Star Charters v. Figueroa
Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 88179
Docket No. 88179-Agenda 19-May 2000. STAR CHARTERS, Appellee, v. DAVID J. FIGUEROA et al., Opinion filed July 6, 2000. JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: The question presented by this appeal is whether adefendant's post-trial request for a setoff based on amounts paidin settlement by other defendants must be filed within 30 days ofthe entry of judgment. The answer is no. David J. Figueroa was injured when the bus in which he wasriding collided with two trucks. Figueroa filed suit against theoperators of each truck and against Star Charters, which operatedthe bus. Prior to trial, Figueroa reached court-approvedsettlements with the two truck operators for a total of $70,000.The case then proceeded to trial, resulting in a $200,000judgment for Figueroa. Two months after judgment was entered, Star Charters filedthis suit seeking to set off the $200,000 judgment by the $70,000already paid to Figueroa in settlement. The circuit court grantedthe requested setoff. The appellate court affirmed. No.1-98-4262 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).We allowed Figueroa's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2dR. 315(a). Figueroa contends that the circuit court had no authority toaward the setoff because Star Charters was required to file itsrequest for setoff within 30 days of the entry of judgment.Figueroa notes that section 2-1202 of the Code of CivilProcedure requires that post-trial motions be filed within 30 daysof the entry of judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 1996).Figueroa argues that a request for setoff is a post-trial motionsubject to this statutory time limit. Figueroa is incorrect. As recognized by nearly all of the appellate decisions whichhave addressed this issue, a defendant's request for setoff toreflect amounts paid by settling defendants seeks not to modify,but rather to satisfy, the judgment entered by the trial court. SeeCouch v. State Farm Insurance Co., 279 Ill. App. 3d 1050,1055 (1996); Klier v. Siegel, 200 Ill. App. 3d 121, 128 (1990);J.F. Equipment, Inc. v. Owatonna Manufacturing Co., 143 Ill.App. 3d 208, 221 (1986); Weaver v. Bolton, 61 Ill. App. 2d 98,105 (1965). Such a request does not arise as a result of trial, butis instead in the nature of a supplementary or enforcementproceeding within the inherent power of the judgment court.Because the request is not a motion directed against thejudgment, it is not subject to the 30-day time limit applicable topost-trial motions. The decision to the contrary by the FifthDistrict of the appellate court in Decker v. St. Mary's Hospital,266 Ill. App. 3d 523 (1994), is hereby overruled. The appellate court's judgment is affirmed. Affirmed. |