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JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

On June 6, 1997, plaintiff John C. Sneed, independent administrator of the estate of Sandra Marie Sneed, deceased (hereinafter decedent), filed an 11-count complaint against defendants Billie E. Howell, the City of Mt. Vernon (hereinafter the City), and Jefferson County State's Attorney Gary Duncan (hereinafter the State's Attorney). The complaint alleged that Howell killed decedent between 11:20 p.m. on July 4, 1996, and 1:30 a.m. on July 5, 1996. Two counts of the complaint charged Howell under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)) and the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 1994)). Four counts were filed against the City: (1) negligence pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, (2) negligence under the Survival Act, (3) willful and wanton negligence under Wrongful Death Act, and (4) willful and wanton negligence pursuant to the Survival Act. Four counts were filed against the State's Attorney, based on the same principles as the four against the City. The final count was to compel Jefferson County Sheriff Roy D. Bradford to respond to discovery requests. On November 19, 1997, the court dismissed all counts with prejudice, except the two against Howell and the two willful and wanton counts against the City. On December 10, 1997, the court amended its order, finding no just reason for delaying appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304 (166 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 15, 1997.

I. FACTS

On December 8, 1997, plaintiff filed a four-count amended complaint, two against Howell and two against the City for willful and wanton negligence. On March 16, 1998, the court dismissed with prejudice the two counts against the City. On March 20, 1998, the court filed an amended order citing Supreme Court Rule 304. On March 23, 1998, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. At that time the two appeals were consolidated.

On December 27, 1991, decedent and Howell married. After a tumultuous marriage, the parties divorced on August 29, 1994. On June 4, 1996, spurred by continued threats from Howell, decedent petitioned the Jefferson County circuit court for an order of protection. The court entered a plenary order of protection on June 18, 1996, effective until January 1, 1997. Steve Chiapelli, Jefferson County investigator and crime-witness advocate, hand-delivered to Howell at the Jefferson County courthouse a copy of the order of protection. The order prohibited Howell from (a) harassing, physically abusing, or interfering with the personal liberty of decedent, her minor son Joseph N. Sneed, and her mother Jessie M. South, (b) entering or remaining at decedent's home, place of employment at Best Inns, Mt. Vernon, or Rend Lake College where decedent was a part-time student, and (c) stalking decedent.

On June 23, 1996, decedent reported to the City's police department that Howell slashed her back passenger-side tire. In a police photo lineup an eyewitness identified Howell as the person who slashed decedent's tire. The next day, decedent reported to the City's police department that Howell was watching her at the Best Inns, her place of work, from a Hardee's restaurant across the street at approximately 11:15 p.m. On July 1, 1996, decedent notified the City's police department that Howell was again watching her at work from the Hardee's restaurant across the street at approximately 11 p.m.. On July 4, 1996, at 11:20 p.m., as decedent left the Someplace Else Tavern in Mt. Vernon, Howell accosted her. He brandished a Jennings-model semiautomatic J-22 pistol and forced her into his car. Howell shot decedent in the chest and continued to drive until 1:30 a.m. on July 5, 1996. Decedent bled to death during the drive.

The original complaint contained four counts against the Jefferson County State's Attorney for the failure to take action to protect decedent. The complaint charges that the State's Attorney had full knowledge of Howell's actions and that because of the State's Attorney's friendship with Howell he willfully and wantonly violated his duties under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 1994)). The November 19, 1997, order dismissed all four counts with prejudice based upon the circuit court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff's original complaint alleges that the City's police department negligently violated the Domestic Violence Act by willfully and wantonly taking no action to inhibit Howell's repeated violations of the June 18, 1996, protection order. The November 19, 1997, court order dismissed the two negligence claims with prejudice and the willful and wanton counts with leave to amend. The amended complaint alleges two counts of willful and wanton conduct. The trial court dismissed the two counts for the failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff appeals both the November 19, 1997, and March 16, 1998, court orders dismissing all counts against the City and the State's Attorney. For the reasons that will follow, we affirm the trial court's ruling as to the Jefferson County State's Attorney, and we reverse and remand to the trial court on the willful and wanton counts against the City.

II. ANALYSIS

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994)). A motion to dismiss, under section 2-615, attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Urbaitis v. Commonwealth Edison, 143 Ill. 2d 458, 475, 575 N.E.2d 548, 555 (1991); Burgess v. Pocrnich, 284 Ill. App. 3d 757, 758, 672 N.E.2d 1334, 1336 (1996). In reviewing a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the appellate court will conduct a de novo review. See Urbaitis, 143 Ill. 2d at 475, 575 N.E.2d at 555; Burgess, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 758, 672 N.E.2d at 1336. The reviewing court shall consider only the allegations contained in the pleadings. See Urbaitis, 143 Ill. 2d at 475, 575 N.E.2d at 556. A court reviewing an order granting a section 2-615 motion takes all well-pleaded facts as true. See Burgess, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 758, 672 N.E.2d at 1336; Roehrborn v. Lambert, 277 Ill. App. 3d 181, 183, 660 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1995). The question presented is whether the pleadings contain sufficient facts that, if proved, would entitle plaintiff to relief. See Urbaitis, 143 Ill. 2d at 475, 575 N.E.2d at 555.

A.

The first issue raised on appeal derives from the November 19, 1997, order dismissing plaintiff's four charges against the State's Attorney. Plaintiff's original complaint alleges two negligence counts and two willful and wanton counts against the State's Attorney. The trial court dismissed the complaint in the circuit court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In 1970 Illinois enacted a new constitution that abolished sovereign immunity for the State of Illinois, except as the General Assembly may provide by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII,