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 636 (1983).

It is obvious to this court that the investigation of riving blades related directly to acrucial issue in this case-the safe design of the circular saw-and that the information Mr.Bartley obtained may have played a part in the deliberations, resulting in a verdict for thedefense. As the court stated in Haight, the extraneous information "could have tipped thescales in defendants' favor[] and thus may have improperly influenced the verdict." Haight,215 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 575 N.E.2d at 255. It is of additional concern that the plaintiff neverhad the opportunity to confront or refute the information that Mr. Bartley obtained and mayhave considered in deciding the case. See Frede, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 815, 428 N.E.2d at1037. We find that the plaintiff met the requisite showing of a probability of prejudice.

Here, the presumption of prejudice might have been rebutted by evidence that theinformation obtained by the juror did not result in any actual prejudice, had the defendantchosen to conduct an evidentiary inquiry of the juror. Haight, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 368, 575N.E.2d at 254; Frede, 101 Ill. App. 3d at 816, 428 N.E.2d at 1037. Because the defendantinstead chose to rely on the summary, it failed to meet its burden in this regard. It cannotalternatively explain away Mr. Bartley's egregious conduct based on its own interpretationof what that investigation entailed.

The defendant cites to a list of cases wherein the courts found reversible errorwarranting new trials, based on extrajudicial information obtained by jurors. The defendantattempts to distinguish those cases by arguing that those cases, unlike the instant case,involved situations that impacted a critical issue in the case. Contrary to the defendant'sassertions, we find those cases more similar than dissimilar to the situation in our case. SeeWade v. City of Chicago Heights, 295 Ill. App. 3d 873, 887, 693 N.E.2d 426, 435 (1998) (ajuror made a visit to the accident site, relating to a core issue of visibility); Frede, 101 Ill.App. 3d at 815, 428 N.E.2d at 1037 (a juror brought a book on boating into the juror room,relating to the crucial question of failing to keep a proper lookout); Heaver, 68 Ill. App. 3dat 238, 386 N.E.2d at 136 (a juror visited the accident site and brought a Rules of the Roadbooklet and diagram into the jury deliberation room, relating to issues in the case); Haight,215 Ill. App. 3d at 368, 575 N.E.2d at 253 (a juror consulted an almanac and discussed hisfinding, relating to a crucial issue of visibility); Holmes, 69 Ill. 2d at 509-10, 372 N.E.2d at657 (several jurors made a visit to a shoe store to compare a shoe imprint with that of thedefendant's, relating to the crucial issue of identity). We conclude that Mr. Bartley'sindependent investigation was presumptively prejudicial and requires a reversal.

The plaintiff next contends that the trial court improperly precluded him from puttingon evidence of a feasible alternative design during his case in chief and during rebuttal. Thedefendant responds by arguing that the court did not refuse evidence of a feasible alternativedesign during the plaintiff's case in chief and properly refused evidence of a feasiblealternative design during rebuttal because the plaintiff did not lay a proper foundation. Alternatively, the defendant argues that the evidence was not proper rebuttal evidence andwould have been irrelevant and prejudicial.

Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will beupheld absent an abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudice to the objecting party. Brandtv. Uptown National Bank of Moline, 212 Ill. App. 3d 621, 626-27, 571 N.E.2d 531, 535(1991). We find that such a prejudicial abuse of discretion occurred in the instant case.

As a part of the defendant's pretrial motions in limine, it moved to exclude evidenceof the European standards requiring riving blades and evidence of the saws it manufacturedwith riving blades for sale in Europe. The defendant argued that the European standardswere not relevant to any issue in the case and that any reference to the standards would beunfairly prejudicial. Likewise, it argued that any reference to saws that it manufactured incompliance with the European standards would necessarily implicate the European standardsand thereby be prejudicial. Additionally, the defendant offered the following admissioncharacterized as a stipulation: "[The defendant] stipulates for the purpose of this trial that itwas technologically and economically feasible to design and manufacture a portable sawwhich would contain a riving knife in 1978." On the basis of this stipulation, it then arguedthat because it had admitted feasibility, evidence of an alternative feasible design was nolonger a contested issue and no longer relevant to issues remaining in the case.

Evidence of the feasibility of an alternative design is relevant and material in an actionalleging an unreasonably dangerous product under both negligence and strict liabilitytheories. See Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d 749,753 (1972). The definition of feasibility set out in the products liability case of Sutkowski was later approved by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390N.E.2d 859 (1979), wherein the court stated, " 'feasibility includes not only the elements ofeconomy, effectiveness[,] and practicality but also the technological possibilities viewed inthe present state of the art.' " Kerns, 76 Ill. 2d at 163, 390 N.E.2d at 863 (quoting Sutkowski,5 Ill. App. 3d at 319, 281 N.E.2d at 753. Underlying this precept is the policy considerationthat manufacturers should not be held accountable if safer alternatives were not feasible. Kerns, 76 Ill. 2d at 163, 390 N.E.2d at 863. The Kerns court queried but did not answer thequestion of whether, in a products liability case based on a defective design, a plaintiff wasrequired to plead and prove an alternative design, since the plaintiff had done so in that case. Kerns, 76 Ill. 2d at 164, 390 N.E.2d at 864. In a recent products liability case, Hansen v.Baxter Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill. 2d 420, 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002), the supreme court reiteratedthe Kerns court's holding, stating, "[A] plaintiff may demonstrate that a product isunreasonably dangerous because of a design defect by presenting evidence of an alternativedesign that would have prevented the injury and was feasible in terms of cost, practicality[,]and technological possibility." Hansen, 198 Ill. 2d at 436, 764 N.E.2d at 45.

Where there is no genuine dispute regarding the feasibility of an alternative design,the courts are split on whether the trial judge may properly exclude that evidence. In Holmesv. Sahara Coal Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 666, 673, 475 N.E.2d 1383, 1388 (1985), a productsliability case, the trial court granted a motion in limine to exclude evidence of apostoccurrence modification, which was offered to show the feasibility of an alternativedesign. This court found the exclusion to be error even though the defendant had admittedto the feasibility of an alternative design (although we found that it was not reversible errorbecause the evidence came in anyway). Holmes, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 673, 475 N.E.2d at1388. The Holmes court stated: "[Evidence of modifications] [was] properly admitted forthe purpose of demonstrating that Caterpillar's original design was defective, notwithstandingCaterpillar's stipulation regarding the feasibility of an alternate design. Caterpillar'sstipulation that it was feasible to design a tractor-scraper upon which plaintiff would nothave been injured cannot reasonably be characterized as a concession that Caterpillar's actualdesign resulted in a defective product; rather, Caterpillar's stipulation conceded but oneelement of a necessarily complex determination." Holmes, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 673, 475N.E.2d at 1388.

A subsequent Second District decision, Davis v. International Harvester Co., 167 Ill.App. 3d 814, 823, 521 N.E.2d 1282, 1288 (1988), criticized the Holmes court for holdingthat evidence of a postoccurrence change is admissible "to prove the ultimate fact that thedefendant's product was defective as originally designed." The Davis court held thatevidence of a postoccurrence change is admissible only to prove that an alternative designwas feasible but not to prove the ultimate fact that the product was defective. Davis, 167 Ill.App. 3d at 823, 521 N.E.2d at 1288. The court in Davis found that the trial court hadproperly excluded evidence of subsequent design changes, following a stipulation by thedefendant that an alternative design of the product was feasible. Davis, 167 Ill. App. 3d at824-25, 521 N.E.2d at 1289. After a discussion about the potential for prejudiceoutweighing any probative value, the court concluded by finding that the trial court had notabused its discretion in accepting the defendant's stipulation and excluding the plaintiff'sevidence of subsequent design changes. Davis, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 824-25, 521 N.E.2d at1288-89. One reason given was that there was no genuine dispute regarding an alternativefeasible design because the defendant had argued that the product in question was not theproximate cause of the injury. Davis, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 824, 521 N.E.2d at 1289.

We adhere to this court's earlier ruling in Holmes and decline to follow the Daviscourt and hold that evidence of an alternative feasible design may not be excluded on thebasis of an admission. To do so may deprive a plaintiff of important proof that the productwas unreasonably dangerous because of a design defect. In the instant case, since thedefendant does not intend by its admission to concede a design defect, an alternative feasibledesign remains a relevant issue. "If the offer to stipulate or not to dispute does not cover allpurposes for which the evidence is relevant, the evidence will not be excluded." M. Graham,Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence