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Docket Nos. 89551, 89560 cons.-Agenda 18-March 2001.

JOHN STEINBRECHER et al., Appellants, v. ROSEMARY STEINBRECHER, Appellee.

Opinion filed September 27, 2001.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 1995, John Steinbrecher (John) filed suit underthe Illinois partition act (735 ILCS 5/17-101 et seq. (West 1994))against his two siblings, Jerome and Rosemary (Rosemary)Steinbrecher, to partition or sell three parcels of land located inKendall County. At the close of the partition trial, the circuit courtheld that each sibling held an undivided one-third interest astenants in common, but that the property could not be divided"without manifest prejudice." The circuit court ordered public saleof the entire property. Thereafter, the circuit court approved theoffer of the highest bidder, Moser Enterprises, Inc. (Moser);confirmed the sale to Moser in open court; and directed that thedeed be recorded in Moser's name. Rosemary never perfected amotion to stay judgment and filed her notice of appeal 49 daysafter the circuit court order. The appellate court determined thatRosemary's procedural errors did not bar her appeal. The appellatecourt vacated the sale of property to Moser and remanded to thecircuit court for further proceedings. 312 Ill. App. 3d 289. We nowreverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On January 21, 1991, Francis Steinbrecher died intestate,survived by his three children, John, Jerome, and Rosemary. Asheirs and beneficiaries of the estate of Francis Steinbrecher, John,Jerome, and Rosemary held title as tenants in common to threeseparate land parcels situated in Kendall County, totaling 409acres. In November 1995, John filed suit under the Illinoispartition act against Jerome and Rosemary in order to partition, orsell in the event partitioning was infeasible, the property.

In August 1996, pursuant to the partition act the trial courtappointed a real estate consultant as commissioner to "evaluate thefeasibility of partitioning" the property.⁽¹⁾ This commissionersurveyed the property and prepared a written"Appraisal/Commissioner Report" for the court.

At the partition trial in August 1997, consistent with hisreport, the commissioner testified that the property was incapableof equitable partition-in-kind between the three heirs. He statedthat the property consisted of three noncontiguous parcels withwidely varied characteristics. For example, the property containedfarmland and wooded acreage on a flood plane. Moreover, thelocation and man-made obstacles such as a railroad track, a countyroad, and a running creek, further prevented an equal three-waydivision of the property. Neither Jerome nor Rosemary presentedevidence to the trial court to refute the commissioner's testimony.

After reviewing the evidence, the trial court ruled that John,Jerome, and Rosemary each held an undivided one-third interestas tenants in common, that the property could not be dividedwithout manifest prejudice, and that the property should be sold ata public sale.

In 1998, the exclusive listing agent approved by the courtlisted the property for a price of $4.5 million. In August 1998,after the trial court was notified by the agent of three offers topurchase, the trial court approved the $3.5 million offer of thehighest bidder, Moser. In open court on September 24, 1998, thetrial court confirmed the sale, directed a quitclaim deed berecorded in Moser's name, and entered a Rule 304(a) finding (155Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) regarding the sale to Moser. Pursuant to the sale,monies were disbursed, including the IRS liens, marketing andadvertising fees, the mortgage, closing costs, and attorney fees.

On September 25, 1998, Rosemary filed a pro se "Motion forStay of Judgment Pending Appeal and Rehearing Re: Deposition"which she noticed for hearing on October 2, 1998. On October 2,the trial court continued the motion for hearing to October 30,1998. The trial court then addressed Rosemary:

"THE COURT: *** I told you a long time ago that I'mnot going to hear this thing every other day. Just becauseyou want to file a motion doesn't mean I'm going to hearit. I told you to file things once a month. We've set a datefor a motion sometime later in this month.

* * *

Now, yet, you continually file motions. You continuallyget the-the Clerk's office has to bring this file down here.The other attorney has to come in. He was here allmorning. And I've told you in the past I'm not going tohear this just because you want to file a motion and noticeit up on whatever day you want to notice it up. Now, I willhear the-everything you have, whatever it is, on the nextcourt date

* * *

Now if you do this again, I'm going to start imposingsanctions against you. We're not going to be disruptingeverybody's life simply because you want to file a motion,especially when I've given you a date in the future.

ROSEMARY: Your Honor, the date in the future hadnothing to do with this particular issue.

THE COURT: What difference does that make? It's[sic] court date where everybody is supposed to be here,correct? Do you think I'm going to sit here and haveeverybody come in here every day just because you wantto file a motion and you want to be heard on this daybecause you happen to be available?

ROSEMARY: I thought time might be of the essence,in fairness to the parties.

THE COURT: I doubt, in this case, time is of theessence to anybody. As I said, do it again and I'm goingto start imposing sanctions against you. Okay?"

On October 30, 35 days after the court's final judgment,Rosemary appeared for hearing on her stay of judgment motion.Additionally, Rosemary filed and presented for hearing a newmotion, entitled "Motion to Declare Void the Sale of Property toMoser Enterprises, Inc." The trial court denied Rosemary's motionto void the sale and denied Rosemary's motion to stay thejudgment. Rosemary never filed a motion with the appellate courtto stay the judgment.

Despite the September 24, 1998, order granting right, title,and interest to Moser, Rosemary refused to vacate the KendallCounty property. As a result, on October 30, 1998, Moser soughtleave to intervene for the limited purpose of "enforc[ing] its rightto possession." This was Moser's first appearance in the litigation.The trial court granted Moser's petition for leave to intervene,granted Moser's motion for possession, and ordered Rosemary tovacate the property on or before November 13, 1998.

On November 13, 49 days after Moser was granted exclusivepossession of the property, Rosemary filed a notice of appeal. Johnmoved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appellate courtlacked jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was untimely andbecause the appeal was moot pursuant to the protections affordedthird-party purchasers under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(j)(155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j)).

The appellate court held that procedural errors did not barRosemary's appeal because the threat of sanctions voiced by thetrial judge to Rosemary, a pro se litigant,⁽²⁾ "were confusing andlikely had the effect of keeping her from filing her motion" withinthe proper time period. 312 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297. By the term "hermotion" the appellate court referred to Rosemary's October 30,1998, "Motion to Declare Void the Sale," which it labeled a post-judgment motion. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297. According to theappellate court, the October 30 post-judgment motion served totoll the period for appeal such that the notice of appeal filed onNovember 13, 1998, was timely. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297.Additionally, the appellate court held that the issue was not mootbecause Moser's post-sale, post-judgment intervention on October30, 1998, barred the application of Rule 305(j) and any protectionit afforded nonparty purchasers. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297-98. Theappellate court then vacated the sale of the property and remandedfor further proceedings to determine, again, whether the propertycould be partitioned without manifest prejudice. 312 Ill. App. 3dat 305.

Following entry of the appellate court judgment, Mosermoved to intervene in order to file a petition for rehearing. OnApril 19, 2000, the appellate court granted Moser leave tointervene but denied its petition for rehearing. On May 24, 2000,Moser timely filed its petition for leave to appeal to this court. OnJuly 5, 2000, John timely filed his petition for leave to appeal tothis court. We granted the petitions and consolidated the appeals.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, John and Moser contend that theappellate court committed reversible error because it lackedjurisdiction due to Rosemary's failure to file a timely notice ofappeal. Rosemary filed her notice of appeal on November 13,1998, 49 days after the trial court entered its final judgment. Theycontend that the notice of appeal was untimely under Rule 303(a),and that her "Motion to Declare Void the Sale" filed on October30, 1998, did not toll the time to file her notice of appeal becauseit was also untimely under section 2-1203(a) of the Code of CivilProcedure (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a); 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West1998)). Moreover, they contend that even if the motion to voidwas timely, it did not toll the time to appeal because the motionwas an insufficient post-judgment motion under section2-1203(a). Anderson v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d342 (1990) (a post-judgment motion must include a request for atleast one form of relief specified in section 2-1203 and allegegrounds that warrant the relief); accord Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d232 (1991); but see Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d891 (1998) (holding that section 2-1203 does not requirespecificity despite judicial dictum stating to the contrary), vacated& appeal dismissed, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000).

It is a well-established proposition that jurisdiction only arisesin the appellate court when a party timely files a notice of appeal.Berg, 193 Ill. 2d at 189; Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103Ill. 2d 536, 538 (1984); 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. Under Rule 303(a),entitled "Appeals from Final Judgments of the Circuit Court inCivil Cases," a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days afterentry of a final judgment or within 30 days after the entry of anorder disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion. 155 Ill.2d R. 303(a). Section 2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedureaddresses the timing of the post-judgment motions referred to inRule 303(a). According to section 2-1203(a), "[i]n all cases triedwithout a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of thejudgment or within any further time the court may allow within the30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, ora retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgmentor for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 1998).

Whether Rosemary's notice of appeal was timely filed isdependent on whether her October 30, 1998, "Motion to DeclareVoid the Sale to Moser Enterprises, Inc." was a sufficient post-judgment motion under section 2-1203(a) of the Code of CivilProcedure, and whether Rosemary timely filed that motion. Onlya sufficient post-judgment motion, timely filed, will toll the 30-dayperiod for filing a notice of appeal.

In addressing these matters, the appellate court held thatRosemary's October 30 motion was essentially a motion toreconsider, which is a proper post-judgment motion under section2-1203. As to the timeliness of the October 30 motion, theappellate court held that under the circumstances of this case, themotion was timely and it thus served to toll the 30-day appealperiod. The appellate court explained that, although prose litigants are presumed to know the procedural rules, "when, ashere, a trial court threatens sanctions for the filing of motions,such a litigant must be given considerable leeway in meetingprocedural requirements." 312 Ill. App. 3d at 297.

We need not decide whether Rosemary's October 30 motionwas a proper motion under section 2-1203 or whether the trialjudge's egregious comments excuse Rosemary's failure to file hermotion within 30 days of the court's September 24, 1998, finalorder. Rather, we agree with John and Moser that Rosemary'sappeal is moot, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305(j), and thatjurisdiction is therefore lacking. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).

An appeal is moot when it involves no actual controversy orthe reviewing court cannot grant the complaining party effectualrelief. Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 133-34 (1945). Courts ofreview will generally not consider moot or abstract questionsbecause our jurisdiction is restricted to cases which present anactual controversy. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 162 Ill. 2d117, 130-31 (1994); People ex rel. Partee v. Murphy, 133 Ill. 2d402 (1990); Barnard, 392 Ill. at 133-34. If this court extendsMoser Rule 305(j) protection, the issue is moot and any judgmentor reversal by a reviewing court is without effect.

Pursuant to Rule 305(j), John and Moser argue that when thetrial court granted right, title, and interest to a nonparty onSeptember 24, 1998, and Rosemary failed to perfect a stay of thatjudgment, any order invalidating that judgment and sale is withouteffect. Whether Rule 305(j) renders this matter moot involves theapplication of law to undisputed facts. Therefore, our review is denovo. People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 204-05 (1999).

Rule 305(j) protects third-party purchasers of property fromappellate reversals or modifications of judgments regarding theproperty, absent a stay of judgment pending the appeal. Rule305(j) provides:

"If a stay is not perfected within the time for filing thenotice of appeal, or within any extension of time grantedunder subparagraph (c) of this rule, the reversal ormodification of the judgment does not affect the right,title, or interest of any person who is not a party to theaction in or to any real or personal property that isacquired after the judgment becomes final and before thejudgment is stayed; nor shall the reversal or modificationaffect any right of any person who is not a party to theaction under or by virtue of any certificate of sale issuedpursuant to a sale based on the judgment and before thejudgment is stayed." 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).

Thus, Rule 305(j) requires (1) the property passed pursuant to afinal judgment; (2) the right, title and interest of the propertypassed to a person or entity who is not part of the proceeding; and(3) the litigating party failed to perfect stay of judgment within thetime allowed for filing a notice of appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).⁽³⁾

We now apply those requirements to the instant case. First, onSeptember 24, 1998, the right, title and interest to the KendallCounty property passed pursuant to a final judgment. A finaljudgment disposes of the rights of the parties. In re Estate ofFrench, 166 Ill. 2d 95, 101 (1995). Particularly, the final judgment"decides the controversies between the parties on the merits andfixes their rights, so that, if the judgment is affirmed, nothingremains for the trial court to do but to proceed with its execution."In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127 (1982); see also Black's LawDictionary 847 (7th ed. 1999) (a final judgment is a "court's lastaction that settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issuesin controversy, except for the award of costs *** and enforcementof the judgment"). Where multiple parties are involved in thelitigation, a court may enter a final judgment pursuant to Rule304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). A Rule 304(a) finding renders ajudgment final, enforceable, and appealable.

In this case, all issues in controversy concerned thedisposition of the Kendall County property. The trial courtconfirmed the sale of that property, directed a quitclaim deed berecorded, and entered a Rule 304(a) finding regarding the sale onSeptember 24, 1998. Under Rule 304(a), this was a "finaljudgment" and therefore satisfies the first element of Rule 305(j).

Second, the property passed to a nonparty to the litigation,Moser. A party is defined as "[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuitis brought." Black's Law Dictionary 1144 (7th ed. 1999). Thisincludes a person who has a stake or standing in the lawsuit andone who is entitled to enforce rights from the final outcome of thelitigation. Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122Ill. 2d 462, 492-93 (1988).

Under Rule 305(j) a person or entity is deemed a nonparty atthe time of the judgment and sale. Its language compels thisconclusion. Specifically, in regard to minors or persons withdisabilities, the text provides that "[t]his paragraph applies even ifthe appellant is a minor or a person under legal disability or underduress at the time the judgment becomes final." 155 Ill. 2d R.305(j). Thus, the rule clearly evaluates and assigns status at thetime of the judgment and sale.

John initiated his partition claim in November 1995. OnSeptember 24, 1998, the trial court approved the offer, ordered thequitclaim deed entered in Moser's name, and entered a 304(a)finding. When Moser acquired title pursuant to the judgment andsale, and at all times prior, neither was it "[o]ne by or againstwhom a lawsuit is brought" nor did it have a stake or standing inthe partition lawsuit. Moser was a mere purchaser of the property.At the time of the judgment and sale, therefore, Moser was anonparty for purposes of Rule 305(j).

Consistent with the appellate court's opinion, Rosemarycontends that when Moser intervened in the circuit court onOctober 30, 1998, to secure its right to possession it became a"party" to the litigation and lost the protections afforded tononparty purchasers under Rule 305(j). We reject this argumentand hold that post-sale, post-judgment intervention does not barthe application of Rule 305(j). As discussed, status attaches at thetime of the sale and judgment. Stripping the protection of Rule305(j) because of subsequent efforts by a party to secure exclusivepossession of the property would render an absurd result. StateFarm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992)(whenever possible, this court shall avoid interpretations thatrender absurd or unjust results). Such a holding would denyrecourse to parties who in good faith purchase property pursuantto a judicial sale, but are unable to secure right to possession anduse of that property. This outcome would force parties to choosecourt intervention, and lose the protection of Rule 305(j), orengage in self-help to secure possession.

Finally, as required under Rule 305(j), Rosemary failed toperfect a stay of judgment in order to bar its application. A stay ofjudgment is collateral to the judgment and does not affect or alterthe issues on appeal. See In re Estate of Goodlett, 225 Ill. App. 3d581, 587 (1992). The Illinois Supreme Court rules provide cleardirection regarding stay of judgments and the recourse available inthe event a trial court denies a stay of judgment. Rule 305(d)authorizes litigants to make a motion in the reviewing court for astay of judgment following denial of the same motion by the trialcourt. 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(d). As noted by our appellate court, evenif the motion before the trial court was denied in error, therecourse remains unchanged, and the party must renew the motionin the appellate court. In re Estate of Bork, 145 Ill. App. 3d 920,930 (1986); Horvath v. Loesch, 87 Ill. App. 3d 615, 620 (1980).Rule 305 requires that a litigant must "show that application to thetrial court is not practical, or that the trial court has denied anapplication or has failed to afford the relief that the applicantrequested." 155 Ill. 2d R. 305(d). Moreover, under Rule 305(j), astay must be "perfected within the time for filing notice of appeal."155 Ill. 2d R. 305(j).

On October 2, 1998, Rosemary filed a "Motion for Stay ofJudgment Pending Appeal and Rehearing Re: Deposition." Thismotion was denied by the trial court on October 30, 1998.Contrary to the requirement in Rule 305(j), Rosemary neverrenewed her motion to stay in the reviewing court.⁽⁴⁾ Therefore,under Rule 305(j), Moser's rights in the Kendall County propertyare protected and the relief Rosemary sought-a judgment voidingthe sale to Moser-cannot be granted. Rather, her appeal is moot.

Rosemary's pro se status does not alter this result. Pro selitigants are presumed to have full knowledge of applicable courtrules and procedures, including procedural deadlines with respectto filing motions. See Domenella v. Domenella, 159 Ill. App. 3d862, 868 (1987) (construing Rule 303(a), holding that pro sedefendants must comply with the same rules of procedure aswould be required of litigants represented by an attorney).Moreover, despite Rosemary's pro se status, the record does notindicate that she was ignorant of court rules and procedures. Infact, the record shows that Rosemary litigated this matter,including the filing of motions, responses, and court appearances,for several years prior to the trial court's final judgment. Rule305(d) clearly explained her recourse following the dismissal ofher motion to stay in the trial court. This court cannot excuse herfailure to follow procedure in order to bar the application of Rule305(j).

Public policy of this state supports our conclusion. Illinois lawprotects the integrity and finality of property sales, includingjudicial sales. Dixon v. City National Bank, 81 Ill. 2d 429, 433(1980); Checkley & Co. v. Citizens National Bank, 43 Ill. 2d 347,350 (1969); Blancett v. Taylor, 6 Ill. 2d 434, 438 (1955); Shultz v.Milburn, 366 Ill. 400, 405 (1937); Levy v. Broadway-CarmenBuilding Corp., 366 Ill. 279, 282-83 (1937); Smith v. Herdlicka,323 Ill. 585, 592-93 (1926); Crist v. McCoy, 287 Ill. 641, 647(1919); Osmond v. Evans, 269 Ill. 278, 284 (1915); Conover v.Musgrave, 68 Ill. 58, 62 (1873). Indeed, it extends this protectionto purchasers who without notice at the time of the purchase buyin good faith. This finality and permanence is relied on by bothpurchasers and others in connection with the purchase of theproperty, including financial institutions, title insurers, realtors,and tenants. Absent this policy, no person would purchase realproperty involved in a judicial proceeding, if afterwards heincurred the hazard of losing the property due to facts unknown tohim at the time of the sale. A party may avoid the harshness of thisrule by complying with the procedural mechanisms available, suchas a motion to stay enforcement of the judgment and sale.

The dissent suggests that this court ignore the plain languageof Rule 305(j) and strong public policy favoring the finality andpermanence of judicial sales to address alleged proceduralirregularities occurring during the sale. This opinion declines toaddress or outline those irregularities because they are secondaryto Rule 305(j).

The dissent maintains that the trial court lacked authority toorder the sale because it failed to comply with the Act, and thatthis rendered the judgment "void." According to the dissent,failure to follow the Act is fatal to the circuit court's jurisdiction.The Act, the dissent argues, gives the circuit court the "inherentauthority"to adjudicate the controversy and, therefore, failure tofollow procedure under the Act divests the court of jurisdictionand renders the order "void." See slip op. at 26-28 (Freeman, J.,dissenting), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53 (1993); People v.Wade, 116 Ill. 2d 1 (1987); Peck v. Peck, 16 Ill. 2d 268 (1959);Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140 (1921); Woodward v. Ruel,355 Ill. 163 (1933); Maloney v. Dewey, 127 Ill. 395 (1889).According to the dissent, if the judgment is "void" Rule 305(j)would not apply.

The dissent mistakenly relies upon a rule of law not applicableto the present circumstances. The "inherent authority" requirementexisted before reform to the judicial system in 1964. EffectiveJanuary 1, 1964, the General Assembly amended article VI andreplaced limited jurisdiction: "Circuit Court[s] shall haveunlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters." Ill. Const.1870, art. VI,