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On December 26, 1997, claimant, Dora Ann Setzekorn, thesurviving spouse of Henry Setzekorn (decedent), filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 through 27 (West1996)), seeking benefits from Freeman United Coal Mining Company(Freeman). After a hearing, the arbitrator denied claimantbenefits. On review, the Industrial Commission (Commission)affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. Claimant soughtjudicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit courtof Franklin County which confirmed the Commission's decision.

Claimant appeals, arguing that (1) the Commission erredby (a) "failing to apply res judicata to the issues alreadydetermined" in the former case, (b) "failing to take judicialnotice of the Federal Register," and (c) "ignoring the statutoryevidentiary presumption concerning pneumoconiosis deaths," and(2) the Commission's finding that "[t]he death of *** decedentwas not causally connected to his exposure to the hazards of anoccupational disease" is against the manifest weight of theevidence. We affirm the circuit court's order confirming theCommission's decision.

Decedent worked as a coal miner for approximately 48years. He last coal mined on December 26, 1980. In approximately 1985, decedent filed an application for adjustment ofclaim under the Act asserting that he suffered "an occupationaldisease arising out of and in the course of his employment." OnNovember 2, 1995, the Commission found decedent disabled andawarded him benefits representing 12.5% loss of a man as a whole.

On November 25, 1992, the arbitrator issued a decisionin which he found decedent suffered "simple coal workers' pneumoconiosis [CWP]." The arbitrator noted decedent's testimony that"[h]e stopped smoking in 1958. Prior to said time he smoked 1-1/2 packs of cigarettes a day for 25 years." Dr. Edward Campbellfound "no impairment in pulmonary function." Dr. Parviz Sanjabifound pulmonary function "basically within the normal range." Dr. Susan Marshall found "no overall obstruction and the presenceof borderline small airways obstruction." Dr. Marshall notedthat "[t]hese small airways changes are most likely due tocigarette smoking in the past." Dr. William Houser found "evidence of *** mild obstructive impairment *** caused by working ina dusty environment for 28-1/2 years breathing coal and rock dustand caused by his previous cigarette smoking." The arbitratorfound decedent disabled and awarded him benefits representing12.5% loss of a man as a whole.

On November 23, 1993, the Commission affirmed andadopted the arbitrator's decision. On July 15, 1994, the circuitcourt of Franklin County "remanded to the *** Commission forfurther assessment of the damage to [decedent's] earning capacitycaused by his occupational disease." On November 2, 1995, theCommission "reaffirm[ed] its prior conclusion" noting decedentretired approximately 15 years earlier and had not sought employment.

In the present case, decedent sought treatment atPickneyville Community Hospital on April 16, 1995. He complainedof "[c]ongestion for approximately [four] weeks." Decedentexperienced "worsening dyspnea" and was transferred to MissouriBaptist Medical Center on April 21, 1995. Dr. Rhody Eisensteinnoted in a discharge summary that decedent was treated forpneumonia and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). Inaddition, a "chest computed tomography scan" suggested a mass andliver metastases. A "computed tomography scan guided needlebiopsy of the left lung mass revealed adenocarcinoma." Decedentwas not a "good candidate" for radiation or chemotherapy. Hesuffered a "far advanced malignancy." He was discharged on May4, 1995, with arrangements for "home hospice care."

Decedent died on May 28, 1995. A death certificateidentified the cause of death as "respiratory arrest due to or asa consequence of metastatic lung cancer."

On December 26, 1997, claimant filed an application foradjustment of claim under the Act asserting "[d]eath caused inwhole or in part by inhalation of coal mine dust including butnot limited to coal dust, rock dust, fumes [and] vapors."

Dr. William Houser testified on August 28, 2000, thathe is a board certified pulmonary specialist. He had examineddecedent on June 12, 1990. Dr. Houser reviewed medical recordsconcerning decedent's diagnoses, treatment, and death at therequest of claimant. He believed decedent suffered from emphysema, CWP, chronic bronchitis, and COPD. Although decedentsmoked approximately "a pack a day for 16 years," Dr. Houserbelieved decedent's smoking was too remote to have been "afactor." Dr. Houser believed decedent quit smoking in approximately 1950. Dr. Houser opined that the various diagnoses wererelated to decedent's employment. Although Dr. Houser acknowledged that "[t]he general consensus is that exposure to coal minedust is not associated with an increased risk of lung cancer," hebelieved that decedent's "obstructive pulmonary defect was acausative factor in his lung cancer and death."

Dr. Joseph Renn testified on May 10, 2001, that he is aphysician board certified in internal medicine and pulmonarydisease. Dr. Renn reviewed medical records concerning decedent'sdiagnoses, treatment, and death at the request of Freeman. Dr.Renn believed decedent's smoking history to be "significantenough to have resulted in a lung cancer and significant enoughto have caused him to have the bullous emphysema and the chronicbronchitis."

Dr. Renn referenced multiple studies "done on coalminers and whether or not there is an increase in lung cancer." Dr. Renn offered:

"Well, what is significant about them is thatthey've studied both smoking and nonsmokingcoal miners and found that there was nogreater incidence among the coal miners,either smoking or nonsmoking, than there wasin the general either smoking or nonsmokingpopulation. And, therefore, if the incidenceis not increased then coal mine dust did nothave an additive effect or even a synergisticeffect."

Dr. Renn opined "the cause of [decedent's] demise wasthe metastatic adenocarcinoma of the lung and its effect on hisvarious organ systems." Further, Dr. Renn stated that "[t]herewas no other cause that either was a contributing factor or evena significant cause of that method of his demise."

Following the hearing, the arbitrator issued a decisionin which he found decedent's death "not causally connected to hisexposure to the hazards of an occupational disease." TheCommission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. Claimant sought judicial review of the Commission's decision inthe circuit court of Franklin County. The circuit courtconfirmed the Commission's decision finding that it was notagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. This appealfollowed.

Claimant first argues that the Commission erred by "failing to apply res judicata to the issues already determined"in the former case.

Section 19(j) of the Act provides:

"Whenever in any proceeding testimonyhas been taken or a final decision has beenrendered, and after the taking of suchtestimony or after such decision has becomefinal, the employee dies, then in anysubsequent proceeding brought by the personalrepresentative or beneficiaries of thedeceased employee, such testimony in theformer proceeding may be introduced with thesame force and effect as though the witnesshaving so testified were [sic] present inperson in such subsequent proceedings andsuch final decision, if any, shall be takenas final adjudication of any of the issueswhich are the same in both proceedings." 820ILCS 310/19(j) (West 1996).

Claimant argues in her initial brief that theCommission "previously awarded decedent benefits *** due tooccupational lung disease." Therefore, "the conclusion thatmining caused obstructive lung disease was litigated."

In the former case, the Commission found decedentsuffered from an occupational lung disease in the form of CWP,and awarded decedent benefits. The Commission did not finddecedent suffered from "obstructive lung disease." Drs. Campbelland Sanjabi found no impairment. Dr. Marshall found "borderline"obstruction likely due to cigarette smoking. Only Dr. Houserfound "evidence of *** mild obstructive impairment *** caused byworking in a dusty environment for 28-1/2 years breathing coaland rock dust and caused by his previous cigarette smoking." Claimant next argues that the Commission erred by

"failing to take judicial notice of the Federal Register and ***of the evidence indicating that coal mine dust causes obstructionand impairing emphysema." Claimant cites portions of the FederalRegister. The record does not show that the Commission failed totake judicial notice of the portions of the Federal Registerclaimant cited. The Commission's decision need not recite all ofthe underlying evidence. Swift & Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 150Ill. App. 3d 216, 221, 501 N.E.2d 752, 755 (1986). A presumptionexists that the Commission considered all evidence in reachingits decision. Swift, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 221, 501 N.E.2d at 755.

Claimant next argues that the Commission erred by"ignoring the statutory evidentiary presumption concerningpneumoconiosis deaths."

Section 1 of the Act provides:

"If a deceased miner was employed for 10years or more in one or more coal mines anddied from a respirable disease there shall,effective July 1, 1973, be a rebuttablepresumption that his or her death was due topneumoconiosis." 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West1996).

Claimant must show that the disease which causeddecedent's death was a "respirable disease" and that the diseasereported suggests a reasonable possibility of death due topneumoconiosis. Claimant states that "there can be no questionthat lung cancer is a respirable disease." In support of herstatement, claimant cites to a definition of occupational diseasereferenced in the Illinois Pension Fund (40 ILCS 5/6-112 (West2002)) and specific to firemen, and to a section of the CivilAdministrative Code of Illinois, Department of Public Health,entitled, "Cancer, heart disease, and other chronic diseases."

20 ILCS 2310/2310-355 (West 2002). Claimant concludes, "since[claimant] had lung cancer and CWP, there is a presumption thathis death was due to CWP."

The Act does not define "respirable disease." Further,the Act does not provide that lung cancer is a chronic lungdisease as a matter of law. We note decedent's lung cancer wasdiagnosed on April 28, 1995, and decedent died on May 28, 1995. Claimant failed to show that the disease which caused decedent'sdeath was a "respirable disease" and that the disease reportedsuggests a reasonable possibility of death due to pneumoconiosis.

Moreover, the death certificate identified the cause ofdeath as "respiratory arrest due to or as a consequence ofmetastatic lung cancer." Dr. Houser acknowledged that "[t]hegeneral consensus is that exposure to coal mine dust is notassociated with an increased risk of lung cancer." Dr. Rennbelieved decedent's smoking history to be "significant enough tohave resulted in a lung cancer and significant enough to havecaused him to have the bullous emphysema and the chronicbronchitis." Dr. Renn believed "the cause of [decedent's] demisewas the metastatic adenocarcinoma of the lung and its effect onhis various organ systems." Further, Dr. Renn stated that"[t]here was no other cause that either was a contributing factoror even a significant cause of that method of his demise." Arebuttable presumption is one that "may be overcome by theintroduction of contrary evidence." Black's Law Dictionary 1224(8th ed. 2004). The Commission did not "ignor[e] the statutoryevidentiary presumption concerning pneumoconiosis deaths."

Claimant next argues that the Commission's finding that"[t]he death of *** decedent was not causally connected to hisexposure to the hazards of an occupational disease" is againstthe manifest weight of the evidence.

It is the Commission's province to judge thecredibility of witnesses, to draw reasonable inferences from thetestimony and to determine what weight the testimony is to begiven. Paganelis v. Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 468, 483-84,548 N.E.2d 1033, 1040 (1989). Further, it is the Commission'sprovince to resolve conflicts in medical evidence. Amoco Oil Co.v. Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill. App. 3d 737, 747, 578 N.E.2d 1043,1050 (1991). The Commission's decision on a question of factwill not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifestweight of the evidence. Paganelis, 132 Ill. 2d at 484, 548N.E.2d at 1040.

Where the inferences drawn by the Commission are reasonable, a court of review will not discard them merelybecause other inferences could be drawn from the evidence. Warren v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Ill. 2d 373, 376, 335 N.E.2d 488,490 (1975). It is not the prerogative of the reviewing court toreweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of theCommission. A reviewing court is not the trier of fact. Likewise, it is for the Commission to decide which of twoconflicting opinions should be accepted. Material Service Corp.v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ill. 2d 382, 387, 454 N.E.2d 655, 657(1983).

In this case, the Commission affirmed and adopted thearbitrator's decision. The arbitrator noted Dr. Renn's testimonythat decedent's "tobacco history was significant enough to resultin a lung cancer, bullous emphysema and chronic bronchitis." Dr.Renn concluded that CWP, COPD, and emphysema did not hastendecedent's death. "The cause of his demise was the metastaticadenocarcinoma of the lung and its affect [sic] on his variousorgan systems." Further, the arbitrator noted that Dr. Houser"admitted that the general consensus is that exposure to coalmine dust is not associated with an increased risk of lungcancer." The Commission's finding that "[t]he death of ***decedent was not causally connected to his exposure to thehazards of an occupational disease" is not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

We affirm the circuit court's order confirming theCommission's decision.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, CALLUM, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ.,concur.