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Docket No. 96581-Agenda 13-January 2004.

JOHN "JERRY" ZAABEL, Petitioner, v. THE HON. JAMES J.
KONETSKI, Associate Judge of the 18th Judicial Circuit, et al.,
Respondents.

Opinion filed March 11, 2004.
 

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an original action for a writ of prohibition. Petitioner asks thiscourt to issue the writ to prevent respondent Judge James J. Konetskifrom taking any further action on a "Petition for Civil Contempt andSanctions" filed by respondent Doris L. Kunz in the circuit court ofDu Page County. For reasons that follow, the writ is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following undisputed facts are drawn from the pleadingssubmitted by the parties. The marriage of John "Jerry" Zaabel and DorisL. Zaabel, now known as Doris L. Kunz, was dissolved by a judgmententered in the circuit court of Du Page County on December 8, 1986.Two children were born to the marriage: Robert W. Zaabel was born in1980, and Jeremy S. Zaabel was born in 1984. A written settlementagreement, dated November 26, 1986, was incorporated into thejudgment of dissolution. Under the settlement agreement, Doris retainedcustody of the children. The settlement agreement also provided, interalia, for Jerry to pay certain "extraordinary" medical expenses incurredby the children, and that "[e]ach party shall pay for the trade school orcollege and professional education expenses of the children." Some timeafter the divorce, Doris moved to Iowa with the children, where theycurrently reside. Jerry moved to Arizona, where he currently resides.

On July 23, 2001, the circuit court of Du Page County entered anagreed order whereby Jerry was ordered to pay (1) $7,000 for medicalexpenses of the children pursuant to the judgement of dissolution and (2)$750 per semester to Robert, based upon Robert's being a full-timestudent enrolled at an accredited college during the 2001-02 school year.Jerry does not deny he signed the agreed order.

On February 4, 2003, Doris filed a "Petition for Indirect CivilContempt of Court and Other Relief" in the circuit court of Du PageCounty. Count I of Doris' petition asks the court, inter alia, to orderJerry to pay past due extraordinary medical expenses. Count II asks thecourt to order a division of expenses for each year of post high schooleducation for both children. Count III asks for the court to order Jerry toconfirm that he maintains insurance on his life, and count IV asks forattorney fees. Jerry moved the circuit court to dismiss Doris' petition onthe ground that the court lacked both subject matter and personaljurisdiction. After his motion was denied by the circuit court, Jerry filed amotion for leave to file a complaint for writ of prohibition in this court,which we allowed. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 381.

In this action, Jerry does not claim the circuit court lacks personaljurisdiction. His sole claim is that a writ of prohibition should issue becausethe circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Doris' petition.

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, we consider a motion filed by Doris, whichwas taken with the case. Doris requests that we dismiss the complaint forwrit of prohibition because Jerry failed to comply with Rule 323 by filinga record on appeal. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 323. This is not an appeal; it is anoriginal action for a writ of prohibition pursuant to Rule 381. See 188 Ill.2d R. 381. Under Rule 381, "[o]nly issues of law will be considered. Theproposed complaint *** shall contain or have attached to it the lowercourt records or other pertinent material that will fully present the issuesof law." 188 Ill. 2d R. 381(a). The pleadings and attached materials fullypresent the issue of law in this case. The motion to dismiss is denied.

Doris also requests, in the alternative, that we strike Jerry's replybrief because it fails to cite authority. Jerry's reply brief cites statutes andone judicial opinion that were cited and discussed in Doris' brief.Argument limited to points raised in the respondent's brief is appropriatein a reply brief. 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(g). The motion to strike is denied.

We now turn to Jerry's complaint. For a writ of prohibition to issue,the following four requirements must be met: (1) the action to beprohibited must be judicial or quasi-judicial in nature; (2) the jurisdictionof the tribunal against which the writ issues must be inferior to that of theissuing court; (3) the action to be prohibited must be outside the tribunal'sjurisdiction or, if within its jurisdiction, beyond its legitimate authority; (4)the petitioner must be without any other adequate remedy. Orenic v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 468 (1989).Original actions for a writ of prohibition may not be used to circumvent thenormal appellate process. People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash, 118 Ill. 2d90, 97 (1987).

Jerry has not attempted to explain why the normal appellate processwould not afford an adequate remedy. It is not obvious Jerry would beirremediably harmed if he were required to press his claim that the circuitcourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction within the normal appellate process.We conclude that Jerry has not met the burden he bears, as petitioner, ofdemonstrating that the fourth requirement for a writ of prohibition is met.Nevertheless, we may choose to address the merits of Jerry's complaint.See Moore v. Strayhorn, 114 Ill. 2d 538, 540 (1986). We do so in thiscase because we consider it important to the administration of justice toprovide guidance regarding the issue Jerry raises. Cf. Foreman, 118 Ill.2d at 98 (refusing to address the merits because the questions presentedare not important to the administration of justice).

Jerry argues that section 205 of the Uniform Interstate FamilySupport Act (the Act) deprives the circuit court of subject matterjurisdiction. See 750 ILCS 22/205 (West 2002). In pertinent part, section205 of the Act reads:

"(a) A tribunal of this State issuing a support order consistentwith the law of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdictionover a child-support order:

(1) as long as this State remains the residence of theobligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefitthe support order is issued; or

(2) until all of the parties who are individuals have filedwritten consents with the tribunal of this State for a tribunal ofanother state to modify the order and assume continuing,exclusive jurisdiction." 750 ILCS 22/205(a) (West 2002).

Jerry points out that Illinois is no longer the residence of the obligor, theobligee, or the children in this case. He argues that "by negativeimplication" subsection (1) means that the Illinois tribunal loses jurisdictionover the child support order when everyone resides elsewhere.

The basic principles guiding our analysis of section 205(a) are wellestablished:

"The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to giveeffect to the intention of the legislature. We look first to thewords of the statute, as the language of the statute is the bestindication of the legislative intent. When the statutory language isclear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools ofinterpretation." People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 414 (2003).

However, if the statutory language is ambiguous we may look to othersources to determine legislative intent. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347,352 (1995).

Turning to the language of section 205(a), we note clause (1) ofsection 205(a) provides that the Illinois court has continuing exclusivejurisdiction "as long as" at least one relevant person resides in Illinois.Clause (2) provides that the Illinois court has continuing exclusivejurisdiction "until" the parties consent to jurisdiction elsewhere. Clauses (1)and (2) are connected by the word "or." Jerry would have us read thislanguage to mean that jurisdiction remains in Illinois until clause (1) is nolonger satisfied or until clause (2) is satisfied, whichever is sooner. Dorisresponds that jurisdiction remains in Illinois until clause (2) is satisfied. Shedoes not discuss the relationship of clause (1) to clause (2).

The plain language of section 205(a) does not rule out eitherinterpretation. Doris' interpretation is flawed insofar as it ignores clause(1). Jerry asks us to infer that clause (1), which states that continuingexclusive jurisdiction remains in Illinois "as long as" a condition is met,means jurisdiction remains until the condition is no longer met. Thelanguage by itself does not establish that the legislature intended thatinference. As another court has explained, the relationship between thetwo clauses is unclear because they are not written in parallel fashion;clause (1) uses the phrase "as long as" where clause (2) uses "until." Etterv. Etter, 18 P.3d 1088, 1090 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001). We conclude thatsection 205(a) of the Act is ambiguous with regard to whether continuingexclusive jurisdiction is lost in the circumstances at bar, where all relevantpersons reside outside Illinois but not all parties have filed consent tojurisdiction elsewhere. We must look beyond the language of the statute.

Jerry alleges, and our research confirms, that there is persuasiveauthority from the courts of other states in favor of Jerry's interpretation.See, e.g., In re Marriage of Metz, 31 Kan. App. 2d 623, 629, 69 P.3d1128, 1132 (2003); Jurado v. Brashear, 782 So.2d 575, 580-81 (La.2001); LeTellier v. LeTellier, 40 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tenn. 2001); Etter,18 P.3d at 1090; Hopkins v. Browning, 186 Misc. 2d 693, 719N.Y.S.2d 839 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); Groseth v. Groseth, 257 Neb.525, 534, 600 N.W.2d 159, 167 (1999); Linn v. Del. Child SupportEnforcement, 736 A.2d 954, 960 (Del. 1999). Moreover, as several ofthese other courts note, the drafters of the Uniform Interstate FamilySupport Act (the Uniform Act) state in the official comment to section 205that, "if all the relevant persons-the obligor, the individual obligee, and thechild-have permanently left the issuing state, the issuing state no longer hasan appropriate nexus with the parties or child to justify exercise ofjurisdiction to modify." Unif. Interstate Family Support Act