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Docket No. 94029-Agenda 12-March 2003.

DAVID J. SHIELDS, Appellant, v. THE JUDGES'
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed May 22, 2003.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, we are asked to decide whether a retired judgewhose pension benefits were forfeited as a result of a felonyconviction is entitled to a full refund of his contributions to theJudges' Retirement System (System) with no deduction forbenefits he received as an annuitant after his retirement. Weanswer that question in the affirmative.

BACKGROUND

David J. Shields began his judicial career in 1971 as amagistrate judge in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. In August ofthat year he elected to participate in the Judges' RetirementSystem. He made contributions in the form of salary deductionsuntil his retirement in November 1990. He began receivingretirement benefits of approximately $5,100 per month beginningin December 1990. Less than a week later, he was indicted by afederal grand jury on seven felony counts, including conspiracy,extortion, and making false statements of material fact to the FBI.He was tried, convicted on all seven counts, and sentenced to 37months in prison. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. SeeUnited States v. Shields, 999 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1993).

Shields continued to receive his retirement benefits until thedate of his conviction, March 2, 1992. The System then notifiedhim that his benefits would be terminated effective on that datepursuant to section 18-163 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40ILCS 5/18-163 (West 1992)). He had contributed $113,222 to theSystem and had received $75,349 in benefits. Although section18-163 of the Code provides that it "shall not operate to ***preclude the right to a refund," Shields did not immediately seeka refund of his contributions, as he intended to pursue an appealand the possibility of a pardon.

In December 1999, however, upon notification by the Systemthat he was entitled to a refund, he filed an application with theBoard of Trustees of the Judges' Retirement System (Board)seeking a full refund of all of his contributions together withinterest at 5% per annum from the date his benefits wereterminated. Relying on the informal opinion of a Special AttorneyGeneral, the Board determined that Shields was entitled to arefund of $37,873. That sum represented the excess of Shields'contributions over the benefits already paid. Shields appealed thatdetermination. The Board found that computation of the refundwas governed by section 18-129 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS5/18-129 (West 1992)). Subparagraphs (a) through (e) of thatsection deal with refunds due: (a) to a participant in the Systemwho ceases to be a judge before benefits are payable; (b) toparticipants who die in office; (c) to annuitants who die without aspouse or other beneficiary; (d) to participants or annuitants whosemarriages are terminated by death or dissolution; and (e) to theestate of the surviving spouse of an annuitant.

Subparagraphs (c), (d), and (e) of the section provide for a netrefund only after paid benefits are subtracted from contributions.Conversely, paragraphs (a) and (b) contain no limiting language.In fact, no provision in section 18-129 of the Code relates to anannuitant whose rights to benefits are terminated by forfeitureresulting from a felony conviction. The only specific statutoryreference to a refund is found in section 18-163 of the Code.Nevertheless, the Board reasoned that the statute should not beread to benefit an annuitant whose pension benefits are terminatedby a felony conviction over an annuitant whose benefits areterminated by death.

Finding that section 18-129(c) should apply, the Boarddenied Shields' appeal and ordered a refund in the amount of$37,873. No interest was awarded since section 18-129(c)specifically provides that refunds should be computed "withoutinterest."

Shields sought administrative review, and the circuit court ofCook County set aside the decision of the Board, finding thatShields was entitled to a full refund of all of his contributionstotaling $113,222.

The appellate court reversed, with one judge dissenting. 329Ill. App. 3d 27. We granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315),and we now reverse the appellate court.

ANALYSIS

There are no contested issues of fact presented by the record.Resolution of this case depends on the interpretation of thestatutory provisions governing a refund of contributions whereretirement annuity benefits are terminated because of a judge'sfelony conviction. This is a question of law. Therefore, our reviewof the Board's decision is de novo. City of Belvidere v. IllinoisState Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). As ageneral rule, courts will accord deference to the interpretation ofa statute by the agency charged with its administration. Anagency's interpretation is not binding, however, and will berejected when it is erroneous. City of Decatur v. AmericanFederation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268,122 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1988).

Section 18-163 of the Code provides as follows:

"Felony conviction. None of the benefits hereinprovided shall be paid to any person who is convicted ofany felony relating to or arising out of or in connectionwith his or her service as a judge.

This section shall not operate *** to preclude the rightto a refund.

All participants entering service subsequent to July 9,1955 are deemed to have consented to the provisions ofthis Section as a condition of participation." 40 ILCS5/18-163 (West 1992).

The section 18-163 reference to a refund is unconditional.However, since that section refers to a "refund" but does notfurther define that term, the Board looked to section 18-129 of theCode, dealing generally with refunds, to determine the amount ofany refund due to Shields. Section 18-129(a) of the Codeprovides, in pertinent part:

"A participant who ceases to be a judge may, uponapplication to the board, receive a refund of his or hertotal contributions to the system including thecontributions made towards the automatic increase inretirement annuity and contributions for the survivor'sannuity without interest, provided he or she is not thenimmediately eligible to receive a retirement annuity." 40ILCS 5/18-129(a) (West 1992).

Section 18-129(c) of the Code provides:

"Upon death of an annuitant, where no spouse or otherbeneficiaries eligible for an annuity survive, thedesignated beneficiary or estate shall receive a refund ofthe contributions made for the survivor's annuity, withoutinterest. If the annuitant received annuity payments in theaggregate less than his or her contributions for retirementannuity and the contributions towards the automaticincrease in the retirement annuity, the designatedbeneficiary or estate shall also be refunded the differencebetween the total of such contribution, excluding interest,and the sum of annuity payments made." 40 ILCS5/18-129(c) (West 1992).

Neither section describes the circumstances applicable toShields. Yet, even though Shields is alive, the Board appliedsection 18-129(c) because, as it reasoned in its written findings:

"To determine otherwise would mean that a member ofthe System who has retired and is receiving a retirementannuity and whose benefits are terminated as the result ofa felony conviction would receive more in benefits thana member of the System who has received a retirementannuity for the same length of time but whose benefits areterminated by death."

The appellate court agreed with this determination. 329 Ill.App. 3d at 34. The court reasoned that since section 18-163 of theCode did not prescribe a method for calculating the amount of anyrefund due, the intent of the legislature must be divined byresorting to the rules of statutory construction. The majorityconcluded that "the legislature intended to discourage malfeasanceby public officials and did not intend that a judge whose pensionterminates because of a felony forfeiture should be entitled underthe Pension Code both to retain annuity payments already receivedand to receive a refund of his or her total contributions." 329 Ill.App. 3d at 37.

Statutory construction requires courts to ascertain and giveeffect to the intent of the legislature. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198,211 (2002). Where statutory language is clear, it must be appliedas written; however, if the language is susceptible of more thanone interpretation, the court may look beyond the language toconsider the legislative purpose. Reda v. Advocate Health Care,199 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (2002). Legislative intent must be ascertainedfrom a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and theconsequences resulting from different constructions. Fumarolo v.Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990). Thelanguage of pension statutes must also be liberally construed infavor of the rights of the pensioner. Matsuda v. Cook CountyEmployees' & Officers' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill. 2d 360,365-66 (1997).

No case has yet addressed the precise issue presented here.Shields argues that some guidance may be found in Janata v.Police Pension Fund, 140 Ill. App. 3d 925 (1986). In that case, apolice chief appealed an order of the Police Pension Fund Boardallowing an officer terminated for a felony conviction arising outof his police duties to keep his pension benefits paid prior to hisconviction. The chief contended that no refund of the officer'scontributions should be made until the pension board firstdeducted the pension payments he received after he was indicted,but before he was convicted, because the forfeiture statutemandated repayment in such a case. The statute in question wasidentical to the one applicable to judges in the case before us. See40 ILCS 5/3-147 (West 2000).

The appellate court applied a plain language analysis inrejecting the police chief's contention, holding:

"The plain meaning of the statute in question is that amember of the pension fund who is convicted of a felonyshall thereafter receive no pension benefits, with only anentitlement to a refund of his contribution. The words'[n]one of the benefits *** shall be paid to any personwho is convicted' [citation] clearly and unambiguouslyfocus on the person's conviction as the time when thebenefits cease. A pension board acquires only suchpowers as are conferred on it by the statute, and there isno language in the statute before us which would permita pension board to halt payments before the conviction orto recoup payments made prior to that date. If thelegislature, as plaintiff suggests, had intended to authorizepension boards to cut off benefits as of the date of thecommission of the felony, it could have so stated."Janata, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 927.

Shields argues that the same result should obtain in his case. Hisbenefits were, in accordance with the statute, terminatedprospectively as of the date of his conviction. No language insection 18-163 of the Code authorizes a recoupment of benefitspaid prior to his conviction. Therefore, since the statute providesthat it shall not operate to preclude the right to a refund, hecontends that he is entitled to recover all of his contributions.

Janata was followed in People ex rel. Wright v. Board ofTrustees of the Teachers' Retirement System, 157 Ill. App. 3d 573(1987). In that case, a teacher received pension benefits after hisguilty plea to a federal felony and before the imposition ofsentence. He sued to prohibit the Teacher's Retirement SystemBoard from terminating his pension benefits pursuant to theapplicable felony forfeiture statute. The Board, in turn,counterclaimed for recoupment of the benefits paid after the guiltyplea. The trial court ruled against the plaintiff on his claim andalso dismissed the Board's counterclaim. The appellate courtaffirmed the dismissal, rejecting the Board's argument that sincethe paid benefits exceeded the plaintiff's contributions, it wasentitled to a recoupment of those benefits. Citing Janata withapproval, the court held that the trial court correctly concluded thatthe statute contains no provision for recoupment of funds paidprior to the plaintiff's conviction. Wright, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 579.

The Board argues that the opinion in Janata does not makeclear how to calculate the refund. If the refund consisted of thedifference between contributions made and benefits paid, theBoard concedes that the opinion is correct because no statutoryauthority exists to allow a recoupment of benefits from the amountalready offset. The opinion does not, however, set out the amountof the refund, nor does it state whether any deductions were takenfrom total contributions.

The Board argues that, unlike the circumstances in Wright, thebenefits received by Shields did not exceed his contributions andthe Board has not sought repayment of any benefits he receivedprior to his conviction.

The Board also refers us to Phelan v. Village of LaGrangePark Police Pension Fund, 327 Ill. App. 3d 527 (2001), decidedafter the appellate court decision in this case. The Phelan courtrelies on the reasoning of the appellate court in this case. Phelansimilarly held that the felony forfeiture section applicable to thePolice Pension Fund should not, as a matter of public policy, beconstrued to favor an officer whose benefits are terminated byfelony conviction over an officer whose benefits are terminated byseparation or death. Phelan, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 536. Phelan offersno further enlightenment on the issue.

Neither Janata nor Wright attempts to refine or limit the term"refund" as used in section 18-163 of the Code. We are notpersuaded that the Board's attempt to limit Shields' refund isjustified by resorting to the provision in the refund statuteapplicable to deceased annuitants. See 40 ILCS 5/18-129(c) (West1992). The terms of section 18-129 are clear and unambiguous.This section appears to express a comprehensive legislativescheme for the computation of refunds in various situationsinvolving system participants, annuitants and their beneficiaries orestates. No provision in section 18-129 of the Code pertains toannuitants whose benefits are subject to the felony forfeiturestatute. We will not presume that the legislature intended to definerights or procedures where the statute is silent on the subject. It isthe dominion of the legislature to enact laws and it is the provinceof the courts to construe those laws. We can neither restrict norenlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute. Petersen v.Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 448 (2002). Thus, we conclude thatsection 18-129 of the Code has no application to refunds dueannuitants whose benefits have been forfeited. Most importantly,we note that section 18-163 contains no limitation on the right toa refund. In other words, the right to the refund is unconditional.Accordingly, we will not impose any conditions that are notclearly required by the statutory language.

As we have noted, the Board concedes that, as held in Janataand Wright, the statute does not allow recoupment of benefits paidprior to conviction. However, if the Board were permitted todeduct Shield's benefits from his total contributions, it would, ineffect, be recouping benefits rightfully paid to Shields prior to hisconviction. That result would be incompatible with ourdetermination that the right to a refund is unconditional.

Although we have held that the purpose of the felonyforfeiture provision in the Code is "to discourage officialmalfeasance by denying the public servant convicted ofunfaithfulness to his trust the retirement benefits to which heotherwise would have been entitled" (Kerner v. State Employees'Retirement System, 72 Ill. 2d 507, 513 (1978)), the result we reachhere does not frustrate that purpose. Shields contributed $113,222of his own money to the pension fund. Since the forfeiture, he hasbeen denied benefits at the rate of approximately $5,000 per monthfor more than 11 years. That loss, now totaling over $600,000, willcontinue to grow until his death and the death of his spouse. Theimposition of such a penalty should have ample deterrent effect.Further, to adopt the Board's construction would be inconsistentwith our obligation to construe pension statutes liberally in favorof the pensioner. Matsuda, 178 Ill. 2d at 365-66.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court andaffirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW took no part in theconsideration or decision of this case.