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Docket No. 94231-Agenda 15-January 2003.

MEL VITRO et al., Indiv. and as Parents and Guardians of DorothyVitro, a Minor, Appellants, v. ALICE S. MIHELCIC, M.D., et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed January 23, 2004.
 

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

The question presented in this appeal is whether a parent mayrecover for loss of the society and companionship of a child who isnonfatally injured. Under Illinois law, such a claim may be brought in awrongful-death action. Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505 (1984).However, in Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61 (1988), we declined toextend the filial society cause of action to those situations where the childis nonfatally injured. For the reasons set forth below, we adhere to ourdecision in Dralle and refrain from enlarging the scope of liability toencompass claims where the child is nonfatally injured.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Mel Vitro and Sabrina Short Vitro, acting individually andas parents and guardians of their minor daughter, Dorothy, filed a medicalmalpractice action in the circuit court of Du Page County againstdefendants Alice S. Mihelcic, M.D., and Naperville Associates inObstetrics and Gynecology, Ltd. (Naperville Associates). The complaintalleged that Mihelcic, while in the course and scope of her employmentwith Naperville Associates, negligently managed Sabrina's labor and thedelivery of Dorothy, thereby causing Dorothy severe brain damage. Thecomplaint further alleged that, as a result of her neurological injuries,Dorothy will suffer cognitive deficits and physical disabilities for the rest ofher life. Count I of the three-count complaint sought damages forDorothy's injuries, and the second count, which was brought pursuant tothe Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2000)),sought compensation for medical and caretaking expenses incurred by theparents. In count III, the only count at issue in this appeal, plaintiffs allegeda loss of filial consortium with their daughter as a result of her injuries, andsought damages for this disruption of the family relationship.

Defendants moved to dismiss count III pursuant to section 2-615 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)) on theground that Illinois does not recognize such a claim. Defendants pointedto Dralle and argued that, under this decision, parents may not claim lossof consortium damages for nonfatal injuries to a child. In response to themotion to dismiss, plaintiffs acknowledged that Dralle bars parental lossof consortium claims where the child's injuries are nonfatal. However,plaintiffs argued that the Dralle decision was poorly reasoned and shouldbe reconsidered.

The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss count III andfound, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)),that there was no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of thedismissal. On appeal, plaintiffs urged the appellate court "to criticize therule pronounced in Dralle because the analysis is flawed and inconsistentwith existing Illinois law." The appellate court declined the request, notingthat "pursuant to controlling authority, plaintiff parents may not bring aclaim against defendants for loss of consortium for the nonfatal injuries totheir child Dorothy." In a summary order, the appellate court affirmed thecircuit court's dismissal of count III of the complaint. No. 2-01-0148(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed plaintiffs'petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)) attacks the legal sufficiency of a complaintby alleging defects on the face of the complaint. American National Bank& Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 192 Ill. 2d 274, 279 (2000);Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 186 Ill. 2d 472, 491 (1999). Inruling on a section 2-615 motion, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom.American National Bank, 192 Ill. 2d at 279; Weatherman, 186 Ill. 2dat 491. The critical inquiry is whether the allegations of the complaint,when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient toestablish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Jarvis v.South Oak Dodge, Inc., 201 Ill. 2d 81, 86 (2002); Weatherman, 186Ill. 2d at 491. We review an order granting a section 2-615 motion todismiss de novo. Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 228 (2003);Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 516(2002).

In the case at bar, as noted, count III of plaintiffs' complaint seeksdamages for loss of filial consortium resulting from their daughter's nonfatalinjuries. The same claim was rejected in Dralle. Accordingly, both thecircuit and the appellate courts held that count III of plaintiffs' complaintfailed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiffs argue, however, that Dralle was incorrectly decided, andthey urge us to overrule that decision. Plaintiffs' contention that Dralleshould be overruled implicates stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis"expresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not todisturb settled points." Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 308-09 (1936),overruled on other grounds by Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321(1944). This doctrine "is the means by which courts ensure that the lawwill not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled andintelligible fashion." Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Illinois State Board ofElections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510 (1994). Stare decisis enables both thepeople and the bar of this state "to rely upon [this court's] decisions withassurance that they will not be lightly overruled." Moehle v. ChryslerMotors Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1982).

To be sure, stare decisis is not an inexorable command. ChicagoBar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2d at 510; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842,115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 746, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2617 (1991) (Souter, J.,concurring). However, we have consistently held that any departure fromstare decisis must be specially justified (Chicago Bar Ass'n, 161 Ill. 2dat 510) and that prior decisions should not be overruled absent "goodcause" (Moehle, 93 Ill. 2d at 304; Heimgaertner v. Benjamin ElectricManufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67 (1955)) or "compellingreasons" (Moehle, 93 Ill. 2d at 304; People v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461,463-64 (1999)). This court also has recognized that "it will not departfrom precedent 'merely because the court is of the opinion that it mightdecide otherwise were the question a new one.' " Robinson, 187 Ill. 2dat 463-64, quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196-97 (1968). In sum,"when a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute orconstitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can beshown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to publicinterests." Maki, 40 Ill. 2d at 196; see also Heidenreich v. Bremner, 260Ill. 439, 450-51 (1913).

In Dralle, as in the case at bar, the question was whether the parentsof a child born with maladies that included brain damage could recover forloss of their child's society and companionship. According to thecomplaint in Dralle, the child's injuries were caused, in part, by themother's use during pregnancy of the prescription drug Bendectin. Thefour-count complaint also alleged negligence on the part of theobstetricians. In count IV of the Dralle complaint, the parents soughtcompensation from the drug's manufacturer for loss of filial societyresulting from their child's injuries. The trial court dismissed count IV forfailure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The appellate court reversed the dismissal order, concluding thatIllinois recognized a parent's claim for loss of companionship and societyresulting from nonfatal injuries to a child. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 63. Thedefendant drug manufacturer appealed, and this court reversed, holdingthat a parent may not recover for loss of society and companionship of anonfatally injured child. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 71.

In Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505 (1984), decided prior toDralle, this court held that, in a wrongful-death action, parents are entitledto a presumption of pecuniary injury in the loss of a deceased child'ssociety and companionship.⁽¹⁾ Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 517. In Dralle, theparents argued that it would be a logical extension of Bullard to allowrecovery for loss of filial society arising from a child's nonfatal injuries.The court in Dralle rejected this argument, explaining that there is animportant distinction between the two types of claims. Where a child isnonfatally injured, the court noted, the child retains his or her own causeof action against the tortfeasor. "Thus, there is no danger that the injurycaused by the tortfeasor will go uncompensated, or that similar conductin the future will be undeterred." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69. By contrast, "anaction under the Wrongful Death Act affords the sole remedy for thesurviving family members." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69. In Dralle's view, ittherefore makes sense to allow recovery for loss of filial society in actionsunder the Wrongful Death Act, but not where the victim survives andretains his or her own cause of action.⁽²⁾ The court also pointed to a secondrelevant distinction between Bullard and the nonfatal-injury case. InBullard, the decision to allow claims for loss of filial society was based onan already-existing statutory foundation: the wrongful death statute. Wherethe loss of society results from nonfatal injuries to the child, there is nosuch statutory foundation. The court in Dralle also rejected the argument that our decision in Dini v. Naiditch,20 Ill. 2d 406 (1960), supported the recognition of a filial society claimwhere injuries are nonfatal. Dini held that, just as a husband may claimloss of spousal consortium arising from nonfatal injuries to his wife, soalso a wife may make the same claim where her husband is nonfatallyinjured. Consortium, in this context, "includes, in addition to materialservices, elements of companionship, felicity and sexual intercourse, allwelded into a conceptualistic unity." Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 427. In Dralle itwas argued that, since this court had already recognized claims for lossof spousal consortium arising from nonfatal injuries, it was but a smallstep to recognize claims for loss of filial society where the child'sinjuries were nonfatal. The court in Dralle rejected this argument,explaining that "[t]he companionship and society for which recovery issought [in a filial society claim] is not identical with the spousal claimrecognized in Dini." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72. Dralle asserted thatspousal consortium includes elements that "are absent from the parent-child relationship." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72. For this reason, the court"decline[d] to find in the action for spousal consortium a basis forrecognizing recovery of loss of filial society." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 72.

The court in Dralle noted several "policy considerations" that argueagainst recognition of the new filial society claim, including "theappropriate scope of tort liability" and the difficulty in assessing damages.Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 69-70. According to Dralle, "[t]o recognize claimsfor loss of society resulting from nonfatal injuries to a child would threatena considerable enlargement of liability. [Citations.] Grandparents, siblings,and friends suffering similar losses of society and companionship wouldalso seek to bring claims, if recovery were to go unchecked." Dralle, 124Ill. 2d at 70. The Dralle court was also concerned with the difficulty inassessing damages. Noting the intangible nature of the loss, Dralleasserted that "a trier of fact would find it difficult to distinguish between thechild's claim, involving pain and suffering, and the legally distinct butfactually similar claim by the parents for loss of the child's society andcompanionship." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70. This difficulty, the courtconcluded, would invite duplicate recoveries.

In a special concurrence,⁽³⁾ Justice Clark criticized the majority'sreasoning. While the majority concluded that Bullard and Dini did notsupport the recognition of a cause of action for loss of filial societyresulting from nonfatal injuries, Justice Clark came to a differentconclusion. In Justice Clark's view, these and other decisions of this court,"together with cases on point from other jurisdictions [citations], ***strongly suggest that we should allow recovery to a parent who, throughnonfatal injury, suffers the loss of his child's society." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2dat 75-76 (Clark, J., specially concurring). Justice Clark foundunpersuasive the policy considerations that the majority cited as argumentsagainst recognizing the new cause of action.

In the case at bar, plaintiffs cite to Justice Clark's specialconcurrence in arguing that, contrary to the majority's view in Dralle,previous decisions such as Bullard and Dini support the recognition of aparental claim for loss of filial society resulting from nonfatal injuries.According to plaintiffs, recognition of this new filial society claim would bea logical extension of our previous holdings. Any failure to allow suchclaims, plaintiffs argue, would be inconsistent with this court's previousdecisions.

Plaintiffs also take issue with Dralle's "policy considerations,"asserting that they are largely illusory. In answer to Dralle's concernsabout enlarging liability, plaintiffs point to Justice Clark's assertion in hisspecial concurrence that recognition of the new filial society claim "will notopen the floodgates of litigation." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 80 (Clark, J.,specially concurring). As Justice Clark explained:

"Loss of society is an injury to familial relationships which hasnever been applied to relations among friends, or even tononcustodial relatives. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases,the child's injuries will neither be so serious nor so permanent asto support a claim for loss of society." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 80(Clark, J., specially concurring).

With regard to the alleged difficulty in assessing damages, plaintiffsassert, as did Justice Clark, that the same difficulty arises in claims for lossof spousal consortium, which are recognized in Illinois. Plaintiffs note thatIllinois juries assess damages in spousal consortium claims arising fromnonfatal injuries (see Dini, 20 Ill. 2d at 430), and they argue that there isno reason why a jury could not do the same in parental claims for loss offilial consortium caused by nonfatal injuries.

We agree with plaintiffs that some of what is asserted in Dralle insupport of the majority's holding does not withstand scrutiny. Forexample, we do not believe that allowing parents to recover for loss offilial society where injuries are nonfatal would necessarily invite duplicaterecoveries. It is true, as Dralle notes, that in such situations the childretains his own cause of action against the tortfeasor. However, the child'scause of action for his injuries and the parents' cause of action for loss ofsociety and companionship seek compensation for different harms. Thesame is true in a spousal consortium context where the injuries arenonfatal. Moreover, any possibility of double recovery could be minimized"by carefully instructing the jury to distinguish between the injuries of theparent and the injuries of the child." See Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 80 (Clark,J., specially concurring).

We also question Dralle's reliance on the alleged difficulty faced bya jury in assessing damages. Dralle points to the intangible nature of theloss; however, intangible losses are encountered in any consortium claim.If Illinois juries are capable of assessing damages in claims for loss ofspousal consortium where the injuries are nonfatal, we see no reason whythey would face insurmountable difficulties in assessing damages in asimilar claim for loss of filial consortium.

Finally, regarding Dralle's concern that liability would be enlargedbecause grandparents, siblings, and friends would also seek to recover forsimilar losses of the child's society, we note that this concern could easilybe addressed. If we were to recognize a cause of action for loss of filialsociety resulting from nonfatal injuries, we could simply base it on theuniqueness of the parent-child relationship and limit the holdingaccordingly.

Even though portions of Dralle's rationale are flawed, wenevertheless agree with an important basis for its holding. In Dralle, oneof the arguments offered by the parents in support of the new filial societyclaim was that, because this court had already recognized such a claim inthe wrongful-death context (Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505 (1984)),it would be a logical extension to allow it where the child's injuries werenonfatal. In rejecting this argument, Dralle explained, inter alia, that thedecision in Bullard to allow claims for loss of filial society in a wrongful-death action was predicated on Bullard's interpretation of Illinois'Wrongful Death Act. Under this act, damages were allowed for"pecuniary injuries" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 2), and Bullardconstrued this term to include loss of filial society. Thus, "the statutoryfoundation was already in place" (emphasis added) (Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at69) for recognition of a claim for loss of filial society in a wrongful-deathaction. No such statutory foundation existed for allowing a filial societycause of action where the injuries were nonfatal. The court thus evinceda preference for a statutory rather than a nonstatutory, or judiciallycreated, basis for the new claim. Implicit in the court's reasoning is theconclusion that it is the legislature which should decide whether this newcause of action should be created. We agree with this conclusion.

This court recently expressed a similar view in Wakulich v. Mraz,203 Ill. 2d 223 (2003). In Wakulich, which declined to recognize socialhost liability for the provision of alcohol to minors, we explained that thelegislature was the more appropriate body to address such liability.

" 'The General Assembly, by its very nature, has a superiorability to gather and synthesize data pertinent to the issue. It isfree to solicit information and advice from the many public andprivate organizations that may be impacted. Moreover, it is theonly entity with the power to weigh and properly balance themany competing societal, economic, and policy considerationsinvolved. ***

This court, on the other hand, is ill-equipped to fashion a lawon this subject that would best serve the people of Illinois. Wecan consider only one case at a time and are constrained by thefacts before us.' " Wakulich, 203 Ill. 2d at 232, quoting Charlesv. Seigfried, 165 Ill. 2d 482, 493-94 (1995).

With regard to the issue of filial consortium, courts in otherjurisdictions have left this determination to the legislature. In Colorado,where claims for loss of filial consortium are authorized under the state'swrongful-death statute, the supreme court declined to extend the filialconsortium claim beyond the wrongful-death context, choosing instead todefer to the legislative branch. Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411 (Colo.1999). According to the court in Elgin, it is the legislature that is "bestsuited to reach decisions about the intangibles of consortium loss and theappropriate standards and limitations that should be applicable thereto."Elgin, 994 P.2d at 420. The same conclusion was reached by theSupreme Court of Missouri, where filial consortium claims also arerecognized under the state's wrongful-death statute. Powell v. AmericanMotors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. 1992). The court in Powellconcluded that "if Missouri is to recognize a cause of action for loss ofconsortium by the children or the parents of an injured party, the decisionto do so should be made by the legislature and not by this Court."(Emphasis added.) Powell, 834 S.W.2d at 185. See also Boucher v.Dixie Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1992) (declining to extendclaims for loss of society and affection beyond the wrongful-death context;deferring instead to the legislature as the appropriate body to determineif such claims should be recognized); contra, e.g., Shockley v. Prier, 66Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).

The Elgin, Powell, and Boucher courts teach that the choice ofwhether to recognize a new filial society claim is a policy decision that isbetter left to the legislature. Such a decision inevitably involves navigatingbetween "the competing interests of compensating all those who havebeen harmed by a tort-feasor and setting rational and workable limits toliability." Boucher, 850 P.2d at 1181. With regard to these limits, it isgenerally acknowledged that while it might be desirable to compensate allthose who are harmed by another's wrong, the law must recognize therealities of this world and set reasonable boundaries upon liability.Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 203 (1983), citing Tobin v.Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d554, 561 (N.Y.1969). Such boundary-setting often is more appropriatelyleft to the legislative branch. Elgin, 994 P.2d at 419; Powell, 834S.W.2d at 188-89.

As noted, Dralle based its holding in part on the view that it is thelegislature that is better suited to decide whether to recognize a cause ofaction for loss of a nonfatally injured child's society. We believe that,notwithstanding the flaws in other portions of Dralle's rationale, thislegislative deference is in itself a valid basis for reaffirming Dralle. SeeUnited States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64, 83 L. Ed. 2d 461, 468, 105S. Ct. 471, 476 (1984).

We note that plaintiffs direct our attention to no post-Dralledecisions by this court or our appellate court that have criticized or calledinto doubt the holding in Dralle. Indeed, it appears that the opposite istrue. See Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill. 2d 272 (1998), decided 10 years afterDralle, in which this court relied on Dralle's reasoning in rejecting a claimfor loss of filial society where the interference with the family relationshipwas direct, rather than indirect. Doe's reliance on Dralle negates anyclaim that Dralle has become unworkable. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827,115 L. Ed. 2d at 737, 111 S. Ct. at 2609. On the contrary, it wouldappear that the rule in Dralle is now firmly settled. See Maki, 40 Ill. 2dat 196.

In the case at bar, the dissent points to our decision in Seef v.Sutkus, 145 Ill. 2d 336 (1991), which recognized a parental claim for lossof society of a stillborn child. The dissent asks: "How can we justifysanctioning a damage claim in the death of [a] stillborn child [citation],whom the parents will never even know, while barring a damage claim inthe nonfatal injury of a newborn child, whom the parents will come toknow, live with, and suffer with for her or his entire life?" Slip op. at 14(Fitzgerald, J., dissenting, joined by Kilbride and Rarick, JJ.). The answeris that, unlike the case at bar, Seef involved the Wrongful Death Act (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 70, par. 1 et seq.). In Seef, we noted that the Actconsiders an unborn fetus to be a child, and damages therefore may berecovered for loss of the society of a nearly full-term child who dies atbirth. As was the case in Bullard, the decision in Seef rests on a "statutoryfoundation." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 212. Thus, it is the legislature, not thiscourt, that sanctioned a claim where the infant is stillborn, but did notprovide a cause of action in the case of a nonfatally injured newborn.

In sum, plaintiffs in the case at bar have failed to demonstrate goodcause (Heimgaertner, 6 Ill. 2d at 166-67) or compelling reasons(Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d at 463-64) for departing from stare decisis.Plaintiffs direct our attention to no post-Dralle decisions by this court orour appellate court that have criticized or called into doubt the holding inDralle. Nor has it been shown that upholding Dralle would bring about"serious detriment *** prejudicial to public interests." Maki, 40 Ill. 2d at196; Heidenreich, 260 Ill. at 450-51.

Moreover, we determined that there is a valid basis for the decisionin Dralle that is independent of any defects in other portions of Dralle'sreasoning. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 64, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 105 S. Ct.at 476. This valid basis, as we have indicated, is Dralle's implicitdeference to the legislature as the more appropriate body to decidewhether the new filial society claim should be recognized. In view of thissound rationale, as well as plaintiffs' failure to meet the burden required todepart from stare decisis, we decline to overrule Dralle.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we adhere to our decision in Dralle anddecline to enlarge the scope of liability to encompass claims for loss of filialsociety resulting from nonfatal injuries to a child. We affirm the judgmentof the appellate court below, which affirmed the circuit court's dismissalof count III of plaintiffs' complaint.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:

Stare decisis, certainly, is an indispensable part of our judicialprocess. Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 Ill. 19, 41 (1921). It promotesevenhanded, predictable, and consistent legal development, fostersreliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the integrity of the courts.See Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 230 (2003), quoting Payne v.Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 736-37, 111 S. Ct.2597, 2609 (1991). But as the United States Supreme Court has recentlyreminded us, and the majority today notes, stare decisis is not aninexorable command. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. ___, ___, 156 L.Ed. 2d 508, 525, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003), overruling Bowers v.Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 92 L. Ed. 2d 140, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986);slip op. at 7.

"The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, anda contrary necessity marks its outer limit. *** Indeed, the veryconcept of the rule of law *** requires such continuity over timethat a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.[Citation.] At the other extreme, a different necessity wouldmake itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen soclearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reasondoomed." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699-700,112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992).

That is, stare decisis is not so static a concept that it binds our handsto do justice when we have made a mistake. See Neff v. George, 364 Ill.306, 309 (1936); People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 339 (2000) ("Ourmost important duty as justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, to which allother considerations are subordinate, is to reach the correct decisionunder the law"). We have repeatedly stated that a prior case may beoverruled only if there are compelling reasons or good cause to do so. SeePeople v. Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999); Heimgaertner v.Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co., 6 Ill. 2d 152, 166-67 (1955).Here, there are not only compelling reasons, but also the best cause toabandon Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61 (1988): it was incorrectlydecided.

Though I echo the arguments advanced in Justice Clark's forcefuland eloquent special concurrence in Dralle, I believe that the resolutionof this case can be distilled into a single, simple question: Is there aninjury? That is, did Mel and Sabrina Vitro suffer an injury of their ownwhen their daughter Dorothy became brain damaged as a result Dr.Mihelcic's alleged negligent management of Sabrina's labor and delivery?

We have recently reiterated that parents' interest in thecompanionship, care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps theoldest liberty interest protected by the federal and state constitutions. SeeWickham v. Byrne, 199 Ill. 2d 309, 316 (2002), citing Troxel v.Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000);Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 472 (2000) (" 'The history and cultureof Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for thenurture and upbringing of their children' "), quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 35, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1541 (1972).Today, parents go to great financial lengths to produce a child-frominfertility treatments to childbirth classes. Even normal childbirth hasbecome a more expensive proposition than it was a decade ago, with amarked increase in prenatal doctor visits, prenatal screening for birthdefects, and hospital costs. And the emotional toll on parents is greaterstill-from the decision to conceive to the stress associated with pregnancy.Parents still make these enormous commitments because the satisfaction,companionship, and joy that parents feel in raising a child into a happy,healthy adult is well worth the investment. See Cockrum v.Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 200 (1983), quoting Terrell v. Garcia,496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). Additionally, though parentssupport the child in infancy through majority and often beyond, they relyon the child to support them in their later years. In short, parents needchildren as parents age.

Because a child's society is beyond a doubt valuable, the injurysuffered by parents deprived of this society is beyond a doubt real-soreal, in fact, that we presume parents suffer pecuniary loss when a childdies. See Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517 (1984). The differencebetween losing a child's society to death and losing a child's society to apermanent injury is far more than a "difference which makes nodifference." Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 76 (Clark, J., specially concurring). Itis a difference with which we have justified a perverse punishment forparents purportedly fortunate enough to live with a child whosecompanionship they can no longer fully enjoy.

"[N]o meaningful distinction can be drawn between death andsevere injury where the effect on consortium is concerned.

Often death is separated from severe injury by mere fortuity;and it would be anomalous to distinguish between the two whenthe quality of consortium is negatively affected by both.

'It is easy to see that the loss of a child through his deathtakes from his parents the society and companionship that is theessence of the lost relationship. But consider the magnitude of theloss of society and companionship that occurs when a normal[child] is suddenly reduced to a blind, nearly deaf, partiallyparalyzed child with a mental age of three. The parentalexpectations for the continuation of the family relationship are thesame in either case. That the parents still have their son to loveand care for is a factor to consider in determining the extent oftheir loss, but does not negate the loss. They have sustained agenuine loss in the nature of the society and companionship theycan anticipate receiving from their son as a consequence of hisinjuries.

Perhaps the loss of companionship and society experiencedby the parents of a child permanently and severely injured ... isin some ways even greater than that suffered by parents of adeceased child. Not only has the normal family relationship beendestroyed, as when a child dies, but the parent also is confrontedwith his loss each time he is with his child and experiences againthe child's diminished capacity to give comfort, society andcompanionship.' " Frank v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228,230-31, 722 P.2d 955, 957-58 (1986), quoting S. Simpson,Note, The Parental Claim for Loss of Society andCompanionship Resulting From the Negligent Injury of aChild: A Proposal for Arizona, 1980 Ariz. St. L.J. 909, 923.

How can we justify sanctioning a damage claim in the death of a stillbornchild (see Seef v. Sutkus, 145 Ill. 2d 336, 338 (1991)), whom theparents will never even know, while barring a damage claim in the nonfatalinjury of a newborn child, whom the parents will come to know, live with,and suffer with for her or his entire life?

In this case, the Vitros' complaint alleges that Dorothy was renderedpermanently brain damaged by Dr. Mihelcic's negligence. Taking theseallegations as true, which we must do in the context of a section 2-615motion to dismiss (see Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482,490 (1996)), the Vitros will never be able to enjoy life experiences withDorothy too numerous to list that other parents can share with a child whois not disabled. When someone disrupts the parent-child relationship byintentionally or negligently injuring a child and, consequently, injuring theability of parents to enjoy fully the child's companionship, we should allowthe parents an opportunity to present a loss of society claim to a jury. SeeIll. Const. 1970, art. I,