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Docket No. 89963-Agenda 24-March 2001.

THE VILLAGE OF BLOOMINGDALE, Appellant, v. CDG ENTERPRISES, INC., Appellee.

Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

This case arises from the Village of Bloomingdale's denial ofa zoning petition submitted by CDG Enterprises, Inc., and presentstwo issues for our review. First, whether the Illinois Constitutionpermits imposition of the common law "corrupt or maliciousmotives" exception to certain immunities afforded by the LocalGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act(Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West1998)). Second, whether a claim for quasi-contract is proper undersection 2-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/2-101(a) (West 1998))and whether the counterplaintiff alleged sufficient facts for thiscourt to impose a quasi-contract remedy. For the reasons set forthbelow, we hold that the Illinois Constitution prohibits the insertionof the common law "corrupt or malicious motives" exception intothe immunities provided by the Act. In addition, we hold that,though section 2-101(a) of the Act, which preserves municipalliability for contract, does not contemplate the remedy of quasi-contract, the counterplaintiff has failed to sufficiently assert aclaim for that remedy. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, the Village of Bloomingdale (Village), sued CDGEnterprises, Inc. (CDG), in the circuit court of Du Page County,for breach of contract alleging that CDG had not paid for servicesthe Village had provided in reviewing its petition for rezoning andsite plan approval. CDG, as counterplaintiff, answered and filedtwo counterclaims, one for tortious interference with businessexpectancy and another for recovery under a quasi-contract theory.These counterclaims are at issue in this appeal.

In support of both counts, CDG alleged the following facts,which we will take as true for purposes of this appeal on theVillage's motion to dismiss. See Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 160, 161 (1997). CDG was thecontract purchaser of five parcels of land adjacent to the Villageof Bloomingdale. In March 1995, CDG petitioned the Village'splanning commission to annex the five parcels into the Village andrezone them so that CDG could build a subdivision. CDG'srepresentatives met with the Village's land planner and otherofficials, including the Village mayor, who allegedly told CDGthat the project would be approved. Between April and October1995, CDG repeatedly appeared before the Village planningcommission for public hearings on its petition.

CDG further stated that, in June or July 1995, the Villageallegedly: secretly formed a "task force" in order to pursue theacquisition and development of a golf course, which was adjacentto the five parcels; commissioned Planning Resources, Inc., theVillage's consultant in charge of reviewing CDG's petition, toprepare a plan to redesign the golf course so that some of the holeswould be on the property CDG intended to acquire; and secretlymet with other individuals to create opposition to CDG's plan. InAugust 1995, the Village planning commission voted downCDG's project, with the chairman allegedly pressuring othermembers to vote against it. Then, in October 1995, the Village'sboard of trustees voted down CDG's petition at a public hearing.Soon afterward, the Village publicly revealed that it planned toacquire the golf course, and later did so. In addition, one of theparcels was allegedly bought by individuals "closely aligned withcertain of the Village's officials." CDG has not claimed that theVillage itself acquired any of the five parcels which CDG hadintended to purchase.

CDG further alleged that its petition met all the Village'srequirements for rezoning and annexation; that CDG took all theaction the Village required; that CDG had spent heavily in relianceon its meetings with the Village; and that, after the Village deniedthe petition, CDG had to cancel its purchase contracts and forfeitsome of what it had paid. CDG's projected gross profits from theproject were $4.8 million.

Count I of the counterclaim alleged that the Villagedeliberately frustrated CDG's business expectancy by secretlyworking to force CDG out of the planned development. Whileostensibly reviewing CDG's petition, the Village allegedlyplanned all along to develop the adjoining golf course and helpcronies of certain Village officials purchase one of the five parcels.Count II alleged that, when CDG filed its rezoning petition andpaid the required fee, the Village became obligated through quasi-contract to process CDG's petition reasonably and in good faith,which it failed to do. CDG never stated what the Village or any ofits employees gained by their alleged misconduct. Both countssought in damages the projected gross profits of $4.8 million.

The Village moved to dismiss the counterclaims pursuant tosection 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code)(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)). It asserted sovereignimmunity based on various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act(see 745 ILCS 10/2-103, 2-104, 2-106, 2-109, 2-201, 2-205(West 1998)). The trial court dismissed the counterclaims, holdingthat both were barred by the Village's sovereign immunity underthe Act. The Village then voluntarily dismissed its complaint, andCDG appealed.

Before the appellate court, CDG argued that (1) the TortImmunity Act did not bar its counterclaims because the Act doesnot immunize governmental actions undertaken for "corrupt ormalicious motives"; and (2) the Act did not bar the second countfor quasi-contract because section 2-101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS10/2-101(a) (West 1998)) specifically preserves municipalliability based on contract.

The appellate court reversed the trial court and held thatCDG's tort claim could proceed under the Act. The court rejectedthe Village's affirmative defenses and held that the general grantsof immunity afforded by the Act are limited by the common lawexception for "corrupt or malicious motives." 314 Ill. App. 3d 210,214-15. The appellate court also reversed the trial court as to thesecond count and held that the Village could be held liable inquasi-contract to process CDG's petition in good faith andaccording to its usual procedures, and that that claim fell undersection 2-101(a) and was, therefore, not barred by the Act. 314 Ill.App. 3d at 215.

The Village appealed and we granted review of both issuesunder Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Since the trial courtdismissed CDG's counterclaim under section 2-619(a)(9) of theCode (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)), our review is denovo. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 386(1998).

ANALYSIS

I. The Tort Immunity Act

Traditionally, a governmental unit in Illinois was immunefrom tort liability pursuant to the common law doctrine ofsovereign immunity. In 1959, however, this court abolished thedoctrine in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302,18 Ill. 2d 11, 25 (1959). Then, in response to Molitor, thelegislature in 1965 enacted the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS10/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)). Under the Act, Illinois adopted thegeneral principle that local governmental units are liable in tort,but limited this liability with an extensive list of immunities basedon specific government functions. Burdinie v. Village of GlendaleHeights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 506 (1990). Finally, in 1970, the stateadopted a new constitution and with it a new provision regardingsovereign immunity. Article XIII, section 4, of the 1970Constitution states: "Except as the General Assembly may provideby law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished." Ill. Const.1970, art. XIII,