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Docket No. 92128-Agenda 10-May 2002.

MARY LOUISE WAKULICH, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the 
Estate of Elizabeth Wakulich, Deceased, Appellant, v.
DENNIS MRAZ et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed February 6, 2003.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal we review the dismissal of a complaint pursuantto section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). 735 ILCS5/2-615 (West 2000). Generally, plaintiff alleged that defendantswere negligent in providing an alcoholic beverage to plaintiff'sminor daughter, and negligent in their performance of a voluntaryundertaking to care for the minor after she became unconscious,such negligence proximately causing her death. In decidingwhether the first claim was properly dismissed, we must considerwhether this court should revisit and overturn its decision inCharles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482 (1995), and recognize a causeof action against adult social hosts for serving alcoholic beveragesto minors who are subsequently injured. For the reasons discussedbelow, we adhere to our decision in Charles and decline torecognize any form of social host liability. Because we find,however, that plaintiff has adequately pled a negligence actionbased on a voluntary undertaking theory, this matter must beremanded to the trial court for further proceedings on plaintiff'scomplaint.

BACKGROUND

Following the death of her 16-year-old daughter ElizabethWakulich, plaintiff Mary Louise Wakulich, individually and asspecial administrator of Elizabeth's estate, brought an action in thecircuit court of Cook County, alleging claims under the WrongfulDeath Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)) and theSurvival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 1996)). According to the10-count "Amended Second Amended Complaint,"⁽¹⁾ during theevening of June 15, 1997, and continuing into the early morninghours of June 16, 1997, Elizabeth was at the home of defendants,Michael Mraz, his brother Brian Mraz, and their father DennisMraz. At that time, Michael was 21 years old, and Brian was 18years old. Plaintiff alleged that Michael and Brian inducedElizabeth, "by offering monies, by goading and by applying greatsocial pressure," to drink a quart bottle of Goldschlager, a "highlyalcoholic and dangerous" beverage, and that Michael and Brianknew, or should have known, that Elizabeth, a minor, could notappreciate the dangers associated with consumption of excessiveamounts of alcoholic beverages.

According to the complaint, after consuming the entire bottleof Goldschlager, Elizabeth lost consciousness. Michael and Brianplaced her in the family room of their home, where they observedher "vomiting profusely and making gurgling sounds." They laterremoved her vomit-saturated blouse and placed a pillow under herhead to prevent aspiration. Brian and Michael allegedly refused todrive Elizabeth home, did not contact her parents, did not seekmedical attention, and "actually prevented other individuals at thehome from calling 911 or seeking other medical intervention."Plaintiff further alleged in the complaint that, during the morningof June 16, 1997, Dennis "ordered" Michael and Brian to removeElizabeth from their home, which they did.⁽²⁾ Elizabeth died laterthat day. The complaint indicates that Michael was subsequentlyconvicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor (720 ILCS130/2a (West 1996)).

Plaintiff advanced two theories of recovery: (1) that Michaeland Brian were negligent in providing alcohol to Elizabeth andinducing her to drink to excess (counts I, II, V and VI); and (2)that Michael, Brian and Dennis were negligent in failing to actreasonably to protect Elizabeth after voluntarily undertaking tocare for her after she lost consciousness (counts III, IV, VII, VIII,IX and X).

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant tosection 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1996)) forfailure to state a cause of action. Defendants principally arguedthat under this court's decision in Charles, there is no commonlaw social host liability in Illinois. The trial court dismissed thecomplaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court reversed the dismissal of those counts ofthe complaint directed against Michael and Brian based on theiralleged negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking,affirmed the dismissal of the balance of the complaint, andremanded the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings.322 Ill. App. 3d 768. We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave toappeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and allowed the Illinois TrialLawyers Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support ofplaintiff (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 345). We now affirm the judgment ofthe appellate court.

ANALYSIS

I

A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 of the Code (735ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)) challenges only the legal sufficiencyof the complaint. Jarvis v. South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81,85 (2002). We review an order granting a section 2-615 motion todismiss de novo. Jarvis, 201 Ill. 2d at 86; Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A., 186 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1999).The critical inquiry is whether the allegations of the complaint,when construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, aresufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may begranted. In making this determination, all well-pleaded facts in thecomplaint must be taken as true. Jarvis, 201 Ill. 2d at 86;Weatherman, 186 Ill. 2d at 491.

Preliminarily, we note that plaintiff has not challenged theappellate court's affirmance of the dismissal of counts IX and Xdirected against Dennis Mraz. Accordingly, we consider only theviability of plaintiff's claims against Michael and Brian.

II

We consider first those counts which alleged that Michael andBrian were negligent in providing an alcoholic beverage toElizabeth and inducing her to consume a dangerous amount.Defendants contend that these counts were properly dismissedbased on our decision in Charles v. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482(1995).

In Charles, decided just two years prior to the events givingrise to the present litigation, we addressed whether this courtshould recognize a cause of action against social hosts for servingalcoholic beverages to minors who are subsequently injured. Thefactual backdrop against which we decided this issue involved twodifferent social gatherings at which minors were served alcoholicbeverages, became intoxicated, and were involved in motorvehicle accidents. In the first case, Lynn Sue Charles, who was 16years of age at the time, became intoxicated at the defendant'shome. She left the party by driving her own automobile and waslater involved in a fatal collision. In the second case, 15-year-oldPaula Bzdek became intoxicated at the defendants' home, and leftthe party with an 18-year-old friend, who was also intoxicated.The 18-year-old friend lost control of his vehicle, crashing intooncoming traffic. Bzdek, who was a passenger in the vehicle,suffered permanent injuries. In each case, a complaint was filedpremised on theories of social host liability. In each case, the trialcourt dismissed the complaint, the plaintiff appealed, and theappellate court reversed the dismissal. Charles v. Seigfried, 251Ill. App. 3d 1059 (1993); Bzdek v. Townsley, 262 Ill. App. 3d 238(1994).

In the Charles litigation, the appellate court recognized acause of action against a social host who knowingly servesalcoholic beverages to a minor at the social host's residence,permits the minor to become intoxicated, and allows the minor toleave in a motor vehicle. Charles, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 1064-65,quoting Cravens v. Inman, 223 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1076 (1991). Inthe Bzdek litigation, the appellate court recognized a similar causeof action against social hosts who knowingly serve intoxicants topersons under the legal drinking age of 21. Bzdek, 262 Ill. App. 3dat 245-46. In a consolidated appeal, we reversed both decisions.Relying on over a century of precedent, we held that "Illinois hasno common law cause of action for injuries arising out of the saleor gift of alcoholic beverages; that the legislature has preemptedthe field of alcohol-related liability; and that any change in the lawgoverning alcohol-related liability should be made by the GeneralAssembly, or not at all." Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 486. We thusdeclined to adopt any form of social host liability.

In the instant case, plaintiff requests that we reconsider andoverrule Charles and recognize a common law negligence actionagainst adult social hosts, i.e., persons 18 years of age and olderwho knowingly serve alcohol to a minor. Based on the doctrine ofstare decisis, we deny plaintiff's request and adhere to ourdecision in Charles.

The doctrine of stare decisis is a basic tenet of our legalsystem. Hoffman v. Lehnhausen, 48 Ill. 2d 323, 329 (1971).Simply stated, stare decisis reflects the policy of the courts " 'tostand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.' "Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 47 (1998), quotingNeff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936). In other words, "aquestion once deliberately examined and decided should beconsidered as settled and closed to further argument ***." Prall v.Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41 (1921). The doctrine "promotes theevenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legalprinciples, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributesto the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Paynev. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 737, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991); see also Prall, 299 Ill. at 41 (stare decisisin "indispensable to the due administration of justice"). Althoughthe doctrine of stare decisis does not constitute an "inexorablecommand" (Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board ofElections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994)), we will depart from thedoctrine only upon a showing of "good cause" (Heimgaertner v.Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67(1955); see also People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64(1999) ("compelling reasons may require a departure from priorprecedent" (emphasis in original))). Plaintiff in the instant case hasfailed to make a showing of good cause. Indeed, the groundsadvanced by plaintiff for the adoption of social host liability areidentical to the grounds we considered and rejected in Charles.

Plaintiff argues, for example, that this court should follow the"national trend" recognizing a cause of action against adult socialhosts who provide alcohol to minors. We expressly rejected thisargument in Charles, concluding that our decision should be"grounded upon the law of Illinois rather than upon contradictorytrends elsewhere." Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 496. As explained inCharles, in Illinois, the common law recognized no cause of actionfor injuries arising out of the sale or gift of alcoholic beverages.The legislature's adoption of the Dramshop Act (now codified atsection 6-21 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/6-21(West 2000)) created a limited and exclusive statutory cause ofaction by imposing a form of no-fault liability upon dramshops forselling or giving intoxicating liquors to persons who subsequentlyinjure third parties. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 486-89. Through itspassage and continual amendment of the Dramshop Act, theGeneral Assembly has preempted the entire field of alcohol-relatedliability. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 491.

Plaintiff in the instant case also argues that because Illinoislaw clearly treats minors as a "protected class" when it comes tothe consumption of alcohol, tort liability should apply to adultsocial hosts who serve alcoholic beverages to minors. Weconsidered and dismissed this very argument in Charles. Charles,165 Ill. 2d at 491. "Legislative preemption in the field of alcohol-related liability extends to social hosts who provide alcoholicbeverages to another person, whether that person be an adult, anunderage person, or a minor." (Emphasis added.) Charles, 165 Ill.2d at 491.

Plaintiff here further contends that "public policy" dictatesthat this court should recognize social host liability for theprovision of alcohol to minors. In Charles, however, we observedthat the "primary expression of Illinois public and social policyshould emanate from the legislature." Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 493.We explained:

"The General Assembly, by its very nature, has a superiorability to gather and synthesize data pertinent to the issue.It is free to solicit information and advice from the manypublic and private organizations that may be impacted.Moreover, it is the only entity with the power to weighand properly balance the many competing societal,economic, and policy considerations involved. Theseconsiderations include such issues as whether sufficientremedies are already available to injured parties throughtheir own insurance ***, the effect on homeowners' andrenters' insurance policies and rates, whether the socialhosts' liability should be limited, and what standards ofconduct should govern social hosts.

This court, on the other hand, is ill-equipped to fashiona law on this subject that would best serve the people ofIllinois. We can consider only one case at a time and areconstrained by the facts before us. Moreover, if we wereto undertake to change the rules concerning alcohol-related liability, the law would be in a confused,disorderly state for many years while the trial courtsattempted to predict how this court would eventuallyresolve these questions." Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 493-94.

We held, therefore, that judicial restraint in this area wasappropriate and that any decision to expand civil liability of socialhosts should be made by the legislature. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at493-94.

Additionally, plaintiff argues that where, as here, thelegislature has failed to act, it is the duty of this court to interveneand develop the common law. Once again, this is an argument thatwe expressly considered and rejected in Charles. We observedthat, since 1986, the General Assembly had considered imposingsome form of social host liability upon adults who furnish alcoholto underage persons at least six times, but that such attempts wererejected. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 499. We appropriately inferred thatthe General Assembly had deliberately chosen not to impose suchsocial host liability. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 501.

Since our decision in Charles, the General Assembly hasagain considered imposing liability upon persons who supplyalcoholic beverages to minors. See 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseBill 4723, 2000 Sess. (creating the Underage Alcohol UseLiability Act); 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 1963, 2000 Sess.(creating the Alcohol Impaired Minor Responsibility Act); 92d Ill.Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 4, 2001 Sess. (creating the AlcoholImpaired Minor Responsibility Act); 92d Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseBill 1990, 2001 Sess. (creating the Underage Alcoholic LiquorUse Liability Act). These attempts to create a new cause of actiondid not succeed. We do not view such failed attempts as inactionon the part of the legislature. Rather, we view it as evidence thatthe legislature continues to debate and consider the merits andcontours of any form of social host liability.

Moreover, "[i]t is a fundamental principle that '[w]here thelegislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicialconstruction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in thecourt's statement of the legislative intent.' " Zimmerman, 183 Ill.2d at 49-50, quoting Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1983).Although the legislature continues to amend the Dramshop Act inother respects (see Pub. Act 90-111, eff. July 14, 1997), thelegislature has made no change to the statute indicating that thecivil liability provided therefor is not intended to preempt theentire field of alcohol-related liability. To change course nowwould amount to an amendment of the statute itself. See Charles,165 Ill. 2d at 492, citing Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324,336 (1983).

Plaintiff maintains that she is not asking this court to "openthe flood gates" regarding social-host liability. We note, however,that the cause of action plaintiff would have us recognize isbroader than the proposed cause of action we declined torecognize in Charles. Under the facts of Charles, liability couldhave been limited to situations involving underage drunk driving.See Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 505-07 (McMorrow, J., dissenting). Inthe present case, however, plaintiff seeks to impose liability forany injuries proximately caused by the adult provision of alcoholicbeverages to a minor. In addition, there was no indication inCharles that the social-host defendants were not themselves oflegal drinking age. Plaintiff in the instant case, however, seeks toimpose liability upon any adult social host, irrespective of whetherthe social host is of legal drinking age. Brian, the younger of thetwo remaining defendants, was only 18 years of age at the time ofthe underlying events, three years younger than the legal drinkingage of 21 years. Thus, plaintiff actually proposes a broad andsweeping change to this area of the law by proposing that alladults-even those adults whom the General Assembly hasdetermined are unable to appreciate sufficiently the risks attendantto alcohol consumption-may be liable in tort for any and allinjuries flowing from the provision of alcohol to minors.

Even if the cause of action plaintiff would have us recognizein the present case was more narrowly tailored, we do not agreewith plaintiff that the "flood gates" would not be opened. Werecognized in Charles that the adoption of social host liability inthat case would open up a " 'Pandora's Box' of unlimitedliability," as any person who might conceivably qualify as a socialhost was made the target of a lawsuit. Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 503.We recognized also that, if this court were to adopt social hostliability, we would be faced with determining under which of themany possible permutations liability would lie.

"Should only injured third parties have a cause ofaction against a social host, or should the intoxicatedperson have one too? Should an exception be createdonly for minors? If so, should we treat persons underthe legal drinking age of 21 as minors, or only thoseunder the age of 18? Should minor or underage socialhosts be liable for serving liquor to their similarlysituated friends? Should a social host be held liableonly when he or she knows that the intoxicated personwill drink and drive, or should the host be liable for alltypes of alcohol-induced injuries? What actions must asocial host take to avoid liability where an intoxicatedguest insists on driving home? Is calling a cabsufficient, or must the police be notified? The flood ofinjured litigants that would inevitably crowd the Illinoiscourts would demand answers to these questions andmany others." (Emphasis added.) Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at494.

The adoption of social host liability in this case wouldlikewise raise numerous questions to which the flood of litigantswould demand answers. Should social hosts be liable only for"knowingly" providing alcohol to minors, or should the socialhost's conduct be judged by what he or she "should have known"?For example, should parents be liable for the consumption ofalcoholic beverages in their home if they "should have known"that their 17-year-old child would have a party in their absence?What measures should parents take to ensure that access to liquorin the home is sufficiently restricted in order to avoid liability forillegal activities that occur in their absence? Should liability attachoutside the home to social gatherings such as picnics, weddingsand other events? Should the social host be liable even where theintoxicated minor's parents are present at the social gathering?Should liability attach where the minor consumes a negligibleamount of alcohol, is clearly not intoxicated, but has an adversereaction due to a medical condition unknown to the social host?Should the liability of social hosts be unlimited, or subject to thesame limitation applicable to liquor vendors?

The members of our General Assembly, elected by thecitizens of this state, are best able to resolve such issuescomprehensively, taking into account the significant social andeconomic consequences of any course of action. They are bestequipped to determine whether a change in the law is bothdesirable and workable, and if so, under what circumstances.Charles, 165 Ill. 2d at 493-94. Thus far, the General Assembly hasdetermined that civil liability for alcohol-related injuries is limitedto two groups of defendants: (1) dramshop owners, and (2) persons21 years of age or older who pay for a hotel or motel roomknowing that the room will be used by underage persons for theunlawful consumption of alcohol. The liability of these defendantsis limited and extends only to third parties, and not to theintoxicated person. 235 ILCS 5/6-21(a) (West 2000). The GeneralAssembly has otherwise elected to treat the possession andconsumption of alcohol by persons under the legal drinking age asa criminal matter. See 235 ILCS 5/6-16(a)(i) through (a)(iii) (West2000) (making it a Class A misdemeanor for licensees and otherpersons to sell, give or deliver alcoholic liquor to any person underthe age of 21); 235 ILCS 5/6-16(a) (West 2000) (making it a ClassA misdemeanor for any person under the age of 21 to use falseidentification to procure alcoholic liquor or to have any alcoholicliquor in his or her possession on any street, highway or publicplace); 235 ILCS 5/6-16(a-1) (West 2000) (making it a Class Amisdemeanor for any parent or guardian to permit his or herresidence to be used by an invitee of the parent's child or theguardian's ward, if the invitee is under the age of 21, in a mannerthat would violate the statutory prohibitions on the sale andpossession of alcohol); 235 ILCS 5/6-16(c) (West 2000) (makingit a Class A misdemeanor for any person knowingly to permit agathering at his or her home where that person knows that anindividual under the age of 21 is in possession of or is consumingany alcoholic beverage and further knows that the underageindividual leaves in an intoxicated condition);⁽³⁾ 235 ILCS5/6-16(d) (West 2000) (making it a Class A misdemeanor for anyperson to rent a hotel or motel room for the purpose of or with theknowledge that such room will be used for the consumption ofalcohol by persons under the age of 21 years); 235 ILCS 5/6-20(West 2000) (making it a Class A misdemeanor for persons under21 years of age to purchase, accept as a gift, possess or consumealcoholic liquor); 235 ILCS 5/10-1 (West 2000) (making it a ClassA misdemeanor for any person under the age of 21 years torepresent that he is 21 years of age or over for the purpose ofbuying, accepting or receiving alcoholic liquor from a licensee).

In sum, plaintiff has not provided any principled basis for thiscourt to revisit its decision in Charles and depart from the doctrineof stare decisis. Plaintiff cannot identify any compelling change incircumstance since our decision was entered and has simplyreargued points already considered and rejected. Accordingly, weadhere to our decision in Charles: apart from the limited civilliability provided in the Dramshop Act, there exists no social hostliability in Illinois.

III

Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that the allegations of thecomplaint fall within an exception to the general rule againstsocial host liability, recognized by our appellate court in Quinn v.Sigma Rho Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 155 Ill. App. 3d231 (1987), and Haben v. Anderson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1992).

In Quinn, an 18-year-old university fraternity pledge sufferedneurological damage and partial disability as the result ofconsuming excessive amounts of alcohol during an initiationceremony. The pledge sued the fraternity under common lawnegligence principles. The trial court dismissed the complaint; theappellate court reversed. The appellate court recognized that "[t]helaw in Illinois appears well settled that the legislative action inadopting the Dramshop Act [citation] has preempted the field ofliability relating to alcohol" and that "this preemption extends tosocial hosts who might provide intoxicating beverages: adult toadult, adult to minor, and minor to minor." Quinn, 155 Ill. App. 3dat 235. Nonetheless, the appellate court concluded that thecomplaint stated a cause of action based on two factors: (1) theplaintiff was required to drink to intoxication in order to becomea member of the fraternity; and (2) the fraternity's conductviolated the hazing statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 144, par. 221),which the legislature adopted to prevent the embarrassment orendangerment of youth through thoughtless and meaninglessactivity. Quinn, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 238.

In Haben, an 18-year-old university freshman died from acutealcohol intoxication following an initiation ceremony for newrecruits in the Lacrosse Club. The ensuing complaint alleged, interalia, that the members of the club had been involved in hazing thedecedent, pressuring him to drink, and causing his intoxication.The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the allegationsdid not fit within the narrow exception announced in Quinn in thatthe plaintiff had failed to allege that the decedent was "required"to drink to intoxication to be initiated into the club. Haben, 232 Ill.App. 3d at 263. The appellate court reversed, finding the plaintiff'sallegation of a de facto requirement for drinking was sufficient tosatisfy the Quinn standard. Haben, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 266.

Plaintiff in the instant case argues that the exception to socialhost liability recognized by Quinn and Haben survived this court'sdecision in Charles and that the allegations of the complaint bringthis case within the Quinn-Haben framework. Plaintiff maintainsthat, similar to the circumstances present in Quinn and Haben,defendants here coerced Elizabeth, a minor, into consuming adangerous amount of alcohol, thereby violating a statutespecifically designed to prevent adults from endangering children.Specifically, plaintiff cites section 2a of the Neglected ChildrenOffense Act, which makes it a Class A misdemeanor to contributeto the delinquency of a child. 720 ILCS 130/2a (West 1996).According to the allegations of the complaint, Michael, the olderof the two remaining defendants, was convicted of violating thisstatute for his role in Elizabeth's intoxication. The appellate courtrejected plaintiff's argument, concluding that the exception to therule against social host liability carved out by Quinn and Habendid not survive this court's decision in Charles and, in any event,the allegations of the complaint did not fit within the Quinn-Haben exception. 322 Ill. App. 3d at 773.

We find it unnecessary to consider whether the so-called"exception" to the rule against social host liability recognized byQuinn and Haben is compatible with our decision in Charlesbecause the present case simply does not come within the reach ofthese two appellate opinions. As discussed above, Quinn andHaben addressed the limited situation in which a collegefraternity, or similar college organization, requires those seekingmembership to engage in illegal and dangerous activities, inviolation of the hazing statute. In contrast, the present casepresents the factually distinct scenario in which a minor, at aprivate residence, is allegedly pressured to drink to excess, inviolation of the delinquency statute.

We note that our appellate court, in Goodknight v. Piraino,197 Ill. App. 3d 319 (1990), expressly rejected the extension of theQuinn-Haben analysis to situations other than those involving acollege hazing incident. In Goodknight, the plaintiff, who was 18years of age, attended a Valentine's Day party promoted by theVillage of Royal and held in the village community building.Liquor was sold at the party. The plaintiff became intoxicated andleft the party with her male companion, who drove the plaintiff'scar. The plaintiff later attempted to drive home and crashed thevehicle, sustaining permanent injuries. The plaintiff sued variousindividuals and entities, including the village, alleging negligence,willful and wanton misconduct, and a violation of the DramshopAct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 43, par. 135). The trial courtdismissed the cause of action as to the village and certain otherdefendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Quinn analysisshould apply and that her cause of action should not have beendismissed. She maintained that, as an innocent minor, she waspressured and "required" to drink in order to join the "fraternity"of her peers at the dance. Goodknight, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 325. Theappellate court rejected this argument. "Quinn did not recognizean exception to the [Dramshop] Act for every 18-year-old who'feels pressured' to drink, but a narrow one-a duty on the part offraternities and sororities to refrain from requiring participation insuch acts ***." Goodknight, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 325.

Thus, we agree with the appellate court in the present casethat it would be a "dramatic expansion" of Quinn and Haben,assuming their continuing viability, to find that plaintiff has stateda cause of action here for negligent provision of alcohol. 322 Ill.App. 3d at 775. We therefore conclude that counts I, II, V and VIof the complaint were properly dismissed.

IV

We next consider whether, as defendants argue, those countsof the complaint alleging a "voluntary undertaking" by Michaeland Brian are fatally defective. Generally, pursuant to thevoluntary undertaking theory of liability, "one who undertakes,gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another issubject to liability for bodily harm caused to the other by one'sfailure to exercise due care in the performance of the undertaking."Rhodes v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 239 (1996).

Plaintiff alleged that Michael and Brian voluntarily undertookto care for Elizabeth after she became unconscious, by placing herin the downstairs family room in order to observe and care for her;that they, in fact, observed her vomiting profusely and makinggurgling sounds while in the family room; and that they checkedon her during the early morning hours of June 16, 1997, at whichtime they removed her vomit-saturated blouse, and placed a pillowunder her head to prevent aspiration. Plaintiff further alleged thatMichael and Brian did not seek medical attention for Elizabeth andprevented other persons in the home from calling 911 or seekingother medical care. Michael and Brian also allegedly refused todrive Elizabeth home or to the hospital and refused to call herparents. While Elizabeth was still unconscious, Michael and Brianremoved her from their home. The appellate court found theforegoing allegations were sufficient to withstand defendants'section 2-615 motion (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)).

As an initial matter, defendants argue that plaintiff's voluntaryundertaking theory is simply an attempt to circumvent the ruleagainst social host liability set forth in Charles. This argumentfails. The liability of defendants, if any, is not contingent on theirstatus as social hosts. Indeed, it is irrelevant for purposes ofplaintiff's voluntary undertaking counts whether defendants wereacting as social hosts on the evening of June 15, 1997, andsupplied the alcohol which Elizabeth consumed. Rather, based onthe allegations of the complaint, defendants' liability arises byvirtue of their voluntary assumption of a duty to care for Elizabethafter she became unconscious, irrespective of the circumstancesleading up to that point. Thus, plaintiff's voluntary undertakingtheory does not circumvent the rule against social host liability.

In a related argument, defendants maintain that there is nospecial relationship between a social host and a guest which wouldimpose a duty upon the social host to seek medical assistance. SeeEstate of Ritchie v. Farrell, 213 Ill. App. 3d 846, 849 (1991);Zamiar v. Linderman, 132 Ill. App. 3d 886, 890 (1985). Thisargument, like the one before it, necessarily fails. Plaintiff did notallege that defendants were under a legal duty to seek medicalassistance for Elizabeth, or to otherwise care for her, by virtue oftheir status as social hosts or their relationship with Elizabeth.Plaintiff alleged that defendants voluntarily undertook to care forElizabeth. "By undertaking to act defendant[s] became subject toa duty with respect to the manner of performance." Nelson v.Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 85 (1964). In other words,having undertaken to care for Elizabeth, defendants were obligatedto exercise "due care" in the performance of that undertaking. SeeNelson, 31 Ill. 2d at 86; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts