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Docket No. 95873-Agenda 13-November 2003.

PAUL WILLIAMS, Appellee, v. NANCY STAPLES, Hospital Adm'r
of the Elgin Mental Health Center, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 23, 2004.
 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

Paul Williams, plaintiff in the proceedings below and defendant in theoriginal criminal proceedings, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus inthe circuit court of Cook County pursuant to section 10-124 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)). Williams' petitionalleged that he was in the custody of the Department of Human Services(DHS) in Elgin, Illinois, and that his detention was illegal because hismaximum period of confinement under section 5-2-4(b) of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000))had expired. The circuit court denied Williams' petition for writ of habeascorpus and remanded Williams to the custody of the DHS. The appellatecourt reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the cause to thecircuit court for a determination concerning whether Williams should becivilly committed. 337 Ill. App. 3d 445. This court allowed the State'spetition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the followingreasons, we affirm the decision of the appellate court in part and vacatein part.

In the original criminal proceedings, Williams was charged with firstdegree murder for killing and dismembering his sister. At the time of themurder, Williams was abusing narcotics. On December 19, 1982, the trialcourt found Williams not guilty by reason of insanity. Williams wasinvoluntarily committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of MentalHealth and Developmental Disabilities (now the DHS), and was confinedto the Elgin Mental Health Center (Elgin). Williams was involuntarilycommitted pursuant to section 5-2-4(b) of the Code.

Section 5-2-4(b) provides that the maximum period of time that adefendant can be involuntarily committed cannot exceed the maximumlength of time that the defendant would have been required to serve, lesscredit for good behavior, before becoming eligible for parole haddefendant been convicted of and received the maximum sentence for themost serious crime for which he was found not guilty by reason of insanity.See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000), formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981,ch. 38, par. 1005-2-4(b). This maximum length of time is known as thedefendant's Thiem date. See People v. Thiem, 82 Ill. App. 3d 956(1980). In this case, the circuit court originally determined that Williams'maximum period of commitment was 80 years. Based upon subsequentcase law, however, the trial court on December 8, 2000, reset Williams'Thiem date to September 26, 2001.

Also on December 8, 2000, the trial court granted the petition of theElgin facility director to conditionally release defendant for a period of fiveyears, pursuant to section 5-2-4(d)(2) of the Code (730 ILCS5/5-2-4(d)(2) (West 2000)), over Williams' objection to the five-yearperiod. Sometime after September 26, 2001, but prior to the expirationof the five-year conditional release period, Williams violated the terms ofhis conditional release by preliminarily testing positive for cocaine. TheState therefore filed a petition to revoke Williams' conditional release.Williams filed a special and limited appearance contesting the circuitcourt's jurisdiction and seeking to dismiss the State's petition to revokehis conditional release. Thereafter, Williams again tested positive forcocaine. The circuit court then issued a contempt citation and issued awarrant for Williams' arrest. Williams was arrested around four days later.

At the hearing on the contempt citation, Williams argued that thecircuit court lacked jurisdiction over him because his Thiem date hadexpired. The circuit court held that even though the Thiem date hadexpired, the conditional release period provided jurisdiction. The circuitcourt entered a finding that Williams had violated his conditional releaseand remanded Williams to the custody of the DHS for an evaluation ofwhether he required involuntary commitment. The circuit court did notenter a finding on the contempt citation. Over Williams' continuingobjection to the court's jurisdiction, Williams was evaluated and found tobe subject to inpatient treatment, but not to involuntary commitment.⁽¹⁾Williams then filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

As noted, the circuit court denied Williams' petition for writ ofhabeas corpus. On appeal, Williams claimed that he was entitled to animmediate release because the circuit court could not continue to confinehim past September 26, 2001, his Thiem date. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 450.Williams also argued that neither his conditional release nor his allegedviolation of the conditional release could extend his maximum period ofcommitment beyond his Thiem date. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 450. The State,on behalf of Nancy Staples, hospital administrator of the Elgin MentalHealth Center,⁽²⁾ responded that once a defendant is conditionally released,the five-year period of conditional release set forth in section5-2-4(a)(1)(D) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000))supercedes the defendant's Thiem date.

In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court found that the circuitcourt lost jurisdiction over Williams on September 26, 2001, when hisThiem date expired. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The appellate courtexamined the legislature history of the statute and concluded that thelegislature did not intend for the five-year conditional release period toextend a court's jurisdiction over a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)defendant past his Thiem date. The appellate court held that although anNGRI defendant may be conditionally released prior to his Thiem date,the five-year period of conditional release may be limited by the amountof time remaining on his Thiem date. 337 Ill. App. 3d at 460.Consequently, once an NGRI defendant's "Thiem date has expired, hisor her period of conditional release must necessarily expire as well." 337Ill. App. 3d at 460.

Before this court, the State argues that the appellate court erred inholding that an NGRI defendant's conditional release automaticallyterminates on his Thiem date. The State claims that the appellate courtignored the mandate of section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D) of the Code, which statesthat the trial court "shall" place an NGRI defendant on conditional releasefor a period of five years. The State contends that because Williams wasconditionally released under section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D) prior to his Thiemdate, Williams' Thiem date became irrelevant because he was no longerconfined. Rather, Williams was now subject to a five-year period ofconditional release, with the possibility of one three-year extension. TheState compares this conditional release period to the mandatorysupervised release period, or parole, imposed upon convicted defendants.

Williams responds that after the expiration of his Thiem date, hecould no longer be confined as an NGRI defendant, but had to bereleased or committed pursuant to the Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq.(West 2000)). Williams argues that because the Thiem date is the outsidelimit for his period of confinement, the conditional release period cannotextend beyond his Thiem date.

At issue in this case, then, is which portion of section 5-2-4 of theCode controls when an NGRI defendant is conditionally released prior tohis Thiem date, but his Thiem date expires prior to the expiration of hisconditional release period. Because our analysis of this issue involves theconstruction of a statute, the issue presents a question of law that wereview de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and giveeffect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v.County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). This court determineslegislative intent by examining the language of the statute, which is "themost reliable indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting aparticular law." Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. Allprovisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole. People ex rel.Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 279 (2003). Accordingly, words andphrases must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of thestatute and must not be construed in isolation. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 279-80. Each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given reasonablemeaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Cryns, 203Ill. 2d at 280. In determining the intent of the legislature, a court mayconsider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason andnecessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose tobe achieved. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 280. "Legislative intent can beascertained from a consideration of the entire Act, its nature, its object andthe consequences that would result from construing it one way or theother." Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96(1990).

The relevant provisions of the Code are as follows. Section 5-2-4(b) provides, in pertinent part:

"If the Court finds the defendant subject to involuntaryadmission *** the initial order for admission of a defendantacquitted of a felony by reason of insanity shall be for anindefinite period of time. Such period of commitment shall notexceed the maximum length of time that the defendant wouldhave been required to serve, less credit for good behavior,before becoming eligible for release had he been convicted ofand received the maximum sentence for the most serious crimefor which he has been acquitted by reason of insanity." 730ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000).

Thereafter, if the court finds that the defendant is in need of mental healthservices but is no longer in need of inpatient care, the court shall order thedefendant released under conditions that the court deems appropriate.730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(h) (West 2000). The section defining conditionalrelease provides that "[s]uch conditional release shall be for a period offive years, unless the defendant, the person or facility rendering thetreatment, therapy, program or outpatient care, or the State's Attorneypetitions the Court for an extension of the conditional release period foran additional three years." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000).During this period of conditional release, if the court determines that thedefendant has not fulfilled his conditions of release, the court shall hold ahearing and:

"if the Court finds that the defendant is subject to involuntaryadmission ***, it shall enter an order remanding him or her to theDepartment of Human Services or other facility. If the defendantis remanded to the Department of Human Services, he or sheshall be placed in a secure setting unless the Court determinesthat there are compelling reasons that such placement is notnecessary." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(i) (West 2000).

Although the statute provides for a maximum period of commitmentand provides for conditional release, the statute does not address whichtime period prevails when an NGRI defendant's conditional release periodexceeds his Thiem date. As noted, the State contends that becauseWilliams was conditionally released prior to his Thiem date, Williams'Thiem date became irrelevant and Williams was now subject to a five-year period of conditional release. Williams argues that because the Thiemdate is the outside limit for his period of confinement, the conditionalrelease period cannot extend beyond his Thiem date.

On its face, section 5-2-4 of the Code can be construed in severalways. Both provisions of section 5-2-4 indicate that the time periods aremandatory. For example, section 5-2-4(b) provides that "[s]uch periodof commitment shall not exceed the maximum length of time that thedefendant would have been required to serve ***." (Emphasis added.)730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(b) (West 2000). Likewise, section 5-2-4(a)(1)(D)provides that "[s]uch conditional release shall be for a period of fiveyears" unless an extension of the conditional release period for anadditional three years is sought. (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS5/5-2-4(a)(1)(D) (West 2000). Consequently, the statute can beconstrued in the manner suggested by the State to provide that theconditional release provision supercedes the Thiem date when an NGRIdefendant is released prior to his Thiem date, so that the conditionalrelease period then sets the outside limit for the court's jurisdiction overan NGRI defendant. The statute can also be construed in the mannersuggested by Williams to provide that the Thiem date sets the outside limitfor a court's jurisdiction over a defendant, so that an NGRI defendant'sconditional release expires on the same date as the Thiem date.Moreover, in an attempt to reconcile the two provisions, the statute couldbe construed in a third way to provide that an NGRI defendant'sconditional release period can extend beyond his Thiem date, but theNGRI defendant cannot be recommitted for a violation of his conditionalrelease once his Thiem date has expired. When a statute "is capable ofbeing understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or moredifferent senses," it is ambiguous. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282,288 (1994), citing 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction